We think we know how to appreciate wine—trained connoisseurs take dainty sips in sterile rooms and provide ratings based on objective knowledge and technical expertise. In Epistenology, Nicola Perullo vigorously challenges this approach, arguing that it is the enjoyment of drinking wine as an active and participatory experience that matters. Perullo argues that wine comes to life not in the abstract space of the professional tasting but in the real world of shared experiences; wines can change (...) in these encounters, and drinkers along with them. Just as a winemaker is not simply a producer but a nurturer, a wine is fully known only through an encounter among a group of drinkers in a specific place and time. Wine is not an object to analyze but an experience to make, creatively opening up new perceptual possibilities for settings, cuisines, and companions. The result of more than twenty years of research and practical engagement, Epistenology presents a new paradigm for the enjoyment of wine and through it a philosophy based on participatory and relational knowledge. This model suggests a profound shift—not knowledge about but with wine. Interweaving philosophical arguments with personal reflections and literary examples, this book is a journey with wine that shows how it makes life more creative and free. (shrink)

Whatever societies accept as "knowledge" is embedded in specific epistemological, political and economic power relations. How is knowledge produced and functionalized? What is the difference between knowledge and the sciences? Can there be science without universal truth claims? Questions like these, all of them highly relevant, are discussed in twelve essays from the perspective of Sociology, Law, Cultural Studies and the Humanities.

Genia Schönbaumsfeld argues that Cartesian skepticism is an illusion induced by the “Cartesian Picture” of perceptual knowledge, in which knowledge of the “external world” depends on an inference from how things subjectively seem to one to how they actually are. To show its incoherence, she draws on the work of John McDowell, which she sees as elaborating a central theme from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I argue that Cartesian skepticism is not an illusion, as Schönbaumsfeld understands ‘illusion’, and that (...) McDowell’s account of perceptual knowledge is both untenable and incompatible with Wittgenstein’s ideas about knowledge. Schönbaumsfeld thinks that, to understand how perception can engender knowledge of the world, we need a non-Cartesian account of perceptual reasons. Wittgenstein offers a much more radical break with the Cartesian Picture: an account of knowledge without ‘experience’. (shrink)

: Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. But it need not. For example, one could know what it’s like to see red without seeing red—indeed, without having any color experiences. Daniel Dennett (2007) and Pete Mandik (forthcoming) argue that this and related considerations undermine the knowledge argument against physicalism. If they are right, then this is not only a problem for anti‐physicalists. Their argument threatens to undermine any version of phenomenal realism— the view that there are phenomenal (...) properties, or qualia, that are not conceptually reducible to physical or functional properties. I will argue that this threat is illusory. Explaining why will clarify what is and is not at issue in discussions of the knowledge argument and phenomenal realism. This will strengthen the case for physically and functionally irreducible qualia. 2 Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. For example, I know what it’s like to see red because I have done so. Does knowing what it’s like to have an experience with phenomenal character X require having an experience with X? No. A famous counterexample is Hume’s missing shade of blue, in which one can extrapolate from phenomenally similar experiences (A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I, Pt. I, Sec. I).1 One might think that a weaker version of the no‐phenomenal‐knowledge‐without‐experience thesis remains tenable, e.g., that knowing what it’s like to see in color requires having or having had color experiences. But this thesis also seems doubtful. Peter Unger (1966) devised plausible counterexamples over four decades ago, and since then others (e.g., Lewis 1988, Alter 1998, Stoljar 2005) have done the same. One could have phenomenal knowledge of color experiences without having such experiences. Indeed, one could have such knowledge without having experiences that are remotely like color experiences. What is the significance of this observation for contemporary debates about consciousness and physicalism? Daniel Dennett (2007) and Pete Mandik (forthcoming) suggest that it undermines the knowledge argument against physicalism.2 That is because they take the claim that someone who has never seen in color could not know what it’s like to see in color to be the basis of the knowledge argument’s main epistemic premise: the premise that (roughly put) 3 no amount of physical knowledge is sufficient for phenomenal knowledge of color experiences. If they are right, then this is not only a problem for anti‐ physicalists. Many physicalists (e.g., Loar 1990/97, Papineau 2002, 2007) accept the knowledge argument’s epistemic premise. Dennett’s and Mandik’s arguments threaten all versions of what David Chalmers (2003) calls phenomenal realism, the view that there are phenomenal properties, or qualia, that are not conceptually reducible to physical or functional properties.3 I will argue that this threat is illusory. Explaining why will clarify what is and is not at issue in discussions of the knowledge argument and phenomenal realism. The net result will be to strengthen the case for physically inexplicable qualia. (shrink)

Psychology training programs emphasize competencies like professional behavior, interpersonal skills, and emotional intelligence. Some students, known as students with problems of professional competence (SPPC), struggle in these areas. This study explored SPPC characteristics and educator experiences in managing them through semi-structured interviews with twelve Australian psychology educators. Thematic analysis revealed that SPPC often struggle with professional attitudes, feedback integration, reflective skills, and mental health, placing demands on resources and contributing to educator stress. The role of educators as gatekeepers, assessors, and (...) evaluators also raises concerns about maintaining ethical standards. Findings highlight the need for better understanding, support, and strategies for managing SPPC to uphold ethical standards. (shrink)

Wines with geographical indication can be classified and represented by such features as designations of origin, producers, vintage years, alcoholic strength, and grape varieties; these features allow us to define wines in terms of a set of necessary and/or sufficient conditions. However, wines can also be identified by other characteristics, involving their look, smell, and taste; in this case, it is hard to define wines in terms of necessary and/or sufficient conditions, as wine concepts exhibit typicality (...) effects. This is a setback for the design of computer science ontologies aiming to represent wine concepts, since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field do not allow for the representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. To solve this problem, we propose to adopt a hybrid approach in which ontology-oriented formalisms are combined with a geometric representation of knowledge based on conceptual spaces. As in conceptual spaces, concepts are identified in terms of a number of quality dimensions. In order to determine those relevant for wine representation, we use the terminology developed by the Italian Association of Sommeliers to describe wines. This will allow us to understand typicality effects about wines, determine prototypes and better exemplars, and measure the degree of similarity between different wines. (shrink)

While research ethics and developing respective competencies is gaining prominence in higher education institutions, there is limited knowledge about the learning process and scaffolding during such training. The global health crisis has made the need for facilitator-independent training materials with sufficient support even more pronounced. To understand how knowledge building takes place and how computer-supported collaborative learning supports research ethics learning, we analysed: 1) how the participants’ understanding was displayed during the collaborative learning process utilising the developed ethics (...) resource; and 2) whether the scaffolding provided by the resource supported the learning process. Epistemic evidence was collected during design-based research involving 36 PhD students and researchers with supervisory experience divided into 11 groups. Data was analysed qualitatively utilising the SOLO taxonomy. The results revealed that: 1) participants displayed high levels of understanding and the need for the facilitator support decreased with the use of the online ethics resource; 2) the learners were able to evaluate their learning outcomes with satisfactory accuracy; 3) when used linearly, the online ethics resource helped learners to achieve high levels of understanding even when the scaffolding gradually faded. Based on the lessons learnt, design principles were extracted to develop research ethics competencies in higher education, and also recommendations for research ethics training were outlined. (shrink)

Amateurs are neither regular consumers nor professionals. What makes them distinctive? To answer that question, this ethnographic study focuses on wine amateurs who show a distinctive feature compared to regular consumers: for them, wine is not a straightforward reality but a world to explore. Wine exploration drives an evolution that transforms both wine and amateurs’ disposition towards it. Amateurs usually start with the discovery of the wines and their tastes, which may turn into an ability to attune to and (...) finally produce taste and good quality. Amateurs’ passion, initially fuelled by the discovery of unknown tastes, is then informed by the renewal of the taste experience itself. Following amateurs in their exploratory activity allows us to extend the analysis beyond scholars’ usual focus on one of its particularly normative stages, and to propose a renewed account of the amateur that is quite remote from the standard image of the ‘cultural prescriber’. (shrink)

The object of our paper is to examine how wine-related knowledge and practices play an important role in determining the respective flavour experiences of novice wine drinkers and sommeliers. We defend the idea that sensation is informed by knowledge, as it circulates in a cultural environment. Biosemiotics has developed appropriate concepts helping us understand how the same wine can generate diverging experiences. Within a biosemiotic framework, we consider wine flavours as relational, semiosic experiences produced by the convergence of (...) sensory-discriminative, motivational-affective and cognitive-evaluative factors. Drawing from fundamental biosemiotics we argue that these factors vary according to the creature and its simultaneously biological and cultural umwelt. We conclude by examining a series of empirical studies consolidating the idea that sensation is informed by knowledge and language. (shrink)

In an increasingly global environment, managers face a dilemma when selecting and applying moral values to decisions in cross-cultural settings. While moral values may be similar across cultures (either in different countries or among people within a single country), their application (or ethics) to specific situations may vary. Ethics is the systematic application of moral principles to concrete problems.This paper addresses the cross-cultural ethical dilemma, proposes a tentative model for conceptualizing cross-cultural ethics, and suggests some ways in which the model (...) may be tested and operationalized. (shrink)

What does vision represent? What does hearing represent? Smell? Touch? Competing answers to each of these questions have been defended. The present paper argues that the issue of what taste represents is categorically more complicated. In particular, it raises two very difficult dilemmas.

This essential business ethics text touches on many themes important to future leaders of business. Broad in its scope, the book presents the business aspects of philosophy, law, politics, government policy, and education. The material is designed to heighten the reader's sensitivity to the moral domain existing in business. As the culture of American "big business" has clouded the view of society towards business professionals, Ethics, Law, and Business realizes a need to prepare business students for leadership roles in the (...) communities, as well as in business. This text discusses the basics of free speech, violence, affirmative action, and public education. Filling an important gap, this textbook presents imminently readable information on several business topics. In the past, there was not one or even any combination of books that provided the necessary coverage in a usable format. This book is appropriate for a semester course on business ethics in any graduate or undergraduate program. This textbook will be accompanied by an Instructor's Manual written by Wines and Nancy L. Bodie, Boise State University. It will feature PowerPoint slides, discussion problems, test items, and teaching suggestions. (shrink)

Art is one thing, the aesthetic another. Things can be appreciated aesthetically – for instance, in terms of the traditional category of the beautiful – without being works of art. A landscape can be appreciated as beautiful; so can a man or a woman. Appreciation of such natural objects in terms of their beauty certainly counts as aesthetic appreciation, if anything does. This is not simply because landscapes and people are not artefacts; for there are also artefacts which are assessable (...) aesthetically without being works of art (e.g. an elegant car or a mathematical proof)... (shrink)

This paper models knowledge in cases where an agent has multiple experiences over time. Using this model, we introduce a series of observations that undermine the pretheoretic idea that the evidential significance of experience depends on the extent to which that experience matches the world. On the basis of these observations, we model knowledge in terms of what is likely given the agent’s experience. An agent knows p when p is implied by her epistemic possibilities. (...) A world is epistemically possible when its probability given the agent’s experiences is not significantly lower than the probability of the actual world given that experience. (shrink)

This commentary offers a friendly extension of Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) account. Not only do active goals sometimes operate unconsciously to dominate or preempt others, but simultaneously active goals can also collaborate or compromise in shaping behavior. Because neither goal wins complete control of behavior, the result may be that each is only partly satisfied.

In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also (...) highlight some philosophical consequences of this conclusion, especially for the issue of whether imagination can help us to learn something from fictions. (shrink)

From religion to philosophy to science, all human systems of definition are formed by human brains. The nature and limits of the human brain are the nature and limits of those systems. This essay shows how the human brain works normally then unusually, and what this reveals about the limits of human knowledge. There are many conditions and instances where the brain processes information unusually, including mental disorders, physical events, and drug use. This essay focuses on the neurological events (...) called mystical experiences. (shrink)

This article summarizes Carroll (Cal) Izard’s contributions to theory and research on emotion competence and an emotion-centered preventive intervention program. Cal’s contributions to emotion competence research began with some of the earliest studies of whether or not recognition and labeling of emotions relate to social and behavioral functioning. He also theorized about the adaptive use of discrete emotions, a construct Cal termed “emotion utilization.” He translated theory and research on emotions into seven principles for emotion-based prevention and intervention, and he (...) applied these principles to a preventive intervention, the Emotions Course. The Emotions Course has been shown to promote emotion competence and reduce problem behaviors. The article concludes with recommendations to deepen the research base on emotion competence. (shrink)