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Socrates' last words are a microcosm of the riddle his character poses to the philosophical reader. Are they sincere or ironic? Do they represent an afterthought prompted by a belated sense of familial responsibility or a death–bed epiphany? Are we to determine their reference in relation to the surface logic of the Phaedo or take them as the sign of a concealed discursive depth? In what follows, I will argue that the answer to these questions depends upon acknowledgement and (...) clarification of the pedagogical challenge Socrates faces in conversation with Simmias and Cebes. What I have to say is prompted, in large measure, by Glenn Mosts recent article which both undertakes substantial analysis of the riddles treatment by the tradition and develops a plausible solution. I do not accept this solution. But the struggle to articulate my misgivings about his argument was indispensible to the development of my own. In view of this, it seems prudent to begin with a brief summary of the position he takes. (shrink)

In 1967, the American Geographical Society awarded Marston Bates with one of its highest honors, the Charles P. Daly medal. In giving this award, they noted that Marston Bates wears an almost bewildering variety of scholarly hats, and all of them become him. He is at one and the same time biologist, zoologist, medical ecologist, naturalist, humanist, and, unquestionably, also geographer manqué.... He possesses a gift of clear and literate exposition; his style displays a philosophic bent, an acuity of perception, (...) and a spark of humor that together make for delightful reading. Bates was an early bioethicist, in the sense that he was one of the first thinkers in the 20th century to... (shrink)

What makes a good leader? This paper takes Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues as the starting point for developing three leadership skills that are still relevant today: being on a mission, thinking in questions, and thinking like a beginner. I arrive at these Socratic leadership skills through an interdisciplinary approach to Plato’s early dialogues that puts Socrates in conversation with a diversity of thinkers: modern-day business leaders and leadership coaches, educators, Zen Buddhists, and art historians. I show that Socratic (...) leadership skills are valued in today’s business world, and I propose concrete exercises that can help anyone acquire these skills. In contrast to Platonic leadership—the leadership skills of the philosopher king—Socratic leadership skills have not been the focus of much investigation. This paper aims to advance a scholarly conversation about Socrates as a leadership model. (shrink)

The present paper discusses Grosseteste’s reception of Proclus’ Elements of Physics (EP) in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics VI. In the first section I examine the method with which Grosseteste reconstructs Aristotelian texts. The second section initiates a study of the way Grosseteste evaluates Proclus’ EP on the basis of this method. Thus, the third section brings out Grosseteste’s moderate criticism of Proclus’ treatment of certain Aristotelian conclusiones and assumptions. The fourth section extends this study to the conceptual relation between (...) contiguity, continuity and succession. Finally, Grosseteste’s evaluation of Proclus’ tendency to omit, divide and merge Aristotelian conclusiones is studied in the fifth section. I conclude that Grosseteste is a careful and moderately critical reader of Proclus. He aptly grasps the dependence of the EP on Physics VI and conceives of Proclus’ EP as a forerunner of his own method of reconstructing Aristotelian texts. (shrink)

This paper is one of the four interrelated action agenda papers resulting from the National Summit on Public Health Legal Preparedness convened in June 2007 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and multi-disciplinary partners. Each of the action agenda papers deals with one of the four core elements of legal preparedness: laws and legal authorities; competency in using those laws; coordination of law-based public health actions; and information. Options presented in this paper are for consideration by policymakers and (...) practitioners — in all jurisdictions and all relevant sectors and disciplines — with responsibilities for all-hazards emergency preparedness.One expert's framing of the mission of public health may help improve understanding of the range of hazards for which to be legally prepared. These hazards include urgent realities — such as chronic disease, injury, disabilities, conventional communicable diseases, and an aging and obese population — and urgent threats, such as pandemic influenza, natural disasters, and terrorism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Life and Character Socrates in Aristophanes' Clouds Plato's Apology of Socrates Socratic Method Moral Psychology Education and Politics Irony Xenophon Conclusion Bibliography.

DigiCat Publishing presents to you this special edition of "Socratic Discourses" by Plato, Xenophon. DigiCat Publishing considers every written word to be a legacy of humankind. Every DigiCat book has been carefully reproduced for republishing in a new modern format. The books are available in print, as well as ebooks. DigiCat hopes you will treat this work with the acknowledgment and passion it deserves as a classic of world literature.

In this paper I argue that in the digression in Plato’s Theaetetus godlikeness may be construed as Socrates’ ethical achievement, part and parcel of his art of mental mid­wifery. Although the philosophical life of contemplation and detachment from earthly affairs exemplifies the human ideal of godlikeness, Socrates’ godlikeness is an inferior but legitimate species of the genus. This is the case because Socratic godlikeness abides by the two requirements for godlikeness that Socrates sets forth in the digression: first, it is (...) a kind of escape from the phenomenal world; and second, it allows Socrates to become just and pious with wisdom. The crucial difference between Socrates and the philosopher that prevents the former from being as godlike as the latter is his epistemic barrenness, on account of which he cannot define the constitutive virtues of godlikeness, i.e., justice, piety, and wisdom. As a barren midwife of the intellect, Socrates practices godlikeness but does not have a philosophical understanding of its nature. Nevertheless, by extolling the life of the philosopher he urges others to aspire to what he can never attain, philosophical godlikeness. (shrink)

In the Phaedrus, Plato’s Socrates distinguishes himself from the natural scientists of his day and indicates that the true philosophical attitude, the love of realhuman wisdom, shares something essential with the mythical attitude. In the following essay, I argue that Socrates criticizes science here for its failure to attend to aporia, to recognize an essentially questionworthy aspect of the world of human experience, an aspect I will refer to as distance. Furthermore, I argue that Socrates aligns his own philosophical (...) activity with myth in its maintenance of this distance. (shrink)

With this volume all of the late Gregory Vlastos's papers on the philosophy of Socrates have appeared in their final form. As promised in the introduction to Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, this volume contains revised versions of four previously published essays and additional material. Readers of Vlastos's Platonic Studies and SIMP are aware of the elaborate genealogies of these works. These books, which lack cohesion and unity, are collections of independent articles: each is a closely focused study of a (...) central problem that undergoes several stages of development--lecture, journal article, response to criticisms of an article, and so forth. The present collection is taken from the same mold. In relation to SIMP this volume represents less a sequel than a prequel. The three major papers presented here in revised form--"The Socratic Elenchus," "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge," and "The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy"--were published earlier than all but one of the eight chapters of SIMP. Vlastos's original article on the elenchus was a classic like his great article on the Third Man Argument in the Parmenides : both spawned scholarly cottage-industries, and both have been superseded in important respects. Burnyeat notes in his editorial preface that this essay is the most revised, which appears to be true. However, Vlastos has not adequately responded to critics of his central claim that the elenchus can be used constructively to discover and confirm moral truths. The important nonconstructivist interpretation of Hugh Benson is not even mentioned. And the searching critiques by his fellow constructivists Richard Kraut and the team of Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith are addressed in rather piecemeal fashion. Nevertheless, it is useful to have the paper available in book form even with these minimal revisions. (shrink)

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This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Elenchus Differences of Structure Differences of Object Ironies Epictetan and Socratic Concluding Comparisons.

This chapter contains sections titled: Background, Sources Tradition Biography Teachings Conclusions.

Warum besteht Nietzsche so sehr auf der Hässlichkeit von Sokrates? Ist er nur grundlos gemein, wie es so oft behaupter wurde? Wäre es nicht denkbar, dass die Physiologie der Kunst dieser Hässlichkeit einen tiefen philosophischen Sinn verleiht? Dies ungeheure Unschönheit ist ein Mittel, die stets unfassbare Figur von Sokrates zu erfassen. Aus diesser Hässlichkeit, und nach der Entschlüsselung seines lezten Wortes: "Oh Kriton, ich bin dem Asklepios einen Hahn schuldig", das auch Nietzsche so sinnvoll erschien, werden wir die doppelte Gestalt (...) - griechisch/antigriechisch - der philosophischen Figur von Sokrates untersuchen, um die Rolle, die er in dem Verfall der griechischen Kultur gespielt hat, zu verstchen.Why is it that Nietzche insists so much upon Socrates' ugliness? Is it simply gratuitous hatred, as has often been argued? Are there not good grounds to believe that the physiology of art endows this ugliness with profound philosophical meaning? Heavily emphasized, the latter constitutes a valuable tool with which to gain an understanding of the nature of the ever evasive character that Socrates represents. It is from this ugliness, then, and by deciphering his mysterious last words, "Oh Crito I owe Asclepius a cock", so rich in meaning in Nietzsche's eyes, that we shall analyse the double Greek/anti-Greek status of the philosophical character Socrates - and in doing so - shed some light upon the role that he played in the decline of Greek culture. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Ancient Portraits Socratic Narratives and Other Ancient Images Summary Postantique Images Socrates as Wise Man Moralizing Tales The Death of Socrates Socrates and the Erotic Conclusion.

Although John Black Grant (1890-1962) is well known among historians of public health and an older generation of public health practitioners, he has not received the wider recognition that he deserves, especially as the solutions that he proposed to public health problems some 70 to 80 years ago still apply. Several factors inhibited Grant from being recognized as a public health leader. To begin with, the general policy of the Rockefeller Foundation's International Health Division (IHD), where he worked for more (...) than 40 years (1917-62), was that its employees should keep a low profile and not advertise their accomplishments. More importantly, the Foundation itself was unsure of Grant's place in their history, as .. (shrink)

L’hypothèse développée ici est que la « meilleure amie » évoquée par Socrate à la fin du chapitre n’est autre que son âme. L’exemple ainsi donné par Socrate de sa maîtrise de soi face à l’attrait exercé par une femme à la beauté « plus forte que les paroles » s’adresse non à cette dernière, mais aux assistants. On comprend ainsi pourquoi ce chapitre prend place dans une série d’entretiens où Socrate prodigue ses conseils à ceux qui « désirent les (...) belles choses » . Cette interprétation plaide en faveur de l’unité du livre III des Mémorables.The hypothesis exposed here is that the « better friend » called up by Socrates in the last sentence of the chapter is just his own soul. By giving a such example of self-control in face of an appealing woman whose beauty was « stronger than words », Socrates is not addressing this woman but his audience. We thus understand why this chapter is located in a series of conversations in which Socrates is giving advices to people who « desire beautiful things » . The thesis of the unity of Book III of Memorabilia is supported by this interpretation. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Socrates among the Pyrrhonists Socrates among the Academics.

This chapter contains sections titled: Exhortation, Refutation, and Examination Inquiry – Not Teaching The “What is x?” Question.

I emphasize four points: Socratic dialectic challenges the interlocutor not only to acquire the correct moral opinions, but to question and think for oneself and to develop one's own moral rationality; it involves anticipatory acts of several types of virtue: courage, moderation, and justice and concern for the common good as opposed to competition and jealousy; what is at stake is not only the topic of the particular exchange, but the opportunity for membership in a rational/educational community; and the fact (...) that Socrates' interlocutors typically reject the opportunity for moral insight and personal growth he makes available to them explains why he cannot be said to possess a techne of moral education, and why he insists that virtue cannot be taught. The process of education through the elenchus is not a matter of correct instruction, but of rational elicitation, which must be responded to by personal choice. Thus Socrates' principles may represent not only beliefs he has tested over many years of dialogue, but also values he has come to through participation in elenctic inquiry, the idealized extension of norms required by and created in the practice of dialectic. Socratic education involves the interlocutor in the confrontation with a self whose irrational attachments of appetite and ego are exposed and must be overcome for the interlocutor to experience catharsis. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Servant of Apollo The Daimonion Other Varieties of Religious Experience.

This chapter contains sections titled: Xenophon and the Socratic Question The Main Differences Between SocratesX and SocratesP SocratesX and Enkrateia Reworking of Socratic Themes on the Basis of Enkrateia Akrasia Enkrateia and Autarkeia One Socrates and Many.

For contemporary democrats, Socrates is a paradox: he is both the paragon of intellectual integrity and the archenemy of democracy. In this essay, the author attempts to navigate this paradox. By offering a revised account of the Socratic elenchus and an examination of Socrates’ objections to democracy, the author proposes a view according to which Socrates provides a compelling image of democracy citizenship. This image is then used to criticize and inform current versions of deliberative democracy.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Origins of Psychoanalysis Socrates as Interpreter and Socrates' Desire Socrates' Desire.

This chapter argues that SNL tends, with some exceptions, away from the philosophical and satirical areas of the spectrum and more towards the smart‐assical, silly side. Moreover, just like SNL sketches, Aristophanes' plays often subjected contemporary figures, celebrities, and politicians to intense ridicule. The sketch provided SNL a way of criticizing its own network by allowing the writers and actors to adopt a different persona, thus creating a safe distance between critic and target. Setting aside how accurately the scenario sketched (...) at the outset depicts typical SNL performances, it should be noted that it does paint a fair picture of staged satire in Athens, Greece, circa. As in the case of Aristophanes, most of SNL's satirical qualities revolve around political debates, issues, and, most famously, figures. (shrink)

Socrates’ inquiry into the nature of the virtues and human excellence led him to experience Socratic ignorance, a practical puzzlement experienced by his recognition that his central life commitments were conceptually problematic. This practical perplexity was not, however, an epistemic weakness but a reflection of his wisdom. I argue that Socratic ignorance, a concept that has not received scholarly attention in business ethics, is a central aim that business practitioners should seek. It is what a truthful, thorough, and courageous inquiry (...) into their professional roles and commitments leads to. It wakes them up from the moral complacency engendered by organizations, forcing them to become much more critical of their day-to-day activities and more intentional about living virtuously. It curbs the corrupting potential of authority positions and prevents the tendency of subordinates to routinely conform to sanctioned norms and expectations. Finally, it opens up novel and creative moral avenues and provides a promising model to deal with the conflicts posed by our globalized and increasingly polarized world. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Question and its Problems Facts and Evidence Euripides' Socrates A Paradox and its Solution.

In this article I argue (against the views of Russell Dancy and Gregory Vlastos, but in support of the views of R. E. Allen, Gail Fine, and Francesco Fronterotta) that Euthyphro 5c-d and 6d-e show that Socrates had a metaphysics, early version of the theory of forms. I disagree with Fronterotta only on the separation of the forms in the Euthyphro.

The Times Literary Supplement of November 8, 1917, contained, under the title of Socrates recognitns, a review of Plato's Biography of Socrates, a lecture delivered by Professor A. E. Taylor to the British Academy in the early part of last year. The opening sentence of the review is as follows: ‘Next to the problem of the Gospels ranks that of the Platonic dialogues amongst those most vital to the history of the human spirit.’ A little further down the reviewer (...) says: ‘It is much to the credit of British scholarship—and especially to that of the University of St. Andrews—that it should have attacked these problems with untiring energy, and propounded solutions which, although they run counter to most of the traditional tendencies of historical and philosophical criticism, have not only challenged attention, but are carrying conviction even to unlikely quarters.’ And again, at the end of the article, we read this passage: ‘It is scarcely to be thought that the ground won by the scholars of St. Andrews will be held without counter-attack; but this is slow to mature, and in the meanwhile such essays as the subject of this notice, with which we may couple the paper recently read to the British Academy by Professor Burnet on the Socratic doctrine of the soul, serve to buttress and consolidate the position.’. (shrink)

The Sophists, the Socratics and the Cynics had one important characteristic in common: they mainly used spoken natural language as their instrument of investigation, and they were more concerned to discover human nature in its various practical manifestations than the facts of the physical world. The Sophists are too often remembered merely as the opponents of Socrates and Plato. Rankin discusses what social needs prompted the development of their theories and provided a market for their teaching. Five prominent Sophists (...) – Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias and Thrasymachus – are looked at individually. The author discusses their origins, aims and arguments, and relates the issues they focussed on to debates apparent in contemporary literature. Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, first published in 1983, also traces the sophistic strand in Greek thought beyond the great barrier of Plato, emphasising continuity with the Cynics, and concludes with a look forward to Epicureans and Stoics. (shrink)

In this paper, I clarify and defend a provocative hypothesis offered by Bernard Williams, namely, that modern people are much more likely to speak in terms of master-concepts like “good” or “right,” and correspondingly less likely to think and speak in the pluralistic terms favored by certain Ancient societies. By conducting a close reading of the Platonic dialogues Charmides and Laches, I show that the figure of Socrates plays a key historical role in this conceptual shift. Once we understand that (...) our narrow, reductionist focus on “thin” ethical concepts is a contingent historical development, we are, I claim, in a much better position to evaluate it. (shrink)

Intellectualism about human virtue is the thesis that virtue is knowledge. Virtue intellectualists may be eliminative or reductive. If eliminative, they will eliminate our conventional vocabulary of virtue words-'virtue', 'piety', 'courage', etc.-and speak only of knowledge or wisdom. If reductive, they will continue to use the conventional virtue words but understand each of them as denoting nothing but a kind of knowledge (as opposed to, say, a capacity of some other part of the soul than the intellect, such as the (...) will or the appetites). Virtue intellectualists may be pluralists or monists. If pluralist, they identify the virtues with distinct kinds of knowledge. If monist, they identify all the virtues with one and the same kind of knowledge. In a number of dialogues-including the Euthyphro, Apology, Charmides, Euthydemus, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Republic I-Socrates gives arguments that support Reductive Monist Intellectualism (RMI) about human virtue. I disarm an influential objection to RMI as the correct interpretation of Socrates. (shrink)

The argument used by Socrates to refute the thesis that piety is what all the gods love is one of the most well known in the history of philosophy. Yet some fundamental points of interpretation have gone unnoticed. I will show that (i) the strategy of Socrates' argument refutes not only Euthyphro's theory of piety and such neighboring doctrines as cultural relativism and subjectivism, but nominalism in general; moreover, that (ii) the argument needs to assume much less than is generally (...) thought, and finally that (iii) while Socrates' argument, properly understood in its full force, appears to be inconsistent with the goal of his own inquiry, his own 'Platonic' position escapes the inconsistency. (shrink)

I propose an alternative interpretation of the Crito. The arguments that are typically taken to be Socrates’ primary arguments against escape are actually supplementary arguments that rely on what I call the Superiority Thesis, the thesis that the state and its citizens are members of a moral hierarchy where those below are tied by bonds of obligation to those above. I provide evidence that Socrates holds this thesis, demonstrate how it resolves a number of apparent difficulties and show why my (...) interpretation is preferable to competing interpretations. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to argue that Socrates is an intellectual character builder. We show that the Socratic Method, properly understood, is a tool for developing the intellectual character of students. It motivates agents towards the truth and helps them to develop the cognitive skills to gain knowledge of the truth. We further elucidate this proposal by comparing the Socratic Method, so understood, with the widely held contemporary view that the epistemic aim of education is the development of (...) the intellectual virtues. (shrink)

An undergraduate honors thesis, this work addresses the question of whether or not the historical Socrates is best understood as a sophist, the charge Plato seems most keen to refute. Using the evidence of both Plato's dialogues and other contemporary sources, this study assesses potential arguments regarding Socrates' identity, putting forward the position that Socrates is most accurately to be described not as a sophist but as a "sage" (Greek: sophos). Although the "sage" is a model drawn from the 6th (...) and 5th centuries BCE, this thesis argues that Socrates seeks to revive traditional Greek values and models of the "wise man" and that this conservatism is at the root of his misidentification as a sophist and, thus, his conflict with the restored democracy that tries him for impiety. (shrink)

When experimental participants are given the chance to reflect and revise their initial judgments in a dynamic conversational context, do their responses to philosophical scenarios differ from responses to those same scenarios presented in a traditional static survey? In three experiments comparing responses given in conversational contexts with responses to traditional static surveys, we find no consistent evidence that responses differ in these different formats. This aligns with recent findings that various manipulations of reflectiveness have no effect on participants’ judgments (...) about philosophical scenarios. Although we did not find a consistent quantitative effect of format (conversation vs. static survey), conversational experiments still provide qualitative insights into debates about how participants are understanding (or misunderstanding) the scenarios they read in experimental studies, whether they are replacing difficult questions with questions that are more easily answered, and how participants are imagining the scenarios they read in ways that differ from what is explicitly stated by experimenters. We argue that conversational experiments—"Socratic questionnaires"—help show what is going on “under the hood” of traditional survey designs in the experimental investigation of philosophical questions. (shrink)

Following R. E. Allen I argue, against the view of Gregory Vlastos that the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues was exclusively a moral philosopher, that there is a metaphysics, an early version of the theory of Forms, in the Euthyphro and other early dialogues. I respond to several of Vlastos's objections to this view.

Polus admires orators for the tyrannical power they have. However, Socrates argues that orators and tyrants lack power worth having: the ability to satisfy one's wishes or wants (boulēseis). He distinguishes wanting from thinking best, and grants that orators and tyrants do what they think best while denying that they do what they want. His account is often thought to involve two conflicting requirements: wants must be attributable to the wanter from their own perspective (to count as their desires), but (...) wants must also be directed at objects that are genuinely good (in order for failure to satisfy them to matter). We offer an account of wanting as reflective, coherent desire, which allows Socrates to satisfy both desiderata. We then explain why he thinks that orators and tyrants want to act justly, though they do greater injustices than anyone else and so frustrate their own wants more than anyone else. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Who or What is Refuted? Can Propositions Be Proven? What Is There That a Midwife Can Know Elenctically? What Is There To Be Known in the Apology? What Is There To Be Known in the Other Early Dialogues? Truth at the End of the Gorgias Conclusion.

Aristotle holds that it was Socrates who first made frequent, systematic use of epagôgç in his elenctic investigations of various definitions of the virtues . Plato and Xenophon also target epagôgç as an innovative, distinguishing mark of Socratic methodology when they have Socrates' interlocutors complain that Socrates prattles on far too much about "his favorite topic" —blacksmiths, cobblers, cooks, physicians, and other such tiresome craftspeople—in order to generate and test general principles concerning the alleged craft of virtue. It is remarkable, (...) then, how little secondary literature exists on this subject—moreover, several of the few accounts we do have naively assume that epagôgç is the same as modern inductive generalization. Others are in conflict as to whether, for example, we can find any legitimate instances of probabilistic inductive epagôgç in the Socratic dialogues. This paper addresses these and other issues by offering a new, critical account of Socratic epagôgç—one tied to its occurrences in several key Socratic elenchoi. (shrink)

This essay examines the first stage of the positive part of the Socratic education in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, whose subject is moderation concerning the gods. This stage of the Socratic education investigates whether providential gods exist and whether it ismoderate to be pious. Socrates does not accept either one of the two teleological sarguments in favour of the existence of providential gods that he advances in the Memorabilia. Instead, he holds that human beings cannot know whether or not the (...) gods exist, and moderation refers to the manner in which Socrates deems it reasonable to proceed in light of this uncertainty. Socrates suggests that the smoderate alternative to piety is justice, and this essay concludes by considering why justice is moderate but piety is not. (shrink)

This four volume set is a collection of some of the most significant scholarship published on the philosophy of Socrates in the last half century. The contributors include many of the most prominent scholars in this field. As the growth in Socratic studies in the past three decades is due in large part to the influential work of Gregory Vlastos, articles by him figure prominently in the collection, and works by other authors are generally related to his work. The (...) volumes deal with different areas of Socratic thought. The first volume begins with the question whether and to what degree we can discern a distinctive philosophy of Socrates in the ancient sources. The second volume deals with the trial of Socrates and the philosophical issues that arise from it. The third volume considers the philosophical methodology of Socrates and the fourth his moral philosophy. This collection shares some material with earlier collections on the philosophy of Socrates, but it is more extensive and up-to-date. Unlike other collections, which may offer the reader only a single article on a given topic, this collection offers a conversation in-depth. The reader can thus get a sense of the dimensions of the scholarly debate on these central issues in the philosophy of Socrates. No collection can be complete, but this aims at a representative portrait of Socratic studies in the last fifty years. (shrink)

In this section-by-section commentary, Benardete argues that Plato's _Republic_ is a holistic analysis of the beautiful, the good, and the just. This book provides a fresh interpretation of the _Republic_ and a new understanding of philosophy as practiced by Plato and Socrates. "Cryptic allusions, startling paradoxes, new questions... all work to give brilliant new insights into the Platonic text."—Arlene W. Saxonhouse, _Political Theory_.