This article aims to introduce the recent movements regarding philosophical practice in Japan. In order to understand them in a better way, the historical development and background of philosophical practice shall be shown briefly in the first part. In the second part, three cases of relatively popular philosophical practices in Japan, that is, philosophy cafe, philosophy for/with children and philosophical consulting in the business settings are described as successful practices.

This book provides a look at philosophical practice from the viewpoint of the practitioner or prospective practitioner. It answers the questions: What is philosophical practice? What are its aims and methods? How does philosophical counseling differ from psychological counseling and other forms of psychotherapy. How are philosophical practitioners educated and trained? How do philosophical practitioners relate to other professions? What are the politics of philosophical practice? How does one become a practitioner? (...) What is APPA Certification? What are the prospects for philosophical practice in the USA and elsewhere? Handbook of Philosophical Practice provides an account of philosophy's current renaissance as a discipline of applied practice while critiquing the historical, social, and cultural forces which have contributed to its earlier descent into obscurity. (shrink)

This paper develops a heuristic of different modes of philosophical engagement with Michel Foucault’s work with the aim to aid self-reflection about contemporary uses of Foucault. Drawing on debates in the history of philosophy, I describe contextualism, appropriationism, and methodologism as three strands of Foucault scholarship. I then examine queer and feminist philosophical engagements with Foucault to explicate and illustrate the aims and strengths of each strand. I conclude by spelling out the larger implications for different uses of (...) Foucault for philosophical practice and make the case for a methodological pluralism that draws on all available modes of inquiry. (shrink)

The definition of the lowest common denominator of philosophical practices is widely debated: what is the philosophical core that allows us to distinguish them from other activities? Also, is it possible to identify a methodical peculiarity in philosophical practices? Indeed, many philosophical practitioners refer to dialogue as the specific philosophical character marking their professional activity. This statement, which as such is rather naive, is obviously somewhat problematic. However, philosophical practitioners stress the λόγος of dialogue. (...) In addition to investigating how the dialogue is understood in the different philosophical practices, this contribution aims at enhancing the διά, the "between" of dialogue. This dimension, in fact, may be a possible theoretical framework within which to understand philosophical practices as a whole. (shrink)

This essay argues that what makes Michel Foucault’s oeuvre not only stand apart but also cohere is an assiduous philosophical practice taking the form of an ongoing yet concrete self-modification in the medium of thought. Part I gives an account of three essential aspects of Foucault’s conception of philosophical activity. Beginning with his famous characterization of philosophy in terms of ascēsis, it moves on to articulate his characterization of philosophical practice as a distinct form of (...) meditation, differing from both Cartesian meditation and Hegelian meditation, as it aims to stand vigil for the day to come and operates as a preface to transgression. Part II begins the articulation of crucial traits left implicit in this understanding of philosophy by turning to Foucault’s in-depth investigation of philosophy in Antiquity during his lectures at the Collège de France in the 1980s. First, it develops how philosophy here begins to constitute and distinguish itself by establishing itself as an activity that has a privileged relationship to truth and truth-telling as an unremitting, existentially determining challenge for the philosopher. Further, it instantiates how Platonism elaborates the need for a sustained ‘auto-ascetic’ ethical non-compliant differentiation as the condition of possibility for accessing and stating truth, and then describes how the assertion of an ethical differentiation and attitude in Cynicism takes the form of an insistent combat for another world in this world. Finally, it underlines how the ethical-practical philosophical work upon oneself in Antiquity is developed in an ongoing critical and political exchange with others. Part III indicates how ethical differentiation according to Foucault remains an essential precondition for the practice of philosophy and is further developed in the modern age. This is particularly perspicuous in Kant’s determination of the Enlightenment, in the attitude of modernity exemplified by Baudelaire, and in the history of revolt since the beginning of early Modernity. On this background, Part IV develops how philosophy as an ongoing meditative practice of self-modification leads to an affirmative critique, confirming the virtuality of this world in order to investigate the potentiality in the examined. In this manner, the essay presents Foucault’s philosophical practice as well as an outline of the history of ideas of a seemingly alternate, yet still agenda-setting conception of philosophical practice today. (shrink)

Regularly, the question on the quality of philosophical practice is raised. Practicing philosophers, policy makers, scientists and last but not least clients wonder how to assess the quality of philosophical practice. Professionals want to value the format of different practices and clients want to know what to expect from visiting a philosophical practice. Understanding the quality of philosophical practice is important for determining its value and its role in society. Quality indicators can (...) provide such information. A quality indicator is not a norm or criterion. A quality indicator is a sign or signal evoking reflection on the structure and process of the philosophical practice and the outcomes of the philosophizing that takes place there. As quality is an abstract phenomenon related to the way or how a philosophical practice is, the quality indicator should inform us on “the how”of a philosophical practice. With respect to the philosophizing in philosophical practice, reflexivity seems to be essential for recognizing it as philosophy. Just like the color of a litmus paper points at the presence or absence of an acid in a solution, the presence or absence of reflexivity informs us about the quality of the dialogue in philosophical practice. Reflexivity deepens such a dialogue every time it is applied. When applied consciously by the philosophical practitioner it can be called intentional depth. This intentional depth determines the quality of a philosophical practice. (shrink)

Lou Marinoff's Philosophical Practice outlines the rise of the new profession of philosophical practice and argues that philosophy should aim to be more applicable to issues people face in their everyday lives. Marinoff is the President of the American Philosophical Practitioners Association, and author of Plato Not Prozac, and he has arguably managed to draw more attention to philosophical counseling than any other person in America.

Rehabilitation medicine, aka Physical medicine and Rehabilitation , is the medical specialty which focuses on optimizing function, ability, participation and life satisfaction in the light of noncurable disability and/or chronic disease. It is primarily geared towards the “so what” than towards “what” . PM & R is holistic and patient-centred, thus comprising a well-suited arena for dialogue and patient participation. Many patients experience a severe crisis reaction in the aftermath of major trauma or disease. This “existential rupture” calls for a (...) fundamental revaluation of many aspects of daily life. Crisis management will not merely be a matter of mourning and then back to “business as usual,” as this often is either not possible or not the optimal choice given altered life circumstances. We propose that philosophical practice may be an important addition to the rehabilitation process, by facilitating “lifeworld analyses” and thereby making it possible for the patient to find sources of meaning in life despite disability. This “therapy for the sane” comprises PP rather than psychiatric or psychotherapeutic interventions, and may come to be seen as a key aspect in the training of future physiatrists and other rehabilitation specialists. (shrink)

Introduction. Non-institutional humanities, philosophical practice, and informal education are “a family like” phenomena that are outside the social institution of science and education and are adjacent to socio-cultural activities and social work. The purpose of the article is to outline the contours of the informal educational creative industry in the postmodern society, which combines non-institutional humanities, philosophical practice, and informal education. Methods. The author uses the methods of autobiographical reflection, comparative analysis, empirical observation and analysis of (...) the primary sources of non-institutional humanities. Scientific novelty of the research. The transition to nonmaterial work of the postmodern era is the reason for the relevance of the area under study. The growing demand of a contemporary for such issues as the meaning of life, happiness, the growth of the precariat, the ousting of philosophy from formal education constitute a new social reality that determines the novelty of the research in the informal educational creative industry. Results. The author classifies non-institutional humanities according to the spheres of its existence and the strategies of subject genesis presented in the teachings. The concept of dedifferentiation is considered as an explanation of the area under study in postmodernism. The specificity of the philosophical approach in the work of a practicing philosopher is considered. Conclusions. The author connects the prospects of the informal educational creative industry with institutionalization in the way of leisure, entertainment, and other personal services. The author makes conclusions about the differences between formal and informal education, and indicates the risks and opportunities for the development of the informal philosophical sector. (shrink)

Philosophical practice, an art of living rooted in ancient traditions, is enriched by modern techniques such as individual counseling, Socratic group dialogues, and organizational consulting. Philosophical counseling, a key aspect of this practice, employs traditional philosophical frameworks and rational reasoning to address clients' concerns, distinguishing itself from psychotherapy while respecting individual autonomy. The growing Western interest in Asian philosophies also underscores a shared pursuit of wisdom, spirituality, and meaning. This paper examines the development, key features, (...) and leading proponents of philosophical practice, its relationship with academic philosophy, and the tensions between their differing aims and methods. The outlook for philosophical counseling is promising, offering an alternative to medical approaches for existential issues and expanding its scope to personal guidance, conflict resolution, and life‐skill development. Its future trajectory hinges on societal trends toward secularization, the de‐medicalization of mental health, and the increasing recognition of philosophy's intrinsic practical value. (shrink)

In her first book, _Cross-Cultural Existentialism: On the Meaning of Life in Asian and Western Thought_, Leah Kalmanson draws on a wide range of Asian ritual and philosophical repertoires in making a case for the role of practical exercises of self-cultivation in the work of existential inquiry. This review considers some of the ways in which Kalmanson’s selection of sources is consonant with the intervention she seeks to make, and suggests some possible avenues for beginning to think in a (...) similarly expansive way with and about western traditions. (shrink)

This paper examines the conceptual matrix of philosophical counseling, and philosophical practice generally, which distinguishes philosophical practice from mainstream theoretical philosophy. I argue that the essence of philosophical practice is the realization and radicalization of Pierre Hadot’s paradigmshifting view of ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life,’ through the projection of philosophical concepts and methods to the goal of attainment of the good life by moral education and character-building. The base-line concept of the (...) good life that the paper works with is the relatively uncontroversial concept of a life based on sustained reflected pleasures that are both socially desirable and individually fulfilling. I argue that this type of concept of the good life as qualified pleasure is inherent in any doctrinal account of what it is to lead a good life, including the ones that emphasise asceticism, such as Christian philosophy of life and ethics. Finally the paper concludes that projections of the good life by philosophical counselors are reflective on philosophical counselor themselves: philosophical counseling is a way of ‘the good life’ that aims to use the resources of philosophy as a whole to help others build the moral qualities and character required to reach their own good lives. By projecting philosophical concepts and methods to the applied conceptual matrix of moral education and the good life, philosophical counseling emancipates philosophy as a whole from its current remoteness and isolation into an active, and reflective, role in the real lives of ordinary people. This heralds a paradigm shift in philosophy, from the pseudo-science that much of mainstream philosophy painstakingly pretends to be to an intellectual powerhouse for the enhancement of the quality, clarity and integrity of life, which was the reason philosophy initially emerged for, both in the Western and in the Eastern philosophical traditions. (shrink)

The concept of well being has become the main criterion to assess quality of life in contemporary society. Individual well-being describes the individual quality of life, while social well-being refers to quality of life in a society. Given that well-being has a multitude of dimensions, a unique definition of it is elusive to scholars. In this article social well-being is conceptualised as a dynamic process within the context set by social integration as one?s relationship to society and the community. This (...) includes the quality of interaction between the individual and society and one?s?social actualisation? understood as the realisation of one?s social capacities. Social actualisation also involves one?s ability to influence social processes and to benefit from social cohesion, which consists, in any society, of the quality, organisation and functioning of the social world. Hence the ability to impact society is an integral part of individual well being. This paper suggests that philosophical practice as a new paradigm in the humanities holds out promise for the improvement of both individual and social well-being. (shrink)

This paper claims that the edifice of philosophical practice bears prima facie resemblance to other counseling-dispensing professions—e.g. medicine, law, psychology, accountancy. It defends virtues of professionalism in philosophical practice against accusations of sophism, and also rejects social constructivism as a politically extreme form of sophistry. It concludes that, notwithstanding prima facie resemblance to other counseling professions, philosophical practice is foundationally distinct from them. When elaborated, this distinction complicates the notion of inculcating virtue in (...) class='Hi'>philosophical practice. (shrink)

After a brief introduction to Philosophical Practice, I explain why I use it in my courses and elaborate on some of the material and techniques I present to students in the hope that it helps them to become better-adjusted and happier people. As an example of the sorts of assignments I create for these courses I present a semester-long assignment called “Everyday Philosophical Practice” that is based on the practice of mindfulness and requires intentional metacognition (...) from the students. This approach has shown success not only at helping students to gain self-knowledge, but also at awakening and strengthening different positive cognitive dispositions such as desiring to think about difficult things, acceptance of the need for effort in clarifying thought, and the like. (shrink)

Considers Deleuze's ideas on philosophical practice in relation to his work. This book presents analyses of, and aims to provide some context for, this relation in Deleuze's work, by focusing on Deleuze's conception of the relation between thought and practice, the brain and the hand (or mouth).

The approach to the question of philosophical practice has been dominated by a subordination of practice to theory corresponding in general to a representational conception of philosophy. Methods of diagrammatic reasoning developed within philosophical semiotics provide a more effective approach. Inparticular, Peirce’s system of existential graphs exemplifies how diagrammatic reasoning is able formally to express the processes through which philosophical dialogue and cooperation actually take place and to link such processes to the methods and practices (...) arising in other disciplines and traditions, including those of science, politics, art, religion and technological production. (shrink)

These days philosophy teaching in universities follows two main views: the continental philosophy and the analytic philosophy. Each one of those traditions has very different philosophical and pedagogical practices. My objectives in this article are: 1. to show the distinctions between the practices that continental and analytical philosophies cultivated at the universities; 2. to indicate that there is a confusion at the characterization of what is analytic philosophy, and that the critics driven to it are in fact driven to (...) logical positivism; 3. to show that the analytic practices are the ones we consider as genuinely philosophical. / Atualmente o ensino de Filosofia nas universidades tem seguido duas visões principais: a filosofia continental e a filosofia analítica. Cada uma dessas duas tradições diferem bastante em suas práticas filosófica e pedagógica. Meus objetivos neste artigo são: 1. mostrar as distinções entre as práticas cultivadas dentro das universidades pela filosofia continental e pela filosofia analítica; 2. indicar que há uma confusão na caracterização do que é filosofia analítica e que as críticas a ela dirigidas na verdade apontam para o positivismo lógico; 3. mostrar que as práticas analíticas são aquelas que consideramos como genuinamente filosóficas. (shrink)

아리스토텔레스의 설명에도 나오듯이, 철학은 당혹감 혹은 의아함에서 출발하여 문제를 던지고 푸는 과정이다. 철학실천으로서의 철학은 문제해결 그 자체를 실행하는 것이다. 따라서 문제해결은 철학과 같이 시작되었고 그 바람직한 모델은 철학자들에 의해 개발되었다. 이 논문은 심리학, 교육학 등 여러 분야에서 개발되어온 각종의 문제풀이 방식을 비교하고 그 원형으로 존 듀이의 반성적 사고의 다섯 단계를 분석하며, 이 모델들에서 핵심적인 사항들을 뽑아 기존의 철학실천에 적용된 모델들과 비교하고 바람직한 모델을 제시하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이를 위해 제2절에서는 언스트와 뉴웰, 정보처리론의 IDEAL, CPS, 립맨의 문제해결 모델을 검토한다. 제3절에서는 원형으로서의 (...) 존 듀이의 반성적 사고의 다섯 단계를 분석하고????우리는 어떻게 생각하는가????(How We Think)의 제1판과 제2판의 차이가 교조적인 적용에 대한 경계와 과거에 대한 검토가 중요하다는 사실을 보인다. 그리고 제4절에서는 듀이의 5단계를 기준으로 여러 문제해결 모델을 비교함으로써 ‘최종 판단의 보류’와 ‘끝없는 탐구’라는 비판적 사고의 정신이 문제해결의 과정에 있어 핵심이라는 사실을 도출한다. 제5절에서는 가족치료의 한 기법인 해결중심치료와 매리노프의 PEACE, 피터 라베의 네 단계 모델을 검토하고 분노치료에 적용한 논자의 모델을 제시한다. (shrink)

John Dewey wrote of moral education as growth from impulsive behavior to a “reflective morality,” involving the pursuit of ends-in-view identified through practices of critical reflection and social interaction. The essays in this section explore a variety of such practices as a philosophical approach to K–12 ethics education. The essays draw on, and contribute to three educational movements that aim for particular kinds of reflective consciousness and agency. Socratic Pedagogy engages students in problematizing the status quo, inquiry to identify (...) truth, and self-correction. Critical Pedagogy utilizes school subjects to raise students’ political awareness and as methods of political inquiry and agency. Contemplative Pedagogy introduces practices of mindfulness to help students cultivate curiosity and attention and to bring personal insight to bear on their studies. Teaching ethics as a series of philosophical practices helps students and teachers become more sensitive to ethical meaning and skillful in ethical inquiry and agency. (shrink)

The need for philosophical practice to integrate various methods, both conceptual and those based on the use of emotions, raises the question as to whether its methodology is necessarily eclectic, in terms of the collection of various methodologies used in philosophy, or whether there is a way to move beyond eclecticism. This is the main subject of this paper. In other words, the question is whether there is such a thing as an ‘integrative’ methodology and, if so, what (...) distinguishes such a method from mere eclecticism. In this text, we define the methodological procedure of integrativeness as the process of systematizing perspectives into an orientational answer to the demands of a specific problem. What differentiates such an approach from mere summation is a new contribution that results from a synergistic and systematic meeting of positions and argumentations whose final result differs from its initial elements. Diversity in the form of a multidimensional relationship towards life and the world results in numerous perspectives, which is a value that should be cultivated and integrated into a reflective and actional perception of the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reading as a Philosophical Practice by Robert PierceyIris Vidmar JovanovićReading as a Philosophical Practice, by Robert Piercey, 130 pp. London: Anthem Press, 2021.Robert Piercey's Reading as a Philosophical Practice is dedicated to exploring the passion of reading, and to explaining ways in which common readers, as Virginia Woolf calls them, rather than professionals, engage with reading. Piercey's answer to this question, which (...) is also the central claim of the book, is that reading—independently of the subject or a genre—is a philosophical activity, that is, "a kind of reflection on experiences and capacities that are distinctive to human beings" (p. 3). As Piercey argues, reading inevitably invites one to consider issues that fall within three main philosophical domains: those related to selfhood; those related to ethical questions, primarily the ones asking about a valuable life; and those concerning ontological questions regarding the true nature of things. Inspiration for this account comes from the writings of Henry James, Stanley Cavell, and Marcel Proust, each of whom describes reading as an experience in which one's self enlarges and new dimensions of subjectivity are revealed. Piercey's ambition is to understand precisely what happens in such moments of discovery, and he sets out to offer an account of the essence of the experience of reading that explains why reading matters so profoundly to so many people.Piercey finds a philosophical grounding for his main claim in Wolfgang Iser's phenomenological account of reading and Alasdair MacIntyre's account of practice. Piercey praises Iser's account of reading as an activity prolonged in time, during which a reader is situated within the text, and tries to rebuild that text by constantly going through interpretative stages. Such a "wandering viewpoint" (p. 20) generates in one a sense of living through an altered subjectivity. As Piercey argues, the greatest value of this explanation is its capacity to account for how a text is given to one's consciousness.Insightful as it is, however, Iser's account has limits, given his focus on fictional classics and his belief that the aim of reading is to arrive at the correct interpretation of a text. To overcome these shortcomings, Piercey adopts MacIntyre's account of practice and argues that understanding reading as a [End Page 468] type of social practice means recognizing it as "embedded in, and expressive of, a full range of human activities and a full picture of the human person." Moreover, thinking of reading as a practice encourages us to see it "as a space where one reflects on what kind of a person one should become, and tries earnestly to make oneself into that kind of a person" (p. 25).What such a project looks like is examined in the third chapter, where Piercey analyzes writings on reading by novelist Nick Hornby. This chapter is particularly interesting in tackling questions that pop up when one pursues reading as important for one's well-being: questions concerning which books to read and which to skip, issues regarding rereading, and the like. The rhetorical power of this chapter is immense, in raising one's awareness of the many nuances that a reflective approach to reading invites. This awareness is further advanced in the sixth chapter, in which Piercey presents "descriptive hermeneutical ontology" (p. 71) to explain how readers discover what is valuable and meaningful about the nature of things and attachments in the process of reading. Interesting here is the dual nature of books that Piercey describes, namely their material copies and their content, or virtual reality, and the instrumental and intrinsic ways in which each of the two can acquire meaning for individual readers. He concludes that reading matters to so many people because it lets them experience and reflect on the fragmentation built into their encounters with things.In chapter 4, Piercey discusses one of the cornerstones of literary aesthetics: the view—as developed by, among others, Martha Nussbaum—that reading makes us morally better. Piercey acknowledges the relevance of empirical challenge to this view, particularly as advanced by Gregory Currie. Piercey claims that the Nussbaum-like approach to getting ethical lessons from reading is an... (shrink)

Pojem filosofie nabyl v průběhu historie řadu podob a významů. Kromě tradičního teoretického zaměření se lze setkat s přístupem, který vyzdvihuje praktický dopad filosofování na život člověka. Příspěvek představuje koncept filosofické praxe a reflektuje její současný stav na území České republiky. Autoři vymezují filosofickou praxi jako disciplínu filosofie, a načrtávají její možné dělení na dílčí oblasti. Nastíněny jsou její historické kořeny, které autoři identifikují v antickém Řecku. Dále se věnují systematickému představení doposud sepsaných materiálů k filosofické praxi a přehledu její (...) realizace na území České republiky. Detailní pozornost věnují autoři popisu tří jejích oblastí, mezi které patří filosofie pro děti, filosofický workshop a filosofická konzultace. Kromě teoretického vymezení reflektují rovněž své vlastní postupy v uvedených oblastech. Článek čerpá především ze zahraniční odborné literatury, konkrétně z textů a dalších materiálů filosofických praktikantů. Jeho cílem je představit českému čtenáři doposud podrobněji neřešený koncept filosofické praxe a připravit tak pole pro možnou debatu na akademické rovině. -------- The concept of philosophy has had several forms and meanings throughout the history. Besides the traditional theoretical focus, we may also encounter the approach that highlights a practical impact of philosophizing on one’s life. This text introduces the concept of philosophical practice and reflects its current situation in the Czech Republic. Authors characterize philosophical practice as a discipline of philosophy and present its possible division into subsections. They also present its historical roots, which can be found in ancient Greece. Moreover, authors introduce available sources dealing with the philosophical practice and describe how this discipline is actually practiced in the Czech Republic. Detailed attention is given to three of its sections, namely philosophy for children (P4C), philosophical workshop, and philosophical consultation. Authors present theoretical background and also reflect their own methods in these sections. The text draws primarily from scholarly literature from abroad, particularly from the manuscripts and other sources produced by philosophical practitioners. The aim of this text is to introduce the concept of philosophical practice to the Czech reader and prepare the field for further academic discussion. (shrink)

Based on the transcript of a fragment from a philosophical practice session carried by Oscar Brenifier, I flesh out several aspects of this dialogical form of philosophical practice. First, it is a form of interaction grounded in the interlocutors’ interaffection. Second, the main mechanism of carrying through the dialogic interaction is the practitioner’s repeating the other’s words, writing them down, and then questioning them, thus extracting them from the other’s discursive flow and making them shared objects (...) for an intersubjective gaze. Third, this form of dialogue is asymmetrical: while the other is providing the “content”, the practitioner is responsible for explicating it. (shrink)

Philosophical practice would profit from renewed attention to the classical virtue of encrateia or “self-mastery.” It is a common human problem to experience a gap between one's intention to do something and one's ability to execute it. The problem raises the question of the need to train the will. An assumption of the importance of that need, and hints on how to address it, permeate traditional spiritual texts such as the Yoga Sutras, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Tao (...) Te Ching. Classical Greek schools of philosophy from Platonism to Stoicism and Epicureanism were in fundamental ways based on will training. In addition, it is possible to draw on modern psychology for useful insights on developing a skillful and effective will, especially in the writings of William James and Roberto Assagioli. A synthesis based on these sources would offer an opportunity to enrich the toolbox of modern philosophical practice. (shrink)

Is Agassi’s philosophy of practical affairs applicable in philosophical practice? Is it recommendable to philosophical practitioners, counselors, or counselees? A critical rational approach like his demands a prior awareness, which participants in practical philosophy programs often miss. That approach is necessary for counseling that is really philosophical, and some of his ideas are inspiring. Yet the problems that interested him and his way of solving or dissolving them on meta-levels, are not always relevant to the counselees’ (...) concerns. His attitude to the opinions, background, and concerns of others, though tolerant, is not recommendable to practitioners who have to take into account the perspectives of participants with other backgrounds, understand their “problem situations” and their “logic.”. (shrink)

Some experimental philosophers have criticized the standard intuition-based methodology in philosophy. One worry about this criticism is that it is just another version of the general skepticism toward the evidential efficacy of intuition, and is thereby subject to the same difficulties. In response, Weinberg provides a more nuanced version of the criticism by targeting merely the philosophical use of intuition. I contend that, though Weinberg’s approach differs from general skepticism about intuition, its focus on philosophical practices gives rise (...) to a new difficulty. Most extant experimental surveys investigate intuitions about particular cases through vignettes giving little contextual information. However, philosophical practices crucially depend on intuitions about general claims and typically provide more contextual background. I argue that, due to these two differences between surveys’ and philosophers’ appeals to intuition, Weinberg’s critique lacks enough support from current experimental data. I conclude that experimental philosophers who engage in the negative program should pay more attention on testing philosophers’ use of general intuitions and context-rich intuitions. (shrink)

Hryhorii Skovoroda's philosophy is distinguished by a variety of interests and a combination of different genres of the embodiment of philosophical ideas. Skovoroda's philosophical views were reflected in his various life practices in different ways. And yet these different practices harmoniously support each other, ensuring the successful integral self-support of Hryhorii Skovoroda both as a philosopher and as a person. He highly valued the importance of practice for human improvement, but did not develop a special concept of (...) practice of his own. Since Skovoroda himself did not clearly distinguish different types of practices, it is necessary to reconstruct them based on modern ideas about possible philosophical practices. Among the various types of philosophical practices, which are distinguished by modern philosophy and some signs of which can be found in the life and work of Hryhorii Skovoroda, the following were found: practices similar to avoiding metanarratives; practices similar to deconstruction; practices of metaphorization; informational diet practices; improvisation practices; practices of avoiding the effects of the society of the spectacle; spiritual self-reference practices; critical thinking practices; social networking practices. The article attempts a reverse theoretical reconstruction of Hryhorii Skovoroda's philosophical practices. That is, from the standpoint of modern philosophical concepts, the meaning of those life practices that Hryhorii Skovoroda adhered to when he embodied his philosophical views in his actions, mostly without unnecessary declarations, has been partially reconstructed. Skovoroda's practical philosophy was not built by him as a theoretical system, although his life clearly shows the coherence of various life practices. All the practices followed by Hryhorii Skovoroda were fundamentally philosophical – he lived like a philosopher and approached everything like a philosopher, with a philosophical heart and a philosophical head. There were many of these practices, and this article mentions only some of them, namely those that seem significant to us today in the light of the later development of European philosophy – as we know it to this day. It is quite likely that other philosophers of our time, and even more so philosophers of the future, will see in Skovoroda's philosophical life also other various practices. (shrink)

An autobiographical narrative forms the basis for the exploration of a tension at the heart of philosophical practice. This paper considers whether Philosophy should be construed as a text-driven, expert-based endeavor as is typical in University programs or whether there is a primordial philosophical experience that grounds a more informal process of philosophical engagement? That is, is Philosophy a natural extension of human perplexity available as a tool for understanding without the trappings of Professorial scholarship and (...) the authority of canonical texts, or has the historical development of Philosophy so constructed its practice that it is beholden to sophisticated scholarship and the professional interpretation of a definitive body of classical and contemporary sources? (shrink)

The article is an overview of the events of the International Online Conference on Philosophical Practice, which took place on July 28-31 on the electronic platform of the South Ural State University, organized by the University Department of Philosophy and the Association of Practical Philosophers “Ratio” with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (project No. 20- 011-22002).

What does it mean to practice a theory of recognition within the discipline of philosophy? Across an initially acrimonious French-German divide, Axel Honneth’s effort to recognise the value of contemporary French philosophy and social theory suggests that philosophy is a self-critical, outwardly oriented, and cooperative discipline. First, mobilising the idea of recognition in his own philosophical practise has permitted Honneth to notice non-deliberative aspects of social interaction that Habermas had overlooked, including the need for self-confidence (drawn from a (...) “deconstructive” ethics of care) and the need for self-esteem (informed by Sartre’s and Foucault’s attention to the existential damage caused by denigration, and the nefarious effects of reproductive power). Second, although Honneth’s ascription of value to contemporary French theory also involves mis-recognition, his practice of recognition has nonetheless prompted philosophical cooperation among theorists who would not otherwise have engaged, encouraging French-influenced critical theorists to extend Honneth’s theory in ways that he had not anticipated. What emerges is an interpretation of philosophy as an ongoing intersubjective pursuit that attempts to respond to its own limitations through cooperative critique. (shrink)

Interpreters of the Phaedo often cite the Pythagorean context of the dialogue as a source of influence on the demanding conception of philosophy defended therein. Sandra Peterson offers a striking account of that influence: the Pythagorean sympathies of Socrates's interlocutors lead him to defend a conception of philosophy that captures their commitments, but that he himself rejects. Call this the Strong Influence Thesis. Peterson defends SIT by attempting to demonstrate a mismatch between the conception of philosophy espoused by Socrates in (...) the Apology and ‘true philosophy’ as described in the Phaedo. Assessing this defence thus requires a detailed examination of both sides of the comparison. This paper undertakes that task. I argue that when the beliefs and norms that define both philosophical lives are correctly understood, the appearance of a significant mismatch fades away. The life of true philosophy realizes the Apology ideal of caring most about wisdom, truth, and the best possible state of.. (shrink)

This article examines what comes to pass when philosophical practitioners start working in the institutional environment of a hospital, with its unique norms and culture through the experience of three philosophical practitioners in Norway. It finds that that a notable characteristic of these practitioners is their effort to avoid taking on the traditional helper role, which they perceive that other hospital professions are representing. Their ideal is to approach “life here and now” with openness, acceptance, curiosity, and wondering, (...) while simultaneously supporting a serious, playful creativity in the search for new perspectives when relevant. For the patients, this offers a space where they can rediscover themselves as whole individuals, rather than rather only beings in need of help. The article concludes that philosophical practitioners have the potential to play a significant role within hospitals. (shrink)

In this volume, an international group of prominent philosophical practitioners brings new methods, aims, problems and audiences to the practice of philosophy. The twelve chapters here exemplify how philosophers can fulfill their responsibility towards their communities, and, ultimately, towards civilization at large. This anthology will prove to be valuable not only to philosophers, both practical and theoretical, but also to professionals and students in education and the helping disciplines. Written in a clear and engaging style, it will be (...) of interest to the general public as well. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the recent arguments against the “Centrality” thesis—the thesis that intuition plays central evidential roles in philosophical inquiry—and their implications for the negative program in experimental philosophy. Two types of objections to Centrality are discussed. First, there are some objections which turn out to only work against Centrality when it is taken as a potential form of philosophical exceptionalism. I respond by showing that negative experimental philosophy doesn’t need the assumption that philosophy is distinctive in its (...) reliance on intuitions. Second, there are some objections which turn out to be related to some particular view concerning the nature of evidence. In response, I distinguish between several different versions of Centrality, and argue that the version of Centrality that experimentalists need remains innocuous. Though none of the arguments against Centrality works as intended, I agree with its opponents that negative experimental philosophers have mischaracterized philosophical practice in a way which has problematic consequences for at least some versions of their argument. Specifically, I contend that philosophical practice grants important evidential status to general intuitions and context-rich intuitions, but extant experimental studies have almost exclusively focused on case intuitions and context-poor intuitions. I conclude that those who work on the negative program of experimental philosophy need to more carefully examine how philosophers actually use intuition in their practice. (shrink)