The philosophy of hope centers on two interlocking sets of questions. The first concerns the nature of hope. Specific questions here include how to analyze hope, how hope motivates us, and whether there is only one type of hope. The second set concerns the value of hope. Key questions here include whether and when it is good to hope and whether there is a virtue of hope. Philosophers of hope tend (...) to proceed from the first set of questions to the second. This is a natural approach, for one might expect that you must develop a basic understanding of what hope is before you can determine its value. The structure of this chapter thus follows this approach. But readers should not be misled: there is in fact a good deal of feedback between the two sets of questions. A theory of hope is more plausible to the extent that it fits well with plausible ideas about the value of hope. So the movement from hope’s nature to its value is one of emphasis rather than a strict, step-wise process. (shrink)

Jordan's book is an inspiring and uplifting exploration of the power of hope. Drawing on philosophy, science, and literature, Jordan argues that hope is a fundamental human need that can sustain us during life's darkest moments. This book is a testament to the resilience of the human spirit and a call to embrace hope as a guiding principle in our lives. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the (...) knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Can philosophy be a source of hope? Today it is common to believe that the answer is no - that providing hope, if it is possible at all, belongs either to the predictive sciences or to religion. In this exciting and simulating book, however, Alexander Douglas argues that the philosophy of Spinoza can offer something akin to religious hope. Douglas shows how Spinoza is able, without appealing to belief in any traditional afterlife or supernatural grace, (...) to develop a profound and original theory of how humans can escape from the conditions of death and sin. Douglas argues that this theory of escape, which Spinoza calls beatitude, is the centrepiece of his entire philosophy, though scholars have often downplayed or ignored it. One reason for this scholarly neglect might be the difficulty of understanding Spinoza's theory, which departs from the standard doctrines and methods of Western philosophy. Douglas's interpretation therefore seeks inspiration beyond the Western tradition, drawing especially on the classical Daoist text Zhuangzi and its commentaries. Here, Douglas argues, surprising resonances with Spinoza's core ideas can be found, leading to a new way of understanding his strange yet compelling theory of beatitude. (shrink)

A leading Catholic philosopher, he won a wide audience through such books as The Four Cardinal Virtues and About Love.This book is one of few extended studies ...

We are happy to be able to present here a Marxist critique of Bloch's philosophy of hope. Manfred Buhr is the director of the Zentralinstituts fuer Philosophie ofthe German Academy in Berlin. This essay was originally published in the Deutsche Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie, which Bloch himself edited at one time. It appeared almost simultaneously with Prinzip Hoffnung. The original title of the article is "Der religiose Ursprung und Charakter der Hoffnungsphilosophie ErnstBloch." Although published some time ago, we feel (...) that it has more than historical interest for the collection of articles we are presenting in this issue of Philosophy Today as an "introduction" to Ernst Bloch's thought. We wish to thank the present editor of the Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie and the VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften of Berlin for their kind permission to publish this translation. Because of space limitations we have had to edit out some of the original article. At most this amounts to a few pages. We have indicated where the cutting has taken place and have tried carefully to respectthe substance and continuity of Professor Buhr's essay. (shrink)

Few reference works in philosophy have articles on hope. Few also are systematic or large-scale philosophical studies of hope. Hope is admitted to be important in people's lives, but as a topic for study, hope has largely been left to psychologists and theologians. For the most part philosophers treat hope en passant. My aim is to outline a general theory of hope, to explore its structure, forms, goals, reasonableness, and implications, and to trace (...) the implications of such a theory for atheism or theism. What has been written is quite disparate. Some see hope in an individualistic, often existential, way, and some in a social and political way. Hope is proposed by some as essentially atheistic, and by others as incomprehensible outside of one or another kind of theism. Is it possible to think consistently and at the same time comprehensively about the phenomenon of human hoping? Or is it several phenomena? How could there be such diverse understandings of so central a human experience? On what rational basis could people differ over whether hope is linked to God? What I offer here is a systematic analysis, but one worked out in dialogue with Ernst Bloch, Immanuel Kant, and Gabriel Marcel. Ernst Bloch of course was a Marxist and officially an atheist, Gabriel Marcel a Christian theist, and Immanuel Kant was a theist, but not in a conventional way. (shrink)

This learned, elegant book builds an interpretation of beatitude in Spinoza’s Ethics through interaction with a range of primary texts, including prominently the Zhuangzi, as well as secondary literature on Spinoza. Douglas’s focus is the promise that Spinoza’s doctrine of beatitude offers for eluding what is worst about death.The book starts with an account of beatitude that will serve as a foil. Chapter 1 sets out André Comte-Sponville’s account of beatitude in Spinoza, advertised as a Stoic account, on which one (...) attains beatitude by developing a sort of desire that is immune to hope: without hope and with the right sort of desire, we lack unfulfilled desires and so are happy (12). Douglas argues that, on this... Read More. (shrink)

This volume presents new philosophical perspectives on environmental emotions. It explores the motivating nature of emotions such as anger, grief, and hope in relation to the current climate crisis. Many of our emotional responses to the climate crisis take a distressed form like anxiety, despair, or grief. However, these emotions almost always coexist with hope, drive toward action, or a strengthened sense of relationality and belonging. This book explores the different levels at which these tensions take place. Part (...) 1 discusses the conceptual and linguistic notions we use to make sense of our ecological predicament. Part 2 looks at the embedded dimension of our emotions: how we feel about the climate crisis as members of our communities and how our emotions are interconnected with what we do and how we work in and for our communities. Several chapters in this section explicitly discuss hope. Finally, Part 3 has a phenomenological and existential focus: it explores the nature of the rootedness and how it shapes our emotional experiences during the climate crisis. The Philosophy of Environmental Emotions will appeal to scholars and graduate students working in environmental philosophy, philosophy of emotion, and environmental psychology. (shrink)

My dissertation examines several proleptic bases running through Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of history. After setting preliminary ground to frame Kant’s hopeful historical viewpoint, I attempt to address and answer problems such as Yirmiyahu Yovel’s notion of “the historical antinomy” by trying to bridge the gap between reason and empirical history; to extricate Kant from Arthur Danto’s inclusion of him in a group of “substantive philosophers of history,” who all share the characteristic of presenting “prophetic” accounts of the future; as (...) well as to offer an original reading of Kant’s use of Seneca’s phrase, “Ducunt volentum fata, nolentem trahunt,” as it appears in two of the socio-political essays. Ultimately, I argue that it would be a betrayal of Kantian hope to forfeit the presumption, however unknowable, that there are teleological principles operating in history, thereby resigning ourselves to the “dismal reign of chance” (trostloses Ungefähr), a caveat that humanity cannot afford to dismiss. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, for Nietzsche, the will to power is a kind of élan vital, i.e., vital impulse, force or drive. In living creatures, it is a drive to express their natures. In human beings, it is complex and must be developed in stages. The initial stages include becoming independent and striving for freedom of spirit and expression. Of the few that achieve the last stage, some will become the Übermensch or superior persons who will achieve great (...) creative acts and in so doing enhance the capabilities of all humans. Nietzsche spoke as if he were one of the free spirits, but implicit in his writings is the idea that he is an exemplar of the Übermensch. (shrink)

Some of the most important achievements in the field of empiricist ethics were made by the School of Moral Sentiment, comprising Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith. This book throws new light on their consensus theory of virtue. Hope works some of their ideas into a merit theory of rights applicable to conventional rights, defends ethical cognitivism, and analyzes pleasure.

In order to address the question of hope in the present, it behooves us to revisit Kant’s third and fourth questions: ‘What may we hope?’ and ‘What is the human being?’ I reexamine these questions through an analysis of Thomas McCarthy’s recent book Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development and several works by Hans Blumenberg. I agree with McCarthy that Kant’s anthropology is incomplete and that the postmodern rejection of macronarratives was premature, but I claim that (...) he requires a more complex philosophical anthropology to guide a philosophy of history. In order to address the question about hope, I reconstruct the anthropology implied in Blumenberg’s writings. I claim that this answer to Kant’s fourth question supplies conceptual scaffolding missing from McCarthy’s book, provides resources necessary for making normative claims on behalf of all human beings, and can inform a multiversal history for grounding rational hope in the present. (shrink)

Ali Mirsepassi's book presents a powerful challenge to the dominant media and scholarly construction of radical Islamist politics, and their anti-Western ideology, as a purely Islamic phenomenon derived from insular, traditional and monolithic religious 'foundations'. It argues that the discourse of political Islam has strong connections to important and disturbing currents in Western philosophy and modern Western intellectual trends. The work demonstrates this by establishing links between important contemporary Iranian intellectuals and the central influence of Martin Heidegger's philosophy. (...) We are also introduced to new democratic narratives of modernity linked to diverse intellectual trends in the West and in non-Western societies, notably in India, where the ideas of John Dewey have influenced important democratic social movements. As the first book to make such connections, it promises to be an important contribution to the field and will do much to overturn some pervasive assumptions about the dichotomy between East and West. (shrink)

Philosophers and intellectual historians generally recognize pragmatism as a philosophy of progress. For many commentators, pragmatism is tied to a notion of progress through its embrace of meliorism – a forward-looking philosophy that places hope in the future as a site of possibility and improvement. I complicate the progressive image of hope generally attributed to pragmatism by outlining an alternative account of meliorism in the work of William James. By focusing on the affectivity and temporality of (...) James’s meliorism, I argue that James offers a non-progressivist version of hope that is affectively tempered by melancholy and oriented temporally toward the present. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE OF BEING: ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY HELMUT HOPING University of Tubingen, Germany Introduction T:HE PHILOSOPHY of the twentieth century has been o no small extent a critique of metaphysics. Admittedly, philosophical programs have been developed in which the tradition of metaphysics survives. Yet the position of metaphysics in the modern age is disputed even today-as is demonstrated by the recent controversy between (...) Jiirgen Habermas and Dieter Henrich about the possibility of metaphysics after Kant.1 Since 1 See J. Habermas, "Ruckkehr zur Metaphysik: Eine Tendenz in der deutschen Philosophie?" Merkur 439/440, 39 (1985): 898-905; "Metaphysik nach Kant," in K. Cramer et al., eds., Theorie der Subjektivitiit: Dieter Henrich zum 60. Geburtstag (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), 425-443. (Both articles are reprinted in J. Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken: Philosophische Aufsiitze [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988], 18-34; 267-279.) Henrich replied to Habermas's critique in the article "Was ist Metaphysik, was Moderne?: Thesen gegen Jurgen Habermas," Merkur 440, 40 (1986): 495-508 (reprinted in D. Henrich, Konzepte: Essays zur Philosophie der Zeit [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987], 11-43). On the controversy between Habermas and Henrich, see V. Gerhardt, " Metaphysik und ihre Kritik: Zur Metaphysikdebatte zwischen Jurgen Habermas und Dieter Henrich," Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung 42 (1988) : 45-70. Habermas's notion of a " return to metaphysics " undoubtedly has a certain diagnostic value; after all, there has indeed been a recent " discovery " of metaphysics. But Habermas 's criticism of the concept and content of metaphysics-i.e., his thesis that after Kant metaphysics is impossible-not only contradicts the self-understanding of modern philosophy for which metaphysics is essential; it also fails to recognize the metaphysical implications of his own theory of communicative action. See W. C. Zimmerli, "Kommunikation und Metaphysik: Zu den Anfangsgrunden von Habermas ' ' Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns,' " in W. Oelmuller, ed., Metaphysik heute? Kolloquien zur Gegenwartsphilosophie, vol. 10 (Paderborn: SchOningh, 1987), 97-111. 189 190 HELMUT HOPING metaphysics has been indispensable for the self-understanding of philosophy in the modern age up until Hegel, this controversy cannot be reduced to the simple disjunction: either the "end of metaphysics" or the "return to metaphysics "-as Habermas has suggested. The task of philosophy today lies in a metaphysical form of thinking that remains possible even after the critique of metaphysics in Kant and Heidegger. Until recently, the current debate about metaphysics has not been adequately addressed by theology. That is surprising because metaphysics is also indispensable for theology.2 But in the light of the modern critique of metaphysics, the self-understanding of theology and its relationship to metaphysics cannot remain unchanged -just as the self-understanding of metaphysics itself cannot remain unchanged. Yet at least in the realm of Catholic theology, the traditional doctrine of the praeambula fidei has not been abandoned. The aim of the following reflections is to show that the determination of the relationship between metaphysics and theology depends upon how metaphysics understands the " difference of Being" that is given with the manifold of beings. I will introduce four different understandings of the " difference of Being": that which is found in Aquinas's metaphysics; that in Kant's transcendental philosophy; that in Heidegger's thinking of Being; and that in the metaphysics of the absolute projected by Henrich. In some concluding reflections, I will then try to draw out some implications of these understandings of the " difference of Being " for the determination of the relationship between metaphysics and theology. I. Metaphysics of God and Creation : Theological Difference (Aquinas) It is well-known that Thomas Aquinas defines metaphysics as the science of being qua being. The subject-matter that dis2 See W. Kasper, " Zustimmung zum Denken: Von der Unerlasslichkeit der Metaphysik fiir die Sache der Theologie," Tiibinger Theologische Quartalschrift 169 (1989) : 257-271. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METAPHYSICS & THEOLOGY 191 tinguishes metaphysics from all other sciences is the ens inquantum est ens 3 or the ens commune.4 Contrary to later concepts of metaphysics, this is not an abstract-universal, for " the term ' a being' [ens], which is applied to a thing by reason of its being [esse], designates the same thing as the term which is applied... (shrink)

In this paper, I give examples of the similarities in thought which I have found in the works of philosophers and thinkers of ancient Greece and ancient India. Being a comparative philosopher, I have worked with both traditions for many years. In fact, the more I do research in both traditions, the more similarities I have found in various views or perspectives, beliefs and values.After briefly explaining some of the similarities, I argue that an ongoing exploration and comparison of these (...) two great traditions can help humans to understand the origins of knowledge, especially philosophical knowledge, and that because the study involves both Western and non-Western traditions, it will require comparative philosophers to undertake the study. Furthermore, since the study will involve research concerning the two cultures, anthropologists, linguists, and some historians will also be needed in this undertaking. (shrink)

이 글은 칸트 실천철학에서 최고선 개념의 변천과정을 희망철학의 관점에서 추적한다. 많은 칸트 연구자들이 지적하듯이, 칸트의 최고선 개념은 그 전모를 파악하기 쉽지 않다. 왜냐하면 칸트 스스로 최고선 개념을 일관되고 통일된 방식으로 설명하고 있지 않기 때문이다. 따라서 최고선 개념을 일관성 있게 해석하기 위해서는 희망철학의 관점에서 해석할 필요가 있다. 이를 위해 『순수이성비판』, 『실천이성비판』, 『판단력비판』에서 제시되는 최고선 개념을 비판적으로 분석할 것이다. 이러한 분석은 최고선 개념이 내세적 희망에서 현세적 희망으로, 또 개인적 차원에서 윤리적 공동체의 의미로 이행하는 과정을 보여줄 것이다. 또한 이는 칸트 윤리학과 종교철학, 역사철학이 (...) 희망철학이라는 테제를 통해 서로 연결가능하다는 것을 제시해 줄 것이다.BR 최고선 개념은 『순수이성비판』에서는 완전히 내세적인 특징을 가지고 있는 반면, 『실천이성비판』을 거쳐 『판단력비판』으로 진행될수록 점점 더 현세적인 특징을 지니게 된다. 특히 『실천이성비판』의 최고선은 한편에서는 『순수이성비판』과 마찬가지로 개인적이며 내세적인 희망을 함의하지만, 다른 한편에서는 이 세계에서 최고선이 실제로 가능할 것이라는 현세적인 희망에 대한 단초를 담고 있다. 이러한 현세적인 희망은 결국 『판단력비판』에 이르러 본격적으로 구체화되는데, 이는 최고선을 목적론적 사유에 따라 세계의 궁극목적으로 규정하는 방식으로 나타난다. 이 궁극목적은 더 나아가 윤리적 공동체에 대한 희망으로 전개된다.BR 이러한 과정은 칸트의 최고선 이론이 단순히 내재적이고 개인적인 차원이나, 종교적이고 내세적인 차원의 논의에서 벗어나, 현세적이며 공동체적인 차원의 논의로 이행하고 있음을 보여준다. 뿐만 아니라 이로써 도덕적 인간의 희망이란 개인적인 차원의 희망에서 공동체적이며 사회적인 차원의 희망으로 확장된다는 것을 알 수 있다. 도덕적 인간은 더 이상 개인적인 차원에서만 최고선이 실현될 것이라고 희망하지 않는다. 도덕적 인간은 자신의 이웃과, 자신이 속한 공동체, 더 나아가 전 세계에 걸쳐 최고선이 실현될 것을 희망하기 시작한다. 이러한 희망은 도덕적으로는 목적의 나라로, 종교적으로는 악의 원리와 투쟁하여 선의 승리를 꿈꾸는 교회의 실현으로, 정치적으로는 영구평화를 목표하는 보편적 세계 시민사회의 실현으로 나타난다. (shrink)

Augustine was a representative of the theology of hope in the patristic age. He saw hope as the grasp of eschatological eternal happy life for human in this world. Together, the three virtues of faith, hope and love constitute the three interdependent faculties of the soul to know God. Hope, which comes from the grace of God given through Christ, is the knowledge of eternity, not of a future in time, and it helps one to resist (...) the temptation of goods which comes from the flesh and earthly things. Hope in eternity gives one a cognitive power beyond time and space, which leads to a unified vision of past, present and future, thus also causing important changes in how one lives in this created world. However, because of this unearthly hope, people can form a gradually expanding community of fraternity in this world, which helps them transcend differences of belief and seek a more virtuous life.Contribution: This article reconstructs Augustine’s interpretation of the nature of hope by synthesising his various texts, analysing the theological structure of the concepts related to hope, sorting out the ‘theology of hope’ he advocates and finally, in light of the wisdom of his philosophy, responding to what and how we can hope in suffering. (shrink)

Theories of Hope: Exploring Affective Dimensions of Human Experience explores the nature of hope from varied and diverse perspectives. This volume includes chapters examining hope within contexts of social and political philosophy, policy, and struggle from both deeply theoretical and practical approaches.

The Philosophy of Matter is a journey in thinking through the material fate of the earth itself; its surfaces and undercurrrents, ecologies, environments and irreparable cracks. With figures such as Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze and Michel Serres as philosophical guides and writings on New Materialism, Posthumanism and Affect Theory as intellectual context, Rick Dolphijn proposes a radical rethinking of some of the basic themes of philosophy: subjectivity, materiality, body (both human and otherwise) and the act of living. This rethink (...) is a work of imagination and meditation in order to conceive of "another earth for another people". It is a homage to courageous thinking that dares to question the religious, capitalist and humanist realities of the day. A poetic philosophy of how to live in troubling times when even the earth beneath us feels unstable, Dolphijn offers a way to think about the world with depth, honesty and glimpses of hope. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis introduction outlines the rationale of the symposium 'Vocabularies of Hope in Place of Vocabularies of Critique: Can Rorty Help Us to Redescribe Education?'. In particular, it argues that, despite some early statements of Richard Rorty, he may turn out to be a particularly timely thinker in reference to debates occurring in the field of educational theory and philosophy, especially by suggesting an engagement with the latter through vocabularies of hope. Moreover, after highlighting that a valuable dialogue (...) may be established between Rorty's stance and post-critical pedagogy, the introduction describes in broad strokes along which lines this conversation will unfold in the three papers and one response composing the symposium. (shrink)

This loosely-argued manifesto contains some suggestions regarding what the philosophy of religion might become in the 21st century. It was written for a brainstorming workshop over a decade ago, and some of the recommendations and predictions it contains have already been partly actualized (that’s why it is now a bit "untimely"). The goal is to sketch three aspects of a salutary “liturgical turn” in philosophy of religion. (Note: “liturgy” here refers very broadly to communal religious service and experience (...) generally, not anything specifically “high church.”) The first involves the attitudes that characterize what I call the “liturgical stance" towards various doctrines. The second focuses on the “vested” propositional objects of those attitudes. The third looks at how those doctrines are represented, evoked, and embodied in liturgical contexts. My untimely rallying-cry is that younger philosophers of religion might do well to set aside debates regarding knowledge and justified belief, just as their elders set aside debates regarding religious language. When we set aside knowledge in this way, we make room for discussions of faith that in turn shed light on neglected but philosophically-interesting aspects of lived religious practice. (shrink)

A chronological approach that examines the progression of Levinas's deliberations on time over six decades, thus providing new insights about aspects of Levinasian thought that have consistently troubled readers, including the differences between Levinas's early and later writings, his controversial invocation of the feminine, and the blurry line between philosophy and religion in his work"--Provided by publisher.

Hoping is an integral part of what it is to be human, and its significance for education has been widely noted. Hope is, however, a contested category of human experience and getting to grips with its characteristics and dynamics is a difficult task. The paper argues that hope is not a singular undifferentiated experience and is best understood as a socially mediated human capacity with varying affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions. Drawing on the philosophy, theology and psychology (...) of hope, five modes of hoping are outlined: patient, critical, sound, resolute and transformative. The key aim of the paper is to illustrate how different modes of hoping are associated with different pedagogical strategies. Phrased differently, the paper seeks to delineate a range of pedagogies of hope. The phrase ‘pedagogy of hope’ is very much associated with critical theory—one thinks instantly of, for example, Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux or bell hooks. There are many pedagogies of hope, however, and an explicitly conservative text such as William Bennett’s Book of Virtues has as strong a claim to the title as Freire’s radical and utopian ideas. A broader argument, therefore, is that there is nothing inherently radical or subversive about a pedagogy of hope. Pedagogies of hope can serve to reproduce social relations as well as to transform them. (shrink)

This article examines the compatibility and relevance of Gabriel Marcel’s phenomenology of hope in interdisciplinary research on the role of hope in end-of-life care. Our analysis is divided into three thematic topics which examine the various shades of hope observed in Marcel’s phenomenology of hope and in the collection of 20 EOL studies on hope as experienced by adult palliative care patients, health care professionals and parents of terminally ill children. The three topics defining the (...) shades of hope are: the meaning of hope in its dynamic aspects, the dialectics of hope and despair, and the transcendent facets of hope. We analyse how Marcel’s understanding of hope is reflected in EOL studies, and how this perception can enrich the philosophy of PC and significantly deepen and broaden HCPs’ understanding of hope. Our findings prove that despite terminological differences between Marcelian phenomenology and the concepts of hope in the 20 EOL studies, hope emerges as a resourceful movement towards being. Implementing Marcelian hope within communication in EOL care could help in HCPs’ interpersonal approach to patients as his concept harbors a holistic perception of the existential situation of a person. Equally, introducing Marcel’s phenomenology of hope into the clinical encounter could play a beneficial role in improving the ability of patients to adapt to the difficult conditions of their disease and PC treatment. (shrink)

The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Affection Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative (...) strategies of the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article makes the case for the continued relevance of former U.S. president Barack Obama's conception of social hope. To present this conception, I compare it with the views of hope developed by two prominent political philosophers: Immanuel Kant and Richard Rorty. Kant, Rorty, and Obama all espouse the idea that progress must be founded on hope since hope motivates action. Yet the three differ on the grounds of hope. Kant believes that social progress (...) depends on our shared humanity. Similarly, Obama regards progress as founded on a set of values shared by all Americans. Given our divisions today, however, Obama's premise appears implausible. Rorty's philosophy of hope provides a way out of this worry: progress need not depend on an essential feature shared by all but can be achieved by “stitching together” coalitions between groups that share interests. Still, this does not imply that we should abandon Obama's conception of hope altogether. The idea of audacious hope implies that we should have the courage to resist the temptation to let divisions quell our efforts toward political progress. Obama's conception of hope, with the Rortian corrective I defend, holds much promise in our current political climate. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that hoping is an integral part of what it is to be human. The present article strives to make sense of the myriad competing conceptions of hope that have emerged over the past half-century. Two problems with the literature are highlighted. First, discussions of hope tend to take place within rather than between disciplines. Second, hope is often taken to be an undifferentiated experience. In order to address the first problem, the article takes (...) an interdisciplinary approach, drawing on research from the fields of philosophy, anthropology, psychology, theology and politics. In order to address the second problem, the article proposes that hope be regarded as a human universal that can be experienced in different modes. A variety of theories and models of hope are discussed, including those offered by Marcel, Dauenhauer, Bloch, Moltmann, Bovens, Pettit, Snyder, Rorty and Gutiérrez. While many of these claim to have identified the characteristics of hope, it is argued that each captures something about a particular mode of hoping. The theories and models are integrated into a framework comprising five modes of hoping: patient, critical, estimative, resolute and utopian. Examining hope in this way, as a human universal that can be experienced in different modes, may help us see the varying conceptions that presently exist within the human sciences not as conflicting, nor even as competing, but rather as complementary. (shrink)

A philosophical memoir about becoming a father in an increasingly terrible world – can I hope the child growing in my partner's womb will have a good-enough life? For Kant, philosophy boiled down to three key questions: “What can I know?”, “What ought I do?”, and “What can I hope for?” In philosophy departments, that third question has largely been neglected at the expense of the first two – even though it is crucial for understanding why (...) anyone might ask them in the first place. In Infinitely Full of Hope, as he prepares to become a father for the first time, the philosopher Tom Whyman attempts to answer Kant’s third question, trying to make sense of it in the context of a world that increasingly seems like it is on the verge of collapse. Part memoir, part theory, and part reflection on fatherhood, Infinitely Full of Hope asks how we can cling to hope in a world marked by crisis and disaster. (shrink)

This paper discusses Kant’s prospect of ‘hope’ that entangles with interrelated epistemic terms like belief, faith, knowledge, etc. The first part of the paper illustrates the boundary of knowing in the light of a Platonic analysis to highlight the distinction between empiricism and rationalism. Kant’s notion of ‘transcendent metaphysical knowledge’, a path-breaking way to look at the metaphysical thought, can fit with the regulative principle that seems favoruable to the experience-centric knowledge. The second part of the paper defines ‘ (...) class='Hi'>hope’ as an interwoven part of belief, besides ‘hope’ as a component of ‘happiness' can persuade the future behaviours of the individuals. Revisiting Kant’s three categorizations of hopes (eschatological hope, political hope, and hope for the kingdom of ends), the paper traces out Kant’s good will as a ‘hope’ and his conception of humanity. (shrink)

현대 사회는 탈진실의 시대라고 할 수 있다. 탈진실 현상은 올바르고 참된 진실을 추구하기보다는, 자신의 느낌과 감정을 더욱 중요하게 여기는 현상이라 할 수 있다. 즉, 우리는 누군가가 아무리 진실에 대해 과학적-객관적으로 해명한다고 하더라도, 자신이 지지하는 정치적 진영의 입장과 일치하지 않거나, 자신의 느낌과 감정에 반할 경우, 혹은 자신의 신념이나 이념과 상충할 경우, 얼마든지 진실을 외면할 준비가 되어 있는 시대를 살아가고 있다. 그렇다면 이러한 탈진실의 문제를 어떻게 해결할 수 있을 것인가? 탈진실 연구자들은 이에 대해 저널리즘 정신의 회복, 디지털 리터러시 교육 등 여러 가지 (...) 대안들을 제시한다. 그러나 이러한 대안들이 가능하기 위해서는 “비판적 사고의 회복”이 절실히 요구된다. 그러나 비판적 사고를 추구하는 일은 그 누구보다도 철학이 가장 잘 수행할 수 있는 영역이 아닌가? 따라서 이 글에서는 탈진실 문제와 그 극복가능성을 칸트철학의 관점에서 제시하고자 한다.BR 먼저 2장에서는 탈진실 문제가 제시되는 배경과 맥락을 추적할 것이다. 이어서 3장에서는 칸트의 「계몽이란 무엇인가?」를 중심으로 칸트의 계몽철학의 의미를 살펴볼 것이다. 왜냐하면 칸트의 계몽철학은 지성을 자유롭게 사용할 용기를 가지는 태도, 더 나아가 이성의 공적 사용을 강조함으로써 탈진실 문제의 극복가능성을 제시해 주기 때문이다. 마지막으로 4장에서는 칸트의『종교론』에서 제시된 근본악 이론을 살펴볼 것이다. 왜냐하면 근본악 이론은, 탈진실 문제의 근본적인 원인으로 지적되는 인지 편향의 문제와 직접적으로 연결되기 때문이다. 따라서 우리는 칸트가 근본악의 문제를 해결하는 이른바 “희망의 방식”을 통해, 인간에게 근절 불가능한 인지 편향으로 인해 비롯되는 탈진실 문제를 해결할 수 있는 가능성을 유비적으로 추론하며 반성해볼 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Isaiah Berlin’s theory of freedom should not be interpreted in a reductive sense. The distinction between negative and positive freedom, as different concepts and possibly conflicting values, truly holds (thereby excluding reductive interpretations that claim there is only one concept of freedom). Moreover, Berlin’s theory as a whole leaves room for both a comprehensive liberalism which advocates autonomy, critical reflection and personal judgement, as well as a liberalism of fear which defends a minimal level (...) of decency and modesty aims at a modus vivendi. I think Berlin’s liberalism is one of hope and fear. (shrink)