Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the (...) transformation of social reality. In the first part I will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’. (shrink)

In the paper, I propose a project of social coordination as naturalistic social ontology (CNSO) based on the rules-in-equilibria theory of social institutions (Guala and Hindriks 2015; Hindriks and Guala 2015). It takes coordination as the main ontological unit of the social, a mechanism homological across animals and humans, for both can handle coordination problems: in the forms of “animal conventions” and social institutions, respectively. On this account, institutions are correlated equilibria with normative force. (...) However, if both humans and animals solve coordination problems in a similar way, and only humans have social institutions, how do the latter evolve? I suggest identifying possible causes of this evolution among cognitive capacities like mindreading and imitation by building dynamic models. Social ontology becomes constrained by the evolution of the forms of coordination and by the cognitive mechanisms involved in the emergence and persistence of social institutions. It means that it becomes bound to what might be derived from social institutions, i.e., social roles, structures and their derivatives. It shows how conceptual relations might emerge from causal. I conclude the paper with the discussion of the relationship between involved types of explanation, mechanistic and equilibrium ones. (shrink)

In the past half century, the theory of the firm has become a specific and prolific research field. However, the social ontology of this central institution of capitalism has never truly been the subject of investigation. I consider this negligence harmful for organizational economics and management and, more broadly, for the social sciences, notably because the first and central question raised by the theory of the firm relates to its nature: What is a firm? For this reason, (...) I propose some novel considerations for a social ontology of the firm by focusing on social emergence, reconstitution, the two-level institutional logic of the firm, complex organizational dynamics and interacting mechanisms, and power. (shrink)

In her Investigation Concerning the State, Edith Stein takes up some of the main ideas of the social ontology presented by Adolf Reinach, and develops a social ontology of the state, of the law and of social acts. I argue that Stein’s social ontology is an eidetics of the state, the law and social acts. Stein identifies the essential relations that constitute the state, the law and social acts, i.e. pinpoints the (...) parts upon which the state, the law and social acts existentially depend as wholes. In doing so, Stein applies Husserl’s account of wholes and parts to the social domain. I also suggest that Stein outlines a regional ontology of sociality that embodies Husserl’s idea of regional ontology. I focus on the intertwining of the wholes-parts relations, which characterize Stein’s regional ontology of sociality, and argue that there are not only necessary but also possible parts within the wholes. This makes Stein’s regional ontology of the sociality a dynamic ontology. (shrink)

This book addresses core questions about the nature and structure of contemporary capitalism and the social dynamics and countervailing forces that shape modern life. From a robust and self-consciously sociological framework, it analyzes and interrogates such issues as the nature of the social, the power of the sacred, the nature of authority, the problem of representation, reification, alienation, utopia, and collective resistance. Historical materialism reveals that the scope of productive functions is broader than the crude realism of economism. (...) Marx’s critical theory of the commodity and his analysis of the capitalist regime of accumulation remain as vital as ever and serve as a guiding light for the continued exploration of the philosophical underpinnings of critical inquiry and praxis. (shrink)

This chapter proposes a dynamic relational ontology (DRO) within a critical realist framework and a theory of ontological emergence and downward causation. The proposed DRO does not subscribe to the idea that relations are the sole constituents of reality. Instead, it argues that the existence and identity of every entity must be addressed and explained in terms of three co-relative and interdependent ontological categories: relations, relata, and relational systems. In the second part of this chapter, I will clarify (...) and illustrate the most important epistemological implications of the proposed ontology. Specifically, I will show how ontological emergence and downward-structural causation require the development of interlevel integrative models of explanation, substituting those underpinning traditional reductionist approaches. I will conclude by briefly analyzing a case study specifically related to the domain of the social and human sciences. In particular, I will consider the problem of the emergence of mind and the domain of social relations, with a special focus on the interdisciplinary field called social neuroscience. (shrink)

This article addresses ontological negotiations in the Global South through three case studies of community-based research in Brazil and Ghana. We argue that ontological perspectives of Indigenous and other subjugated communities require an ontological pluralism that recognizes the plurality of both representational tools and ways of being in the world. Locating these two readings of ontological pluralism in the politics of the Global South, the article highlights a wider dynamic from ontological paternalism to ontological diversity to ontological decolonization. We (...) conclude by arguing that this dynamic provides important lessons for reorienting agendas in social ontology through Southern Ontologies. (shrink)

Agent-Based Models are useful to describe and understand social, economic and spatial systems' dynamics. But, beside the facilities which this methodology offers, evaluation and comparison of simulation models are sometimes problematic. A rigorous conceptual frame needs to be developed. This is in order to ensure the coherence in the chain linking at the one extreme the scientist's hypotheses about the modeled phenomenon and at the other the structure of rules in the computer program. This also systematizes the model design (...) from the thematician conceptual framework as well. The aim is to reflect upon the role that a well defined ontology, based on the crossing of the philosophical and the computer science insights, can play to solve such questions and help the model building. We analyze different conceptions of ontology, introduce the 'ontological test' and show its usefulness to compare models. Then we focus on the model building and show the place of a systematic ABM ontology. The latter process is situated within a larger framework called the 'knowledge framework' in which not only the ontologies but also the notions of theory, model and empirical data take place. At last the relation between emergence and ontology is discussed. (shrink)

Recovering an ancient debate on the meaning of the Latin word pomoerium, I will show that if John Searle has offered the standard version of social ontology, Maurizio Ferraris has good reasons to claim that his ‘Theory of Documentality’ can go further. Nonetheless, his anti-post-modernism and his blindness about the religious origins of the social objects he deals with, reduce the width of his argument. Complementing his hasty analysis of mimesis with the mimetic theory of religion, violence (...) and the sacred, put forward by René Girard, I will try to show that social objects always hide a scapegoating event and not just a document, as Ferraris would say. Recovering the underlying Derridean paradigm and adding a Girardian reading, such an investigation would turn Ferraris’ static and insufficient analysis into a dynamic ontology of actuality. Thus my aims are: 1) to verify to what extend Ferraris’ theory holds ground, 2) point out, through the application of mimetic theory, certain limits of the theory pertaining to the origins of the social objects investigated, and 3) hint at a new paradigm based on the graft of Derridean thought with the trace of Girardian thoughts on mimesis. (shrink)

I endorse five central themes of Charlotte Witt's Social Goodness: the pervasiveness and irreducibility of social roles and norms; normative externalism; the artisanal model; a richer social ontology; and the possible critical transformation of social norms from within. I reframe these themes within the biological account of the evolution and development of human ways of life in Joseph Rouse's Social Practices as Biological Niche Construction. Witt's social analysis attends to human bodies as loci (...) of artisanal skills and social salience as gendered, sexed, and raced, but not to bodies as vulnerable, dependent organisms in social environments. A broader, biological conception of normativity shifts from Witt's focus on social roles and norms to the dynamics of social practices as shaping people's developmental environments. This more complex account of social dynamics enriches Witt's conservative account of how practices are transmitted and sustained. It thereby surpasses limitations in her account of how hierarchical social norms can be both obligating and open to critical challenge from within. It does so in three ways: by emphasizing normative conflicts within practices, by shifting from individual know-how to discursive practices as loci of artisanal authority, and by an account of power relations as intertwined with biosocial normativity. (shrink)

This work introduces a formal framework for the social acquisition of ontologies which are constructed dynamically from overhearing the possibly conflicting symbolic interaction of autonomous information sources, and an approach to the pragmatics of communicated ontological axioms. Technically, the framework is based on distributed variants of description logic for the formal contextualization of statements w.r.t. their respective provenance, speaker's attitude, addressees, and subjective degree of confidence. Doing so, our approach demarcates from the dominating more or less informal approaches to (...) context and provenance representation on the semantic web, and carefully distinguishes between communication attitudes such as public assertion and intention exhibited on the (semantic) web on the one hand, and mental attitudes such as private belief on the other. Furthermore, our framework provides formal means for the probabilistic fusion of controversial opinions, and presents a semantics of information publishing acts. Our approach provides an incomplex and genuinely social approach to knowledge acquisition and representation, and is thus expected to be widely applicable in fields such as the semantic web and social software, and possibly also in other distributed environments such as P2P systems. (shrink)

Given the affective psychological and cognitive dynamics prevalent during human–robot-interlocution, the vulnerability to cultural-political influences of the design aesthetics of a social humanoid robot has far-reaching ramifications. Building upon this hypothesis, I explicate the relationship between the structures of the constitution social ontology and computational semiotics, and ventures a theoretical framework which I proposes as a thesis that impels a moral responsibility on engineers of social humanoids. In distilling this thesis, the implications of the intersection between (...) the socio-aesthetics of racialised and genderised humanoids and the phenomenology of human–robot-interaction are illuminated by the figuration of the experience of a typical black rural African woman as the user, that is, an interlocutor with an industry-standard socially-situated humanlike robot. The representation of the gravity of the psycho-existential and socio-political ramifications of such woman’s life with humanoids is abstracted and posited as grounds that illustrate the imperative for roboticists to take socio-ethical considerations seriously in their designs of humanoids. (shrink)

This work presents a post-positivist research framework for explaining any surprising or anomalous fact in the evolutionary path of a complex, dynamic, and contingent social process. Firstly, it elaborates on the reconciliation betweenthe ontological and epistemological assumptions of Critical Realism with the principles of American Pragmatism. Next, the research method is presented: theoretical propositions about a social structure are translated into a set of grammar rules that acknowledge patterns of sequences of events, either involving individual action or (...) interaction between actors within a real social system. The result is a discrete mathematical model for a concrete category of social process based on these rules. Finally, data-grounded refinement of the theory is possible through comparison between cases belonging to the same category, but differing in some contingent pattern of sequences of event outcomes. Consequently, their grammars differ in some pairs of context-sensitive rules that explain this surprising fact, and the derivation of this alternative historical trajectory of event outcomes becomes an extension to the early category of social process. In this sense, the proposed framework suggests a hierarchy of classes of grammars for middle-range explanations based on the ontological assumption of the generative nature of social reality. (shrink)

In the study of special languages and translation, the legal field is often insulated from other domains. This is primarily due to the extreme system dependence of the terminology of law, which results from a lack of a common legal system of reference throughout the world. The abstract nature of this human-made field and its dynamicity in view of the continuously evolving case law and constant changes in legislation make it difficult to illustrate its complex ontology through traditional terminology (...) management techniques. Therefore, this paper argues for an interdisciplinary approach to constructing the ontology of legal concepts based on structural constituents from frame semantics and comparative law. Frames allowing for the representation of interconnected knowledge segments evoked by legal concepts and the distinction between micro- and macro-dimensions in legal comparison research make it possible to capture the complex ontology of legal terminology evoked in a specific point in time and a determined legal context. The ontological knowledge structure will be exemplified by terms from German social, commercial, employment, and tax law. (shrink)

This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics suggest that this is a mistake. How scientists exchange and take into account (...) information about each others’ beliefs may greatly influence the accuracy and speed with which the scientific community as a whole approximates the truth. On the other hand, social epistemologists concerned with peer disagreement have so far neglected the question of how practices of responding to disagreements with peers fare with respect to the goal of approximating the truth. Again, work on opinion dynamics shows that this may be a mistake, and that how we ought to respond to disagreements with our peers may depend on the specific purposes of our investigations. (shrink)

If humans are created in the image of a trinitarian God, then we might consider that the fundamental ontology of humans would be relational, furthermore to some degree perichoretic. If perichoresis is somehow reflected in human relations, perichoresis should be evident analogically in our social relations, theology, and various disciplines of thought. This relational concept of the Church Fathers failed to be further developed because the concept of the Trinity fell from theological focus over the centuries. Today subtle (...) but radical changes are occurring in the field of social psychology and communications theory. Whereas it was once common for modern paradigms to dominate the field, social constructionists have begun to react against the preponderance of typically modern themes as the primacy of the subject or ontological discourse framed exclusively in the language of subject-subject. On the other hand, their work offers a unique opportunity for Christian theology to expand its understanding of perichoresis. For Kierkegaard the relationship itself becomes a positive third term that intensifies the polarities and therefore suggests an alternative tripartite consideration: subject-relationship-subject. From this tripartite relational structure of humanity as differentiated-unity, I am positioned to develop a logic of spirit and explore the possibility of analogia spiritus—the non-reflexive transformational dynamic facilitating holistic change and meaning—as the essential dynamic within perichoresis. This in turn reveals that these dynamics active as human spirit can be analogically correlated in mutual co-conditioning reciprocity in relation to the Trinity and the Eternal activity of the Spirit and Christ. (shrink)

This article investigates agency as a way of being and acting in sustainability leadership. Our primary aim is to enhance understanding of agentic strategies that facilitate transcending systemic complexities in sustainability leadership. We make a distinction in our analytical approach by drawing from Emirbayer and Mische’s conceptualisation of agency as ‘an interactive process of reflexive transformation and relational pragmatics, a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past, oriented towards the future and enacted in the present’ . (...) We add ontological sources of agency to these dynamics which interact with habit, imagination, judgement and learning in the transformation of social systems. This approach underpins our model ‘Dynamic Interactions of Agency in Leadership’ , an integrative framework for analysing agency in sustainability leadership. We examine the efficacy of our framework in higher education initiatives in which sustainability aspirations, aims and actions are envisioned, articulated and mobilised. We conclude by offering further avenues of research in sustainability leadership designed to advance this burgeoning field and contribute to bridging the gap between sustainability challenges and our abilities to solve them. (shrink)

The framework of the ‘social ontology of the internet’ is applied to music recommendation platforms. Those websites provide individual suggestions of music to users, creating new dynamics of taste that are no longer based on human-to-human interaction and verbalized judgments. An exemplary analysis of three platforms shows that different conceptions of musical tastes are represented by technical systems: situational emotional preferences, a formalist aesthetics, and social proximity based on tastes. The platforms share certain assumptions about the (...) class='Hi'>ontology of musical entities and of course the constitutive act of recommending. We discuss how this act can be ascribed to technical systems. Theses on the platforms’ effects on the social structure of musical tastes are developed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Narrative Ontology by Axel HutterFrank SchalowHUTTER, Axel. Narrative Ontology. Translated by Aaron Shoichet. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022. xiii + 296 pp. Cloth $69.95; paper, $26.95Where postmodernism has dominated the language of contemporary philosophy, there is a need to develop an alternative discourse to address perennial philosophical issues. In Narrative Ontology, Axel Hutter proceeds along this path by introducing narration or a form of storytelling to (...) reinscribe "the three ideas that have belonged since time immemorial to the heart of philosophical reflection: freedom, God and immortality." Hutter's defense of his thesis is twofold. First, he distinguishes narration as a temporal enactment embodied in telling a story, the scope of which is sufficiently universal as to found a new understanding of history, its alpha and omega. Second, he appeals to the biblical account of the tribulations of Jacob and Joseph as retold in the narrative style of Thomas Mann's novel Joseph and His Brothers. "The first reason a philosophical enquiry seeks to connect with Thomas Mann is that he himself accommodates a reciprocal illumination of philosophy and literature by situating his own way of thinking and working in explicit proximity to philosophy." "The second reason this philosophical enquiry seeks to connect with Thomas Mann is that he accommodates a narrative ontology of meaning, by contemplating, in his way, the same fundamental question."Along with an introduction, Hutter divides his book into three parts. In Part One ("The Stories of Jacob"), Hutter undertakes a precise explication of Mann's novel, in order to illustrate how ontology can be reconstituted as a narrative event that redefines "being" as a foundational act of history. "Jacob's sentences give expression to the hope that God can preserved the possibility of the future even if it seems to be destroyed in the fire of death." Form (that is, the narrative style) and content (that is, the interwoven meanings of the biblical text of Jacob as told and retold) are united. "This characterizes how Thomas Mann reads the original text.... The manner of his reading is articulated, in fact, in the Joseph novel itself.... Thus, a complex intertwining of narrative levels of meanings emerges: the inner meaning of the original story consists in a narrative ontology in which being is understood—in a sense that is still in need of elucidation—narratively and historically: as (hi)story. For an adequate understanding, this original story is re-narrated by Thomas Mann himself with the explicit intention of raising the original meaning of the story, its narrative ontology, clearly into consciousness."In Part Two ("Time and Meaning"), Hutter explores the thematic and methodological implications of narration as an attempt to infuse meaning into history and, conversely, through its own self-illustration, to chart the course of what is historical, that is, the transmission of future [End Page 143] understanding through the recovery of the past. Thus, storytelling renders history concrete, and, reciprocally, history challenges the narrator to plumb the depths of its greatest mysteries. According to Hutter, the Joseph novel embodies Mann's effort to meet this challenge. Storytelling is a way of preserving the past, but only under the condition of welcoming the promise of the future. "Yet the story that the Joseph novel narrates concretely is the story of Abraham and his blessing that is handed down to his descendants. In the peculiarly timeless omnipresence of this story, the tradition of the figure of Abraham is joined with the prophecy of the blessing that is not only promised to Abraham but to all his heirs."In Part Three ("The Stories of Joseph"), Hutter examines the dynamic of conversion or the transformative movement from self-love to compassion. He appeals to these spiritual elements to check the nihilistic tendency to exalt the individual both as the center of freedom and as the ground of social relations. Another kind of bond is necessary to overcome the abyss of meaninglessness, which is prefigured in ancient times and becomes most evident today in postmetaphysical forms of nihilism. "The 'whole theology' of the Joseph novel revolves around the Abrahamic covenant between God and human being—a covenant that, as already stated, implies a theory of... (shrink)

Ontological realism claims that at least a part of reality is ontologically independent of human minds. This view is compatible with physicalism, emergent materialism, and dualism, and even objective idealism, but incompatible with subjective idealism. This chapter defends ontological realism by interpreting Popper's doctrine of three worlds as a form of emergent materialism, which allows for the existence of human‐made cultural and social entities. Against nominalism and universalism, and contrary to essentialist assumptions about natural kinds, it is suggested that (...) the basic furniture of the world consists of dynamically developing tropes or property instances. (shrink)

At least since the time of Aristotle, it has been widely accepted that “man is by nature a social animal”. We eat, sleep, talk, laugh, cry, love, fight and create in ways that integrally depend on others and the social norms that we collectively generate and maintain. Yet in spite of the widely accepted importance of human sociality in underlying our daily activities, its exact manifestation and function is consistently overlooked by many academic disciplines. Cognitive science, for example, (...) regularly neglects the manner in which social interactions and interactively generated norms canalise and constitute our cognitive processes. Without the inescapable ubiquity of dynamic social norms, any given agent simply could not cognise as a human. In this thesis, I aim to use a range of insights – from phenomenology, social psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology and gender studies – to clarify the role of sociality for human life. More specifically, the thesis can be broadly separated into three parts. I begin with a broad explanation of how human agents are fundamentally tied to worldly entities and other agents in a way that characterises their ontological existence. In chapters 3 and 4, I criticise two recent and much-discussed theories of social cognition – namely, we-mode cognition and participatory sense-making – for failing to make intelligible the social constitution of human existence. In the later chapters, I then propose foundations for a more satisfactory theory of social cognition, as well as explicating a view of human selfhood as ‘biosocial’, such that even the autonomy of biological bodies is socially codified from a human perspective. Taken together, the aforementioned chapters should contribute to calls for a new direction in social cognitive science, whilst also yielding novel insights into the nature of human selfhood. (shrink)

A categorical ontology of space and time is presented for emergent biosystems, super-complex dynamics, evolution and human consciousness. Relational structures of organisms and the human mind are naturally represented in non-abelian categories and higher dimensional algebra. The ascent of man and other organisms through adaptation, evolution and social co-evolution is viewed in categorical terms as variable biogroupoid representations of evolving species. The unifying theme of local-to-global approaches to organismic development, evolution and human consciousness leads to novel patterns of (...) relations that emerge in super- and ultra- complex systems in terms of colimits of biogroupoids, and more generally, as compositions of local procedures to be defined in terms of locally Lie groupoids. Solutions to such local-to-global problems in highly complex systems with ‘broken symmetry’ may be found with the help of generalized van Kampen theorems in algebraic topology such as the Higher Homotopy van Kampen theorem (HHvKT). Primordial organism structures are predicted from the simplest metabolic-repair systems extended to self-replication through autocatalytic reactions. The intrinsic dynamic ‘asymmetry’ of genetic networks in organismic development and evolution is investigated in terms of categories of many-valued, Łukasiewicz–Moisil logic algebras and then compared with those obtained for (non-commutative) quantum logics. The claim is defended in this essay that human consciousness is unique and should be viewed as an ultra-complex, global process of processes. The emergence of consciousness and its existence seem dependent upon an extremely complex structural and functional unit with an asymmetric network topology and connectivities—the human brain—that developed through societal co-evolution, elaborate language/symbolic communication and ‘virtual’, higher dimensional, non-commutative processes involving separate space and time perceptions. Philosophical theories of the mind are approached from the theory of levels and ultra-complexity viewpoints which throw new light on previous representational hypotheses and proposed semantic models in cognitive science. Anticipatory systems and complex causality at the top levels of reality are also discussed in the context of the ontological theory of levels with its complex/entangled/intertwined ramifications in psychology, sociology and ecology. The presence of strange attractors in modern society dynamics gives rise to very serious concerns for the future of mankind and the continued persistence of a multi-stable biosphere. A paradigm shift towards non-commutative, or non-Abelian, theories of highly complex dynamics is suggested to unfold now in physics, mathematics, life and cognitive sciences, thus leading to the realizations of higher dimensional algebras in neurosciences and psychology, as well as in human genomics, bioinformatics and interactomics. (shrink)

Introducing the ontology of theory choice -/- Economists choose theories and they choose ways of pursuing theories, and they leave others unchosen. Why do economists choose the way they do? How should economists choose? What are the objectives and what are the constraints? What should they be? The questions are both descriptive and prescriptive. -/- There are two broad classes of “criteria of choice” that have been somewhat systematically considered in the recent literature on economic methodology: (1) Empirical criteria. (...) There are several possible ways of incorporating empirical criteria in one's theory of science. The respective methodology of theory assessment may be static or dynamic, it may be deductivist or inductivist, it may include various ideas of what constitutes empirical evidence, and so on. What they all share is the general idea that scientific theories are, or are to be, checked against empirical evidence according to some rules, and that this determines the choice of theory. (2) Social criteria. Again, there are several options. The social criteria may be related to the social interests of scientists or larger social collectives, they may be based on the persuasiveness and tradition-boundedness of theories, they may involve social or moral norms, they may be derived from various costs and benefits of holding a theory in a given research community, and so on. If they involve empirical data, it is the social aspects of the data that matter. What all these views share is that scientific theories are taken to have social attributes (functions, consequences) that play or should play a major role in theory choice. (shrink)

One common interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature views itas a social dilemma, a natural extension of the well-knownprisoner''s dilemma to a group context. Kavka (1986)challenges this interpretation, suggesting that the appropriate wayto view the state of nature is as a quasi social dilemma. Iargue that Hobbes''s remarks on the rationality of keeping covenantsin the state of nature indicate that the quasi social dilemma doesnot accurately represent the state of nature. One possiblesolution, I suggest, views the (...) state of nature as a social dilemmabetween groups rather than individuals. Although thiscleanly represents the strategic problem faced in the state ofnature, it also means we should take intergroup dynamics intoaccount when putting forth a solution. I argue that Hobbes''ssolution of commonwealth by institution – the favored solution forHobbesian social contract theories – will not work in the state ofnature viewed this way. (shrink)

I explore a puzzle at the heart of the so-called ‘practice theory of rules’: how can rules, operating as normative standards, be determined by the very actions they govern? I demonstrate how this puzzle has shaped criticism of the practice theory and limited its ability to account for mistake and disagreement within social practices. I identify the reason for these difficulties: an exclusive focus on individual deliberative attitudes which ignores the dynamic interaction between plural and individual deliberation within (...) social practices. Drawing on recent work in social ontology, I construct a framework to capture this dynamism. I distinguish between two deliberative contexts in social practices: background rule-setting and foreground move-making. Social practices involve a complex interplay between these two contexts. With this, I account for the possibility of divergence between practices and the rules governing them, while at the same time retaining an analysis of social rules’ dependence on practices. (shrink)

The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be conceived as an "agent-free" type of dynamical self-organization. However, in generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology": to have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting the world, possesses an ontology too. It (...) decomposes target space in a way that exhibits certain invariances, which in turn are functionally significant. A challenge for empirical research is to determine which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process. What are the explicit and implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and the representational deep structure of the conscious mind arising from it (its "phenomenal output")? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results, we focus on the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it turns out, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence now clearly shows how the brain actually codes movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be interpreted as an internal representation of the intentionality relation itself. We try to show how such a more complex form of representational content, once it is in place, can later function as the building block for social cognition and a for more complex, consciously experienced representation of the first-person perspective as well. The motor system may therefore play a decisive role in understanding how the functional ontology of the human brain could be gradually extended into the subjective and social domains. (shrink)

In the epistemological tradition, there are two main interpretations of the semantic relation that an empirical theory may bear to the real world. According to realism, the theory-world relationship should be conceived as truth; according to instrumentalism, instead, it should be limited to empirical adequacy. Then, depending on how empirical theories are conceived, either syntactically as a class of sentences, or semantically as a class of models, the concepts of truth and empirical adequacy assume different and specific forms. In this (...) paper, we review two main conceptions of truth (one sentence-based and one model-based) and two of empirical adequacy (one sentence-based and one model-based), we point out their respective difficulties, and we give a first formulation of a new general view of the theory-world relationship, which we call Methodological Constructive Realism (MCR). We then show how the content of MCR can be further specified and expressed in a definite and precise form. The bulk of the paper shows in detail how it is possible to accomplish this goal for the special case of deterministic dynamical phenomena and their correlated deterministic models. This special version of MCR is formulated as an axiomatic extension of set theory, whose specific axioms constitute a formal ontology that provides an adequate framework for analyzing the two semantic relations of truth and empirical correctness, as well as their connections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Vice and Naturalistic OntologyChristopher R. Williams (bio)Keywordscausality, criminality, determinism, medical model, positivismThese questions have been posed: Is vice (encompassing criminal and other wrongful conduct) best regarded as “sick” behavior, “immoral” behavior, or some other type altogether? Are we to understand vice in natural-medical terms, or are we better served by utilizing a moral framework? Is criminality reducible to and best categorized as a metaphysical type the essential features of (...) which are neurological or otherwise biological in nature? Or, perhaps, is criminality closer to a (non-natural) sociological type, the essential features of which can be understood only through reference to social norms and cultural conventions? These are torturously involved philosophical and theoretical questions that have given rise to an equally torturous volume of literature. Without pretending to do justice to these questions or their corresponding literature, several key considerations that must be inserted into and accounted for within the discursive pursuit of these inquiries are worth noting.Where a naturalistic ontology is employed within the study of vice, we reduce the intricacies of deviant behavioral phenomena to what we presume to be their underlying medical/biological properties. It is worth remembering that behavior itself cannot rightfully be said to be “sick”; rather, what we mean to say is that the behavior in question—in our case, various forms of “vice”—is symptomatic of some underlying illness or medical/biological condition. The presumed underlying sickness and the behavior itself are distinct, ontologically linked only through their theorized relationship to one another. This, then, is a key assumption of the medical approach to vice and its ontological classification as a natural-medical kind: that there exists a relationship between the behavior (a symptom) and the underlying illness or medical condition, and that the relationship is of the causal kind. Vice, it is suggested, is a change in state that is caused by (or, at the very least, is a direct consequence of) sickness or illness. Second, to legitimate such attributions, the illness supplying the requisite causal force must be identifiable and its causal connection to the behavior must be or be capable of being sufficiently explicated. In other words, once we have identified the relevant medical/biological properties and the behavior to which they stand in causal relatedness, we must be prepared to characterize this dynamic—we must be able to show exactly how and why such and such a condition gives rise to such and such a behavior.Problematically, causation itself is and has always been a contentious metaphysical specimen. Hume (1955) reminded us of the troubling reality [End Page 39] that we cannot ever “see” one thing cause or necessitate another. We are left, rather, to merely presume the existence of causal relationships between things. How is it, exactly, that disorder in neurodevelopment can necessitate certain behavioral outcomes? Even if we can “see” (in the empirical sense) the disorder and equally “see” the behavior, we cannot of course witness the precise causal action of the former upon the latter. Even if we are content inferring causal action in such cases, we still need to demonstrate the basic conditions of causality. To show that Condition X is causally related Behavior Y, we need to show that they are regularly associated with one another, that Condition X temporally preceded Behavior Y and, most challengingly, that no other conditions or factors have an intervening (e.g., additive, synergistic) influence. Hypothetically, if we were to posit a causal relationship between schizotypal personality traits and violent behavior, we would need to establish: (1) that schizotypal traits and violent behavior regularly coexist; (2) that those traits presented before the manifestation of the violent behavior; and (3) that no other factors (biological, psychological, and/or sociological) contributed in any meaningful way to those manifestations. We would thus need to systematically rule out family dynamics, income, education, intelligence, substance use, and so forth, as contributing factors. If, in turn, we were to determine that the presence of schizotypal traits alone is not sufficient—even if a necessary condition—to produce violent behavior but, rather, that those traits act in concert with other variables to produce the behavior, then we would not truly be... (shrink)

Dignity is omnipresent in Western ethics, but it also provokes dissension and controversy. One of the most striking examples is the debate on medically assisted death, where dignity is invoked to support antagonistic positions. While some authors conclude that the concept is useless as an ethical reference, many others invite us to deepen our analysis from a multidimensional perspective, to enrich it and make it useful. This scoping study is intended to provide an overview of the different conceptions of dignity (...) used in the assisted dying debate, to better grasp the multiple facets of the concept. The Joanna Briggs Institute's JBI Manual for Evidence Synthesis guided the scoping review. Key words were based on the researchers' expertise and were used to identify relevant literature in French and English. Eleven databases covering the last six decades were consulted. Initially, 2,071 references were found in the databases. After excluding duplicates, screening titles, abstracts, and full texts, and after a specific literature search on the concept of relational dignity, 156 papers were found to match the identified inclusion criteria. The literature highlights the stark confrontation between two dominant conceptions of dignity: ontological and autonomist. However, a lesser-known conceptualization of dignity integrates these two perspectives, underlining the relational and social dimensions of dignity. As a result, dignity emerges as a dynamic, experiential, and dialogical concept, that modulates itself according to circumstances. This raises the possibility of breaking through the binary debate and questioning the current frameworks that define dignity. This multidimensional conceptualization of dignity could lead to a more complete and nuanced understanding of the concept, as well as open richer normative horizons regarding the issue of medically assisted death. (shrink)

Micro-interaction dynamics of affective sanctioning have been widely acknowledged but rarely related to the emergence of social phenomena. This paper aims to highlight the constitutive force of interaction activity by critically analysing two sociological models, Bourdieu's theory of practice and Barnes's Performative Theory of Social Institutions (PTSI). Such a comparison allows me to reveal two differing models of social phenomena currently operating in sociological debates: an extrinsic structuralist model which tacitly conveys macro-structural phenomena as prior and determinant (...) of individuals and their micro-interactions, and an intrinsic structuralism model which prioritizes individuals’ interactions and conceives them as constituting both the individual and the structural. I argue that the latter's emphasis on the dynamics of mutual susceptibility to affective sanctioning as underpinning consensus among inherently heterogeneous individuals provides a platform to further support the tenets of Interactionism and helps to expose Bourdieu's over-deterministic methodological individualism prevalent in most sociological theory. I conclude that by conceiving emotions as causal, rather than the effect of social forces, sociological theory can provide an explanation of both individual practices and systemic phenomena which resolves macro-structural tensions. In doing so, I suggest an ontological understanding of the “social” which supports the Interactionist central tenet that the local takes priority over wider structural phenomena. (shrink)

To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and (...) implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and its representational deep structure, in particular of the conscious mind arising from it (its ''phenomenal output'')? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results and integrating them with a wider philosophical perspective, we will emphasize the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it will be shown, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the brain models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be conceived of as an internal, dynamic representation of the intentionality-relation itself. We will show how such a complex form of representational content, once it is in place, can later function as a functional building block for social cognition and for a more complex, consciously experienced representation of the first-person perspective as well. (shrink)

I propose a reconsideration of the role that ‘interpellations’ play in the dynamic process of identity construction. ‘Interpellation’ is a quasi-technical term introduced by Louis Althusser (1969) that I reinterpret using the lens of contemporary social ontology. I therefore look at it as an identity proposal that the individual can either accept, reject, negotiate, or outright ignore. In the original text, Althusser mentions the fact that the individual’s acceptance is the essential moment of an interpellation, but he (...) does not elaborate on the other options available to the individual. I believe it is important to analyze the individual’s options and the factors that may influence whether the individual’s freedom of choice is fully exercised in such contexts. I further discuss the human vulnerabilities that cause ‘interpellations’ to be adopted without much reflection, even in the absence of a repressive system that would try to enforce a mainstream ideology. (shrink)

In the article, the author analyzes methodological approaches to the study of the concept of historical responsibility, comparing the German tradition of study with the voluntary actions ontology of M.M. Bakhtin 's. The German tradition, influenced by the thinking of World War II, emphasizes the perception of responsibility in the context of the relationship with guilt, which raises a substantial question about the nature of responsibility and its boundaries. In particular, H. Arendt formulates the concept of banality of evil, (...) focusing on the disappearance of internal perception of responsibility, but does not solve the question of the origins of such feeling. The Russian religious tradition, presented by M.M. Bakhtin, allows to propose a way to solve the issues raised due to the identification of ontological grounds of individual responsibility. Nevertheless, M.M. Bakhtin conclusions are also important for solving the problem of collective responsibility. Bakhtin addresses responsibility as an ontological characteristic of human existence, opposing its freedom. Responsibility manifests itself in acts, but ontologically precedes a separate action performed by a person. The role of the act is that it allows the person himself to understand the burden of responsibility and act on these prerequisites. The transfer of the Bakhtins methodology from individual to collective responsibility makes it possible to link the moment of its occurrence not to public recognition, but to the very fact of the individual 's entry into a certain community. The ontological integrity of the individual also acquires a social dimension, not only synchronic but also diachronic. According to the author, the application of the Bakhtins methodology in the field of social research makes it possible to consider problems of historical responsibility in the context of more fundamental philosophical questions about the relationship between individual and collective identity, the dynamics of identity, the combination of regularity and variability in human behavior. (shrink)

In the last decades ontology has been successfully developed in many directions and has fostered various approaches for depicting the contemporary ontological landscapes. An important task is to outline recent thought on the conceptual interfaces between science and philosophy. The present volume opens up a view onto the plurality of different ontological schemes. The papers collected here discuss the interfaces between ontology and empirical research that are created by the notions of a whole, a thought, a number, a (...) quality, an ability, a kind, notions of causation, dynamicity, and social objects, the application of relevant logical tools for the reconsideration of ontological paradigms, as well as the investigation of the consequences in cognitive sciences on the development of ontology. (shrink)

Putnam’s internal realism implies a form of conceptual relativity with respect to ontology. There can be different descriptions of the world which are based on distinct ontologies. It has been argued that this relativity forecloses any possibility of unifying our knowledge and can even lead to inconsistency. If this is true, internal realism should be abandoned because it is compatible with non-rational positions. We will argue that these objections can be dismissed if truth as idealized warranted assertibility is understood (...) as stability of a belief state under new evidence. This view of truth is still compatible with the existence of distinct belief states expressing different views on the world. This understanding of the notion of truth is a consequence of interpreting both our cognitive activities and the notion of meaning dynamically. The meaning of a sentence is no longer given in terms of (static) truth conditions but as a relation between belief sets, that is, as a kind of information change potential. (shrink)

A theory intended to bridge social constructionist and cognitive constructivist thought is presented, and some of its implications for psychotherapy and education are considered. The theory is mostly concerned with understanding the emergence and development of the psychological from its biological and sociocultural origins. It is argued that the psychological is underdetermined by the biological and sociocultural, and possesses a shifting, dynamic ontology that emerges within a developmental context. Increasingly sophisticated capabilities of memory and imagination mediate and (...) support the emergence of genuinely agentic psychological phenomena from appropriated sociocultural forms and practices. (shrink)

Processes constitute the world of human experience - from nature to cognition to social reality. Yet our philosophical and scientific theories of nature and experience have traditionally prioritized concepts for static objects and structures. The essays collected here call for a review of the role of dynamic categories in the language of theories. They present old and new descriptive tools for the modelling of dynamic domains, and argue for the merits of process-based explanations in ontology, cognitive (...) science, semiotics, linguistics, philosophy of mind, robotics, theoretical biology, music theory, and philosophy of chemistry and physics. The collection is of interest to professional researchers in any of these fields; it establishes - for the very first time - crossdisciplinary contact among recent process-based research movements and might witness a conceptual paradigm shift in the making. (shrink)

Introduction. The rapid dynamics of the present world results in its complication and construction. Reality turns out to be woven from many quote fragments, representing a collage that a person creates and comprehends through the prism of various texts. Constantly transformable forms come to the fore and, as a result, there exists a plurality of meanings. Models of the world are continuously generated, replacing the actual reality with a multi- tude of spectacular simulacra. The search for ways to comprehend reality (...) through the identification of markers of its transformations is noted, and under- standing becomes the basis of ontology and one of the dominants of consciousness in the last quarter of the 20th and first quarter of the 21st centuries. Signs and symbols of subculture, determined by the context of culture and presented by various means, become one of the markers of the social reality transformations. The purpose of the study is to show the markers of the transformation of the total communication society. Methods. Methodological framework is in G. Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach and the provi- sions of M. Halliday’s social semiotics to coding/de- coding the meanings of operators-markers of social transformations. In addition, other methods were used in the work - methods of analogy, analysis and synthesis. Fragments of the study devoted to the study of chanson as a creolized text required the use of a systematic method. Scientific novelty of the research. The authors re- vealed the specificity of the chanson as a creolized text and present understanding of the subculture as a marker of the social reality transformations, which is manifested by sign-symbolic forms of con- tinuously generated creolized texts, thanks to the technique and technologies of communication. Results. Markers of social reality transformations represent them in the format of creolized texts. What is broadcast in them is filled with a person and, consequently, his responsibility for their con- tent is growing. Semiotic methodology based on the synthesis of the intellectual capital of hermeneutics and linguistics makes it possible for us to consider them as a product of human sign-symbolic activity and decode the content. Conclusions. The specificity of human existence is determined by the existence of a person in the lin- guistic aspect of the world around him - the world is given by language, which involves the search for meaning and understanding of the world. Thinking and language are ontologically connected: mean- ing is expressed by linguistic means. Although the nature of the markers of social reality transforma- tions is different, nevertheless, it is presented and framed as a text, the understanding of which is one of the ways to comprehend social reality. (shrink)

The theory of imperatives is philosophically relevant since in building it — some of the long standing problems need to be addressed, and presumably some new ones are waiting to be discovered. The relevance of the theory of imperatives for philosophical research is remarkable, but usually recognized only within the field of practical philosophy. Nevertheless, the emphasis can be put on problems of theoretical philosophy. Proper understanding of imperatives is likely to raise doubts about some of our deeply entrenched and (...) tacit presumptions. In philosophy of language it is the presumption that declaratives provide the paradigm for sentence form; in philosophy of science it is the belief that theory construction is independent from the language practice, in logic it is the conviction that logical meaning relations are constituted out of logical terminology, in ontology it is the view that language use is free from ontological commitments. The list is not exhaustive; it includes only those presumptions that this paper concerns. (shrink)

This article is an account of the dynamics of interaction across the social sciences and neurosciences. Against an arid rhetoric of ‘interdisciplinarity’, it calls for a more expansive imaginary of what experiment – as practice and ethos – might offer in this space. Arguing that opportunities for collaboration between social scientists and neuroscientists need to be taken seriously, the article situates itself against existing conceptualizations of these dynamics, grouping them under three rubrics: ‘critique’, ‘ebullience’ and ‘interaction’. Despite their (...) differences, each insists on a distinction between sociocultural and neurobiological knowledge, or does not show how a more entangled field might be realized. The article links this absence to the ‘regime of the inter-’, an ethic of interdisciplinarity that guides interaction between disciplines on the understanding of their pre-existing separateness. The argument of the paper is thus twofold: (1) that, contra the ‘regime of the inter-’, it is no longer practicable to maintain a hygienic separation between sociocultural webs and neurobiological architecture; (2) that the cognitive neuroscientific experiment, as a space of epistemological and ontological excess, offers an opportunity to researchers, from all disciplines, to explore and register this realization. (shrink)

The predominant conception of the status of race is that race is a social construction. But what does it mean to say that a group, racially defined, is a social construct? How we understand the process of constitution and related identities is important beyond the conceptual reality or non-reality that defines the group. To this end, this dissertation explores two models of group constitution employed by Jean-Paul Sartre, the first from Anti-Semite and Jew, which bases group constitution and (...) identity on the gaze of the dominant Other, and the second from his later work, Critique of Dialectic Reason, Vol.1, which places the group as a prominent facilitator of history that produces itself in the domain of the Other. Both models show that the existence of group and group identity are constructed and as a result both reject claims of essentialism that may be ascribed to the group. However, I argue that the more nuanced conception of the social construction of the group, found in the Critique, envisages a more complex and dynamic account of group formation and identification, an account that acknowledges the need for group identities particularly among those who are historically oppressed as members of a group. ;My dissertation attempts to reconcile two fundamental and distinct approaches to race---ontology and experience---through what I hope the reader will appreciate as a series of dialogues between Sartre and various interlocuters. These interlocuters include contemporary authors such as Ian Hacking, K. Anthony Appiah, and Naomi Zack whose works refer to some aspect of Sartrean thought. Additionally, I explore textual dialogues between Sartre and both Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Frantz Fanon, existentialists authors themselves, whose works provide insights into the possibilities and problems that Sartre faced in his attempts to attend to colonialism, racism, race and class consciousness, individual and group freedom. Thus, a secondary goal of this dissertation is to show Sartre's continued relevance to our contemporary discourse of race in particular and contemporary philosophy in general. (shrink)

My contribution seeks to unfold an ontology of the imagination based on the history of the productive imagination in its relation to common sense and recent developments of the notion of the social imaginary, while making use of ideas found in both Western and Japanese thinkers. Kyoto School philosopher Miki Kiyoshi shows a connection between the imagination he inherits from Kant and a certain form-formlessness dynamic he inherits from Nishida Kitarō’s notion of a self-forming formlessness. The source (...) of the imagination’s creativity is in that formlessness that lies both within the interior depths of the psyche and outside in the environing nature. Post-war Japanese philosopher Nakamura Yūjirō—taking off from Miki’s attempts to concretize Nishida’s theory of place in terms of the imagination—in turn points to a connection between imagination and place and explicates this via his development of the Aristotelian notion of common sense (koinē aisthēsis, sensus communis). Common sense in itself has a long history within the West that involves a variety of meanings starting with the Aristotelian faculty for integrating the various senses (as koinē aisthēsis) that was closely associated with the imagination, and ending with two contrasting notions of a communal or social sensibility (as sensus communis)—the vulgar “commonplace” notion of common sense as habituated custom and the healthy sense of common sense as prudential, contextual, ethical judgment explicated by thinkers like Hannah Arendt. Both are found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment but the imagination’s creativity expressed in genius comes into tension with the latter communal sense of common sense that attempts to fetter that creativity of genius with the judgment of taste. The contemporary notion of the social imaginary, for example in Cornelius Castoriadis, seems to encompass both the vulgar and the healthy senses of common sense, and also recalls the close connection between the imagination and common sense in Aristotle. Contrary to what Kant sought, however, this underscores the temporal contingency or historicity and non-transcendental status of common sense, even in its healthy sense, and its communal judgments. At the same time, the form-formlessness dynamic found in Miki and the tension between unbounded creativity and communal responsibility found in Kant’s third Critique in a certain sense also reappears in Castoriadis’ ontology (of magmas) whereby chaos is the source of the imagination’s creativity not only for the individual psyche but for the social-historical or social imaginary significations as well, that is, in the social imaginary’s inner tension between the instituting and the instituted. Recalling the fact that Nishida was inspired by the Greek notion of chōra in developing his theory of place, I then suggest that the linking of the imagination with the process of the forming of the formless as well as with place may allow us in turn to understand the creative imagination ontologically in the Greek terms of chōrismos—etymologically related to chōra—as the difference that brings order to chaos by allotting beings, each to its own place. Imagination as Ein-bildung might then be viewed as the ontological formation that, through differentiation, gives shape, form, to place. This then leads to the issue of autonomy—To whom does the spontaneity of the creative imagination belong when the chaos or formlessness, indeed “freedom,” at the root of its creativity exceeds the boundaries of subjectivity or reason? Heidegger in his later works, albeit in only a few places, suggests such a sense of the imagination as no longer a faculty of the human subject, no longer a doing of man. (shrink)

Seeking to capture the multi-layered, contradictory, nature of subjectivities and social positions through a framework which insists upon the complex, dynamic nature of the social, intersectionality feminism has inspired Marxist-Feminists to push the social-reproduction feminism paradigm beyond a narrow preoccupation with gender/class relations. Yet even its most politically radical articulations stop short of fully theorising the integrative logic they espouse. This article explores the roots of this under-theorisation, and suggests that a more fully integrative ontology (...) informs certain formulations of social-reproduction feminism. In understanding the social as constituted by practical human activity whose object (the social and natural world) is organised capitalistically, social-reproduction feminism highlights thedialecticalrelationship between the capitalist whole and its differentiated parts. The challenge for Marxist-Feminism is to embrace this dialectical approach while building on the insights of intersectionality feminism to more convincingly capture the unity of a complex, diverse social whole. (shrink)

Inspired by Heidegger’s concept of the clearing of being, and by Wittgenstein’s ideas on human practice, Theodore Schatzki offers a novel approach to understanding the constitution and transformation of social life. Key to the account he develops here is the context in which social life unfolds—the "site of the social"—as a contingent and constantly metamorphosing mesh of practices and material orders. Schatzki’s analysis reveals the advantages of this site ontology over the traditional individualist, holistic, and structuralist (...) accounts that have dominated social theory since the mid-nineteenth century. A special feature of the book is its development of the theoretical argument by sustained reference to two historical examples: the medicinal herb business of a Shaker village in the 1850s and contemporary day trading on the Nasdaq market. First focusing on the relative simplicity of Shaker life to illuminate basic ontological characteristics of the social site, Schatzki then uses the sharp contrast with the complex and dynamic practice of day trading to reveal what makes this approach useful as a general account of social existence. Along the way he provides new insights into many major issues in social theory, including the nature of social order, the significance of agency, the distinction between society and nature, the forms of social change, and how the social present affects its future. (shrink)

Our position is critical of the dominant method in psychology, and critical of the social use of psychological models. We assert that the scientific approach in psychology must break with modernist claim, but without sinking into post-modernist relativism. We consider that the epistemology associated with experimental psychology should be a specific epistemology associated with the particular objects studied. By calling on pragmatism and realism, psychology can find the resources to use quantitative studies as an action deployed within a complex, (...) interactive and dynamic social space, and thus break with its normative practice and function. (shrink)

This article offers an in-depth analysis of Carl Schmitt's social ontology to explain how and why he came to reject exceptionalist decisionism. To this end, the authors unearth the considerable shifts in terms of social ontology that paved the way for this conceptual turn. The gist of their argument is that Schmitt's Political Theology (1922) espoused a Hobbesian conception of the political as the possibility condition for stable patters of social interaction. Though the first three (...) chapters of Political Theology were originally designed for and published in a posthumous Festschrift for Max Weber, his understanding of the social was indebted to a Hobbesian legacy. Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, he began to revise his conception of the social and to put stress on the organisational dynamics of social institutions as independent of there being a political authority. From 1927 through to 1950, Schmitt never got back to his 1922 exceptionalist view of politics and rather sought to make sense of how the state could and should draw the contents of the legal order from the normative life of social institutions. (shrink)

Fātima is an important figure in Islamic society, both religiously and historically, and is regarded as a symbol of innocence and sanctity, especially in the Shīʿa faith. In this context, her marriage to ʿAlī is considered in Shīʿa theology not only as the union of two great personalities but also as a divine covenant representing the beginning of the chain of imāmate. According to Shīʿa sources, this marriage took place in accordance with God's will and gained a sacred dimension with (...) the Prophet's approval. The marriage also came to the fore as an important element that reinforced the legitimacy of ʿAlī’s caliphate. This article aims to analyze the marriage of Fātima, one of the most important figures in Islamic history, to ʿAlī within the framework of Shīʿa sources and to determine the impact of the religious-political events of later periods on the narratives related to this marriage. While Sunnī sources written in the second and third centuries of the Hijri era contain limited information about Fātima’s biography, Shīʿa sources, especially from the fourth century onwards, contain a large number of narrations about certain periods of her life. From this century onwards, the influence of Shīʿa beliefs on the biography of Fātima became evident in the works of Shīʿa authors. In this process, the roles attributed to Fātima began to diverge from Sunnī sources. These narratives focus on the events of Fātima’s birth, her marriage, and her short life after the death of her father. While Sunnī sources present only a few narratives about her marriage, in Shīʿa literature, this marriage took on an ontological meaning and began to carry a divine character. In the narrations, the choice between the marriage of the first caliphs, who had requested to marry Fātima but were rejected, and ʿAlī’s marriage was reflected in the caliphate debates in the following period and became the starting point of the belief in imāmate. The marriage is seen as a symbol of the religious and political conflicts between ʿAlī and the first caliphs in the early periods and with the Shiite groups in the later periods. The marriage is seen as a symbol of the religious and political conflicts between ʿAlī and the first caliphs in the early periods and with the Shiite groups in the later periods. This article analyzes the marriage of Fātima in historical and theological contexts and reveals the religious and political meanings of this marriage. It critically evaluates how these narratives developed in line with sectarian differences and how they transformed over time in the context of the impact of sociocultural and political elements on these narratives. The analysis reveals that the marriage of Fātima and ʿAlī had a significant impact on religious and political events in Islamic history. While Shīʿa sources consider this marriage as the manifestation of a divine command, they present the characteristics of Fātima and ʿAlī as elements that reinforce the legitimacy of the imāmate. It has been determined that marriage constitutes the ontological foundations of imāmah and has become one of the cornerstones of Shīʿa belief. In Sunnī sources, on the other hand, marriage is treated more as a familial event, which reveals the different perspectives between the two sects. This situation clearly reveals the differences in the historical narratives of marriage. In the narratives, the rejection of the first caliphs who proposed to Fātima led to the formation of a sub-message that they did not deserve the caliphate. Over time, this idea led to marriage acquiring a divine character in Shīʿa theology and becoming a symbolic representation of imāmah. Moreover, the Sunnī sources' treatment of marriage in a simpler context contrasts with the deep theological analysis in Shīʿa sources. In conclusion, the marriage of Fātima and ʿAlī is a critical event that affected the religious and political dynamics of Islamic society and deepened the divergent understandings between the two sects. The differences in narratives about the marriage provide a powerful example of how religious and historical narratives are shaped by social and political factors. (shrink)

Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic project has been understood to be antithetical, or at best indifferent, to any project of sexual ontology. Against these dominant views, I argue for an interpretation of the schizoanalytic project that does justice to the differentiation of beings—particularly the human being—according to distinct forms of sexuate morphology. I claim that, although it is largely absent in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, we can read this kind of determinate sexual difference into their project at both the organic (...) stratum of the organism and the alloplastic stratum of human signification and meaning. Given its importance in structuring bodies and organizing generational reproduction, I consider how sexual difference is the historical condition of possibility for alloplastic subjectivity. Nevertheless, I argue that the innovative features of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic project emerge from their recognition that neither the organismic structure of sexual difference nor its social and personal representation is static. As such, reading sexual difference into the schizoanalytic project not only supplements Deleuze and Guattari’s work but also opens possibilities for developing a sexual ontology that recognizes the dynamic embodiment of individuals without denying the structural reality of sexual difference. (shrink)