Gli autori intendono proporre le premesse necessarie al chiarimento del rapporto, incerto e da sempre dibattuto, che lega architettura e filosofia attraverso il riferimento al concetto di “Filosofia architettonica” proposto da Peter Eisenman. Una prima premessa riguarda le varie tipologie di approccio alla filosofia riscontrabili nel campo dell’architettura, fino a delineare una forma di consapevolezza filosofica nell’architettura contemporanea. La seconda premessa riguarda la possibilità di spiegare il rapporto tra filosofia e architettura attraverso i casi (...) di collaborazione concreta tra architetti e filosofi. (shrink)

Chora L Works documents the unprecedented collaboration, initiated in 1985, between philosopher Jacques Derrida and architect Peter Eisenman on a project for the Parc de la Villette in Paris. Woven into the volume are discussion transcripts, candid correspondence, and essays, as well as sketches, presentation drawings, and models. Derrida and Eisenman's design process was guided by Plato's chora text from the Timeaus; their unique reciprocal relationship was an interchange - and transformation - of voices.

A presentation of writings by and about Peter Eisenman, arguably the most significant architect working today. The book analyzes the whole spectrum of subjects covered in the architect/philosopher's oeuvre. Seminal texts are included that show how his theories have developed over time.

Essais sur l'architecture par l'architecte Eisenman.

Peter Eisenman is known internationally for his innovative and provocative architecture and writings. One of the "New York Five," he has been a leading figure in the architectural community for many years, as teacher, as founder and former director of the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, and as builder. This long-awaited book is a rich and complex investigation of his first six houses, which he calls "Houses of Cards" and specifically about House IV and House VI. In (...) these houses, Eisenman has tried to strip architecture of its traditional meanings and associations, making the planes, walls, and elements of the houses as valueless as an arrangement of playing cards. This book contains the architect's own texts on House IV and House VI, which he wrote in 1974, and 1976, as they were being designed, as well as an overview in which he places these houses in the context of his work as a whole. In his essay Manfredo Tafuri offers a psychological perspective; in hers Rosalind Krauss provides cultural and historical contexts. The book is profusely illustrated with sketches, diagrams, and photographs. In some ways, the book itself becomes a new project--somewhat of a metaphor for Eisenman's new approach to architecture--layered with "absences and presences," a complex fiction. (shrink)

Essays and detailed descriptions are built along a central axis tracing Eisenman's career. Project profiles are organized according to their "generating motif": the interiority of architecture, or projects generated by the internal forces of shapes and forms; and the exteriority of architecture, projects governed by external forces such as site and scientific process.

Anhand ausgewählter Bauten von Le Corbusier, Alvar Aalto, Frank Lloyd Wright und Giuseppe Terragni analysiert Peter Eisenman die Merkmale allgemeiner und spezifischer Form, deren Zusammenspiel er als Grundlage architektonischer Erfindung und Komposition ausweist. Gleichzeitig wird in seiner Studie der Ausgangspunkt des theoretischen und praktischen Werks von Peter Eisenman erkennbar..

In 1963 at the University of Cambridge, Peter Eisenman -- world famous for his Holocaust Memorial in Berlin (2005) and respected and feared by his colleagues for his intellectual acuity and quick-wittedness -- wrote a dissertation on the formal basis of modern architecture. This striking document, with its idiosyncratic photographs, fully deserves to be published here, for the first time, in a faithful reproduction of the original. In an afterword, Peter Eisenman discusses this remarkable starting point (...) of his practical and theoretical work. (shrink)

Uses the architectural design of a house to show the principles of structuralism and a possible reaction against traditional functionalism.

Intensive relations between philosophical deconstruction and architecture, which were present in the late 1980s and early 1990s, belong to the past and therefore can be described with greater objectivity. Within these relations three basic variations can be distinguished: -/- the first one, in which philosophy of deconstruction deals with architectural terms but does not interfere with real architecture. In this version of the account, philosophy explored the architectural metaphors used by philosophers, but ignored real architecture. This stage was a shaky (...) balance between pure philosophy and the philosophical concepts of architects; -/- the second one, in which a collaboration between Jacques Derrida and a group of architects interested in his concepts is commenced. The philosopher managed to impose on Eisenman and Tschumi the subject of the philosophy of chôra. In addition to working directly with the philosopher, both architects introduced in their publications many concepts that developed the philosophy of deconstruction; -/- and the third one, in which completed or only designed objects or new concepts of deconstruction created by architects gain their supremacy over philosophy. A special feature of this stage of the account was the contribution of architectural works to philosophy. A situation has arisen where works of art are primarily of value as philosophical statements. -/- The following book analyses these three possible ways, first of all with the reference to Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi. -/- . (shrink)

La dimension artistique du mémorial de Peter Eisenmann a été peu considérée. A la croisée de l'architecture et de la sculpture, il convient d'étudier sa dimension urbaine et de relever son identité comme monument in situ. Les réflexions du philosophe Derrida sur le déconstructivisme architectural, notamment de Libeskind, sont capitales. Comme le dit Habermas, son défenseur majeur, le monument s'adresse aux descendants allemands des bourreaux. Notre essai propose une lecture adornienne du mémorial qui dépend de l'art abstrait et de (...) sa métexis aux ténèbres. Le mutisme du mémorial implique une réflexion sur les questions de l'infigurable et de l'ineffable concernant la Shoah. Si le sens de l'oeuvre semble être absent, cela peut s'expliquer par la déclaration de Ruth Klüger, selon laquelle l'extermination des juifs par les nazis est un non-sens absolu. Le monument invite à ouvrir le champ de la mémoire et contient un avertissement : l'autodestruction de l'espèce humaine. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

O texto discute algumas perspectivas educacionais em torno do ensino da filosofia, partindo do caráter eminentemente pedagógico da filosofia e filosófico da educação.

Basandomi su (Harvey 2012) argomenterò che la struttura architettonica della città deve seguire un determinato modello morale: gli edifici devono adattarsi alla persone e alle loro esigenze, e non il contrario. Definita la città come un particolare tipo di oggetto sociale, difenderò la tesi della possibilità di cambiamento “qui e ora” delle strutture architettoniche delle città sulla base del modello che, come mostra (Sudjic 2011), è attualmente ribaltato in una situazione in cui gli agglomerati urbani seguono sostanzialmente una struttura che (...) sposa le sole esigenze dei costruttori. Una volta argomentato che la città deve tenere conto degli interessi di tutti, modificando di continuo le proprie strutture, mi baserò su (Frau 2009) per sostenere che la città deve anche trasformarsi in un luogo in cui anche i “ diversi” (malati mentali, ecc.) trovano un loro spazio non dissimile da chi è definito “normale”. (shrink)

The systematic relevance of the arguments Schopenhauer directs against Kant's categorical imperative has hardly been discussed in detail so far. As the difference between Kant's and Schopenhauer's moral philosophy amounts to the opposition between practical reason and sympathy, it is anything but surprising that it is reflected by Schopenhauer's objections. Schopenhauer tries to show that practical reason - be it in its pure or empirical form - is altogether incapable of furnishing a solid basis for ethics. To assess the import (...) of this thesis, a detailed examination of the aspects of practical reason that provoke Schopenhauer's critique is necessary including: 1) the identification of morality and reason; 2) the moral value of maxims; 3) the categorical imperative; 4) the prescriptive character of Kant's approach; and 5) his ethico-theology. Although some of Schopenhauer's arguments are based on misunderstanding, his interpretation of the categorical imperative as an expression of rational egoism seems convincing. /// A relevância sistemática dos argumentos que Schopenhauer dirige contra a doutrina kantiana do Imperativo Categórico quase não tern sido objecto de discussão. O autor do presente artigo considera que tal como a diferença entre a filosofia moral de Kant e de Schopenhauer se reduz à oposição entre razão e simpatia, não é motivo de surpresa verificar que ela está reflectida nas objecções de Schopenhauer. Este, com efeito, tenta mostrar que a razão prática - seja isso na sua forma pura ou na sua forma empírica - é totalmente incapaz de fornecer uma base sólida para a ética. Em ordem a captar a importância desta tese, o artigo propõe um exame detalhado dos aspectos da razão prática que suscitam a crítica de Schopenhauer, entre os quais se inclui necessariamente: 1) a identificação de moralidade e razão; 2) o valor moral das máximas; 3) o imperativo categórico; 4) o carácter prescriptivo da abordagem kantiana; e 5) a sua teologia ética. Muito embora alguns dos argumentos de Schopenhauer estejam baseados numa compreensão deficiente, o autor do artigo defende que a sua interpretação do imperativo categórico enquanto expressão de uma forma racional de egoismo parece convincente. (shrink)

O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...) superior de conhecimento é possível, bem como com as daqueles que rejeitam algum ou ambos os conjuntos em 1). Em outras palavras, o infinitismo nem endossa, nem rejeita o ceticismo, tomando-se essa tese como sendo aquela segundo a qual nós não possuímos conhecimento naquelas situações que nos parecem cognoscíveis. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Certeza. Coerentismo. Fundacionismo. Infinitismo. Pirronismo. Regresso epistêmico. ABSTRACT The purpose of the paper is to show how robust accounts of justification and certainty can be developed within infinitism. First, I explain how the infinitist conception of epistemic justification differs from both the foundationalist and coherentist conceptions. Second, I explain how the infinitist can provide a solution to the epistemic regress problem. Third, I explain how infinitism, per se, is compatible with both the views of those who hold 1) that knowledge requires certainty and that such high-grade knowledge is possible as well as those who deny either or both conjuncts in 1). In other words, infinitism neither endorses nor rejects skepticism, taking that view to mean that we do not have knowledge in those areas commonly thought to be within our ken. KEY WORDS – Certainty. Coherentism. Foundationalism. Infinitism. Pyrrhonism. Epistemic regress. (shrink)

L'analisi dell'aristotelismo «platonizzante» nell'ambito della filosofia araba prima della sistemazione della Shifa di Avicenna, secondo cui Dio non avrebbe conoscenza dei particolari, consente all'A. di dimostrare come ci siano stati anche approcci platonici ad Aristotele , che non sono passati attraverso il filtro dei neoplatonici greci. L'altra cosa significativa è il fatto che all'interno della scuola di Baghdad vi sono modi diversi di intendere lo stato ontologico degli universali. L'A. tenta anche di ridimensionare la figura di al-Farabi all'interno della (...) scuola di Baghdad. I filosofi considerati sono al-Farabi, Yahya b. Adi e Ibn al-Tayyib. (shrink)

Il saggio intende mostrare l’irriducibile articolazione tra etica ed estetica quale condizione dell’esperienza architettonica, tanto della sua produzione quanto della sua fruizione. Per questo è necessario decostruire la tradizione classica nella quale la dimensione estetica dell’architettura è abitualmente ridotta alla ricerca di ordine, misura e proporzione. Da un punto di vista fenomenologico, la dimensione estetica di un’opera architettonica ha a che fare con un’esperienza dello spazio emotiva, sensibile, che presuppone lo spazio quale elemento del nostro abitare sulla terra, e cioè, (...) seguendo Heidegger, quale condizione irriducibile del nostro ethos. L’autore ricorre all’esempio del Mémorial des Déportés di Parigi per mostrare le radici etiche dell’esperienza esistenziale dell’architettura. In questa prospettiva, l’autore richiama l’eredità di Henry Maldinay, con particolare attenzione ai contributi di quest’ultimo alle attività della rete francese PhilAU (Philosophie, Architecture, Urbain). (shrink)

It is exceedingly frequent for people to speak of the ‘passing of time’. We do not, on the other hand, speak of the ‘passing of space’. There do not seem to be any common locutions concerning spatial passage analogous to those of time’s assumed passage. Further, there is a long held belief in the philosophy of time that there is no spatial analogue of the passage of time. This opinion does not take into account circumstances that cannot be noticed in (...) day-to-day existence and which indicate that there is such a spatial analogue. (shrink)

‘Drawing Metaphysical Consequences from a T-theory’. Pubblicato come quarto capitolo di Semantics, Tense, and Time: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language, Cambridge, Massachussetts, MIT Press, 1999. Per gentile concessione dell’autore e dell’editore. Traduzione italiana di Carlotta Pavese. L’idea che lo studio del linguaggio possa illuminare certe questioni metafisiche ha radici lontane nella storia della filosofia. Questa assunzione sembra già operante ai tempi del filosofo pre-soc...

This paper explores the relationship between social and individual phenomena, advocating for a form of analytical individualism that incorporates both ontological and explanatory holism. The first part of the paper addresses foundational ontological questions, arguing for the reduction of social facts to individual behaviors without equating them in identity. In the second part, the discussion focuses on collective intentionality, particularly through a critical examination of John Searle’s account. I argue that while collective intentionality offers useful insights into the nature of (...) social institutions, it faces principled limitations when applied to broader social phenomena. The paper ultimately supports a non-identifying reductive individualism, which recognizes the social as grounded in individual actions while avoiding simplistic reductions. This approach, I contend, provides a more coherent framework for understanding the complex interaction between individual and social processes, as well as the ontological status of social facts. (shrink)

The following reflections are intended as a preliminary to a more extended and in-depth series of case studies, focused analyses of actual artworks, and the issues arising from their particularity within what will be described here as a Heideggerian post-aesthetic aesthetics. The essay is not written from the perspective of a professional or academic philosopher or of a practising artist (even though I am one), neither fields of which have sufficiently engaged with the existential and aesthetic predicament sketched out below. (...) Thus, the attraction of both Heidegger and Blanchot is not just related to their well-known discussions of inbetween-ness, but, more essentially, to the peculiarly in-between location of their own thought and trajectory of thinking: Heidegger from "out of" philosophy "drawn" towards art; Blanchot from within the space ofliterature towards the exteriority of ontological thinking. The intention is to identify similarities and differences in their thought, but this is only perceived as relevant to the extent that it allows an initial reassessment of a de-subjectivized existential and aesthetic mode of thinking that has been largely abandoned by academic philosophy and art practice alike (albeit for very different reasons). If nothing else, the hope is that a different voice might be heard in the clamorous exchange between philosopher and artists, one that is sensitive to the complex predicament of the artist in a post-Heidegerrian world, and which above all remains faithful to the project of the artist and the artwork in the face of the philosophical valorization of "Art". Las siguientes reflexiones se presentan como preliminares a una serie de estudios de caso mas extensos y profundos, analisis focalizados de obras de artes reales, y los temas que surgen de sus particularidades dentro de lo que se describira aqui como una estetica heideggeriana post-estetica. El ensayo no esta escrito desde la perspectiva de un filosofo profesional o academico ni de un artista operante (aunque yo lo soy), ninguno de cuyos campos se ha comprometido suficientemente con el dilema bosquejado mas adelante. Asi pues, la atraccion de Heidegger y Blanchot no solo tiene que ver con sus bien conocidas discusiones sobre la inbetween-ness, sino, mas esencialmente, con la ubicacion particularmente in-between de su propio pensamiento y trayectoria del pensar: Heidegger desde "fuera de" la filosofia "sacado" hacia el arte; Blanchot desde dentro del espacio de la literatura hacia la exterioridad del pensar ontologico. La intencion es identificar similitudes y diferencias en su pensamiento, pero esto solo es percibido como relevante en la medida en que permite una reevaluacion de un modo de pensar existencial y estetico des-subjetivado, que ha sido ampliamente abando-nado por la filosofia academica y la practica del arte (aunque por razones distintas). Sin mas pretensiones, la esperanza es que se pueda escuchar una voz diferente en el intercambio clamoroso entre el filosofo y los artistas; voz que es sensible al complejo dilema del artista en un mundo post-heideggeriano, y que sobre todo permanece fiel al proyecto del artista y a la obra de arte frente a la valorizacion filosofica del "Arte". (shrink)

Desde su publicación a principios de 2014 los Cuadernos negros de Martin Heidegger incitaron a un debate tanto en la academia como en la esfera intelectual pública. Supuestamente estos cuadernos ponen en evidencia cómo Heidegger comulgaba con el antisemitismo y el nacionalsocialismo. A partir del análisis elaborado por David Nirenberg en su libro Antijudaísmo: la tradición occidental, se discute si el referente del antijudaísmo representa un fenómeno real o si el antijudaísmo es una visión del mundo en donde el significado (...) de “los judíos” representa una función en la autocomprensión de aquellos que hablan de “judío” o “ser judío”, sin que este significado posea un referente real. Aquello que aquí se denomina ‘referencia real o fáctica’ representa un problema constante para la filosofía. Si ésta tuviera siempre que remitirse a algo real, sería entonces una ciencia particular como la biología. El “objeto” de la filosofía parece ser, no obstante, un problema filosófico. Por ello, en este caso se trata llanamente de la cuestión de si el discurso filosófico de Heidegger en los Cuadernos negros se corresponde o no con algo del mundo. Se trata, en pocas palabras, de definir el tipo de antisemitismo que se expresa en los Cuadernos negros. (shrink)

Entrevista a Peter Trawny por Soraya Guimarães Hoepfner.

This paper discusses and criticizes Joseph Nye’s account of soft power. First, we set the stage and make some general remarks about the notion of social power. In the main part of this paper we offer a detailed critical discussion of Nye’s conception of soft power. We conclude that it is too unclear and confused to be of much analytical use. However, despite this failure, Nye is aiming at explaining an important but also neglected form of social power: the power (...) to influence the will and not just the behavior of other agents. In the last part of this paper we briefly discuss Steven Lukes’ alternative view of a “third dimension” of power and end with a sketch of a more promising way to account for this neglected form of power. (shrink)

Does evolutionary theory have the potential to undermine morality? In his book The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce (2006) argues for a positive answer. He contends that an evolutionary account of morality would undermine moral judgements and lend support to moral scepticism. I offer a critique of Joyce’s argument. As it turns out, his case can be read in two different ways. It could be construed as an argument to establish a general scepticism about the justification of moral judgements. Or (...) it could be read as an argument that targets only a particular meta-ethical position, namely moral realism. My claim is that it fails on both interpretations. There is no reason to believe that evolutionary considerations undermine morality. (shrink)