Until recently, with one historical exception, America was able to take for granted a coherent national culture and identity. Successive waves of immigrants entered a country that assumed that their ultimate assimilation was a desirable, not an oppressive, outcome. The United States did not prove equally hospitable to everyone: some groups endured enormous hardships on their way to a fuller realization of America's great promise of opportunity and freedom. Yet, throughout U.S. history, the dream of common purpose and community propelled (...) the collective desire to live up to this promise and provided the framework within which progress was understood and made. (shrink)

This article draws from my current research on the challenges that the concept ‘citizenship’ brings to postcolonial Africa. The article takes Zimbabwe as a case study with the view to interrogate how the decade-long crisis has been obfuscated by the elites' manipulation of the education system which has left it redundant for envisioning both postcolonial and world citizenship. First, this article seeks to outline the challenge of enunciating the crisis. Second, it outlines and discusses how the limits of (...) postcolonial education reforms and the demand for a patriotic citizenry have stemmed from the political ideologues' deployment of ‘patriotic history’ to mobilise citizens' allegiance to the party-state. Third, the article situates the citizenship education debate within the broader discourse of democratic citizenship and argues that the Zimbabwean crisis can be meaningfully addressed, among other measures, by taking citizenship education seriously and making schools and institutions of higher learning sites for democratic engagement. (shrink)

Who is to be included in a political community and on what terms? William A. Barbieri Jr. seeks answers to these questions in this exploration of the controversial concept of citizenship rights—a concept directly related to the nature of democracy, equality, and cultural identity. Through an examination of the case of Germany’s settled “guestworkers” and their families, _Ethics of Citizenship_ investigates the pressing problem of political membership in a world marked by increased migration, rising nationalist sentiment, and the ongoing (...) reorganization of states through both peaceful and violent means. Although some of Germany’s foreign workers have gradually attained a degree of social and economic legitimacy, Barbieri explains how they remain effectively excluded from true German citizenship. Describing how this exclusion has occurred and assessing current attitudes toward political membership in Germany, he argues for a just and democratic policy toward the tax-paying, migrant worker minority, one that would combine the extension of the individual rights of citizenship with the establishment of certain group rights. Through a dissection of ongoing public “membership debates” over issues such as suffrage, dual citizenship, and immigration and refugee policy, Barbieri identifies a range of competing responses to the question of who “belongs” in Germany. After critiquing these views, he proposes an alternative ethic of membership rooted in an account of domination and human rights that seeks to balance individual and group rights within the context of a commitment to democracy and equal citizenship. Indispensable for scholars of German studies, _Ethics of Citizenship_ also raises questions that will attract moral philosophers, constitutional scholars, and those interested in the continuing, global problems associated with migration. (shrink)

Are democratic states permitted to denationalize citizens, in particular those whom they believe pose dangers to the physical safety of others? In this article, I argue that they are not. The power to denationalize citizens—that is, to revoke citizenship—is one that many states have historically claimed for themselves, but which has largely been in disuse in the last several decades. Recent terrorist events have, however, prompted scholars and political actors to reconsider the role that denationalization can and perhaps should (...) play in democratic states, in particular with respect to its role in protecting national security and in supporting the global fight against terror more generally. In this article, my objective is to show that denationalization laws have no place in democratic states. To understand why, I propose examining the foundations of the right of citizenship, which lie, I shall argue, in the very strong interests that individuals have in security of residence. I use this formulation of the right to respond to two broad clusters of arguments: (1) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize citizens who threaten to undermine the safety of citizens in a democratic state or the ability of a democratic state to function as a democratic state, and (2) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize dual citizens because they possess citizenship status in a second country that is also able to protect their rights. (shrink)

Korean civil society is often criticized because of its dual nature, that is, the paucity of social capital in everyday life and the plethora of collective political actions in the national civil society. Although liberals view such duality as the critical impediment to Korea’s authentic democratization, which would represent a fundamental, liberal-pluralist transformation of Korean society, this article rather acknowledges its cultural uniqueness and utilizes it as the basis on which to construct a Korean non-liberal democracy that is culturally (...) pertinent and politically viable. First, this article critically re-examines the recent neo-Tocquevillian praise for social capital in light of Tocqueville’s original idea on the art of association, and reveals the liberal-individualistic assumption behind them, with which Confucian-Koreans are culturally unfamiliar. It presents a Korean version of Confucian civil society to promote democratic collective self-government and common citizenship, while rejecting modern Western moral individualism. (shrink)

Korean civil society is often criticized because of its dual nature, that is, the paucity of social capital in everyday life and the plethora of collective political actions in the national civil society. Although liberals view such duality as the critical impediment to Korea’s authentic democratization, which would represent a fundamental, liberal-pluralist transformation of Korean society, this article rather acknowledges its cultural uniqueness and utilizes it as the basis on which to construct a Korean non-liberal democracy that is culturally (...) pertinent and politically viable. First, this article critically re-examines the recent neo-Tocquevillian praise for social capital in light of Tocqueville’s original idea on the art of association, and reveals the liberal-individualistic assumption behind them, with which Confucian-Koreans are culturally unfamiliar. It presents a Korean version of Confucian civil society to promote democratic collective self-government and common citizenship, while rejecting modern Western moral individualism. (shrink)

Citizenship and marriage are legal statuses that generate numerous privileges and responsibilities. Legal doctrine and argument have analogized these statuses in passing: consider, for example, Ted Olson’s statement in the Hollingsworth v. Perry oral argument that denying the label “marriage” to gay unions “is like you were to say you can vote, you can travel, but you may not be a citizen.” However, the parallel between citizenship and marriage has rarely been investigated in depth. This paper investigates the (...) marriage-citizenship parallel with a particular focus on three questions prompted by recent developments in law and policy: -/- 1) Should we provide second-best statuses? Some couples — in particular gay and lesbian couples — have been offered permanent statuses, like civil unions, that bear legal privileges but fall short of full marriage equality. In contrast, similar differentiations within citizenship are generally resisted. The history of citizenship may presage the increasing unacceptability of differentiations within status in the gay marriage context. Meanwhile, the history of marriage equality efforts may help present-day citizenship advocates choose legal strategies. -/- 2) Should statuses be a gateway to rights? Some early gay rights advocates unsuccessfully argued that advocates should challenge the primacy of marriage, rather than seek access to the institution. Advocates attempting to expand the rights of current noncitizens face similar choices: should they seek to give current noncitizens greater access to citizenship, or challenge the reservation of important rights to citizens? -/- 3) Can status relationships be plural? Many critics of dual and multiple citizenship argued that allegiance to multiple states was immoral, unadministrable, or both. More recently, polygamous marriage has become a topic of legal and political discourse, first as a foil in anti-gay marriage arguments and later as a political possibility in its own right. I consider whether polygamous marriage advocates can profitably draw on arguments for multiple citizenship, and how multiple-citizenship advocates should responsibly respond to the analogy with polygamy. (shrink)

While the current debate highlights an increasing deficit of civic engagement, new - and often less visible - forms of “participation” are beginning to be detected, such as those implemented by citizens with migratory background living at the physical and symbolic margins of Western towns. Our study, part of the project “Abitare insieme” (Living together) in Milan’s multicultural suburbs, was developed with a dual purpose: to analyze the relationship between citizens with a migratory background, active citizenship, and their (...) place representations/belongings; to experiment the co-construction of innovative spaces of speech for citizens, through their dialogical involvement in the research. In a framework of participatory research to enhance reflexivity and transformative practices, a survey was designed and administered. In this paper we will discuss the survey results, along with some methodological implication. The aim is to contribute to reinvent the “active citizenship” construct from a transformative, pedagogical, and intercultural perspective. (shrink)

This study seeks effective ways for managing employees with a high Machiavellian personality in organizations by identifying how to enhance their pro-organizational attitudes and behaviors [organizational citizenship behavior ] through transformational leadership. Drawing upon the dual-focused model of TFL, we suggest that exerting TFL upon employees high in Machiavellianism involves ethical dilemmas in that individual-focused and group-focused TFL have contrasting effects on leading pro-organizational attitudes/behaviors among these pro-individual employees. Analysis of data from 184 employees working in South Korea (...) shows that Machiavellianism negatively relates to affective commitment, OCB toward the organization, and OCB toward individuals, but positively to continuance commitment. More importantly, the results reveal that group-focused TFL can effectively manage employees high in Machiavellianism by mitigating the negative relations between Machiavellianism and affective commitment and between Machiavellianism and OCB-O. However, individual-focused TFL strengthens these negative relations as well as the negative relation between Machiavellianism and OCB-I. This study thus shows that to lead employees high in Machiavellianism in a pro-organizational direction, group-focused TFL rather than individual-focused TFL needs to be employed. (shrink)

This Article presents a new mode of governance called “inclusive regionalism,” which aims at curing the fragmented citizenship of marginalized groups within multicultural-divided societies. It seeks to expand the theoretical work on the appropriate mode of local governance in multicultural-divided societies from a narrow resident-based to a broad citizen-based point of view. I argue that regionalism can play a dual role in curing social ills through the establishment of regional facilities that engage in civic activities and promote solidarity (...) between citizens. As opposed to localism, a regionalist mode of governance that coordinate the facilities and practices of several localities within a region is more capable of confronting issues of discrimination, segregation, and inequality within and between localities. Moreover, such a mode of governance can connect the residents of separate localities within the region by providing regional facilities and institutions that serve as bridges between communities. Accordingly, applying a regional mode of governance might result in a much less fragmented society, which benefits from greater opportunities for cooperation between residents of the region in various fields. Promoting such a mode of governance requires a shift in the perception of regionalism as a means of control toward a mode of “community building” that advances social and environmental justice and inclusive citizenship. (shrink)

Denaturalization and denationalization were once much more common among western democracies. From 1906 till 1968, the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom denationalized their citizens by hundreds and thousands, for fraud or illegality during the process of naturalization, for dual citizenship, or for banal default of loyalty. In a context of a ‘war against terror’ we are now seeing an apparent return to the past – with the resuming of denationalization policies and provisions. However, the (...) previous restriction imposed through courts and judicial bodies on the power to denaturalize in the USA, France and the UK, the international recognition of citizenship as the most important human right, the transformation of nationality and the acceptance of dual citizenship, and the impact and meaning of citizenship in a republic explain why, while being hotly debated and highly supported by the majority of citizens, denationalization has resumed only symbolically in the USA and France, if not in the UK. (shrink)

Previous research suggests that all-inclusive superordinate categories, such as “citizens of the world” and “humans,” may represent different socio-psychological realities. Yet it remains unclear whether the use of different categories may account for different psychological processes and attitudinal or behavioral outcomes. Two studies extended previous research by comparing how these categories are cognitively represented, and their impact on intergroup helping from host communities toward migrants. In a correlational study, 168 nationals from 25 countries perceived the group of migrants as more (...) prototypical of the superordinate category “citizens of the world” than their national group, whereas no differences in prototypicality occurred for the category “humans.” Identification with “citizens of the world” was positively associated with a disposition to oppose helping migrants and to offer dependency-oriented help. However, identification with “humans” was positively associated with helping in general, and with offering dependency- and autonomy-oriented help; and negatively associated with opposition to helping. The experimental study manipulated the salience of “citizens of the world” vs. “humans” vs. control category, among 224 nationals from 36 countries. Results showed that the salience of “humans” triggered higher entitativity and essentialist perceptions, and dual-identity representations. No differences due to salience were found for representations of relative ingroup prototypicality or helping responses. Overall, these findings suggest that the interchangeable use of different labels is problematic, considering these might activate different representations, and thus, are likely to lead, in some circumstances, to different attitudinal or behavioral outcomes. (shrink)

Why do some Chinese local governments include informal workers in their welfare systems while others exclude them? This article argues that local officials attempt to balance multiple, conflicting, top-down career-evaluation criteria by developing different inclusion mechanisms. The central mandate to build an inclusive welfare regime incentivizes local officials to embrace welfare “outsiders”. However, other top-down policy goals and the locally defined citizenship system disincentivize the full integration of outsiders. Faced with this political dilemma, local officials have strategically incorporated different (...) types of outsiders into their welfare regimes. Their strategies depend on local labor market structures—specifically, the extent to which informal workers overlap with nonlocal workers. This hypothesis is tested using an original data set derived from thirty-one Chinese provinces, covering the period between 2005 and 2015, as well as two rounds of national-level survey data. Findings suggest that recent Chinese welfare expansion has ironically consolidated, even exacerbated, regional inequality. (shrink)

The democratic egalitarian ideal requires that everyone should enjoy equal power over the world through voting. If it is improper to vote twice in the same election, why should it be permissible for dual citizens to vote in two different places? Several possible excuses are considered and rejected.

Two dominant perspectives on consciousness representing the eastern and the western viewpoints are discussed. In the western scholarly tradition, consciousness is generally equated with the mind; intentionality is regarded as its defining characteristic; and the goal is one of seeking rational understanding of what consciousness/mind is. In the eastern tradition, as represented by the Indian approach to the study of consciousness, consciousness and mind are considered to be different; consciousness as such is believed to be nonintentional while the mind is (...) regarded as intentional; and the goal is one of developing practical methods for transformation of the human condition via realization of consciousness as such. It is suggested that consciousness encompasses two different domains, the transcendental and the phenomenal, and that humans enjoy dual citizenship in them. The eastern and western viewpoints each seems to be directed more toward one domain than the other, resulting in a biased emphasis. Seen as complementary rather than in opposition to each other, the eastern and the western perspectives may give us a more comprehensive understanding of consciousness and its role in our being. (shrink)

Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess the pros (...) and cons of Frege’s view that the indirect reference of an expression is nothing but its customary sense (Sections 3–4), and call the reader’s attention to the fact that in belief ascriptions de re we take it for granted that the believer’s intentional object is at the same time a ‘citizen’ of the belief ascriber’s subjective world (or, for that matter, the real word), and that the idea of such a ‘dual citizenship’ is even more obviously presupposed in the cases of true belief and propositional knowledge (Section 5). Then, we try to argue that it is more fertile to take the belief ascriber’s intentional object to be, not the whole state of affairs the believer has in mind and thinks to exist, but the latter’s intentional object as such, that is, as being his intentional object (Section 6). Finally, we discuss the intricate and mostly neglected question of whether an intentional object’s inhabiting two or more subjective belief-worlds should be considered to be sort of a ‘transmundane identity’ in the numerical sense or rather in some deviant sense of the term, which can be specified as a momentous subcase of a ‘categorial difference’ (Section 7). (shrink)

In these two important lectures, distinguished political philosopher Seyla Benhabib argues that since the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have entered a phase of global civil society which is governed by cosmopolitan norms of universal justice--norms which are difficult for some to accept as legitimate since they are sometimes in conflict with democratic ideals. In her first lecture, Benhabib argues that this tension can never be fully resolved, but it can be mitigated through the renegotiation of the (...) dual commitments to human rights and sovereign self-determination. Her second lecture develops this idea in detail, with special reference to recent developments in Europe (for example, the banning of Muslim head scarves in France). The EU has seen the replacement of the traditional unitary model of citizenship with a new model that disaggregates the components of traditional citizenship, making it possible to be a citizen of multiple entities at the same time. The volume also contains a substantive introduction by Robert Post, the volume editor, and contributions by Bonnie Honig (Northwestern University), Will Kymlicka (Queens University), and Jeremy Waldron (Columbia School of Law). (shrink)

This chapter explores the influence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on digital democracy, focusing on four main areas: citizenship, participation, representation, and the public sphere. It traces the evolution from electronic to virtual and network democracy, underscoring how each stage has broadened democratic engagement through technology. Focusing on digital citizenship, the chapter examines how AI can improve online engagement while posing privacy risks and fostering identity stereotyping. Regarding political participation, it highlights AI's dual role in mobilising civic actions (...) and spreading misinformation. Regarding representation, AI's involvement in electoral processes can enhance voter registration, e-voting, and the efficiency of result tabulation but raises concerns regarding privacy and public trust. Also, AI's predictive capabilities shift the dynamics of political competition, posing ethical questions about manipulation and the legitimacy of democracy. Finally, the chapter examines how integrating AI and digital technologies can facilitate democratic political advocacy and personalised communication. However, this also comes with higher risks of misinformation and targeted propaganda. (shrink)

Drawing upon the dual status of the Eumenides as metics who were neither included in nor excluded from Athenian democratic politics, this essay attempts to bring the last scene of The Eumenides to contemporary political settings wherein we observe the duality of immigrants—that is, the tension between political citizenship and cultural foreignness—in our liberal society. The controversial bride kidnapping cases among Hmong immigrants show that the liberal regulative principles such as reciprocity and mutual respect cannot work in the (...) context of powerful and irreconcilable cultural and moral conflicts, which go beyond the line that we can tolerate in the name of cultural diversity. Instead, this essay focuses on the Athenian citizens’ and the Eumenides’ courageous decision to suffer together, not merely to live together, in an attempt to find a new possibility of democratic coexistence. (shrink)

This paper examines the evolving ideological content of the concept of citizenship and particularly the challenges it faces as a consequence of the building of the European Union. From an epistemological point of view it is first argued that citizenship may be described as a dual concept: it is both a legal institution composed of the rights of the citizen as they are fixed at a certain moment of its history, and a normative ideal which embodies their (...) political aspirations. As a result of this dual nature, citizenship is an essentially dynamicnotion, which is permanently evolving between a state of balance and change. The history of this concept in contemporary political thought shows that, from the end of the second World War it had raised a synthesis of democratic, liberal and socialist values on the one hand, and that it was historically and logically bound to the Nation-State on the other hand. This double synthesis now seems to be contested, as the themes of the "crisis of the Nation State" and"crisis of the Welfare state" do indicate. The last part of this paper grapples with recent theoretical proposals of new forms of european citizenship, and argues that the concept of citizenship could be renovated and take its challenges into consideration by insisting on the duties and the procedures it contains. (shrink)

Substantial research examines the follower consequences of leader alignment of words and deeds, but no research has quantitatively reviewed these effects. This study examines extant research on behavioral integrity and contrasts it with two other constructs that focus on alignment: moral integrity and psychological contract breaches. We compare effect sizes between the three constructs, and find that BI has stronger effects on trust, in-role task performance and citizenship behavior than moral integrity and stronger effects on commitment and OCB than (...) psychological contract breach. These stronger attitudinal consequences run counter to our initial expectations, but they provide evidence of important conceptual distinctions and mechanisms that we articulate. BI theory suggests that BI’s greater performance impact is due to the notion that BI affects communication clarity in addition to attitudes. Results of meta-analytic structural equation modeling are consistent with this proposed dual path of BI’s impact. We highlight avenues for future research on BI and discuss how our findings inform the broader research on leader alignment. (shrink)

This paper examines the Fair Trade practices of Dure, a Korean consumer cooperative, through the extended cooperative enterprise citizenship framework. Extended cooperative citizenship means that cooperatives should replace citizenship and fill the gaps in the weakening public service sector. As dual-purpose business organizations, cooperatives have already played essential roles as extended corporate citizens. However, previous literature regarding CSR or cooperatives has not sufficiently explored the social responsibility of cooperatives. Furthermore, corporate citizenship is generally regarded as (...) a singular and static concept. Therefore, this paper analyses Dure’s Fair Trade practices through the newly developed framework. Significantly, this article clarifies how Dure collaborates with key stakeholders and upholds their civil, political, and social rights through Fair Trade. This paper also explains how cooperative enterprise citizenship has changed as Fair Trade practices have shifted. Two implications of this research are revealed. First, the paper develops a new analytical model to explain the dynamics of corporate citizenship and Fair Trade practices. Second, the research provides details about the social responsibility of Korean consumer cooperatives based on Fair Trade that will have practical applications for practitioners in the business sector. (shrink)

Robertson, Geoffrey CAHS is delighted to announce that the Australian Humanist of the Year for 2014 is Geoffrey Robertson QC. He is a human rights barrister, academic, author and broadcaster and holds dual Australian and British citizenship.

continent. 1.4 (2011): 253—278. A Sense of French Politics Politics itself is not the exercise of power or struggle for power. Politics is first of all the configuration of a space as political, the framing of a specific sphere of experience, the setting of objects posed as "common" and of subjects to whom the capacity is recognized to designate these objects and discuss about them.(1) On April 14, 2011, France implemented its controversial ban of the niqab and burqa , commonly (...) referred to as the Islamic veil, in public places. On the coattails of the 2004 prohibition of religious artifacts, including the less concealing hijab or Islamic headscarves, in schools, the veil ban sparked equal outrage across both political and theological spectra, and many on both sides of the debate were quick to inquire about enforcement. As Steven Erlanger reports, “The police do not have the authority under the law to remove full veils, only to fine or require citizenship lessons for those who violate the new law.”(2) While the legal and social implications of this interdiction are ripe for study, the reprisals for breaking the law, notably compulsory citizenship classes, illuminate the strategic governmentality underlying the French government's targeting of the Muslim community, particularly those elements it considers affiliated with fundamentalist factions and/or terrorist organizations, if only through fashion—an integral component of French citizenship. Indeed, in allowing the (fashion) police to mandate instructional courses in citizenship for offenders, France implies that any Muslim choosing to wear the niqab or burqa , perhaps even for those who are already citizens, must not be aware of the subtle nuances of dress indicative of the French citizenry within public space. Furthermore, the degree of instruction requisite to citizenship, which clearly can and must be updated as the state sees fit, cements the imagined relation between citizens and states within the discourses on the veil ban. As Sharma contends, “Concepts of citizenship are the ideological glue that bonds the nation to the state. Citizenship provides the legal framework through which the state performs its role as ruler for the nation.”(3) Speaking for/as the state, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared in a 2009 presentation before members of the government and other citizens that the burqa “is not welcome on the territory of France.”(4) Although there is nothing unique, especially recently, about a nation-state taking extreme measures to guard itself against what it deems to be threats to its sovereignty, the way in which the ongoing discourses on hijab have (d)evolved, which coincide with recent pronouncements by governmental leaders in Germany, Britain, and France that policies of multiculturalism have “failed,”(5) points toward nationalist reterritorializations, which is also to say physical and ideological re-appropriations, of public space within democratic milieux, which remain predicated upon the mediation of spaces. As Panagia deduces from Rancière, “Democracy […] is not an institutional form of government […], but an appearance whose visibilities and audibilites arise out of the dissonant blur of the everyday.”(6) Ultimately, the veil ban represents a calculated move to regulate the every day, which is to say the micropolitics of, that which is visible and invisible within French society, which makes it nothing short of a struggle to manage (the sensation of) bodies. Re-situating the political within the context of sense, Rancière argues that the fundamental essence of politics lies within the distinction between consensus and dissensus , and whereas most consider politics proper as fundamentally concerned with the fluid operations of the state— consensus , Rancière actually locates the political within events that disrupt the normative sensory order of things— dissensus . He explains, “Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time.”(7) This reformulation of politics centers on agency and, albeit perhaps unintended, representationality and offers a useful formulation for spatializing the discourses surrounding the Islamic veil, which are mired within seemingly senseless policies and practices of objectification. Instituting a normative “regime of visibility,” the French veil ban encapsulates the political economy of agency, now both mediated and representational, under the rule of nationalist governmentalities in increasingly transnational contexts.(8) Adjudicating presence within public space signals a concern with the sensory aspects of agency itself—what Rancière terms the “distribution of the sensible,” which is “a matrix that defines a set of relations between sense and sense: that is, between a form of sensory experience and an interpretation which makes sense of it.”(9) To be concerned with sense is to focus upon the body, and this somatic repositioning of the (fashionable) citizen within the territory of the state augurs the resurgence of nationalist bio-politics within Europe, since, as Hage explicates, “Nationalism, before being an explicit practice or a mode of classification, is a state of the body. It is a way of imagining one's position within the nation and what one can aspire to as a national.”(10) The French government's attempt to make (bodily) sense of public space for its citizens by and through policies aimed against a burqa-clad Muslim minority, which might only apply to “less then 400 to fewer than 2,000” women(11), reveals the necessary, yet mercurial, transmutation of public space into national space through bio-political strategies of sense-making, which, as Hage observes, denotes that “nationalists perceive themselves as spatial managers.”(12) At the center of this concern over public space is the equally contentious dimension of governing female Islamic identity, which has become one of the main critiques levied against Islam from outsiders who view the veil in its various forms as a clear sign of the religion's actual and symbolic violence against women, even if such critiques remain ensconced within nationalist discourses. As Halim and Meyers argue, “Although Western news media may focus their coverage of Muslim women on the debate over whether and the extent to which the veil may by oppressive to the women who wear it, they have exhibited little interest in the physical oppression of violence against women in Islamic countries.”(13) While it falls outside of the scope of this analysis to arbitrate all of the dimensions of this debate, understanding some of the issues related to female identity and hijab within public space are crucial to this study. As these topics are extraordinarily complex, even and perhaps especially within the Muslim community, it is necessary to provide some context concerning the value, purpose, and meaning of the Islamic veil, which has a rich and arduous history. The Art of the Veil At present, there are only two countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, that require women to wear hijab , which is a decidedly problematic term and concept whose locus is itself caught within a struggle of sensation. Noting the strategic reterritorialization of the term, Berger explains: The choice of the name, hijab , now widely adopted to designate the “Islamic veil,” it itself interesting, although the semantic shift it operates is not directly commented upon by its users. Although the design (both the cut and the symbolic function) of the hijab and the Iranian chador are indeed the same, as opposed, for instance, to the traditional Algerian haik , the word hijab has come to replace the term chador popularized by the Iranian revolution, as a properly Arabic (hence Koranic) designation. This discursive shift points to the successful reclaiming of the national revolution in Iran by a transnational pan-Islamic movement, whose language of reference can only be Koranic Arabic.(14) While the hijab is certainly a point of contention within various countries dealing with immigrant Islamic populations (of which France has the largest in Europe as part of its colonial legacy in Algeria), it is clear that the veil is a historically contextualized artifact of Muslim identity with a variety of manifestations, even as forces outside of and within Islam seek to codify its actual and symbolic value. Ultimately, the varieties of hijab , including the full-faced burqa and niqab , are complex assemblages of meaning that speak to the multitudinous flows of Islamic identities over time and space. As Gökariksel and McLarney observe, “Wearing a certain style of veil may simultaneously be a disciplinary practice crucial to the cultivation of piety (Mahmood 2005; Gokariksel 2009) and a gendered performance of social distinction in terms of class, taste, and urbanity (White 1999; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Gokariksel and Secor 2009) or of ethnicity and race (Dwyer 1999).”(15) The ideological marketplace from which the varieties of hijab ebb and flow serves both as a reflection of the ever-present materiality and dynamic functionality of spiritual economies, which are derivative of the equally ubiquitous flows of transnational capital driving agency and representationality within our historical moment. Keeping these dual, yet deeply interconnected, capital ecologies as the site of exploration for how the veil is represented within public space, one might begin to sense what lurks behind such veiled agendas. Examining the symbolic and representational nature of the Islamic “veil” in its various forms, this project situates the decidedly political contestations of public space at stake in the French ban alongside recent condemnations of multiculturalism as calculated efforts to re-distribute the sensible so as to valorize national identity within increasingly transnational and globalized socio-economic spaces, which collapse exchange values between distinct, yet interwoven, economies of (cultural/material/spiritual) capital. As the discourses on the veil rely upon representational imag(in)ings, it seems fitting to explore the political economy and art of the veil through the phenomenon of street art, which, much like hijab , is a complex assemblage of meaning of sensation mired in representationality and capital exchange. As street artists have taken up hijab in various forms, the movement offers a lens with which to situate critical responses to the veil debate across both spiritual and material economies. Situating this street art both aesthetically and historically, Lewisohn explains, “'Street art' is a sub-genre of graffiti writing and owes much to its predecessor. Though there is a good deal of crossover between the genres, they are distinct and separate in their own right.”(16) Evolving out of the graffiti explosion of the late 1970's and 1980's, street art broke the unspoken rules of the artistic underground by challenging and re-examining one's sensory experience of art in public space by experimenting with both content and form in ways that harken back to the Situationist International, which as a collective challenged one's experience of urban space through various media and experiential phenomena. Again, Lewisohn observes, “It's important to note street art's break with the tradition of the tag, and its focus on visual symbols that embrace a much wider range of media than graffiti writers would use.”(17) From stencils to prints and murals to one-liners, street artists developed a reputation for critical social and political commentary, and while it is certainly the case that not all street art is intentionally political, in challenging the normative “regime of visibility,” as Rancière puts it, of public space, street artists—even if unconsciously—call into question the common sensory experience of the politics underlying the formation of (nationalist) space.(18) Indeed, Rancière refers to the partisan sensory managers as “police,” who ultimately forge “the rules governing the circulation of appearances, of their visibility and audibility, and the proper distribution of bodies therein.”(19) As such, one can sense that street art's relationship with the police is tenous for a variety of reasons. Writing about his own experience as a street artist, Shepard Fairey observes, “With street art, there's no committee deciding whether I can put my work up on the street, there's no censorship, and I have total freedom of expression, and that concept of freedom is expressed just by using the street as a medium.”(20) As Fairey and other street artists demonstrate, the medium, to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, is the most glaring aspect of street art's message, and even as it now finds itself in galleries and usurped by private collectors, the ethos of the movement remains relavent to politics as it is, first and foremost, concerned with the configuration and experience of space. Just as examining the punishments for breaking the veil ban can map the terrain of French politics, a representational genealogy of street artist's deployment of hijab and female Muslim identity can assist in mining the depths of public space as a site of bio-political control and contestation in light of recent events in France and the rising tide of anti-multiculturalist rhetoric across Europe, even though the Islamic presence there is radically heterogenous. Using the work of Shepard Fairey, Princess Hijab, br1, and Banksy, this paper sets out to answer a number of key questions concerning the deployment of hijab, and female Islamic identity in particular, within street art as a movement now integral to and critical of the economies of exchange underlying global capitalism, which as a force of influence cannot be underestimated as a driver in the resurgence of nationalist biopolitical governmentalities. Although there exists a litany of artists to choose from, the aforementioned quartet of designers integrate hijab into their work in a seminal and critical fashion, and all have been working with the veil in some way prior to the French ban, which grants some additional context to their usage of it as a symbol in regards to the breakdown of multiculturalism across Europe, even if unconsciously. Although each artist depicts various amalgamations of hijab in their respective corpus, they share common tropes that raise significant questions concerning the veil debate, namely: what are the conditions of possibility for hijab to become a marker of Islamic identity within public space? How can we make sense of the representational topologies within street art's utilization of the hijab and female Islamic identity in light of the French ban? How might these aesthetic imag(in)ings simultaneously inhabit and combat normative discourses concerning hijab , multiculturalism, female Islamic identity, and public space? With these considerations as a backdrop, it is first necessary to outline more fully the hijab as a representative marker of female Islamic identity. The (Veiled) Writing on the Wall

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This paper begins with the opposition common to almost all discussions of the nation and nationalism: that between the cultural and the civic nation. Behind this opposition, however, one can detect a certain "complicity" between the two conceptions. And in order to understand the nature of this complicity, the paper proposes to re-examine the origins of the modern nation during the French Revolution. The first nation, it is argued, was conceived in strictly contractual terms; and yet within only a few (...) years the revolutionaries began stumbling towards a more cultural understanding of the nation, which served to complement its contractual definition. This turn to a more cultural discourse must be understood as responding to three rather pressing problems faced by an exclusively contractual conception. First there is the need to find a stable anchorage for the nation in space and time. Second are the difficulties posed by a purely voluntarist conception of national citizenship. Third, and above all, there are the seemingly uncontrollable conflicts borne by the identification of the nation with its political "constitution," and with the revolutionary regime said to embody that constitution. In this perspective, the emergence of a more cultural discourse must be seen as an attempt to stabilize the post-revolutionary regime by depoliticizing the "idea" of the nation. As such, this discourse's emergence is inseparable from "the discovery" of society separate from the instance of democratic, political institutions. The nation, then, has two discourses because it has a dual nature, both political and social. The paper concludes with a reflection on the hyphen in the term "nation-state," as indicating the need to bring society and polity together, but also to keep them apart. (shrink)

Offering a political optic on transnationalism, this article shows how the Partido Acción Nacional from Guanajuato, Mexico, seeks to reconstitute Guanajuatense transnational migrants as clients and funders of state policies, as political subjects with “dual loyalty” but limited political autonomy. To co-opt migrants into development projects designed bythe state but financed bythe migrants, partyelites reconfigure the meanings of “migrant,” “region,” and “citizen.” This is contested by migrant leaders whose views of extraterritorial citizenship, translocal community, and partyloy alty differ (...) from views of the partyelites. The migrants see the state as diverting their energies from true civil societyand local development initiatives across borders. (shrink)

The conditions of climate change are increasingly shaping the modern era of international migration; yet the principles and norms that shape the international regime are struggling to keep pace with this reality. Because forced environmental migration is becoming more prominent, it is necessary to respond at the international level. Not only is it the ethical responsibility of the international community to recognize special mobility rights for envi­ronmentally displaced peoples, but further, these rights should be maximized with policy-oriented solutions that sacrifice (...) neither feasibility nor ethical robustness. The mechanisms of dual, tiered, and deterritorialized citizenship are a way to bring special mobility rights for climate migrants into fruition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Beside Still Waters: Jews, Christians and the Way of the BuddhaPaul L. SwansonThis is a very moving collection of essays by committed Jews and Christians who have learned from and experienced Buddhism over a good portion of their lives. The names of the authors will be familiar to anyone with even a passing acquaintance with Buddhist-Christian dialogue of the past twenty to thirty years. The essays are inspiring (...) without being sentimental. It is tempting (and would probably be easier) to give brief comments about each of the numerous choice and thoughtful essays in this collection, to offer kudos to old friends and colleagues, as many reviews have already done. Instead, in the short space given to me, I would like to concentrate on the essay by Terry Muck on "Living in God's Grace," and use this opportunity to comment briefly on the importance of dialogue for people of a "conservative" persuasion.I especially appreciate the essay by Terry Muck because he succeeds sublimely in the difficult (and touchy) task of justifying the importance of learning from Buddhism for someone from a conservative Protestant background. I did my undergraduate studies at the same college (at around the same time) as Terry—Bethel College —a midsize, Midwestern, evangelical Protestant milieu. The attitude of many students (and faculty) at Bethel (at least in the early 1970s) was reflected in a comment I overheard from a fellow student in the class we were taking on "World Religions": "Why do we have to study other religions when we already have The Truth?" In retrospect, hearing this comment was a defining moment for me, and my antipathy to this statement and my strong belief that this comment reflected a mistaken (and arrogant, un-Christian) attitude propelled me to return to Japan and study Japanese religions, eventually leading to a focus on Buddhist studies and a career as a "Buddhologist." Like Terry, I still value my Christian identity and commitment, and yet find that my spiritual journey has been enriched beyond measure by living a variety of religious experiences, most prominently from the Buddhist traditions.As Terry points out in his essay, such an openness to other religions is looked on with suspicion, at best, from much of the evangelical Christian community. In a later essay in this book Norman Fischer (reflecting Kris Kristofferson?) uses the phrase "we are walking contradictions" (p. 252). But is this really so? Must commitment to one tradition exclude being enriched by others? Of course not. I myself feel the "contradiction" only when trying to explain it to other people; in daily life, the "contradictions" are not a cause for tension but more a source of enrichment. Perhaps the case of dual cultures or multiple ethnic or national backgrounds is somewhat analogous here. I, personally, am an American by citizenship, though I cannot (and do not wish to) claim to be only American. I was born and raised and have lived most of my life here in Japan, but I cannot (and do not wish to) claim to be Japanese. Must this be a contradiction? Does this give me a double identity, or no identity at all, or just make identity more multivalent and richer? And is this not analogous to many of our experiences of multiple religious belonging, or at least of multiple religious heritages? Cannot this openness be reconciled with the evangelical concerns of conservative Protestants? Terry's essay shows that it can.To return to Terry Muck's essay, he not only defends his own personal involvement in dialogue and the importance of learning from other religious traditions, but [End Page 263] directly faces one of the greatest imperatives for interreligious understanding: acceptance of the dialogical challenge by those of a conservative persuasion. He eloquently spells out how (at least for him) openness to other religions springs naturally from his hope as a Christian based on God's grace, and points out that there are limits to just "being a good Christian in the Church" (p. 194), cut off from the hurly-burly of the world.To look at this point from another perspective, I believe that the conservative members of the worldwide... (shrink)

In the context of the Dutch immigration debate, tributes to the Holocaust and the memory of Europe’s dead Jews increasingly serve to dismantle multiculturalism as a failed paradigm and to drive a wedge between a revitalized, redeemed, color-blind, post-racial Europe and disenfranchized immigrant, minority and Muslim populations. Embedded in these invocations of the Holocaust and its moral imperatives is a ‘spectropolitics’ of tolerance, in which tolerance, staged as an essential touchstone of Dutch identity, supplies a differential norm that measures the (...) civilizational and racial disjuncture between Europeans, minorities, and Muslims, and validates the new dual paradigm of Dutch citizenship and immigration policy: securitization and disciplinary integration. The centrality of the Holocaust as paradigmatic of Dutch and European racial history meanwhile sidelines the colonial past as constitutive of European identity; displaces an alternative understanding of race as (bio- and necro-political) instruments of colonial rule; and disavows the continued application of these instruments of racial rule in Dutch and European post-colonial societies. (shrink)

In December 2010, the governor of Mississippi suspended the dual life sentences of two African American sisters who had been imprisoned for sixteen years on an extraordinary condition: that Gladys Scott donate a kidney to her ailing sister Jamie Scott. The Scott Sisters’ case is a highly unusual one, yet it is a revealing site for inquiry into US biopolitics more broadly. Close attention to the conditional release and its context demands a broader frame than traditional bioethics and helps (...) to push science and technology studies analysis of race past its conventional focus on genetics. This article draws on the Scott Sisters’ case as a site for interrogating the US context of racialized mass incarceration and kin-oriented and consumerist valorization of organ donation. Tensions between racialized exclusions, the promise of consumerist freedom, and the lack of expectations of the state are foundational to a distinctly American biological citizenship. By putting the Scott Sisters’ case into conversation with broader arguments about incarceration as a site of racialization and STS literatures of organ transplantation and of biological citizenship in diverse geographical sites, this article seeks to articulate some of the racialized contours of biopolitics in the United States. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Being after Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in QuestionG. Felicitas MunzelRichard L. Velkley. Being after Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. x + 192. Cloth, $40.00. Paper, $18.00.In this collection of essays Velkley realizes a dual achievement: a penetrating scholarly analysis of a familiar topic, modern philosophy's on-going criticism of rational Enlightenment as a "project aiming at progressive rational mastery of (...) nature and the human situation" (60, 3), and an exemplary presentation of philosophizing as a self-reflexive activity in which the "know thyself" is posed to philosophy itself. The focus is on the German Idealist tradition, taking its origins from Rousseau and Kant to "reform, not simply to reject," but still to "overcome earlier modern accounts of scientific reason as abstract, mechanistic, and narrow, and as failing to do justice to the concrete wholeness or richness of nature and human experience, thus impoverishing our conceptions of morality, political life, and human aspirations toward the noble, the sacred, and the beautiful" (93). Velkley's scholarly interpretation identifies Rousseau as the pivotal figure who is the source both of the modern philosophical effort to achieve "human wholeness" by recovering an "original prediscursive or prerational unity" (an account that is the further source of the distinction between culture and civilization [12]) and of the "bifurcation in the ways to reach such wholeness," the ways of "citizenship" and "natural freedom" (13-14). The essays argue for an "important connection between Rousseau and Heidegger, through Kant and Schelling" (6). [End Page 345]While other thinkers are treated (for example, Pufendorf and Nietzsche), the essays primarily examine the writings of these four thinkers to elucidate "the persistence of a set of problems and a way of questioning" particular to modern philosophy (8).Velkley points out that Rousseau's critique of modern rationality is far more subtle than it is usually read. Granted, "through its introduction of self-reflectiveness into the previously 'innocent' and prereflective human situation," reason is perceived as the "true origin" and not the means for overcoming human ills (53). However, the "prereflective origin is nowhere to be found," it is an "imaginative construction," and it is a "mistake to take at face value any apparent assertion that natural man was merely an animal with only instinct and sensation" (37, 41). Because of his distinctively human awareness of time, natural man, "far from being mere animal," is "the only being whose openness to being exposes him to the nonbeing of death" (48). In short, "some 'bondage' to reason" is inescapable and "Rousseau's various plans for the reform of politics, education, the family, and the philosophical life" should be read as "ways of making the most of that bondage" (33).In the case of Kant, Velkley's emphasis is on the critical effort to resolve the dialectic, to correct the rational self-ignorance "so that the striving of reason for totality will not turn into a nihilistic rejection of reason" (112); or put another way, Rousseau inspires Kant's quid juris question, the issue of the "justification of reason as a whole," specifically the legitimacy of the categories (50-61, 101). Schelling, together with Kant's other Idealist successors, seeks a "greater unity, integration, wholeness, and concreteness than Kant provides" (113). The two main aspects of Schelling's project that Velkley discusses are (1) the discovery of the true human self in nature, the "hidden infinite unconscious self beneath the apparent finite conscious self," a "self whose objectification by the finite categories of discursive reason is quite impossible" and which thus discloses an "infinite contradiction" (115); and (2) the affirmation of the error of earlier philosophizing as belonging "essentially to philosophical inquiry" and being the very "precondition for finding truth" (125). From the philosophical attempt to correct reason's fundamental error, to its reading of "being in error" as an ineliminable step in the historical progress of reason and philosophy, Velkley turns to Heidegger's effort to step behind traditional metaphysics altogether and to move "forward into a new thinking beyond metaphysics" (142), from speech about Being to language as a power of disclosure of Being that overpowers the... (shrink)

This essay reconsiders Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s debt to Jean Bodin, on the basis of Daniel Lee’s recent revision of Bodin as a theorist of popular sovereignty. It argues that Rousseau took a key feature of his own theory of democratic sovereignty from Bodin—namely, the dual identity of political members as both citizens and subjects of the state. It further makes the case that this dual identity originates in medieval corporatist law, which Bodin was summarizing. Finally, it demonstrates the lasting (...) impact of corporatist law in eighteenth-century France, highlighting Rousseau’s direct borrowings from the corporatist language and logic of contemporary commercial societies. In this regard, the article revisits and updates Otto von Gierke’s classic argument about the origins of the state in corporatist thought. (shrink)

Behavioral integrity (BI) is the alignment pattern between an actor’s words and deeds as perceived by another person. Employees’ perception that their leader’s actions and words are consistent leads to desirable workplace outcomes. Although BI is a powerful concept, the role of leader referents, the relationship between perceived BI of different referents, and the process by which BI affects outcomes are unclear. Our purpose is to elaborate upon this process and clarify the role of different leader referents in determining various (...) outcomes. To understand the impact of referents, we explicitly compared the BIs of two leader referents: senior management and supervisor. In contrast to previous research findings where supervisory BI was found to have a stronger relationship with outcomes than senior management, we find that both referents are important. However, their impact varies based upon the outcome studied. Only senior management BI predicted organizational commitment, while senior management BI, supervisory BI and supervisory trust predicted organizational cynicism. Only trust in supervisor, and not supervisory BI, impacted organizational citizenship behaviors. When senior management is the referent, trust and not BI might play an important role for outcomes that require extensive employee investments, such as organizational commitment. In contrast, when the outcome measured does not require employee investments, BI might have a direct impact on the outcome. We also uncovered that trust in supervisor substantially influences the trust employees have in their senior management. (shrink)

"Case notes." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (198), pp. 35–36.

: Undoubtedly, in the formation of history, relations between religious structures and political powers, which are shaped within certain principles, have an important place. The course of these relations determines the strength and domain of both sides. This form of relationship, in some cases, evolves in favor of political power, and sometimes manifests itself as a political direction of religious interests. It is possible to see politics as a direction of religion or to use it in the direction of its (...) own interests in the politics that the Soviet Union has implemented since the Second World War. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union, which has embraced the ideology of official atheism and struggled against religious beliefs, did not stop using religion/church for conjuration in its own interests. In this context, The Soviet leader Stalin has almost reconstructed the Russian Orthodox Church, which he had been trying to destroy since the early years of the Second World War. Even, Moscow has made serious attempts to make Patriarchate the pioneer of the Orthodox world. In this article, we aim to emphasize Stalin’s church politics and reasons. We will also stress the reasons behind the Council of the Orthodox Churches, which Stalin sought to achieve through the Moscow Patriarchate in 1947. Finally, we will touch on the policy of the Fener Greek Patriarch against these developments. Summary: Throughout history, politics of states have been under the influence of religion. Likewise, religions have directed political authority in the direction of their own interests. Sometimes a religion takes the state under its influence; sometimes under a state takes a religion under the influence and they try to use the other one in the interests of itself. Concepts that define religion-state relations have emerged under the influence of experiences experienced over time. Secularism is at the head of the concepts that determine religion-state relations today. What secularism is and how it is practiced is much debated in the scientific circles. Despite all these struggles, however, no binding definition has been reached for all political issues. Certainly, the subjective structure of states plays an important role in regulating religion-state relations. The political ideology adopted by this political structure and the world view varies. Sometimes political structures with official atheist ideology can break the principle of secularism. While these ideologies are ungodly in their nature, they benefit from political interests. As an example, it is possible to show the Soviet Union with an atheist ideology. Because the Soviet regime used religion in the direction of political interests between 1943-1948. The Russian Orthodox Church, which was very active and competent during the reign of Tsarist Russia, lost its power with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Soviet regime has made the Russian Orthodox Church an illegal institution. The struggle against the church by the regime continued until the Second World War. With the Second World War, Stalin's church politics changed. There is no doubt that this political change has become more than one reason. The first is that the state has entered into a war. Stalin did not want to continue the struggle with religion while the war was going on. Another reason for pushing Stalin for a policy change towards the Church is the anti-Soviet propaganda carried out by the Germans. As a matter of fact, the Germans defined themselves as the savior of the Russian people. It was also alleged that Germany was waging a war against the Soviets in order to free Russian people from communism. Even brochures were taken from the airplanes in this frame. The Germans aimed to break the resistance of the Russian people with this method. Stalin acted to ward off this propaganda of the Germans. Stalin therefore had to keep an eye on church politics and stopped the oppression against the church. In this framework, opportunities were provided for the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, have been approved to organize rites in churches. The priests are encouraged to strengthen hand the people. Also closed churches have been reopened by Stalin. In this way the German propaganda has been wasted. The Second World War ended with the victory of the Soviet Union. Stalin, however, continued to use the church after the war was over. So why did Stalin continue to support the church as an atheist? What were the reasons for pushing Stalin into this policy? Stalin's post-war church policy has multiple causes. The most important of these is spreading the Soviet influence over the entire Balkans and Middle East geography through the Russian Orthodox Church. Undoubtedly this is related to the long-term policies of the Soviets. Because the war has changed all the balances in the world. This has given new opportunities to the Soviets. At the beginning of these, the Orthodox world comes to the Soviet influence. It seems that the steps towards this have been started to be started from 1945. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church found important activities. For example, the Moscow Patriarch has established relations with other Orthodox Churches. Jerusalem, Athens, Cyprus, Antakya churches were visited. In the end, an attempt was made to collect the Orthodox Council. The struggle of the Western and Eastern bloc emerged after the Second World War divided the Orthodox world into two camps. In this process, the Greek, Cyprus and Jerusalem Orthodox churches under the leadership of the Fener Patriarchate were under American influence. The Serbian, Bulgarian and Antiochian Orthodox Churches under the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate were under Soviet influence. For these reasons, the Soviet regime, which has been fighting for the Church since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, has given up its position. It is understood from this historical fact that a regime adopting irreligion as an official ideology uses religion in its own interests as needed. This indicates that secularism is relative. This study will try to show how the Soviet Union uses the Russian Orthodox Church in its own interests despite the atheism ideology. (shrink)

This article presents a response to Néron and Norman’s contention that the language of citizenship is helpful in thinking about the political dimensions of corporate responsibilities. We argue that Néron and Norman’s main conclusions are valid but offer an extension of their analysis to incorporate extant streams of literature dealing with the political role of the corporation. We also propose that the perspective on citizenship adopted by Néron and Norman is rather narrow, andtherefore provide some alternative ways in (...) which corporations and citizenship might be brought together. We conclude by suggesting that, rather than simply applying the concept of citizenship to corporations, we now need to go further in exploring how corporations might play an active role in reconfiguring the whole notion of citizenship itself. (shrink)

Many of our inherited civic institutions are dead or dying. We need an ambitious reform program to revive democratic life. This essay advances a four-pronged “citizenship agenda”: a campaign finance initiative granting each voter fifty “patriot dollars” to fund candidates and political parties of his or her choice; a proposal for a new national holiday, Deliberation Day, held before each national election, enabling citizens to deliberate on the merits of rival candidates; a system of federally financed electronic news-vouchers to (...) permit professional journalism to survive the destruction of its traditional business model; and a new form of citizenship inheritance, which provides $80,000 to all Americans as they start off life as adults. Working with collaborators, I have developed each of these initiatives at book length. This essay suggests how the “citizenship agenda” yields a whole that is larger than the sum of its parts. (shrink)

Avia Pasternak argues that intentional citizens who are genuine participants of their state should share the liability for state wrongdoings. In real-world states, how prevalent is intentional citizenship? This commentary concerns the application of the theoretical model. I argue that there are two problems with Pasternak’s proposal of testing intentional citizenship in reality. First, the difficulty of distinguishing citizens’ ambiguous internal attitudes towards their citizenship is underestimated. Second, the objective aspect of citizens’ status in society, namely, the (...) way they are treated by their state, is more important than their subjective attitudes, but this aspect is neglected by Pasternak. (shrink)