Manifest Activity presents and critically examines the model of human power, the will, our capacities for purposeful conduct, and the place of our agency in the natural world of one of the most important and traditionally under-appreciated philosophers of the 18th century: Thomas Reid. For Reid, contrary to the view of many of his predecessors, it is simply manifest that we are active with respect to our behaviours; it is manifest, he thinks, that our actions are not merely remote products (...) of forces that lie outside of our control. Reid holds, instead, that actions are all and only those events that spring from active power and he produces insightful and imaginative arguments for the claim that only a creature with a mind is capable of having active power. He believes that only human beings, and creatures 'above us', are capable of directing events towards ends, of endowing them with purpose or direction, the distinctive feature of action. However, he also holds that all events, and not merely human actions, are products of active power, power possessed either by human beings or by God. This collection of theses leads Reid to the view that human behaviour and the progress of nature are both essentially teleological. Patterns in nature are the products of laws of which God is the author; patterns in human conduct are the products of character and the laws that individuals set for themselves. Manifest Activity examines Reid's arguments for this view and the view's implications for the nature of character, motivation and the special kind of causation involved in the production of human behavior. (shrink)

In the Commentary on the Sentences of Thomas Aquinas, creation is conceived as a “hierarchical order”. This idea, which he takes from Dionysius the Areopagite, is related to the concept of similitude used to explain the relation between God and his creation, and to the idea that he create d it to manifest his goodness. In this article I show the importance that this idea of hierarchical order has when it is applied to creation in this early work of the (...) Dominican friar. In the first place, I analyze the definition of hierarchy, and I especially focus on its relation with the idea of similitude and the importance Aquinas gives to the “law of hierarchy” as a law that ordains not only being but also the action of beings. (shrink)

Manifestly covariant quantum theory with invariant evolution parameter is a parametrized relativistic dynamical theory. The study of parameterized relativistic dynamics (PRD) helps us understand the consequences of changing key assumptions of quantum field theory (QFT). QFT has been very successful at explaining physical observations and is the basis of the conventional paradigm, which includes the Standard Model of electroweak and strong interactions. Despite its record of success, some phenomena are anomalies that may require a modification of the Standard Model. The (...) anomalies include neutrino oscillations, non-locality, and gravity.The two key QFT assumptions that are altered in PRD are the following: fields depend on space and time; and interactions between fields are local. Locality and non-locality refer to the correlation of particles with space-like separation. A local theory does not allow the existence of greater than light speed correlations, while a non-local theory does. PRD is a non-local theory that allows fields to depend on space, time and an invariant evolution parameter. A formulation of PRD is presented together with applications that can be directly compared to results from the conventional paradigm. (shrink)

The Manifestation Requirement, advanced by Dummett in his critique of semantic realism, has been criticized for being behavioristic, and the responses have been made that the critics are mistaken. However, the dispute has failed to exhibit the point of the Requirement. In this paper, I shall argue (1) that, in the light of Anscombe's theory of practical knowledge, knowledge of linguistic meaning is to be seen as the knowledge-how that forms the basis of the practical knowledge that an agent (...) has of his own intentional actions, (2) that such knowledge of linguistic meaning is to be based on mutual agreements in a community, and (3) that the Manifestation Requirement is a condition for the possibility of such mutual agreements. As a result, the Manifestation Requirement finds its basis on the idea that language and linguistic acts are tools that we use while continually improving them. (shrink)

Our actions, even the quietest, are liable to become occasions for inculpation. But what kind of action would remain immune to the act of judgement? Such an action is made manifest in Michelangelo’s Moses. Freud’s cinematic reading of the sculpture yields a concern with what Moses does not do. Neither the origin nor the outcome of an action proves decisive but rather “the remains of a movement that has already taken place.” Such a remainder troubles the ascription (...) of agency to action by undermining the fantasy of homogenous time which underlies it. Continuity is revealed as the semblance of an imperceptible series of temporal omissions. The paper aims not only to bring to light the radical potential harboured in Freud’s approach to the Moses but to account for the reason he arrests its appearance. (shrink)

Recent accounts of emotional action intend to explain such actions without reference to goals. Nevertheless, these accounts fail to specify the difference between goals and other kinds of motivational states. I offer two remedies. First, I develop an account of goals based on Michael Smith’s arguments for the Humean theory of motivation. On this account, a goal is a unified representation that determines behavior selection criteria and satisfaction conditions for an action. This opens the possibility that mental processes (...) could influence behavior without such a unified representation and hence, without goals. Second, I develop a model of emotions and appetites on which behavior selection criteria can be decoupled from satisfaction conditions. If this model is correct, then in many cases, there is no unified representation that determines the behavior selection criteria and satisfaction conditions of emotional actions. In contrast with many traditional accounts of action, the model suggests the following: Whether or not a behavior constitutes an action does not depend on the agent’s grasp of the behavior’s aim. Rather, a behavior constitutes an action if it was organized by the agent, where an agent can organize actions without a coherent grasp of their aim. Some emotional actions are manifestations of this possibility. (shrink)

Trust may be an important organizing idea when thinking about law. However, if trust is to be deployed usefully as an organizing idea when thinking about law, work must be done to understand what trust is, what it does and what effect it has. This article explores one aspect of interpersonal trust that may be relevant when thinking about law. The article considers how one person might manifest trust to another. In so doing, the article considers types of action (...) that are ill- and well-suited to manifesting trust. It then considers why it might be important to manifest trust. Finally, the article suggests some lines of future inquiry by pointing to how the phenomenology of trust might be significant when assessing the sorts of claims about trust that lawyers typically make. (shrink)

This paper explores the distinction between active and passive powers. Interest in the distinction has recently been revived in some quarters of the philosophy of action as some have sought to elucidate the distinction between action and passion (the changes that happen to a substance) in terms of the former (Hyman, 2015; Mayr, 2011; Lowe 2013). If there is a distinction between active and passive powers, parallel to the distinction between action and passion, what is it? In (...) this paper, I distinguish two ways of drawing it. According to the first one, active and passive powers are distinguished by the ways in which their manifestations come about. According to the second, they are distinguished by their directedness, i.e. what they are powers to do. Both accounts are examined and the latter is defended against the former. I argue that active powers are powers to alter, modify, corrupt or change something. (shrink)

The representation of illness manifestation during the first psychiatric interview with patients preliminary diagnosed with depressive illness The aim of the study is the analysis of patients' and doctors' discursive representation of mental health problems during the first psychiatric interview. The data comes from 16 initial psychiatric interviews recorded by doctors in three psychiatric hospitals in Poland. Assuming the discursive character of representation the analysis of the data has shown that the representation of illness manifestations in doctors and patients (...) narratives differs. The doctors constructed mental health problems mainly as static and timeless existence of medical symptoms and patients' traits. Conversely, the patients constructed illness manifestations in terms of action, as dynamic and contextualised processes. Interestingly, the patients deprived themselves of control over the acting illness manifestations. Doctors' static picture of illness manifestations eliminates the possibility of exploring the complicated relationship between patients and their problems. An examination of the way patients construct illness manifestations could be relevant diagnostic information. (shrink)

There is a common intuition that genocide is qualitatively distinct from, and much worse than, mass murder. If we concentrate on the most obvious differences between genocidal killing and other cases of mass murder it is difficult to see why this should be the case. I argue that many cases of genocide involve not merely individual evil but a form of collective action manifesting a collective evil will. It is this that explains the moral distinctiveness of genocide. My view (...) contrasts with one put forward by Claudia Card, though we both agree that the notion of ‘‘social death’’ plays a significant role here. (shrink)

As it is broadly accepted, typical uses of demonstratives are accompanied by demonstrations. The concept of demonstration, however, manifests the action–product ambiguity analogous to that visible in the opposition between jumping and the resulting jump, talking and the resulting talk or crying and the resulting cry. It is also a heterogeneous concept that enables demonstrations to vary significantly. The present paper discusses action–product ambiguity as applied to demonstrations as well as the heterogeneity of the latter. An account that (...) acknowledges ambiguity and heterogeneity of demonstrations is sketched in the paper. It is argued that it has a rich explanatory and descriptive potential. (shrink)

From time to time we explain what people do by referring to their habits. We explain somebody’s putting the kettle on in the morning as done through “force of habit”. We explain somebody’s missing a turning by saying that she carried straight on “out of habit”. And we explain somebody’s biting her nails as a manifestation of “a bad habit”. These are all examples of what will be referred to here as habit explanations. Roughly speaking, they explain by referring (...) to a pattern of a particular kind of behaviour which is regularly performed in characteristic circumstances, and has become automatic for that agent due to this repetition. (shrink)

This article examines the phenomenon of collective or aggregate civil litigation, manifested in different forms as a class action, representative action, or group action. Different countries have adopted different models of collective civil litigation. This diversity presents a challenge in drawing comparisons, and raises the need to study the different techniques involved. This article summarizes the adoption of a technical perspective. Following this, the article reviews the availability and limitations of the research techniques in relation to what (...) we want. It discusses the questions of goals of collective procedures, levels of need, technical modes of operation, and evaluation. The ultimate goal is to be able to compare different techniques and decide which ones might work best and in what circumstances or types of situation. There is plenty of research to be done in this field. (shrink)

This article examines the phenomenon of collective or aggregate civil litigation, manifested in different forms as a class action, representative action, or group action. Different countries have adopted different models of collective civil litigation. This diversity presents a challenge in drawing comparisons, and raises the need to study the different techniques involved. This article summarizes the adoption of a technical perspective. Following this, the article reviews the availability and limitations of the research techniques in relation to what (...) we want. It discusses the questions of goals of collective procedures, levels of need, technical modes of operation, and evaluation. The ultimate goal is to be able to compare different techniques and decide which ones might work best and in what circumstances or types of situation. There is plenty of research to be done in this field. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References Further reading.

This article examines a changing global reality that manifests itself in new forms of social activism. The struggle of the multitude challenges political representation and contemporary art seems to corroborate this observation. Becoming a form of social intervention, it turns into an active force and leaves behind the need to double action with representation, representational practices being the hallmark of classical art. A new theory of the image would have to incorporate this dynamic: it would have to treat and (...) develop the basic categories of action and relation. There are few philosophies of the act, and the existing semiotic models mostly deal with dual structures (signifier/signified; sign/meaning; image/referent, and so on). It is necessary to sketch out a dynamic theory of the image that would: (1) reveal the limitations of the concept of representation; (2) conceive of the image as a set of multiple changing relations. The image would thus be seen as a necessary part of the relations governing the world in its entirety, that is, as part of the movement of matter itself. Which is another way of saying that those relations are actualized, or expressed, in the image. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in philosophy of action that there is and must be teleologically basic action: something done on an occasion without doing it by means of doing anything else. It is widely believed that basic actions are exercises of skill. As the source of the need for basic action is the structure of practical reasoning, this yields a conception of skill and practical reasoning as complementary but mutually exclusive. On this view, practical reasoning and complex (...) intentional action depend on skill and basic action, but the latter pair are not themselves rationally structured: the movements a basic action comprises are not intentional actions, and they are not structured as means to an end. However, Michael Thompson and Douglas Lavin have argued that action that bears no inner rational structure is not intentional action at all, and that therefore there can be no such thing as basic action. In this paper, I argue that their critique shows that standard conceptions of basic action are indeed untenable, but not that we can do without an alternative. I develop an alternative conception of skill and basic action on which their basicness is not to be equated with simplicity: like deliberation and non-basic action, they are teleologically complex, but their complexity takes a different form. On this view, skill contrasts with deliberation—not because it is not a manifestation of practical reason, but because the two are specifically different manifestations of practical reason. (shrink)

Je soutiens qu’Héraclite développe une théorie implicite de l’action : l’accomplissement réussi d’une action intentionnelle dépend de la compréhension du logos, qui constitue une explication causale de toutes les choses dans le cosmos. Mon analyse d’Héraclite repose principalement sur le concept de gnome, qui, comme j’entends le montrer, est une manifestation de la convergence entre la compréhension du logos et l’action intentionnelle. Gnome, qui permet au feu divin de guider « tout à travers tout » en (...) B41, se compose de trois éléments : la capacité à élaborer un plan, le plan lui-même, et son exécution. J’illustre comment l’échec à accomplir une action réussie résulte d’un déficit de gnome en mettant l’accent sur deux aspects particuliers : l’exécution et le plan. J’examine la relation entre la compréhension et le contrôle, ainsi que la manière dont le (manque de) contrôle physique affecte l’exécution d’un plan pour l’homme ivre en B117. J’étudie en outre comment la connaissance peut influencer la pertinence du plan lui-même en examinant les fragments d’Héraclite sur la religion. (shrink)

After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be defended with (...) particular reference to the work of Charles Taylor on expression, as well as recent work on embodied cognition. (shrink)

This article defends a novel definition of evil. An action is evil if (1) a pro-attitude (or complete indifference) towards severe harm to a sentient being is (2) manifested in the action. The manifestation can take either of two forms: expressing the pro-attitude or attempting to realize its object. In order to exclude cases where the pro-attitude is the result of a positive attitude and the action does therefore not count as evil, the proattitude (3) must (...) be generated from a morally reprehensible attitude such as greed or sadistic pleasure. As an implication of this definition, not every evil action is extremely bad, and some ‘merely’ wrong acts might be worse than some evil acts. (shrink)

In the article, the author analyzes methodological approaches to the study of the concept of historical responsibility, comparing the German tradition of study with the voluntary actions ontology of M.M. Bakhtin 's. The German tradition, influenced by the thinking of World War II, emphasizes the perception of responsibility in the context of the relationship with guilt, which raises a substantial question about the nature of responsibility and its boundaries. In particular, H. Arendt formulates the concept of banality of evil, focusing (...) on the disappearance of internal perception of responsibility, but does not solve the question of the origins of such feeling. The Russian religious tradition, presented by M.M. Bakhtin, allows to propose a way to solve the issues raised due to the identification of ontological grounds of individual responsibility. Nevertheless, M.M. Bakhtin conclusions are also important for solving the problem of collective responsibility. Bakhtin addresses responsibility as an ontological characteristic of human existence, opposing its freedom. Responsibility manifests itself in acts, but ontologically precedes a separate action performed by a person. The role of the act is that it allows the person himself to understand the burden of responsibility and act on these prerequisites. The transfer of the Bakhtins methodology from individual to collective responsibility makes it possible to link the moment of its occurrence not to public recognition, but to the very fact of the individual 's entry into a certain community. The ontological integrity of the individual also acquires a social dimension, not only synchronic but also diachronic. According to the author, the application of the Bakhtins methodology in the field of social research makes it possible to consider problems of historical responsibility in the context of more fundamental philosophical questions about the relationship between individual and collective identity, the dynamics of identity, the combination of regularity and variability in human behavior. (shrink)

It is argued that Kull’s approach to aesthetics complements a cognitive semiotic approach to culture. The concept of ‘ecological, semiotic fitting’ allows us to connect the three main concepts of beauty we encounter in discussions about the aesthetic, where the term beauty is, firstly, used to refer a positive experience in relation to what is perceived, or, secondly, to a positive experience in relation to an intentional action or, thirdly, to a positive experience in relation to a sense making (...) process. Kull makes a strong case for the ‘ecological, semiotic fitting’ being the common underlying structure of all three manifestations of the aesthetic. (shrink)

How does thinking affect doing? There is a widely held view that thinking about what you are doing, as you are doing it, hinders performance. Once you have acquired the ability to putt a golf ball, play an arpeggio on the piano, or parallel-park, reflecting on your actions leads to inaccuracies, blunders, and sometimes even utter paralysis--that's what is widely believed. But is it true? After exploring some of the contemporary and historical manifestations of the idea, Barbara Gail Montero develops (...) a theory of expertise which emphasizes the role of the conscious mind in expert action. She aims to dispel various myths about experts who proceed without any understanding of what guides their action, and she analyzes research in both philosophy and psychology that is taken to show that conscious control and explicit monitoring of one's movements impedes well practiced skills. Montero explores a wide range of real-life examples of optimal performance, in sports, the performing arts, healthcare, the military, and other fields, and draws from psychology, neuroscience, and literature to offer a refreshing and persuasive view of expertise, according to which expert action generally is and ought to be thoughtful, effortful, and reflective. (shrink)

We are creatures of habit. Familiar ways of doing things in familiar contexts become automatic for us. That is to say, when we acquire a habit we can act without thinking about it at all. Habits free our minds to think about other things. Without this capacity for habitual action our daily lives would be impossible. Our minds would be crowded with innumerable mundane considerations and decisions. Habitual actions are not always mundane. Aristotle famously said that acting morally is (...) a matter of exercising the right habits.2 For him, a lack of conscious thought is no bar on an action’s moral status. Habits are involved in our most prized activities. Of course our natural capacity for acquiring habits is sometimes a nuisance, and we acquire bad habits all too easily. But we nevertheless could not do without a vast array of habits which are not like this, and we can’t help but exercise them in our daily lives. It does not seem too strong to say that we spend much more of our time acting habitually than we do acting in the light of conscious thought. We are also rational creatures. It is because of our rationality that we naturally think that most human actions are different in kind from the behaviour of other animals. This difference is manifest in the fact that we hold rational creatures personally responsible for what they do, in ways that would make no sense for nonrational creatures. Our rationality, then, appears to give our actions a unique quality. (shrink)

This paper argues that the passages on practical spirit within Hegel's 'Psychology' are able to enrich the picture of Hegel's account of intentional action by providing us with a genuine discussion of 'subjective action.' This kind of intentional activity is not yet part of moral or legal philosophy, and it is neutral as regards the question how an action becomes actually manifest in the world as a 'deed', potentially causing unintended consequences. Instead, subjective action consists in (...) the teleological, end-pursuing action of an agent acting on drives and wilfully choosing ends, which are practical as the causa finalis of an agent's doing. Thus, the 'Psychology' investigates intentional action from the first-personal perspective of the mental activity of the subject. It is legitimately part of subjective rather than objective spirit and its socially mediated normativity is psychological rather than moral. (shrink)

Conceptual knowledge inspires imagination. On the other hand, it is a claim to power as well. Multiple knowledge claims often, therefore, are engaged in a contest. This contest can take the form of several discourses. Extant power structures play a significant role in lending (or not lending) a voice to one or several such discourses. To one with the power to govern, knowledge claims flowing from abstract concepts generated in an elite discourse not only inspires imagination but also often leads (...) to ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ that drive governance in the system which leads to action. Norms and rules define actionability of the conceptual knowledge claim. However, for the one weighed by powerlessness in being governed, knowledge claims often get generated only in action, since an autonomous discourse is often lacking. Yet the sheer powerlessness of the authors of such knowledge claims generated in action leads to its non-celebration. It fails to get elevated. It might also wither away. Such actionable knowledge claims of the powerless often then gets manifested as something like an ‘unvoiced’ or an ‘unvoicable’ discourse, in macabre forms of subversion of ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ of the system that leads to a sense of failure in governance among those with power as well. Power, thus, brings actionable knowledge to the fore, but in two different forms. For the power-holder, it takes the form of a ‘deviation’ from norms and rules in the actionable domain through subversion by the powerless, revealing a gap between knowledge in the conceptual and actionable domain that is reluctantly (often tacitly) tolerated. For the powerless, on the other hand, actionable knowledge is living; negotiating on the ‘deviation’ is an existential requirement. This paper is an attempt to explore these dichotomies, how power (and the lack of it) alters the significance and implications of actionable knowledge. (shrink)

Nous ecartons ici deux tentatives visant a rendre compte de l’irrationalite de l’action akratique au sein du systeme de Spinoza: celle contenue dans Spinoza meme et une seconde toute recente, due a della Rocca, qui pretend parler au nom de Spinoza. Nous tracons a larges traits une troisieme voie, laquelle n’est pas manifestement en porte-a-faux avec les principes de la psychologie morale de Spinoza. Cette tentative tourne autour d’une conception du conatus integrant un element normatif et subjectif, soit le (...) besoin de former un moi structure de facon stable. Sans ce dernier, le plus grand bien que les humains soient susceptible d’atteindre, l’acquiescientia in se ipso, serait en fait irrealisable. Concevoir ainsi le conatus donne la latitude dont Spinoza a besoin pour representer le desir irresistible que concoit Medee pour Jason comme contre-conatif et celle dont Medee a besoin pour en etre elle-meme pleinement consciente. (shrink)

Universities are occupied by Management, a regime obsessed with ‘accountability' through measurement, increased competition, efficiency, ‘excellence', and misconceived economic salvation. Given the occupation's absurd side-effects, we ask ourselves how Management has succeeded in taking over our precious universities. An alternative vision for the academic future consists of a public university, more akin to a socially engaged knowledge commons than to a corporation. We suggest some provocative measures to bring about such a university. However, as Management seems impervious to cogent arguments, (...) such changes can only happen if academics take action. Hence, we explore several strategies for a renewed university politics. (shrink)

The goal of this experimental project was to investigate lay peoples’ perceptions of epistemic authority (EA) in the field of finance. EA is defined as the extent to which a source of information is treated as evidence for judgments independently of its objective expertise and based on subjective beliefs. Previous research suggested that EA evaluations are biased and that lay people tend to ascribe higher EA to experts who advise action (in the case of medical experts) or confirm clients’ (...) expectations (in the case of politicians). However, there has been no research into biases in lay evaluations of financial experts and this project is aimed to fill this gap. Experiment 1 showed that lay people tended to ascribe greater authority to financial consultants who gave more active advice to clients considering taking out a mortgage. Experiment 2 confirmed the action advice effect found in Experiment 1. However, the outcomes of Experiments 2 and – particularly – 3 suggested that this bias might also be due to clients’ desire to confirm their own opinions. Experiment 2 showed that the action advice effect was moderated by clients’ own opinions on taking loans. Lay people ascribed the greatest EA to the advisor in the scenario in which he advised taking action and where this coincided with the client’s positive opinion on the advisability of taking out a loan. In Experiment 3 only participants with a positive opinion on the financial product ascribed greater authority to experts who recommended it; participants whose opinion was negative tended to rate consultants who advised rejecting the product more highly. To conclude, these three experiments revealed that lay people ascribe higher EA to financial consultants who advise action rather than maintenance of the status quo, but this effect is limited by confirmation bias: when the client’s a priori opinion is salient, greater authority is ascribed to experts whose advice confirms it. In this sense, results presented in the present paper suggest that the action advice effect might be also interpreted as a specific manifestation of confirmation bias. (shrink)

Transform your yoga practice into a force for creating social change with this concise, eloquent guide to social justice tools and skills. Skill in Action asks you to explore the deeply transformational practice of yoga as a way to become an agent of social change and work toward a just world. Through yoga practices and philosophy, this book explores liberation for ourselves and others, while asking us to engage in our own agency-whether that manifests as activism, volunteer work, or (...) changing our relationships with others and ourselves. To provide a strong foundation to begin this work, Michelle Cassandra Johnson clearly defines power and privilege, oppression, liberation, and suffering, and invites you to make changes in your life that promote equality and freedom for all. Each chapter ends with a breathwork, asana, meditation, or interpersonal relational practice to help you incorporate this wisdom into your daily life. Each of the practices extend beyond the individual to offer resources and tools to shift institutional policies and procedures in a culture that has left all of us negatively impacted by white supremacy and social inequity. We must awaken to the injustice and suffering of marginalized communities, and we must use our voices and actions toward the liberation of all people. (shrink)

This paper argues that contemporary philosophy of mind and action could learn much from the structure of action explanation manifested in ancient Greek tragedy, which is less deterministic than typically supposed and which does not conflate the motivation of action with its causal production.

The principle argument of the book is that, given the background of philosophy of mind, it is possible to identify a notion of human agency which goes beyond the limitations which Hume seems to have imposed upon empiricism and which takes advantage of a version of Aristotle's notion of 'soul.' Action, as it has been developed recently, particularly by those of an utilitarian inclination, has been subject to two criticisms: it makes responsibility a rather cheap and ordinary commodity, it (...) makes human agency simple and identifiable. The author accepts this first criticism, but spends most of his effort arguing against the second; he does not contend that action is always simple, but he does argue that the human agent can be identified with precision and that effects can be attributed to him in his role as someone who considered his act and decided to bring about the observed effect. The starting point is a consideration of embodiment, the situation in which considered effects are seen to be situated in the same realm as simple inanimate interactions; any version of human action will have to first of all differentiate itself from inanimate action; the fact that a man is involved in an event is no guarantee that the effect is the result of genuine action. Having done justice to what might be termed the empirical nature of the human condition, the author follows out his announced program: he argues that Hume's empiricism restricts and reduces the human agent and that if we mean by soul nothing much more than what Anscombe means when she typifies the agent as one for whom the question of his own activity arises, then the human agent may be said to have his own unique point of view in virtue of his soul. Whether agent or spectator, there is something uniquely purposeful about the being in the empirical order who manifests this view; it is this view which classical empiricism does not appreciate, and which enables the author to review a set of examples in order to determine what kind of conditions must be satisfied in order to be able to meaningfully attribute an effect to an agent. The examples are intentionally very simple, but the thesis of the argument is not.--J. J. E. (shrink)

There is a long tradition in the philosophy of the social sciences that emphasizes the meaningfulness of human action. This tradition doubts or even negates the possibility of causal explanations of human action precisely on the basis that human actions have meaning. This paper provides an argument in favour of methodological naturalism in the social sciences. It grants the main argument of the Interpretivists, i.e. that human actions are meaningful, but it shows how a transformation of a “nexus (...) of meaning” into a “causal nexus” can take place, proposing the “successful transformation argument”. Based on previous work presented in my Naturalistic Hermeneutics, Cambridge University Press, 2005 the paper discusses four approaches that describe the “nexus of meaning” connected with a human action based on the motives, the intentions, the reasons, and the rationality of the action respectively. From the standpoint of eachapproach a causal nexus can arise, namely, if the respective motives, intentions, reasons, or the human rationality that are manifest in the different nexuses of meaning exhibit certain invariances. These approaches can be formulated as theories, which explain human action every time that the nexuses of meaning – described with the diverse conceptual apparatuses – can be transformed into causal nexuses. It is shown that explanations based on motives, intentions, reasons, or rationality are possible, as are explanations of human action based on, at least in principle, an unlimited number of other theories. (shrink)

This paper seeks to address the relationship between two key areas of contention figuring in the communicative realities in which language is used and the morality of action: the role of silence and the role of power and the lack thereof. It is proposed that action per se becomes problematic under practical manifestations of silence such as inarticulacy (which is aggravated by major asymmetries in the global politics of language) and ignorance, and that even when action is (...) possible, deciding on what would constitute morally right action under such circumstances remains a question. Furthermore, another key hindrance to action for greater justice and equality is constituted by lack of empowerment. This paper presents the view that a beginning towards answering such questions can be made on the basis of the recognition of the universality of human creativity, in the domains of both language and constructive action, and the fundamental universality of human morality with culture- and communityspecific modes of putting that morality into practice. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of methodology in action research. It begins by showing how, as a form of inquiry concerned with the development of practice, action research is nothing other than a modern 20th century manifestation of the pre‐modern tradition of practical philosophy. It then draws in Gadamer's powerful vindication of the contemporary relevance of practical philosophy in order to show how, by embracing the idea of ‘methodology’, action research functions (...) to sustain a distorted understanding of what practice is. The paper concludes by outlining a non‐methodological view of action research whose chief task is to promote the kind of historical self‐consciousness that the development of practice presupposes and requires. (shrink)

According to Phillips, (1) genuine perception is attributable to the individual (i.e. it’s a personal state/event, as opposed to sub-personal states/events in the individual’s brain); (2) since unconscious perceptual representations are ill-suited to guide action, there’s no good reason to attribute them to the individual; (3) not being attributable to the individual, they don’t instantiate genuine perception, thereby failing to support the hypothesis that genuine perception can occur unconsciously. I argue that this reasoning is flawed and can’t be easily (...) fixed. Phillips contends that unconscious perceptual representations don’t guide action because they fail to meet certain conditions that are sufficient for action guidance. But those conditions may not be necessary for action guidance. Consequently, unconscious perceptual representations may guide action even if they don’t meet Phillips’ conditions. Furthermore, due to his commitment to the distinction between personal and sub-personal states/events, Phillips isn’t in a position to argue that his conditions are necessary for action guidance. For the distinction applies to action as well as to perception, and when genuine action is identified by personal-level criteria, Phillips’ conditions turn out unnecessary for action guidance. (shrink)

A number of philosophers from Hume on have claimed that it does not make sense to blame people for acting badly unless their bad acts were rooted in their characters. In this paper, I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this claim. The claim is false, I argue, if it is taken to mean that agents can only be blamed for bad acts when those acts are manifestations of character paws. However, what is both true and important is (...) the weaker claim that an act is not blameworthy unless it is rooted in some enduring aspect or aspects of the agent's character that may or may not be flaws, and that, if flaws, may or may not be bad in the same way that the act itself is. (shrink)

This article focuses on situations and emotional perception. To this end, I start with the Kuleshov effect wherein identical shots of performers manifest different expressions when cut to different contexts. However, I conducted experiments with a twist, using Darth Vader and non-primates, and even here expressions varied with contexts. Building on historically and conceptually linked Gibsonian, Gestalt, phenomenological and pragmatic schools, along with consonant experimental work, I extrapolate these results to defend three interconnected points. First, I argue that while perceiving (...) expression is sometimes about reading minds, it is more squarely about perceiving solicitations or closures for action. Second, I frame expressions as a subcategory of Gibson’s affordances. This includes those showing up through context, in turn suggesting Kuleshov-like scenarios are not mere perceptual tricks. Third, I maintain that situations—with or without other human beings—have action-motivating expressive qualities or what Gestalt theorists called physiognomic characters, following Werner. These likewise emerge through ecological relations, and are very much like affordances and in the world as much as them. With resemblance theories, my account agrees that we perceive expression in the world. However, it indicates a broad range of cases in which expression shows up as consequences of overall situations that solicit or close actions, as opposed to mere resemblance between entities and human expressions. (shrink)

Recent work in the theory of action by analytical philosophers has focused on explaining actions by citing the agent's motivating reason(s). But this ignores a pattern of explanation typical in the social sciences, i.e. situating the agent in a reference group whose members typically manifest that behavior. In some cases the behavior of such groups can itself be shown to be the product of social forces. Two extended examples of this explanatory pattern are studied. In each case the motivating (...) reasons of the agents concerned can scarcely be understood apart from reference to the groups of which the agents are members and the social forces which work on those groups. However, attention to the agent's own reasons for action remains important, in part because of action theory's critical potential to help liberate people from arbitrary, hypostasized social forces. (shrink)

The Idle Argument is the classical argument for fatalism and the futility of action: ‘If it is fated that you will recover, you will, regardless of whether you consult a doctor. If it is fated that you won’t recover, you won’t, regardless... Either it is fated that you will recover or that you won’t. Therefore it is pointless to consult a doctor.’ In the first part of this chapter, the sources that preserve this argument are analysed in detail, and (...) the various ways of understanding the argument, and the ambiguities in its expressions, are exposed. The main distinction turns out to be that between a reading of the argument as manifesting logical determinism, and a reading of it as manifesting causal determinism. Depending on which version one considers, in which way one understands the ambiguous phrases, and whether one takes them throughout in the same way, the argument may turn out as valid or invalid, its premisses as true or false, and it may or may not justify idleness. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to Chrysippus’ reply: He takes the Idle Argument to concern causal determinism, and to be a fallacy, and his refutation of it is designed to make clear the difference between common and garden fatalism and Stoic causal determinism, which is consistent and does not lead to idleness, since human action and inaction are just as fated as everything else. It is shown that Chrysippus’ refutation does not require the existence of an empirically accessible, universal relation of necessitation, nor a causal theory with universal laws of nature. (shrink)

Scaling ecosystem-wide flourishing, organizational impact, and the total value generated across an organization’s ecosystem of stakeholders is a manifestation of love in action. Many organizations are figuring out how. With a large, longitudinal dataset this research is uncovering the agreements enabling that scaling. This research note highlights the research design and early findings. The research design is based on interviews, surveys, and systemic strategy. Strategic systems assessment, stakeholder interviews, workshops with leadership, calibration with functional leaders were used to (...) determine what to measure. Wave 1 of data collection was completed in 2021. Wave 2 is in progress, with following waves every 6 months. With survey responses from 70,700 clients and 9,554 collaborators in Wave 1, the mean level of flourishing and organizational impact is high, relative to the levels found in over 164,000 groups surveyed in 126 countries. While the mean level is high, there is a distribution from high to low across the hundreds of service offices of the business, highlighting significant differences in how the offices work, such as putting the person at the center in everything they do, and the quality of the relationships within the company and with their clients. The survey uses established measures. The Total Value Generated framework is new. (shrink)