Law is traditionally related to the practice of command and hierarchy. It seems that a legal rule should immediately establish a relation between a superior and an inferior. This hierarchical and authoritharian view might however be challenged once the phenomenology of the rule is considered from the internal point of view, that is, from the stance of those that can be said to “use” rather than to “suffer” the rules themselves. A practice oriented approach could in this way open up (...) a more liberal, and also somehow less parochial and ideological, road for legal theory. This is – it is argued in the paper – the programme, or better, the promise we can find in Herbert Hart’s main work, The Concept of Law. The article tries to render this promise more transparent while, nonetheless, not eschewing the blind sides of its narrative and argumentative strategy. (shrink)

Alf Ross je želel izoblikovati »pristno« realistično teorijo prava. To pomeni, da naj bi bila ta sposobna po eni strani razrešiti probleme, s katerimi sta se soočali tako Kelsnova normativistična teorija kot teorija ameriških realistov, po drugi strani pa poustvariti njihove razprave na znanstveni način. Rossova izvirnost tiči v njegovem pojmu pristojnostnih norm, ki jih je pred vsemi drugimi obravnaval kot »konstitutivna pravila«. V nasprotju s trditvami mnogih komentatorjev takšen pojem konstitutivnih norm ni neskladen z Rossovo realistično teorijo (...) prava. V luči njegovih zgodnjih zapisov je mogoče kompetenčne norme razumeti kot racionalizacije, ki lahko izrazijo nagnjenost naslovnikov norm, da določena dejstva prepoznajo kot pravo. Zato je mogoče Rossa šteti za prehodnika postpozitivizma. (shrink)

Prispevek kritično obravnava znano Bobbievo tridelbo pravnega pozitivizma na pozitivizem kot splošni pristop k učenju prava, nauk o pravu in ideologijo. Avtor uvodoma opozori na nekaj problemov same tridelbe, nato pa se osredotoči na Bobbievo samoopredelitev znotraj nje. Na primeru Bobbieve obravnave pojmov temeljne norme in pravila priznavanja pokaže, kako ga njegovo kasnejše zavračanje teh dveh pojmov nezavedno privede do sprejemanja pravnega pozitivizma kot nauka o pravu in pravne ideologije – ki ju je sicer zavračal. Avtor vidi razlog (...) za ta nezavedni Bobbiev zdrs predvsem v njegovi vpetosti v specifično pravnokulturno okolje, ki ga prežema notranji pogled na pravo. Ob tem predlaga, da zavrnemo tridelbo pravnega pozitivizma in ga namesto tega proučujemo kot skupek ne vedno ločljivih stališč, ki tvorijo specifično pravnokulturno okolje. (shrink)

Radikalizam državnog terorizma i terorizma samoubojica u odnosu su frustracijske telerancije. Postoje i mogućnosti međusobnih napada oružjem za masovno uništenje – nuklearnim, biološkim i kemijskim oružjem. Frustracijska tolerancija obaju terorizama – terorom protiv terora – radikalizira njihove međusobne odnose i ostvaruje osvetničke ciljeve, jednake ili veće smrti. Unatoč tome, postoji mogućnost za uljuđenu toleranciju i rješenje sukoba – stabilnu ravnotežu suradnje, mira, sigurnosti i zdravog rivalstva među sukobljenim stranama. Rješenje je u pronalaženju umijeća politike koja pravila ne samo provodi (...) nego ih i mijenja – pronalaženju politike koja nije samo politika političarâ i zadrtih ekstremista koji se orijentiraju na politku sile i dominacije, nego i politika društva koje osuđuje i potiče osudu ekstremističkih tumačenja religija i mitova, koje potiče recepciju svjetskog etosa – čovjeku zajedničkih načela samokontrole, normi i vrijednosti, bez obzira na rasnu, nacionalnu, religijsku i kulturnu pripadnost. Rješenje je i u uvažavanju mnogostrukih identiteta i poticanju mnogostrukog komuniciranja, uključujući i interkulturno komuniciranje među sukobljenim stranama – kao umijeća kretanja kroz kulturne prepreke, ne samo vlada nego i građana – pojedinaca, drušvenih grupa, različitih udruženja i institucija. Izvan svake sumnje, rješenje je i u prevladavanju siromaštva i bijede – najrazornijeg oružja masovnog uništenja. Gospodarstva državnih terorizama i terorizama samoubojica čvrsto su srasla s ‘normalnim gospodarstvima’, pa je nadzor nad njima i financijskim izvorima njihove moći jedna od značajnih pretpostavki prevladavanja terorizama. Na kraju, ali ne manje važno, rješenje je i u snažnoj i nepristrasnoj kritici terorističkih zbivanja mnogih autora i aktivista za ljudska prava. Podsjećamo samo na neka takva imena koja se navode i u ovom tekstu – Yeshayahu Leibowitz, John Rose, Marc Ellis, Jessica Stern, Israel Shahak, Irena Klepfisz, Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Arundhati Roy, Amartya Sen, Amin Maalouf.Radicalism of state terrorism and of suicides terrorism have been keeping some relations of frustrated tolerance. There are and some possibilities of mutual attacks by mass destroing weapon – nuclear, biological and chemical weapon. Frustrated tolerance both of terrorisms – by terror against of terror – radicalizes their mutual relations and realizes of the revengeful purposes, of the equal or the greater death. In spite of, there is a possibility of courtly tolerance and the solution of that conflict – stable balance of cooperation, peace, security and of sound competition between facing sides. The solution is in finding of politics art which some rules not only realises, than of them and changes, too – finding of politics which doesn’t only the politics of politicians and of stubborn extremists that have been closed with politics of power and domination, than and politics of society that doesn’t accept extrem explanations of religions and myths, that keep stimmulatings of reception of world ethos – to man common principles of autocontrol, norms and values, without a consideration to racism, national, religious and cultural appurtenance. The solution is in an accepting of multilateral identities and a stimulating of multilateral communication, including and intercultural communication between conflict sides, too – as an art of movement trough cultural obstacles, not only of some governments, than and of citizens – of individuals, social groups, different civil organisations and institutions. No question of that, the solution is in overcome of a poverty and misery as the most destructive weapon of mass annihilation, too. Economies of state terrorisms and of suicides terrorisms have firm grown with ‘normal economies’. Therefore, a control over them and financial sources of their power is important supposition of overcome of terrorisms. Last but not least, the solution is in strong and impartial critique of terrorism of many authors and activists for human rights, too. We only remember on such names that are adduced in this text – Yeshayahu Leibowitz, John Rose, Marc Ellis, Jessica Stern, Israel Shahak, Irena Klepfisz, Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Arundhati Roy, Amartya Sen, Amin Maalouf. (shrink)

Na temelju analize strukture i slijeda postupka analogije, autor upućuje kritiku tezi o djelomičnoj svodljivosti, tj. tezi prema kojoj se analogija, izuzev onoga njezinog koraka koji predstavlja strogu analogiju, može svesti na vaganje. U radu se stoga prvo iznose neki problemi navedene teze, poput nenužnosti svodljivosti ili činjenice da se pod krinkom vaganja provodi prava analogija. Središnja je teza rada tvrdnja da analogiju nije moguće uspješno svesti na oblik vaganja.

The paper claims that the rule of recognition, given the way it is presented by Hart, cannot be a constitutive rule of any legal system as a whole, but rather a constitutive rule of legal rules as elements of a legal system. Since I take the legal system to be an institutional artifact kind, I claim that, in order to account for a legal system as a whole, at least two further constitutive rules, in addition to the rule of recognition (...) as a token-element constitutive rule, are needed – one constitutive of legal officials and the other constitutive of a legal system as a token. However, given the central role the legal officials' practice occupies in establishing a particular instantiation or token of a legal system, I also claim that the rule of recognition cannot be understood as 'merely' a token-element constitutive rule but also as a legal system's implementation or concretisation rule. (shrink)

Let us now examine one of these radical positions, say, the sceptical one first. According to this, since error is a fact, we may as well treat every perception as erroneous, only undetected so far and so accepted as true. But if we accept error as a fact we must also accept truth as such, for an error cannot be known as one unless we know something as true. When one says one mistook a rope for a snake one must (...) know the rope truly, otherwise there can be no mistake. One may think erroneously, "I am apparently seeing a rope but it may be that I am only imagining it, just as I imagined the snake; I may be mistaking something else for a rope." But then one must also see that as the rope is thus doubted, the unreality of the snake must also be doubted, for it is against the rope as real that the snake becomes unreal. And now one would have to say, "Perhaps I am imagining this rope which might really be the snake I thought I imagine." But in this state of oscillation one cannot pronounce any judgment at all, and so cannot assert anything about the truth and falsity of any perception. The original perception proving false leads one, through analogy, to doubt the latter perception. But if there is a doubt regarding the falsity of the original perception, there cannot be a legitimate doubt regarding the validity of the later one. More generally we may say that if one doubts one's perceptions of certain objects on the ground that some perceptions regarding these had proved false in the past, this doubt logically involves the possibility of those perceptions, rejected as false being true. So that though one may psychologically take up the attitude of doubt with respect to every perception, this attitude has no rational backing. If, however, one doubts certain objects of perception because some other perceptions e.g., snakes) proved false, one has only a weak analogy and is, moreover, forced to doubt all perceptions, including those which proved certain perceptions false, thereby starting the original doubt. But then the reasoning given above which will dispel this doubt will have to be applied. So that this doubt cannot be rationally justified. The argument that since certain perceptions have proved false therefore every one of them may prove so is, after all, a very weak one. A perception is false only when it is falsified by a true one, and we cannot doubt a perception unless it is so falsified. (shrink)

The solipsist, on the analogy of our dream-experience, imagines a higher mode of selfhood or spirit to whom the world is like a dream; his own self is a lower or deluded mode of this selfhood and to it the world appears as real. Thus objectivity appearing to the lower self is illusory and contingent, not ultimate. This analogical argument for a higher self, as against an alien God, has this counter-argument. In dreams I have unpleasant experiences because of certain (...) external causes, such as physiological and psychological. But what compels my higher self to have the unpleasant dreams that are my waking experiences of life? In other words, why cannot my higher self have nothing but rosy dreams when there cannot be anything else than itself to force on it bad ones? The answer to this is that in our dreams and fantasies we do not have unpleasant experiences due to external causes only, but also due to our inherent love of experience for its own sake. Our dreams are our wish-fulfilments too. We love to have all sorts of experiences, to taste all kinds and shades of emotion. Thirst for passions, curiosity after the unknown, and adventure for the strange and the new mark our empirical self. So it is not absurd to conceive the higher self fashioning its dreams, our waking experiences, as a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant elements rich in variety and complexity. And just as my empirical self is said to enjoy the experiences of my dreams, so this higher self may be said to enjoy his dreams, my waking experiences. (shrink)

Dva su osnovna shvatanja odnosa između ustavnih prava i analize proporcionalnosti. Prvo drži da postoji nužna veza između ustavnih prava i proporcionalnosti; drugo tvrdi da pitanje o tome da li su ustavna prava i proporcionalnost povezani zavisi od toga šta su ustavotvorci zapravo odlučili, tj. zavisi od pozitivnog prava. Prva teza se može označiti kao “teza o nužnosti”, druga se može označiti kao “teza o kontingentnosti.” Prema tezi o nužnosti, legitimnost proporcionalnosti je pitanje prirode ustavnih (...) class='Hi'>prava, dok je prema tezi o kontingentnosti legitimnost proporcionalnosti pitanje tumačenja. U članku se zastupa teza o nužnosti. | Prethodna verzija ovog članka je objavljena u Chinese Yearbook of Constitutional Law (2010). 221–235. (shrink)

Istinski realistička teorija prava – čija se mogućnost ispituje u ovome radu – trebala bi imati sljedeća obilježja. U svakom slučaju, trebala bi biti općenitija od postojećih teorija, to jest vrijediti kako za common law tako i za kontinentalnoeuropsko pravo; posljedično tome, trebala bi obrnuti odnos između zakonodavstva i pravosuđenja kakav obično uspostavljaju pozitivističke teorije. I u historiografiji i u poredbenom pravu, pri čemu je teorija prava njihov produžetak na višoj razini apstrakcije, središnji trenutak legal processa je pravosuđenje, (...) dok se zakonodavstvo može shvatiti kao jedan od mnogih pokušaja, možebitno ne i najuspješniji, ograničavanja i nadziranja pravosuđenja. Primjer objašnjavalačke sposobnosti istinski realističke teorije prava jest tzv. kriza izvora: zakonodavstvo uspostavlja suce, no oni su ti koji potom, u konačnici, određuju hijerarhiju izvora prava i sam položaj zakonodavstva u hijerarhiji. (shrink)

Ovaj rad se bavi metodološkim aspektima obnovljenih pravno-filozofskih nastojanja da se preispita pojam međunarodnog prava. Posle kratkog osvrta na istoriju pravne filozofije i ključne tačke Hartovog i Kelzenovog pozitivističkog stanovišta, u radu se dalje ispituje na koji način se savremene pravne teorije, kako u pozitivističkoj, tako i u ne-pozitivističkoj tradiciji, bave međunarodnim pravom. Poslednji deo rada predstavlja pokušaj da se skiciraju određene smernice za novi početak u filozofskoj obradi međunarodnog prava. Prvo, istorija rasprava u ovoj oblasti svedoči o (...) tome da su metodološki pravni teoretičari u pravu kada tvrde da nam utvrđivanje odgovarajućeg metoda pomaže u odgovoru na pitanje šta je pravo. Drugo, imajući na umu stalno promenjivu prirodu međunarodnog prava, odgovarajući metodološki pristup zahteva „evolucionarnu epistemologiju“ (D’Amato), koja teško da se može nazvati obeležjem analitičke jurisprudencije. Najzad, takva epistemologija je na kompleksan način povezana sa našim istraživanjem šta međunarodna pravda ili, bar, šta međunarodna „unutrašnja moralnost“ zahteva. (shrink)

Axel Honneth. Das Recht der Freiheit. Grundriß einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit. Suhrkamp : Berlin 2011; 628 s., ISBN 978-3-518-58562-7.