In Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7, Aristotle gives a definition of the human good, and he does so by means of the “ ergon argument.” I clear the way for a new interpretation of this argument by arguing that Aristotle does not think that the ergon of something is always the proper activity of that thing. Though he has a single concept of an ergon, Aristotle identifies the ergon of an X as an activity in some cases (...) but a product in others, depending on the sort of thing the X is—for while the ergon of the eye is seeing, the ergon of a sculptor is a sculpture. This alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of an ergon allows the key explanatory middle term of the ergon argument to be what, I argue, it ought to be: “the best achievement of a human.”. (shrink)

One of Elizabeth Anscombe’s most decisive legacies is the rejection of modern legalistic morality, in the name of a rescue of Aristotelian-inspired natural normativity. However, as I will argue in this contribution, this legacy does not seem to have been fully collected, neither by those who, like Philippa Foot, are explicitly inspired by Anscombe’s work, nor by those who, while apparently opposing its assumptions, have also somehow recovered it by different routes, as emblematically does Christine Korsgaard in her constitutivist proposal. (...) In more detail, I aim to explore the relationship between teleology and normativity at the crossroads between neo-Aristotelian naturalism and constitutivism: both theories, though opposed, rest normativity on a link between function (the Aristotelian ergon) and practical reason and fail precisely in declining this relationship convincingly. (shrink)

Das Xργον-Argument, das Aristoteles selbst als das Kernstück bei der Bestimmung des gelingenden Lebens ansieht, findet sich in variierter Form sowohl in der Nikomachischen Ethik als auch in der Eudemischen Ethik. Die vorliegende Abhandlung rekonstruiert zuerst skizzenartig die beiden Argumentationsgänge zwecks Akzentuierung der an der Oberfläche der Argumentation sichtbaren Unterschiede. Diese Unterschiede werden anschließend darauf hin untersucht, ob sie Ausdruck einer genuin divergenten Tiefenstruktur der Argumente und ihrer Voraussetzungen sind, oder ob sie sich doch auf ein geteiltes Grundverständnis zurückführen lassen. (...) Im Zentrum der Analyse stehen die Bedeutung und Funktion zentraler Grundbegriffe wie Xργον, τXλειον und áρετh sowie die daraus resultierende Interpretation der beiden εbδαιμονiα-Bestimmungen zum Abschluß der Argumente. Auf der Basis dieser Ausführungen wird entgegen der in der Forschung vorherrschenden dissoziierenden Interpretation der beiden Xργον-Argumente für eine unifizierende Lesart plädiert; aus dieser Interpretation werden abschließend einige Schlußfolgerungen für die Voraussetzungen eines adäquaten Verständnisses der aristotelischen εbδαιμονiα in toto gezogen. (shrink)

This paper explores the tension between two views attributed to Plato: 1) that every person in a just society must fulfil his function, and 2) justice requires philosophical wisdom. It is argued that is not Plato’s view in Republic, and that this can be seen as early as Book II.

Scholars have often thought that a monistic reading of Aristotle’s definition of the human good – in particular, one on which “best and most teleios virtue” refers to theoretical wisdom – cannot follow from the premises of the ergon argument. I explain how a monistic reading can follow from the premises, and I argue that this interpretation gives the correct rationale for Aristotle’s definition. I then explain that even though the best and most teleios virtue must be a single (...) virtue, that virtue could in principle be a whole virtue that arises from the combination of all the others. I also clarify that the definition of the human good aims at capturing the nature of human eudaimonia only in its primary case. (shrink)

The article presents the first comprehensive interpretation of the ergon argument in Aristotle’s Protrepticus. It further argues that Aristotle in this argument distinguishes the ergon of an entity from the ergon of its virtue thus presenting a complicated argumentative structure which is explicitly simplified in the Eudemian Ethics. Based on the latest attempts to reconstruct the Protrepticus, the article shows the relation of the ergon argument to its other versions in both Ethics. This account not only (...) clarifies the relation of the Protrepticus to Aristotle’s other ethical writings, it shows that Aristotle intends the argument as a transition between describing what human being does and what a good human being does well, namely a natural transition from the descriptive to the normative. (shrink)

This paper (in German) lays out two different conceptions of language as 'Spiel', which I call - appropriating a pair of expressions used by Wilhelm von Humboldt - 'Spiel' as 'ergon' and 'Spiel' as 'energeia'. The first one conceives of 'Spiel' as 'game', an abstract entity constituted by a set of rules; the second one conceives of 'Spiel' as 'play', a mode of being that is constituted by a certain kind of movement. I show how the metaphor of language (...) as 'Spiel' has been interpreted in both of these ways, but how, and why, historically, the first interpretation, specifying linguistic entities as rule-constituted entities of a certain kind, came to be superseded by the second interpretation, specifying 'play' as the mode of being of language itself, most prominently in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Jacques Derrida. (shrink)

Aristotle does not uniquely specify, much less define, eudaimonia in the EE’s ergon argument. He concludes simply that eudaimonia belongs to a certain kind. That Aristotle claims to have offered a horos of eudaimonia does not show that he has uniquely specified eudaimonia. This interpretation has implications for our understanding of Aristotle’s Eudemian account of eudaimonia; of Eudemian methodology; and of his use of ergon argument more generally.

Este artículo analiza la aportación de Aspasio al concepto aristotélico de ergon. Hasta el momento no se ha realizado un estudio de este concepto bajo el prisma de las aportaciones aspasianas, centrándose en el capítulo séptimo del libro primero de la Ética Nicomaquea. Examina el significado que Aristóteles reconoce en la función propia del ser humano, y los matices que añade Aspasio. Para esta investigación se sigue el orden del texto y se centra el análisis en los términos clave: (...) el primer apartado se dedica al bien del hombre; el segundo, a la felicidad. El tercero y cuarto a las diversas cualidades que definen la función propia: es específica y racional; es activa, virtuosa y estable. El quinto y último apartado examina los comentarios sobre el método y los principio. (shrink)

Thomas Nagel argues that Aristotle identifies rationality as the ergon idion of the human being. Against Nagel, I defend a reading of Aristotle which depicts a complex human ergon. This complex identity involves desire. It is in Book X of the Nichomachean Ethics that my understanding of Aristotle's position is clinched.

In this paper, I discuss in detail one of the first conclusions drawn by Aristotle in the ergonargument. The paper provides an in-depth approach to Nicomachean Ethics’ lines 1098a3-4, where one reads: “λείπεταιδὴπρακτικήτιςτοῦλόγονἔχοντος”. I divide the discussion into two parts. In the first part, I put under scrutiny how one should take the word “πρακτική” and argue that one should avoid taking this word as meaning “practical” in the passage. I will argue in favor of taking it as meaning “active”. (...) The exegetical inconvenience of taking “πρακτική” as meaning “practical” is the fact that it restricts the results achieved in the ergonargument by excluding the possibility of contemplation being considered a eudaimonlife. In the second part, I discuss the expression “λόγονἔχον” and provide some arguments to take it as preliminarily introducing the criterion of division of the virtues that will be spelled out in ENI.13 so that the λόγον-ἔχονpart of the soul here also makes reference to thevirtue of the non-rational part, i.e., virtue of character. I offer a deflationary view by showing that the moral psychology is developed in ENI.7 within the limits imposed by the ergonargument. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that the distinction between two types of body, which is sometimes appealed to in order to clear up the Aristotelian definition of soul, sheds some light on the ontological status of prostheses and on the issue of the “multiple realizability” of life-functions. After discussing the strain that the definition of soul imposes upon the basic hylomorphic categories, the paper turns to the idea of a “functionally defined body”, whose organs are defined by the power to (...) perform their proper functions. This way of talking about the body suggests that Aristotle is committed to a principle of Functional Definition, which allows him to decide dubious cases of kind-membership solely on the basis of the presence or absence of the relevant powers – i.e., without drawing on any further considerations. The paper argues that even if that criterion seems unable to avoid the inclusion of artificial items under the same kinds as their biological counterparts, Aristotle’s philosophy of nature provides independent reasons for rejecting that unwelcome result of Functional Definition. Given the Aristotelian recognition of strong natural unities, which are “one” not because of their material continuity but because of partaking in the same principle of change, artificial limbs cannot be equated with their models. Accordingly, they perfom the same task, but in a sui generis way. (shrink)

Translating the Bible into Arabic: Historical, Text-Critical and Literary Aspects. Edited by Sara Binay and Stefan Leder. Beiruter Texte und Studien, vol. 131. Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2012; distributed by Ergon Verlag, Würzburg. Pp. 150 + 127. €59.

Focusing on the speeches and actions of the Platonic Socrates, this book argues that Plato's political philosophy is a crucial source for reflection on the hazards and possibilities of democratic politics.

ABSTRACT Schmidt introduces the Aristotelian term “koinonia” as denoting a political community which aims to achieve a common good for society as a whole. A good that promotes the flourishing of every party involved. In addition, Schmidt adopts further insight about the term by engaging more thoroughly in discourse about it, realising that this easily extends to the term taking on tenets of communities such as a family. Within family, the terms address even more specific relationships, such as husband and (...) wife, parents and children, sibling relationships, etc. Essentially, Aristotle’s premise of common good persists even in these specific relationships, so much so that Schmidt highlights the pillars which sustain the pursuit of the common good. These pillars are justice, fairness and reciprocity, all grounded in good will and fellowship. This goodwill and fellowship among African parents in a community is to assist each other in raising children in the community and ensure they are grounded in African values, hence the African proverb “a single hand cannot raise a child”. In fact, biological parents may draw from the knowledge of the elderly in the community who can assist in instilling values in the youth. The importance of this is that the elderly in African communities are valued not only as those who sustain order in the community, but are also the custodians of African value systems which younger generations should ideally be grounded in. With the introduction of technology, the digital divide seems to be presenting a challenge when it comes to the solidarity of African parents, as a village, raising their children. Hence, a strategy is required for modern African parents to not abandon this solidarity afforded by their cultural values. The communal way of raising their children should persist in order to preserve the African value of parental solidarity in raising children, even in the midst of what technology and the digital divide presents to the African community. (shrink)

Andrea Staiti, Geistigkeit, Leben und geschichtliche Welt in der Transzendentalphänomenologie Husserls Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10743-012-9103-8 Authors Nicholas de Warren, Department of Philosophy, Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA 02481, USA Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848.

This paper takes as its starting point the argument from Eudemian Ethics II,1 which introduces as premisses conclusions from the previous chapters, namely, the chief good of human beings is an end and everybody judges speculative wisdom, moral virtue and pleasure to be ends, either all or some of them. These two claims allow Aristotle to conclude that the most desirable of all goods is in the soul and to proceed arguing to his main conclusion in terms of the (...) class='Hi'>ergon, function or characteristic activity, of the soul. It should be noticed, though, that if the ergon of the human soul can explain speculative wisdom and moral virtues to be ends, the same is not so easily defensible in the case of pleasure. In fact, to take pleasure as end seems to take a subjective satisfaction with no matter what as end. Now, the ergon of the soul cannot explain pleasure as an end in this unrestricted way. To solve this difficulty, this paper seeks to interpret a prior passage, I, 5, 1215b15-1216a10, as responsible for restricting the range of pleasures that can be counted as finalities to human beings. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Eudaimonia, Ergon, and Espresso The Golden Mean The Bean.

Né opera (ergon), né fuori-d’-opera (hors-d’oeuvre), né dentro né fuori, né sopra né sotto, il parergon sconvolge ogni opposizione, ma non rimane indeterminato e dà luogo all’opera. Non sta più soltanto intorno all’opera. Quel che esso introduce – le istanze della cornice, del titolo, della firma, della didascalia ecc. – non smette più di mettere sottosopra l’ordine interno del discorso sulla pittura, le sue opere, il suo commercio, le sue quotazioni, i suoi plusvalori, la sua speculazione, i...

Aristoteles' Ethik basiert auf der These, dass sich Güter als Strebensziele begreifen lassen. Die vorliegende Arbeit soll dabei helfen, diese These besser zu verstehen. Sie untersucht die Voraussetzungen und die Konsequenzen der teleologischen Konzeption des Guten. Der Gemeinplatz von der Aristotelischen "Strebensethik" wird neu beleuchtet. Als Ausgangspunkt dient eine genaue Lektüre der ersten Kapitel der Nikomachischen Ethik. Hier wird deutlich, dass Aristoteles einer teleologischen Güterkonzeption kritischer gegenübersteht, als üblicherweise angenommen wird. Die Gleichsetzung von Gütern und Zielen bietet zwar den Zugang (...) zur Bestimmung des Glücks; sie ist aber keine Definition des Guten. Aristoteles geht vielmehr davon aus, dass die als Ziele aufgefassten Güter in relevanter Hinsicht verschieden sind. Wie aber kann man dieser Verschiedenheit gerecht werden, ohne die Identifikation von Gütern und Zielen aufzugeben? Die Arbeit zeigt, dass sich wesentliche Bestandteile der Nikomachischen Ethik auf genau diese Frage beziehen lassen. Dazu gehören etwa das "ergon-Argument" und die Einführung des Tugendhaften als "Maßstab" des in Wahrheit Guten. Auf diese Weise wird eine Antwort auf einige Deutungsprobleme gegeben, die die Debatten um diese Schrift nachhaltig geprägt haben. Außerdem eröffnet sich eine andere Sicht auf das Projekt, das Aristoteles in seiner Ethik verfolgt. (shrink)

In what precedes, I have argued that Aristotle does not, in his ethics, commit three metaphysical errors sometimes imputed to him: he does not define the good as a fact; he does not claim that human beings move by nature towards their telos; he does not claim, in the ergon argument, that human beings are fixed rather than versatile. Instead, I have shown, he does the opposite in each case: he argues that the good cannot be defined as a (...) fact; he claims that human beings move towards their telos only if they have virtue and virtue is not by nature; he locates, in the human ergon, that which is responsible for human versatility. Finally, I have shown by example that the metaphysical commitments of Aristotle's account of human happiness are not as controversial as they seem.If all of this is true, then perhaps the disorder that has existed in ethics since the enlightenment has been misdiagnosed. Perhaps it is not due to an unhappy choice between end-neutral emotivism on the one hand and Aristotle's bad metaphysics on the other. Perhaps instead it is due, at least in part, to a too hasty rejection of Aristotle's ethics on the grounds of a rejection of his biology. (shrink)

Na República Platão assume que a τέκνη é um fator fundamental para agregar as pessoas dentro de uma vida em comum e organiza as relações de modo que a cidade tenha o melhor sistema político possível, onde cada um exerce o ἒργον que lhe cabe. Para tanto o filósofo defende que a função exercida por cada membro da pólis esteja de acordo com a sua natureza. É a partir dessa premissa que se torna importante verificar dentro do texto platônico como (...) ele articula elementos importantes para defender tal pressuposto. Neste caso temos que verificar a relação da τέκνη com o ἒργον e da τέκνη com a ἐπιστήμη sem negligenciar como a τέκνη pode ser considerada algo que beneficia a cidade como um todo. Palavras-chave: República; Tékhne; érgon; platonismo. (shrink)

The article discusses the characteristics of virtuous persons in relation to their social role(s). It explores the key features of the neo-Aristotelian account of right action and some problems for this account in the context of a certain social role. The problem can be characterized as a dilemma. When evaluating an action in some role, one view is that the obligations and requirements of roles could be taken as something already given by social or professional role descriptions, such that the (...) virtuous person must respond to these demands in the right way. Alternatively, the virtuous person could evaluate the role itself in terms of what the “good parent, teacher, doctor” and so on should be like. Using two different neo-Aristotelian approaches to the ethics of professional roles as examples I argue that neither strategy is, as it stands, satisfactory. ‘Internalism’ about role demands takes institutionally specified role requirements in a way that is too strongly determinate for a virtue ethical analysis. On the other side, ‘externalism’ is all too indeterminate in bypassing or failing to accommodate the institutionally determined demands of social or professional roles. These shortcomings contour an “institution shaped gap” in virtue ethics such that it needs to attend to the qualities of social institutions as well as the character and actions of individuals. In response I suggest that there is a distinctly Aristotelian way in which the virtue ethicist can address it, by appeal to the distinctive function or “characteristic activity”— ergon—of the institution. (shrink)