This article examines ethical implications of the growing AI carbon footprint, focusing on the fair distribution of prospective responsibilities among groups of involved actors. First, major groups of involved actors are identified, including AI scientists, AI industry, and AI infrastructure providers, from datacenters to electrical energy suppliers. Second, responsibilities of AI scientists concerning climate warming mitigation actions are disentangled from responsibilities of other involved actors. Third, to implement these responsibilities nudging interventions are suggested, leveraging (...) on AI competitive games which would prize research combining better system accuracy with greater computational and energy efficiency. Finally, in addition to the AI carbon footprint, it is argued that another ethical issue with a genuinely global dimension is now emerging in the AI ethics agenda. This issue concerns the threats that AI-powered cyberweapons pose to the digital command, control, and communication infrastructure of nuclear weapons systems. (shrink)

There is widespread consensus among policymakers that climate change and digitalisation constitute the most pressing global transformations shaping human life in the 21st century. Seeking to address the challenges arising at this juncture, governments, technologists and scientists alike increasingly herald artificial intelligence (AI) as a vehicle to propel climate change mitigation and adaptation. In this paper, we explore the intersection of digitalisation and climate change by examining the deployment of AI in government-led climate action. Building on participant observations conducted (...) in the context of the “Civic Tech Lab for Green”—a government-funded public interest AI initiative—and eight expert interviews, we investigate how AI shapes the negotiation of environmental sustainability as an issue of public interest. Challenging the prescribed means–end relationship between AI and environmental protection, we argue that the unquestioned investment in AI curtails political imagination and displaces discussion of climate “problems” and possible “solutions” with “technology education”. This line of argumentation is rooted in empirical findings that illuminate three key tensions in current coproduction efforts: “AI talk vs. AI walk”, “civics washing vs. civics involvement” and “public invitation vs. public participation”. Emphasising the importance of re-exploring the innovative state in climate governance, this paper extends academic literature in science and technology studies that examines public participation in climate change adaptation by shedding light on the emergent phenomenon of public interest AI. (shrink)

The introduction of Artificial Intelligence systems has demonstrated impeccable potential and benefits to enhance the decision-making processes in our society. However, despite the successful performance of AI systems to date, skepticism and concern remain regarding whether AI systems could form a trusting relationship with human users. Developing trusted AI systems requires careful consideration and evaluation of its reproducibility, interpretability, and fairness, which in in turn, poses increased expectations and responsibilities for data scientists. Therefore, the current study focused on (...) understanding Canadian data scientists’ self-confidence in creating trusted AI systems, while relying on their current AI system development practices. (shrink)

This Special Publication will be an important tool for geoscientists, aimed at increasing the awareness of their societal role and responsibility in conducting education, research and practice activities. What are the responsibilities of a geoscientist? And what motivations are needed to push geoscientists to practice the Earth sciences in an ethical way? The major environmental challenges affecting human communities require not only a strictly scientific and technical preparation by the geoscientists, but also a reflection on their broader obligations (...) towards society. It is important that geoscientists consider geoethics as an indispensable framework on which to base their training and activity. The principles of geoethics can guide them to pursue the common good by weighing the benefits and costs of each choice, and identifying eco-friendly and society-friendly solutions that guarantee the respect of the right balance between human life and the dynamics of the Earth. Communication and dissemination of geosciences should become core activities in building a knowledge-based society, which is able better to protect itself and the Earth ecosystems in order to guarantee a life in harmony with our planet for future generations. (shrink)

This paper examines whether corporate environmental responsibility is influenced by regional differences in climate change denial. While there is an overwhelming consensus among scientists that climate change is happening, recent surveys still indicate widespread climate change denial across societies. Given that corporate activity causing climate change is fundamentally rooted in individual beliefs and societal institutions, we examine whether local perceptions about climate change matter for firms’ engagement in environmental responsibility. We use climate change perception surveys conducted in (...) the U.S. to compute a novel measure of climate change denial for each U.S. county. We find that firms located in counties with higher levels of climate change denial have weaker environmental performance ratings, are more likely to commit environmental violations, and impose greater environmental costs on society. Regional differences in religiosity, social capital, political leaning, or county-level demographic characteristics cannot explain these results. Furthermore, we document that strong corporate governance mechanisms and corporate culture moderate the negative relationship between climate change denial and corporate environmental responsibility. Overall, our findings offer new insights into how local beliefs and perceptions about climate change may influence firm-level sustainability practices. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked interest in various areas, including marketing. However, this exhilaration is being tempered by growing concerns about the moral and legal implications of using AI in marketing. Although previous research has revealed various ethical and legal issues, such as algorithmic discrimination and data privacy, there are no definitive answers. This paper aims to fill this gap by investigating AI’s ethical and legal concerns in marketing and suggesting feasible solutions.,The paper synthesises information from academic articles, industry reports, (...) case studies and legal documents through a thematic literature review. A qualitative analysis approach categorises and interprets ethical and legal challenges and proposes potential solutions.,The findings of this paper raise concerns about ethical and legal challenges related to AI in the marketing area. Ethical concerns related to discrimination, bias, manipulation, job displacement, absence of social interaction, cybersecurity, unintended consequences, environmental impact, privacy and legal issues such as consumer security, responsibility, liability, brand protection, competition law, agreements, data protection, consumer protection and intellectual property rights are discussed in the paper, and their potential solutions are discussed.,Notwithstanding the interesting insights gathered from this investigation of the ethical and legal consequences of AI in marketing, it is important to recognise the limits of this research. Initially, the focus of this study is confined to a review of the most important ethical and legal issues pertaining to AI in marketing. Additional possible repercussions, such as those associated with intellectual property, contracts and licencing, should be investigated more deeply in future studies. Despite the fact that this study gives various answers and best practices for tackling the stated ethical and legal concerns, the viability and efficacy of these solutions may differ depending on the context and industry. Thus, more research and case studies are required to evaluate the applicability and efficacy of these solutions in other circumstances. This research is mostly based on a literature review and may not represent the experiences or opinions of all stakeholders engaged in AI-powered marketing. Further study might involve interviews or surveys with marketing professionals, customers and other key stakeholders to offer a full knowledge of the practical difficulties and solutions. Because of the rapid speed of technical progress, AI’s ethical and regulatory ramifications in marketing are continually increasing. Consequently, this work should be a springboard for more research and continuing conversations on this subject.,This study’s findings have several practical implications for marketing professionals. Emphasising openness and explainability: Marketing professionals should prioritise transparency in their use of AI, ensuring that customers are fully informed about data collection and utilisation for targeted advertising. By promoting openness and explainability, marketers can foster customer trust and avoid the negative consequences of a lack of transparency. Establishing ethical guidelines: Marketing professionals need to develop ethical rules for the creation and implementation of AI-powered marketing strategies. Adhering to ethical principles ensures compliance with legal norms and aligns with the organisation’s values and ideals. Investing in bias detection tools and privacy-enhancing technology: To mitigate risks associated with AI in marketing, marketers should allocate resources to develop and implement bias detection tools and privacy-enhancing technology. These tools can identify and address biases in AI algorithms, safeguard consumer privacy and extract valuable insights from consumer data.,This study’s social implications emphasise the need for a comprehensive approach to address the ethical and legal challenges of AI in marketing. This includes adopting a responsible innovation framework, promoting ethical leadership, using ethical decision-making frameworks and conducting multidisciplinary research. By incorporating these approaches, marketers can navigate the complexities of AI in marketing responsibly, foster an ethical organisational culture, make informed ethical decisions and develop effective solutions. Such practices promote public trust, ensure equitable distribution of benefits and risk, and mitigate potential negative social consequences associated with AI in marketing.,To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is among the first to explore potential solutions comprehensively. This paper provides a nuanced understanding of the challenges by using a multidisciplinary framework and synthesising various sources. It contributes valuable insights for academia and industry. (shrink)

In this paper we, an epistemologist and a machine learning scientist, argue that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI – the ethics of belief for AI. Here we take the ethics of belief to refer to a field at the intersection of epistemology and ethics concerned with possible moral, practical, and other non-truth-related dimensions of belief. In this paper we will primarily be concerned with the normative question within the ethics of belief regarding what (...) agents – both human and artificial – ought to believe, rather than with questions concerning whether beliefs meet certain evaluative standards such as being true, being justified, constituting knowledge, etc. We suggest four topics in extant work in the ethics of (human) belief that can be applied to an ethics of AI belief: doxastic wronging by AI (morally wronging someone in virtue of beliefs held about them); morally owed beliefs (beliefs that agents are morally obligated to hold); pragmatic and moral encroachment (cases where the practical or moral features of a belief is relevant to its epistemic status, and in our case specifically to whether an agent ought to hold the belief); and moral responsibility for AI beliefs. We also indicate two relatively nascent areas of philosophical research that haven’t yet been generally recognized as ethics of AI belief research, but that do fall within this field of research in virtue of investigating various moral and practical dimensions of belief: the epistemic and ethical decolonization of AI; and epistemic injustice in AI. (shrink)

Healthcare systems across the globe are struggling with increasing costs and worsening outcomes. This presents those responsible for overseeing healthcare with a challenge. Increasingly, policymakers, politicians, clinical entrepreneurs and computer and data scientists argue that a key part of the solution will be ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI) – particularly Machine Learning (ML). This argument stems not from the belief that all healthcare needs will soon be taken care of by “robot doctors.” Instead, it is an argument that rests on the (...) classic counterfactual definition of AI as an umbrella term for a range of techniques that can be used to make machines complete tasks in a way that would be considered intelligent were they to be completed by a human. Automation of this nature could offer great opportunities for the improvement of healthcare services and ultimately patients’ health by significantly improving human clinical capabilities in diagnosis, drug discovery, epidemiology, personalised medicine, and operational efficiency. However, if these AI solutions are to be embedded in clinical practice, then at least three issues need to be considered: the technical possibilities and limitations; the ethical, regulatory and legal framework; and the governance framework. In this article, we report on the results of a systematic analysis designed to provide a clear overview of the second of these elements: the ethical, regulatory and legal framework. We find that ethical issues arise at six levels of abstraction (individual, interpersonal, group, institutional, sectoral, and societal) and can be categorised as epistemic, normative, or overarching. We conclude by stressing how important it is that the ethical challenges raised by implementing AI in healthcare settings are tackled proactively rather than reactively and map the key considerations for policymakers to each of the ethical concerns highlighted. (shrink)

Scientists and engineers lack the equivalent of an ethics committee to which their colleagues in the medical profession may turn when ethical dilemmas arise. In the US workers in aerospace industry have campaigned for a Technology Bill of Rights. In the UK there has been a vigorous movement around the concept of socially useful and environmentally desirable technology. The organisation Scientists for Social Responsibility has set up a panel of scientists who can advise younger colleagues on issues (...) of ethical responsibility. (shrink)

This paper aims to engineer the concept of biomimetic design for its application in agricultural technology as an innovation strategy to sustain non-human species’ adaptation to today’s rapid environmental changes. By questioning the alleged intrinsic morality of biomimicry, a formulation of it is sought that goes beyond the sharp distinction between nature as inspiration and the human field of application of biomimetic technologies. After reviewing the main literature on Responsible Innovation, we support Vincent Blok’s “eco-centric” perspective on biomimicry, which (...) considers the human and natural worlds as indistinguishable parts of a shared Earth. We propose this approach as a complement to the “evomimetic” critique, which warns biomimetic research against the limits of adaptationism. By merging these two reframing of the biomimicry concept, we thus pave the way for a new understanding of the use of human-inspired technology (such as artificial intelligence) to help the “evolution” of domesticated species into (semi)autonomous natural-technological hybrids. In particular, the examples we consider concern the potential of AI-enabled robotic bases in technological beekeeping. (shrink)

This paper examines whether corporate environmental responsibility is influenced by regional differences in climate change denial. While there is an overwhelming consensus among scientists that climate change is happening, recent surveys still indicate widespread climate change denial across societies. Given that corporate activity causing climate change is fundamentally rooted in individual beliefs and societal institutions, we examine whether local perceptions about climate change matter for firms’ engagement in environmental responsibility. We use climate change perception surveys conducted in (...) the U.S. to compute a novel measure of climate change denial for each U.S. county. We find that firms located in counties with higher levels of climate change denial have weaker environmental performance ratings, are more likely to commit environmental violations, and impose greater environmental costs on society. Regional differences in religiosity, social capital, political leaning, or county-level demographic characteristics cannot explain these results. Furthermore, we document that strong corporate governance mechanisms and corporate culture moderate the negative relationship between climate change denial and corporate environmental responsibility. Overall, our findings offer new insights into how local beliefs and perceptions about climate change may influence firm-level sustainability practices. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to further our understanding of the “GM is unnatural” view, and of the critical response to it. While many people have been reported to hold the view that GM is unnatural, many policy-makers and their advisors have suggested that the view must be ignored or rejected, and that there are scientific reasons for doing so. Three “typical” examples of ways in which the “GM is unnatural” view has been treated by UK policy-makers and their (...) advisors are explored. These are the Government’s position (DEFRA Report), the account of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and the position of Nigel Halford, a scientist with an advisory role to the Government. I show that their accounts fail to mount a convincing critique. Then, I draw on an empirical research project held during 2003–2004 at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the north east of England. Scientists met with non-scientists in a range of facilitated one-to-one conversations (“exchanges”) on various environmental issues, one of which was on GM. Our findings show that some scientists who rejected the “GM is unnatural” view struggled to do so consistently. Their struggle is interpreted in terms of a conflict between a so-called “scientific” worldview, and a different worldview that underlies the concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view. This worldview is explored further by an examination of their concerns. What distinguishes this worldview from the “scientific” worldview is that the instrumentalization of the nonhuman world is questioned to a larger extent. I conclude that, because the underlying concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view were not with GM as such, yet with a worldview that was considered to be problematic, and of which many GM applications were held to be expressions, policy-makers and their advisors should reflect on the critical worldview of those who claim that GM is unnatural if they want to engage seriously with their concerns. (shrink)

To support the trustworthiness of AI systems, it is essential to have precise methods to determine what or who is to account for the behaviour, or the outcome, of AI systems. The assignment of responsibility to an AI system is closely related to the identification of individuals or elements that have caused the outcome of the AI system. In this work, we present an overview of approaches that aim at modelling responsibility of AI systems, discuss their advantages and shortcomings to (...) deal with various aspects of the notion of responsibility, and present research gaps and ways forward. (shrink)

The perception of two key stakeholders such as policymakers and scientists on genetic modification (GM) technology was examined in Ghana and Nigeria using semi-structured interviews. A total sample of 20 policymakers (16 at ministries and 4 at parliament/cabinet) and 58 scientists (43 at research institutes and 15 at universities) participated at the interviews. This study revealed respondents perspectives on potential benefits and risks of GM technology, status and development of biosafety regulatory frameworks, role of science and technology innovation (...) in agricultural development, intellectual property right and related issues. The study also shed some light on a possible influence of the European Union and United States in the development and potential adoption of GM technology. More importantly, the article suggests that most respondents including policymakers believe that GM technology has great potential to solve part of agricultural problems in both countries. But, lack of appropriate regulatory framework, lack of trained personnel, weak institutions and poor equipped laboratory among others represent a significant challenge in introducing GM technology in this part of Africa. (shrink)

This paper explores and discusses the various meanings of the stewardship concept in the field of sustainability science. We highlight the increasing differences between alternative approaches to stewardship and propose a typology to enable scientists and practitioners to more precisely identify the basis and objectives of the concept of stewardship. We first present the two dimensions we used to map the diversity of stances concerning stewardship. Second, we analyse these positions in relation to the limits of the systemic approach, (...) ideological manipulation, responsibility, and solidarity. In the final section we explain how the concept of ecological solidarity, a core principal in recent French law on biodiversity conservation and national park governance can contribute to the underpinning of a specific form of social-ecological stewardship. (shrink)

Abstract:Many scientists argue that the world is becoming increasingly dominated by human activity, much to the detriment of the natural world. In what scholars have dubbed the Anthropocene, the current geological epoch during which time human activity has been the dominating force over climate and the environment, many questions of environmental ethics have arisen. Who does the earth belong to? What is the relationship between humans and the environment? What is the moral standing of non-human life? Locke and (...) Rousseau provide varying answers to these questions, which are central to discussions of environmental ethics. In many ways, Locke and Rousseau's answers are opposed to each other, suggesting a differing world view when it comes to environmental ethics. Locke's understanding of environmental ethics seems to dominate, and perhaps even cause, the onset of the Anthropocene, but Rousseau's response, and a potential turn toward his understanding of environmental ethics marks an ideological shift in the way that humans understand their relationship with the world around them. This paper argues that the writings of Locke and Rousseau correspond to different stages of the Anthropocene with significant effects on both environmental ethics and environmental governance and policy. (shrink)

Recent anxieties about the deterioration of the global environment have had the effect of intensifying the ambiguity that surrounds the social roles of scientists and engineers. This has happened not merely, as suggested at the outset, because the environmental crisis has made their roles more conspicuous. Nor is it merely because recent disasters have alerted us to new, or hitherto unrecognized, social consequences of using the latest science-based technologies. What also requires recognition is that ideas about the social (...) role of modern science and engineering are embedded in, hence mediated by, larger views of the world. Within such American worldviews, moreover, the status of science and engineering is closely bound up with their perceived effect upon the environment.In the dominant culture, accordingly, the respect given to scientists and engineers is in large measure dependent on their ability to play the central role assigned to them in the historical narrative about progress. As the ostensible heroes of that popular story, they are expected to lead the way in realizing the promise of prosperity and general well-being. The environmental crisis surely has diminished the credibility of that story, thereby causing the social role of science and engineering to seem more dubious — more ambiguous. To be sure, the crisis also may have the effect, for very different reasons, of increasing the power and responsibility of organized science. But the late twentieth-century task of damage control cannot possibly elicit anything like the respect accorded to organized science by the earlier belief in progress.It also is important to recall, finally, that the narrative of progress itself has undergone a disillusioning transformation. The early Enlightenment version of the story depicted scientists and engineers working in the service of a social and political ideal that all people could share. But the later technocratic concept of progress, with its sterile instrumentalist notion of advancing the power of science-based technology as an end in itself, is far less likely to inspire trust. Its patent inadequacies have had the effect of enhancing the appeal, if only by contrast, of the seemingly “anti-science” ideologies of pastoralism and primitivism. All of which might be taken to suggest that if the scientific and engineering professions want to recover some of the respect and status they once had, they would be well advised to join with sympathetic humanists and social scientists in recuperating some of the idealism that the project of modern science formerly derived from its place within the ideology of progress. That might entail the sacrifice of their technocratic posture of neutrality, dissociating themselves from people and institutions responsible for environmental degradation, and their help in formulating a new concept — which is to say, new criteria — of progress to which they might commit themselves. A primary test of any proposed social policy under this new dispensation surely would be whether it would improve, or at a minimum protect, the life-enhancing capacities of the global ecosystem. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00011 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00012 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00013. (shrink)

Dr Stockmann, the principal character in Henrik Ibsen's A Public Enemy, is a classic example of a whistle-blower who, upon detecting and disclosing a serious case of environmental pollution, quickly finds himself transformed from a public benefactor into a political outcast by those in power. If we submit the play to a ‘second reading’, however, it becomes clear that the ethical intricacies of whistle-blowing are interwoven with epistemological issues. Basically, the play is about the complex task of communicating scientific (...) (notably microbiological) data to lay audiences. This becomes even more apparent when we realise that Stockmann was a contemporary of real ‘microbe hunters’ such as Pasteur and Koch. The play's basic message is that epoch-making scientists (such as Pasteur and Koch) not only produced convincing and reliable data from a scientific point of view, but also acquired the skills and insights needed to enter into a dialogue with their cultural and societal environment. (shrink)

Biological scientists, like scientists in other disciplines, are uncertain about whether or how to use their knowledge and time to provide society with insight and guidance in handling the effects of inventions and discoveries. This article addresses this issue. It presents a typography of structures in which scientists may contribute to social understanding and decisions. It describes the different ways in which these contributions can be made. Finally it develops the ethical arguments that justify the view that (...) biological scientists have social responsibilities. (shrink)

This paper discusses the announcement by a team of researchers that they identified a genetic influence for a range of “antisocial” behaviours in the New Zealand Māori population (dubbed the “warrior gene”). The behaviours included criminality, violence, gambling and alcoholism. The reported link between genetics and behaviour met with much controversy. The scientists were described as hiding behind a veneer of supposedly “objective” western science, using it to perpetuate “racist and oppressive discourses”. In this paper we examine what went (...) wrong in the dissemination of the research. We chose as our framework the debate around the “internal/external” responsibilities of scientists. Using this discourse we argue that when the researchers ventured to explain their research in terms of social phenomena, they assumed a duty to ensure that their findings were placed “in context”. By “in context”, we argue that evidence of any genetic influence on behavioural characteristics should not be reported in isolation, but instead presented alongside other environmental, cultural and socio-economic influences that may also contribute to the studied behaviour. Rather than imposing a new obligation on scientists, we find this duty to contextualise results is in keeping with the spirit of codes of ethics already in place. Lessons from the “warrior gene” controversy may assist researchers elsewhere to identify potential areas of conflict before they jeopardise research relationships, or disseminate findings in a manner that fuels misleading and/or potentially discriminatory attitudes in society. (shrink)

This comprehensive analysis dives deep into the intricate interplay between artificial intelligence (AI) and human agency, examining the remarkable capabilities and inherent limitations of large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-3 and ChatGPT. The paper traces the complex trajectory of AI's evolution, highlighting its operation based on statistical pattern recognition, devoid of self-consciousness or innate comprehension. As AI permeates multiple spheres of human life, it raises substantial ethical, legal, and societal concerns that demand immediate attention and deliberation. The metaphorical illustration (...) of humans as “shepherds” of AI, coupled with a thought-provoking examination of “agency without intelligence,” engenders deep reflections on the future of human-AI interplay and the associated philosophical, ethical, and practical ramifications. The paper further elucidates critical challenges associated with AI, such as ethical dilemmas, “agency without intelligence,” the role of human oversight, and the environmental impact of AI technologies. In the pursuit of solutions, the paper maps prospective directions, emphasizing the need for robust AI policies, improved AI literacy, sustainable AI practices, and a continued dialogue on the multifaceted issues surrounding AI. Through a holistic exploration of AI, this paper underlines the necessity for a multidisciplinary, collaborative approach to chart an ethical, beneficial, and sustainable AI future, enabling society to harness the potential of AI responsibly while mitigating the associated risks. (shrink)

Many of the mathematicians and scientists who guided the development of digital computers in the late 1940s, such as Alan Turing and John von Neumann, saw these new devices not just as tools for calculation but as devices that might employ the same principles as are exhibited in rational human thought. Thus, a subfield of what came to be called computer science assumed the label artificial intelligence. The idea of building artificial systems which could exhibit intelligent behavior comparable to (...) that of humans was a heady prospect, and the claims made on behalf of AI during the 1950s and 1960s were impossibly ambitious. Despite some theoretical and applied successes within the field, serious problems soon became evident. Instead of fulfilling the goal of quickly producing artificial intelligent agents which could compete with or outperform human beings, by the 1970s and 1980s AI had settled into a pattern of slower but real progress in modeling or simulating aspects of human intelligence. (shrink)

The use of black box algorithms in medicine has raised scholarly concerns due to their opaqueness and lack of trustworthiness. Concerns about potential bias, accountability and responsibility, patient autonomy and compromised trust transpire with black box algorithms. These worries connect epistemic concerns with normative issues. In this paper, we outline that black box algorithms are less problematic for epistemic reasons than many scholars seem to believe. By outlining that more transparency in algorithms is not always necessary, and by explaining that (...) computational processes are indeed methodologically opaque to humans, we argue that the reliability of algorithms provides reasons for trusting the outcomes of medical artificial intelligence. To this end, we explain how computational reliabilism, which does not require transparency and supports the reliability of algorithms, justifies the belief that results of medical AI are to be trusted. We also argue that several ethical concerns remain with black box algorithms, even when the results are trustworthy. Having justified knowledge from reliable indicators is, therefore, necessary but not sufficient for normatively justifying physicians to act. This means that deliberation about the results of reliable algorithms is required to find out what is a desirable action. Thus understood, we argue that such challenges should not dismiss the use of black box algorithms altogether but should inform the way in which these algorithms are designed and implemented. When physicians are trained to acquire the necessary skills and expertise, and collaborate with medical informatics and data scientists, black box algorithms can contribute to improving medical care. (shrink)

What is the significance of the wicked problems framework for environmental philosophy? In response to wicked problems, environmental scientists are starting to welcome the participation of social scientists, humanists, and the creative arts. We argue that the need for interdisciplinary approaches to wicked problems opens up a number of tasks that environmental philosophers have every right to undertake. The first task is for philosophers to explore new and promising ways of initiating philosophical research through conducting (...) collaborative learning processes on environmental issues. The second task is for philosophers to recognize the value of philosophical skills in their engagements with members of other disciplines and walks of life in addressing wicked problems. The wicked problems framework should be seen as an important guide for facilitating philosophical research that is of relevance to problems like climate change and sustainable agriculture. Content Type Journal Article Category Articles Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9344-0 Authors Paul B. Thompson, Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, 503 S. Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA Kyle Powys Whyte, Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, 503 S. Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863. (shrink)

Environmental scientists and engineers have been exploring research and monitoring applications of robotics, as well as exploring ways of integrating robotics into ecosystems to aid in responses to accelerating environmental, climatic, and biodiversity changes. These emerging applications of robots and other autonomous technologies present novel ethical and practical challenges. Yet, the critical applications of robots for environmental research, engineering, protection and remediation have received next to no attention in the ethics of robotics literature to date. This (...) paper seeks to fill that void, and promote the study of environmental robotics. It provides key resources for further critical examination of the issues environmental robots present by explaining and differentiating the sorts of environmental robotics that exist to date and identifying unique conceptual, ethical, and practical issues they present. (shrink)

Environmental scientists and engineers have been exploring research and monitoring applications of robotics, as well as exploring ways of integrating robotics into ecosystems to aid in responses to accelerating environmental, climatic, and biodiversity changes. These emerging applications of robots and other autonomous technologies present novel ethical and practical challenges. Yet, the critical applications of robots for environmental research, engineering, protection and remediation have received next to no attention in the ethics of robotics literature to date. This (...) paper seeks to fill that void, and promote the study of environmental robotics. It provides key resources for further critical examination of the issues environmental robots present by explaining and differentiating the sorts of environmental robotics that exist to date and identifying unique conceptual, ethical, and practical issues they present. (shrink)

The problems of the social responsibility of the scientist became a subject of public debate after the World War II in Japan, thanks to the activities and publications of Yukawa and Tomonaga. And such authors as J. Karaki, M.Taketani, Y. Murakami, and S. Fujinaga continued discussion in their books. However, many people seem to be still unaware of the most important source of these problems. As I see it, one of the most important treatments of these problems was the Franck (...) Report (June 11, 1945) submitted to the US government by James Franck (chairman) toward the end of the war. This Report contains many important ideas and suggestions as regards the responsibility of the scientist, the morality of the use of atomic bombs, the prospective nuclear armaments race, and the possibility of international control of nuclear power. However, I should like to concentrate only on the first topic in this paper. Why did Franck and his committee at Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago feel the urgent need for writing and submitting this Report? According to the Report, "in the past, scientists could disclaim direct responsibility for the use to which mankind had put their disinterested discoveries. We cannot take the same attitude now because the success which we have achieved in the development of nuclear power is fraught with infinitely greater dangers than were all the inventions of the past." (I. Preamble) This passage seems to contain the crux of our problem: These scientists clearly recognize the "new" responsibility for them, and the ground of this responsibility is also clear enough; i.e., when a new scientific discovery or invention turns out to have grave bearings on human interests, the scientists who became aware of that are responsible for notifying people of this and advise to look for suitable means for avoiding prospective dangers. In the rest of the paper, I elaborate the reasoning behind the preceding passage, and confirm that basically the same idea and reasoning has been repeated and developed in Russell-Einstein Manifesto (1955), by Pugwash Conferences (first in 1957), by Tomogana, and by Rotblat (the long-time Secretary of Pugwash, who received the Nobel Peace Prize together with the Conference in 1995). (shrink)

Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat was one of the most distinguished scientists and peace campaigners of the post second world war period. He made significant contributions to nuclear physics and worked on the development of the atomic bomb. He then became one of the world’s leading researchers into the biological effects of radiation. His life from the early 1950s until his death in August 2005 was devoted to the abolition of nuclear weapons and peace. For this he was awarded the (...) Nobel Peace Prize, together with Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (that he helped found) in 1995. His work in this area ranked with that of Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell and this article is an attempt to summarise his life, achievements, but in particular outline his views on the moral responsibilities of the scientist. He is a towering intellectual figure and his contributions to mankind should be better known and more widely understood. (shrink)

In 1980, the 85 year-old mystic and thinker Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895–1986), having been introduced to the subject of artificial intelligence by computer scientists, became engrossed in the challenge posed to the human mind by the prospect of the machine taking over its processes and faculties. What makes Krishnamurti’s angle worthy of separate discussion is that it accentuates not social and cultural ramifications, but a mostly overlooked potential philosophical and psychological crisis. As a thinker and mystic whose life work entirely (...) centred on the transformation of the human mind, Krishnamurti worried that an insufficiently cultivated mind that had been employed merely for material and mechanical purposes would be perfectly imitable and thus replaceable by computers and other machines. Thus, our main concern should not be machines attaining humanlike minds, but people having machinelike minds. I argue that the particular dimension of the AI–mind encounter elucidated by Krishnamurti can significantly broaden the field of the philosophy of artificial intelligence. Firstly, Krishnamurti’s investigation further problematizes the field by handing us the question: ‘If the machine can take over everything man can do, and do it still better than us, then what is a human being?’ Accordingly, he demonstrates, deploying phenomenological observations, various ways in which human thought is worryingly computational and machinelike. Secondly, since Krishnamurti’s approach is transformative and arguably soteriological, he offers intriguing ways in which we could consider the inherently nonmechanical yet unactualized faculties of the mind. Since Krishnamurti’s observations involve an insight into the present condition of the mind and a potential active response to this condition, they have some pertinence to both the primary discourse in the field – the interrelations between artificial intelligence and aspects of human cognition – and the emerging discussion of meaningfulness in life in the face of AI. (shrink)

Could low-level exposure to polluting chemicals be analogous to exercise -- a beneficial source of stress that strengthens the body? Some scientists studying the phenomenon of hormesis claim that that this may be the case.s A Little Pollution Good For You? critically examines the current evidence for hormesis.

This article describes how a small but vocal group of biomedical scientists propagates the views that either HIV is not the cause of AIDS, or that it does not exist at all. When these views were rejected by mainstream science, this group took its views and arguments into the public domain, actively campaigning via newspapers, radio, and television to make its views known to the lay public. I describe some of the harmful consequences of the group's activities, and ask (...) two distinct ethical questions: what moral obligations do scientists who hold such minority views have with regard to a scientifically untrained lay audience, and what moral obligations do mainstream newspapers and government politicians have when it comes to such views. The latter question will be asked because the 'dissidents' succeeded for a number of years in convincing the South African government of the soundness of their views. The consequences of their stance affected millions of HIV infected South Africans severely. (shrink)

Minorities who disagree with the “scientific consensus” must be allowed to air their viewsI will begin by discussing the example used in Schüklenk’s paper1 of the self proclaimed “HIV dissidents” and then discuss whether the recommendations made are useful and could be applied to other examples in science.Schüklenk’s primary concern according to his title is with the professional responsibilities of biomedical scientists engaging in public discourse. The example given is of the effect that self proclaimed HIV dissidents have (...) had on the provision of HIV related public health measures in South Africa. Fundamental to the example given is a distinction that both Schüklenk and indeed the general public often fail to make. It is important to recognise the difference between biomedical science and clinical practice. Science and medicine are two distinct fields, each with their own historically founded methods and purposes; they have had little in common with each other until relatively recently. Schüklenk confuses the two when he judges a scientific hypothesis by its clinical utility."It certainly seemed prudent to me at the time to give support to critics of a hypothesis, the pursuit of which had done little to bring those in need closer to life extending or life saving AIDS drugs."He later reconsiders his position on the basis of new clinical evidence."My own conversion to the mainstream view took place roughly when dissident predictions about AIDS deaths resulting from what they believed were highly poisonous drug cocktails—that is, triple therapy, did not occur, and when it became clear that actually the opposite was true; these drugs were at least life extending. I saw … ". (shrink)

Our massive tampering with the world's interdependent web of life-coupled with the environmental damage inflicted by deforestation, species loss, and climate change-could trigger widespread adverse effects, including unpredictable collapses of critical biological systems whose interactions and dynamics we only imperfectly understand. Uncertainty over the extent of these effects cannot excuse complacency or delay in facing the threats ... We the undersigned, senior members of the world's scientific community, hereby warn all humanity of what lies ahead. A great change in (...) our stewardship of the earth and the life on it is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated. (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1992). (shrink)

In the past few years, the ethical ramifications of AI technologies have been at the center of intense debates. Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding how a morally responsible practice of data science can be promoted and which values have to shape it. In this context, ethics and moral responsibility have been mainly conceptualized as compliance to widely shared principles. However, several scholars have highlighted the limitations of such a principled approach. Drawing from microethics and the virtue theory tradition, (...) in this paper, we formulate a different approach to ethics in data science which is based on a different conception of “being ethical” and, ultimately, of what it means to promote a morally responsible data science. First, we develop the idea that, rather than only compliance, ethical decision-making consists in using certain moral abilities, which are cultivated by practicing and exercising them in the data science process. An aspect of virtue development that we discuss here is moral attention, which is the ability of data scientists to identify the ethical relevance of their own technical decisions in data science activities. Next, by elaborating on the capability approach, we define a technical act as ethically relevant when it impacts one or more of the basic human capabilities of data subjects. Therefore, rather than “applying ethics”, data scientists should cultivate ethics as a form of reflection on how technical choices and ethical impacts shape one another. Finally, we show how this microethical framework concretely works, by dissecting the ethical dimension of the technical procedures involved in data understanding and preparation of electronic health records. (shrink)

We examine how corporate environmental responsibility affects the cost of equity capital for manufacturing firms in 30 countries. Using several approaches to estimate firms’ ex ante equity financing costs, we find in regressions that control for firm-level characteristics as well as industry, year, and country effects that the cost of equity capital is lower when firms have higher CER. This finding is robust to addressing endogeneity through instrumental variables, to using alternative specifications and proxies for the cost of equity (...) capital, and to accounting for noise in analyst forecasts. We conclude that investment in CER reduces firms’ equity financing costs worldwide. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to investigate how living lab (LL) activities align with responsible research and innovation (RRI) principles, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI)-driven digital transformation (DT) processes. The study seeks to define a framework termed “responsible living lab” (RLL), emphasizing transparency, stakeholder engagement, ethics and sustainability. This emerging issue paper also proposes several directions for future researchers in the field. Design/methodology/approach The research methodology involved a literature review complemented by insights from a workshop on defining RLLs. The literature review (...) followed a concept-centric approach, searching key journals and conferences, yielding 32 relevant articles. Backward and forward citation analysis added 19 more articles. The workshop, conducted in the context of UrbanTestbeds.JR and SynAir-G projects, used a reverse brainstorming approach to explore potential ethical and responsible issues in LL activities. In total, 13 experts engaged in collaborative discussions, highlighting insights into AI’s role in promoting RRI within LL activities. The workshop facilitated knowledge sharing and a deeper understanding of RLL, particularly in the context of DT and AI. Findings This emerging issue paper highlights ethical considerations in LL activities, emphasizing user voluntariness, user interests and unintended participation. AI in DT introduces challenges like bias, transparency and digital divide, necessitating responsible practices. Workshop insights underscore challenges: AI bias, data privacy and transparency; opportunities: inclusive decision-making and efficient innovation. The synthesis defines RLLs as frameworks ensuring transparency, stakeholder engagement, ethical considerations and sustainability in AI-driven DT within LLs. RLLs aim to align DT with ethical values, fostering inclusivity, responsible resource use and human rights protection. Originality/value The proposed definition of RLL introduces a framework prioritizing transparency, stakeholder engagement, ethics and sustainability in LL activities, particularly those involving AI for DT. This definition aligns LL practices with RRI, addressing ethical implications of AI. The value of RLL lies in promoting inclusive and sustainable innovation, prioritizing stakeholder needs, fostering collaboration and ensuring environmental and social responsibility throughout LL activities. This concept serves as a foundational step toward a more responsible and sustainable LL approach in the era of AI-driven technologies. (shrink)

Several scientists have shown the importance of mitigating global warming and have highlighted a need for major social change, particularly when it comes to meat consumption and collective engagement. In the present study, we conducted a cross-sectional study to test the mismatch model, which aims at explaining what motivates individuals to participate in normative change. This model stipulates that perceiving a self—other difference in pro-environmental attitudes is the starting point and can motivate people to have high pro-environmental (...) intentions. This mismatch effect is explained by participants’ willingness to participate in normative and social change: people that perceive a gap between their personal attitude and the social norm should be more willing to participate in normative change. This should then motivate them to have high pro-environmental intentions on an individual and group level. The results confirm the hypothesized model on an individual and group level and explain how people can be motivated to participate in normative change. Implications of these findings and the need for further studies are discussed. (shrink)

Recent breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked a wide public debate on the potentialities of AI, including the prospect to evolve into a subject comparable to humans. While scientists typically avoid directly addressing this question, philosophers usually tend to largely dismiss such a possibility. This article begins by examining the historical and systematic context favoring this inclination. However, it argues that the speculative philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel offers a different perspective. Through an exploration (...) of Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, particularly the ‘Phenomenology of Mind’ and ‘Psychology’ sections, this article investigates the conceptual resources within Hegel’s philosophy to understand and evaluate both current ‘weak’ AI and potential ‘strong’ AI. It contends that, according to the Hegelian speculative line of thought, AI is already partially ‘conscious,’ though not yet ‘intelligent’ or possessing a ‘mind.’ Furthermore, it highlights that the same line of thought does not philosophically dismiss the formal possibility of strong AI and artificial subjects like us; rather, it suggests that it is solely empirical research that possesses the competence to rigorously investigate the real possibility of such entities. Before reaching its conclusion, the article emphasizes that the Hegelian perspective implies a philosophy of integrating strong AI: if artificial subjects resembling humans become technically feasible, we have a moral responsibility to actively support their development from the beginning, similarly to how we nurture and welcome emerging human subjects into our families and societies. (shrink)

This paper argues that multinational corporations face levels of environmental and social responsibility higher than their national counterparts. Drawing on the literatures of stakeholder salience, corporate reputation management, and evidence from the confrontation between Shell and Greenpeace over the Brent Spar, in 1995, two mechanisms – international reputation side effects, and foreign stakeholder salience – are identified and their contribution in creating an environment more restrictive, in terms of environmental and social responsibility, is elaborated on. The paper concludes (...) with discussing the links of the work presented here with a number of ongoing debates within the filed of international business ethics, and the managerial implications of the two mechanisms identified. (shrink)

The application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in healthcare and epidemiology undoubtedly has many benefits for the population. However, due to its environmental impact, the use of AI can produce social inequalities and long-term environmental damages that may not be thoroughly contemplated. In this paper, we propose to consider the impacts of AI applications in medical care from the One Health paradigm and long-term global health. From health and environmental justice, rather than settling for a short and fleeting (...) green honeymoon between health and sustainability caused by AI, it should aim for a lasting marriage. To this end, we conclude by proposing that, in the upcoming years, it could be valuable and necessary to promote more interconnected health, call for environmental cost transparency, and increase green responsibility. (shrink)

The first part (“Is there a future?”), discusses the idea of the future in the context of Carl Schmitt’s vision for the spatial revolutions of modernity, and then the idea of Anthropocene, as a synonym for an environmental crisis endangering the very survival of humankind. From this point of view, the conquest of space and the colonization of Mars at the center of futuristic and technocratic visions appear to be an attempt to escape from human responsibilities on Earth. (...) The second part (“AI and other hyperobjects”) discusses the extent of intellectual hubris expressed in computation, AI (Garvin Minsky e Ray Kurzweil), and the philosophy of computing and information (Eric Fredkin), involved in the elaboration of new theoretical assessments on the ultimate nature of reality. Their vision is then contrasted and made to interact with that of philosopher Timothy Morton. He has taken the perspective of global warming and the possibility of ecological catastrophe seriously, avoiding all the futuristic enthusiasms and instead emphasizing the radical nature of the transformations that humans experience in the present. In this perspective, AI becomes one of the “hyperobjects,” like the Internet or climate change, in which humans are immersed. Morton’s hyperobjects delineate an uncanny view of the future; this uncanniness is not related to the supernatural but to the environment. The third section (“More-than-human-humanism”) further reflects on the “uncanniness” that human perceive in the encounters with the manifestations of hyperobjects. It also seeks to understand the human position in the face of the radical technological transformations induced by cybernetics and AI. This section discusses Anti-humanism, Transhumanism, and Posthumanism within the broader category of more-than-human thought, which seems to be a more appropriate term to clarify the possible misunderstandings induced by the word “posthuman” and “transhuman.” The central question is not to empower (Transhumanism) or disempower (Posthumanism) humans, but to see them in relation to what is not human, including other animals, the environment, and the machine. The analysis considers the works of Cary Wolfe, Jane Bennet, Bryant Levi, among others, and introduces ethical debates on cyborgs, robots, and Autonomous weapons systems (AWS). The fourth section (“Ethical Perspectives”) continues this inquiry, concentrating on the non-standard ethical theories of Luciano Floridi (Computer and Information Ethics) and David Gunkel (The question of the Machine). It examines the opportunity and feasibility of including in the discussion on the ethics of our time - characterized by the pervasiveness of AI - the notions of consciousness as theorized by Emmanuel Levinas’s Humanism of the Other and Paul Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another. Finally, the last section (“The time of the end?”) reflects on how the hyperobject, Anthropocene, re-establishes a sense of limits in human history and confirms the special responsibility of human beings, and supports the need for a more-than-human-humanism. The latter, in other words, means intertwining ourselves with a unique ecosystem which cannot be overlooked and which restores meaning to our relationship with the past, present, and future. The awareness of the current challenges of technology can and must express itself in different forms of resistance to the adverse effects of AI in our lives. The ethical approach based on the persisting role of human consciousness is essential, but it must be coupled with human decision-making and political action. (shrink)

This book provides methods and practical cases and experiences with the aim of stimulating Responsible Research and Innovation through the direct engagement of researchers, Civil Society Organisations, citizens, industry stakeholders, policy and decision makers, research funders and communicators. The book furthermore aims to advance debate on Responsible Research and Innovation and also to reinforce the RRI community identity. With chapters covering governance, public engagement and inclusion in responsible R&D and innovation processes; RRI actions in science education and communication; gender and (...) ethical issues in RRI initiatives; and sustainability of RRI processes, the book is solidly part of the Europe 2020 strategy to promote a vision for a stronger collaborations between social, natural and physical scientists and the societal actors for a wider dimensions of science and innovation and the role in environmental preservation. (shrink)

As a member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, I was involved in early deliberations about the appropriateness of publishing this avian influenza research when manuscripts were referred to us from two scientific journals during their review process, via the U.S. government. As described by David Resnik in this issue, we grappled with benefits and risks, and in our initial, unanimous decision recommended limited publication, alerting the world to the possibility of evolved transmissibility in these viruses but with (...) redaction of the exact genetic mutations that would enable anyone skilled in the art to synthesize these potentially dangerous viruses. However, after additional discussion, both internal and external to the board, we were asked to reconsider the situation, and this time a majority voted in favor of full publication. I was one of the minority that opposed full publication. Resnik points to the difficulties of performing a formal risk‐benefit assessment without the means of quantifying these two terms and suggests application of reasoning based on the precautionary principle instead. This makes sense. But there are three other issues that should be highlighted. (shrink)

When is it justified to use opaque artificial intelligence (AI) output in medical decision-making? Consideration of this question is of central importance for the responsible use of opaque machine learning (ML) models, which have been shown to produce accurate and reliable diagnoses, prognoses, and treatment suggestions in medicine. In this article, I discuss the merits of two answers to the question. According to the Explanation View, clinicians must have access to an explanation of why an output was produced. According to (...) the Validation View, it is sufficient that the AI system has been validated using established standards for safety and reliability. I defend the Explanation View against two lines of criticism, and I argue that within the framework of evidence-based medicine mere validation seems insufficient for the use of AI output. I end by characterizing the epistemic responsibility of clinicians and point out how a mere AI output cannot in itself ground a practical conclusion about what to do. (shrink)

Simion and Kelp develop the obligation-based account of trustworthiness as a compelling general account of trustworthiness and then apply this account to various instances of AI. By doing so, they explain in what way any AI can be considered trustworthy, as per the general account. Simion and Kelp identify that any account of trustworthiness that relies on assumptions of agency that are too anthropocentric, such as that being trustworthy, must involve goodwill. I argue that goodwill is a necessary condition for (...) being trustworthy and further suggest a network account of trustworthy AI, which retains the goodwill as the essential requirement for the concept of trustworthiness and meanwhile predicts that current AI can be trustworthy. The alternative account suggests that the focus of trustworthy AI is not merely AI technology, but the whole network of AI involving AI technology, AI designers, AI companies, and other social and legal institutions. A trustworthy AI requires that AI technology is reliable and that other involved agents are trustworthy. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) governance and auditing promise to bridge the gap between AI ethics principles and the responsible use of AI systems, but they require assessment mechanisms and metrics. Effective AI governance is not only about legal compliance; organizations can strive to go beyond legal requirements by proactively considering the risks inherent in their AI systems. In the past decade, investors have become increasingly active in advancing corporate social responsibility and sustainability practices. Including nonfinancial information related to environmental, social, (...) and governance (ESG) issues in investment analyses has become mainstream practice among investors. However, the AI auditing literature is mostly silent on the role of investors. The current study addresses two research questions: (1) how companies’ responsible use of AI is included in ESG investment analyses and (2) what connections can be found between principles of responsible AI and ESG ranking criteria. We conducted a series of expert interviews and analyzed the data using thematic analysis. Awareness of AI issues, measuring AI impacts, and governing AI processes emerged as the three main themes in the analysis. The findings indicate that AI is still a relatively unknown topic for investors, and taking the responsible use of AI into account in ESG analyses is not an established practice. However, AI is recognized as a potentially material issue for various industries and companies, indicating that its incorporation into ESG evaluations may be justified. There is a need for standardized metrics for AI responsibility, while critical bottlenecks and asymmetrical knowledge relations must be tackled. (shrink)

_Environmental Ethics_ provides an accessible, lively, and up-to-date introduction to the central issues and controversies in environmental ethics. Requiring no previous knowledge of philosophy or ethical theory, the book will be of interest to students, environmental scientists, environmental policy makers, and anyone curious to know what philosophers are saying today about the urgent environmental challenges we face. _ The book is divided into two parts. _Part One deals with theoretical issues in environmental philosophy, examining (...) a variety of ethical and environmental theories that provide diverse and thought-provoking perspectives on critical ecological issues. Part Two turns to applied environmental ethics, addressing current debates on topics such as climate change, biodiversity loss, wilderness preservation, responsibilities to future generations, population growth, overconsumption, food ethics, and ecological activism. _ Features include: _ Clear explanations of key concepts and theories that lie at the heart of current debates in environmental ethics. A mix of theory of practice that permits readers to apply diverse theoretical perspectives to key environmental debates. A wealth of pedagogical aids, including chapter summaries, discussion questions, suggested readings, and a glossary of important terms. (shrink)

The evolving dynamics of the marketplace, coupled with concerns regarding the finite capacity to meet increasing demands, have led to the emergence of new phenomena and practices. These developments, while heralding significant changes in the perception and selection of products and services, also elicit substantial concerns. Greenwashing is defined as the strategic practice by which corporations create a misleading impression of their environmental initiatives. This paper examines the theoretical foundations and multifaceted nature of greenwashing, identifying key deceptive strategies such (...) as hidden trade-offs, lack of verifiable evidence, vagueness, irrelevance, and false labels. It explores the motivations behind greenwashing, which often stem from the pressure to appear environmentally responsible without incurring the costs associated with genuine sustainability. The analysis underscores the broader implications of greenwashing, including its impact on consumer trust, corporate governance, and environmental policy. Additionally, the paper addresses the emerging issue of "machinewashing," wherein companies make exaggerated claims about the ethical aspects of their AI technologies. Furthermore, the concept of environmental vices is explored, illustrating how greenwashing perpetuates unethical behaviors and undermines authentic sustainability efforts. To address these practices, the study advocates for a comprehensive approach that includes stricter regulations, increased transparency, and greater engagement from civil society. By promoting genuine sustainability and holding corporations accountable, it is possible to restore consumer trust and support authentic environmental initiatives, thereby fostering a more sustainable and ethical commerce. (shrink)

Robert Hoffman's note, ‘Scientific Research and Moral Rectitude’ , 475–7), is a highly misleading introduction to this important topic. Hoffman points out that there are some people who ‘believe that the researcher's claim to freedom of inquiry should be upheld only if his discovery does not adversely affect mankind or any significant segment thereof’ , and his aim is to reject this belief. But such people are right, as can be shown by some counter-arguments and examples. But first a slight (...) qualification is necessary, for, as Hoffman points out, it is impossible before an inquiry to state categorically that its outcome will adversely affect mankind. But it may be possible to estimate whether it is likely to affect mankind adversely, and it is surely reasonable to hold that a researcher's claim to freedom of inquiry should not be upheld if it is likely that the inquiry will adversely affect mankind. If a nuclear physicist interested in particle fusion wishes to carry out research which is likely to lead to an uncontrolled nuclear explosion, no one would seriously uphold his right to carry out this research in a laboratory situated in a densely populated area. And to reply that he still has a right to carry out this research alone on a desert island would be to concede, not to circumvent, the claim that scientific research ought to be under the critical eye of moral responsibility. The critic of science would not in any case accept this reply, since he believes not unreasonably that nuclear explosions adversely affect mankind wherever on earth they occur. (shrink)