Results for ' primitive beliefs'

961 found
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  1.  14
    Primitive forms of belief and knowledge.E. L. Thorndike - 1934 - Psychological Review 41 (5):403-411.
  2. Primitively rational belief-forming processes.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200.
    Intuitively, it seems that some belief-forming practices have the following three properties: 1. They are rational practices, and the beliefs that we form by means of these practices are themselves rational or justified beliefs. 2. Even if in most cases these practices reliably lead to correct beliefs (i.e., beliefs in true propositions), they are not infallible: it is possible for beliefs that are formed by means of these practices to be incorrect (i.e., to be (...) in false propositions). 3. The rationality of these practices is basic or primitive. That is, the rationality of these practices is not due simply to the availability, by means of some process of reasoning that relies purely on other practices, of a rational or justified belief in the reliability of these practices. -/- How can there be such practices? This paper offers an answer to that question. (shrink)
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  3. De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness.Florian L. Wüstholz - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):401-422.
    De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. (...)
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  4. Students'“untutored” beliefs about natural phenomena: Primitive science or commonsense?George L. C. Hills - 1989 - Science Education 73 (2):155-186.
  5.  26
    Knowledge before belief ascription? Yes and no (depending on the type of “knowledge” under consideration).Hannes Rakoczy & Marina Proft - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13:988754.
    Knowledge before belief ascription? Yes and no (depending on the type of “knowledge” under consideration). In an influential paper, Jonathan Phillips and colleagues have recently presented a fascinating and provocative big picture that challenges foundational assumptions of traditional Theory of Mind research (Phillips et al., 2020). Conceptually, this big picture is built around the main claim that ascription of knowledge is primary relative to ascription of belief. The primary form of Theory of Mind (ToM) thus is so-called factive ToM that (...)
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  6. Primitive causal relations and the pairing problem.Paul Audi - 2011 - Ratio 24 (1):1-16.
    There is no doubt that spatial relations aid us in pairing up causes and effects. But when we consider the possibility of qualitatively indiscernible things, it might seem that spatial relations are more than a mere aid – they might seem positively required. The belief that spatial relations are required for causal relations is behind an important objection to Cartesian Dualism, the pairing problem. I argue that the Cartesian can answer this objection by appeal to the possibility of primitive (...)
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  7.  71
    Belief ascriptions, prototypes and ambiguity.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    A belief ascription such as “Oedipus believes that his mother is the queen of Thebes” can be understood in two ways, one in which it seems true, and another in which it seems false. It can seem true because the woman who was, in fact, Oedipus’ mother was believed by him to be the queen of Thebes. It can seem false because Oedipus himself would have sincerely denied that Jocasta could be correctly characterized as “Oedipus’s mother.” Belief ascriptions thus seem (...)
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  8. Dissonant beliefs.Fred Sommers - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):267-274.
    1. Philosophers tend to talk of belief as a ‘propositional attitude.’ As Fodor says:" The standard story about believing is that it's a two place relation, viz., a relation between a person and a proposition. My story is that believing is never an unmediated relation between a person and a proposition. In particular nobody grasps a proposition except insofar as he is appropriately related to some vehicle that expresses the proposition. " Fodor's story – that belief is a three-place relation (...)
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  9.  31
    Toward a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict.David Pietraszewski - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e97.
    We don't yet have adequate theories of what the human mind is representing when it represents a social group. Worse still, many people think we do. This mistaken belief is a consequence of the state of play: Until now, researchers have relied on their own intuitions to link up the conceptsocial groupon the one hand and the results of particular studies or models on the other. While necessary, this reliance on intuition has been purchased at a considerable cost. When looked (...)
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  10.  71
    The Relational Character of Belief.Andrew Ward - 1989 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 35 (1):73-82.
    In his book Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Paul Churchland suggests that the singular terms for prepositional attitude predicates serve an adverbial function as elements of complex predicates. This view, called monadic adverbialism, has three problems. First the monadic predicates cannot be semantic primitives because this would compromise the learnability of the language containing them. Second, the account has no way to analyze general de dicto beliefs that does not compromise the language being learnable. Third, the account (...)
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  11.  16
    The Relational Character of Belief.Andrew Ward - 1989 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 35 (1):73-82.
    In his book Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Paul Churchland suggests that the singular terms for prepositional attitude predicates serve an adverbial function as elements of complex predicates. This view, called monadic adverbialism, has three problems. First the monadic predicates cannot be semantic primitives because this would compromise the learnability of the language containing them. Second, the account has no way to analyze general de dicto beliefs that does not compromise the language being learnable. Third, the account (...)
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  12. Leibniz's Argument for Primitive Concepts.Dennis Plaisted - 2003 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (3):329-341.
    On its face, Leibniz's argument for primitive concepts seems to imply that unless we can analyze non-primitive concepts into their primitive constituents, we cannot grasp them. This implication, together with Leibniz's belief that we do conceive of some non-primitive concepts, entails that we can analyze some non-primitive concepts into their primitive components. However, Leibniz claims elsewhere that we are incapable of doing this. To resolve this inconsistency, I argue that, for Leibniz, grasping a concept (...)
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  13. What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
    Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Most of the action in the literature concerns stage ii). Assuming that stage i) has been (...)
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  14.  49
    Anthropological approaches to 'primitive' religions.Max Charlesworth - 2009 - Sophia 48 (2):119-125.
    The study of religion by social anthropologists, as distinct from the classical philosophical approach of the Greeks and their medieval heirs, began in the late 19th century with Edward Tyler’s Primitive Culture (1871). Tyler’s approach was completely a priori in style in that it did not rest on systematic field work or empirical observation. The same approach characterized James Frazer’s famous book, The Golden Bough (1891). Baldwin Spencer, the founding father of Australian anthropology, was persuaded by Frazer to see (...)
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  15.  24
    Logics of True Belief.Yuanzhe Yang - 2024 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 65 (1):55-80.
    In epistemic logic, the beliefs of an agent are modeled in a way very similar to knowledge, except that they are fallible. Thus, the pattern of an agent’s true beliefs is an interesting subject to study. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study on a novel modal logic with the bundled operator ⊡ϕ:=□ϕ∧ϕ as the only primitive modality, where ⊡ captures the notion of true belief. With the help of a novel notion of ⊡-bisimulation, we characterize (...)
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  16. Logics for Belief as Maximally Plausible Possibility.Giacomo Bonanno - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (5):1019-1061.
    We consider a basic logic with two primitive uni-modal operators: one for certainty and the other for plausibility. The former is assumed to be a normal operator, while the latter is merely a classical operator. We then define belief, interpreted as “maximally plausible possibility”, in terms of these two notions: the agent believes \ if she cannot rule out \ ), she judges \ to be plausible and she does not judge \ to be plausible. We consider four interaction (...)
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  17. Prototypes, belief ascriptions, and ambiguity.Henry Jackman - unknown
    Many philosophers have suggested that belief predicates are ambiguous between a de dicto and a de re reading. However, the impression of ambiguity is a function of the narrow ranges of examples that philosophers focus on. When we consider our ascriptional practices as a whole, the suggestion that belief predicates are ambiguous is neither plausible nor needed to explain the de dicto/de re distinction. This paper will argue that understanding paradigmatic de dicto and de re ascriptions in terms of disavowals (...)
     
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  18. Delusions and beliefs: a knowledge-first approach.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-7.
    In Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono proposes an extended and convincing argument for the thesis that delusions are malfunctional beliefs. One of the key assumptions for this argument is that belief is a biological notion, and that the function of beliefs is a product of evolution. I challenge the thesis that evolutionary accounts can furnish an epistemologically satisfying account of beliefs because evolutionary success does not necessarily track epistemic success. Consequently, also delusions as beliefs cannot (...)
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  19.  37
    Conjecture and Criticism in Religious Belief.Shivesh C. Thakur - 1979 - Religious Studies 15 (1):71 - 78.
    Accounts of religion, like almost all influential academic and intellectual exercises, as indeed much else, in the last two or three centuries, have generally been the work of Western scholars and intellectuals, often less familiar with, but sometimes simply disinclined to take seriously, non-Western religious traditions. Consequently most of these accounts have tended to be parochial, failing to apply to, say, Eastern religions, not to mention so-called ‘primitive’ religions; and have often given to what should only have been ‘local (...)
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  20.  19
    Knowledge Maximization.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - In The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 249–279.
    This chapter explores some general aspects of the tension between one’s role as a believer and one’s role as an appraiser of oneself as a believer in philosophy. The proposal is to replace true belief by knowledge in a principle of charity constitutive of content. Knowledge maximization need not make the ascription of knowledge come too cheap. By contrast, Davidson’s principle of charity gives good marks to an interpretation for having Stone Age people assent to many truths of quantum mechanics, (...)
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  21.  19
    Belief, Existence, and Meaning. [REVIEW]K. T. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (4):749-750.
    This book is an attempt to give a completely extensional account of belief without recourse to entities such as propositions and the like. This is done by developing a semantical metalanguage and instead of alluding to such intensional elements as meanings, the talk is rather of individuals, virtual classes, and relations. A Quinean kind of paraphrastic program is used, making explicit time references and belief conditions, as well as the above objects of belief. They are all keyed to the user (...)
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  22. Origin of life. The role of experiments, basic beliefs, and social authorities in the controversies about the spontaneous generation of life and the subsequent debates about synthesizing life in the laboratory.Deichmann Ute - 2012 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 34 (3):341-360.
    For centuries the question of the origin of life had focused on the question of the spontaneous generation of life, at least primitive forms of life, from inanimate matter, an idea that had been promoted most prominently by Aristotle. The widespread belief in spontaneous generation, which had been adopted by the Church, too, was finally abandoned at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the question of the origin of life became related to that of the artificial generation of (...)
     
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  23. How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-117.
    This chapter argues that olfactory experiences represent either everyday objects or ad hoc olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties, which happen to be uninstantiated. On this picture, olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent: they falsely represent everyday objects or ad hoc objects as having properties they do not have, and they misrepresent in the same way on multiple occasions. One might worry that this view is incompatible with the plausible claim that olfactory experiences at least sometimes justify true beliefs (...)
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  24. Wittgenstein and Religious Belief.John W. Cook - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (246):427-452.
    This article argues that wittgenstein's account of religious belief is fundamentally defective because he treats religion as a language-Game and holds that language-Games arise spontaneously from prelinguistic (or primitive) reactions, And yet such reactions as wittgenstein postulates are a philosophical myth. It is further argued that his treatment of several other philosophical issues, Such as induction, Are infected with the same mistake. Wittgenstein's view of language, It is argued, Is basically behavioristic. Defenses of wittgenstein's account of religious belief by (...)
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  25.  35
    Logics of (In)sane and (Un)reliable Beliefs.Jie Fan - 2022 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 30 (1):78-100.
    Inspired by an interesting quotation from the literature, we propose four modalities, called ‘sane belief’, ‘insane belief’, ‘reliable belief’ and ‘unreliable belief’, and introduce logics with each operator as the modal primitive. We show that the four modalities constitute a square of opposition, which indicates some interesting relationships among them. We compare the relative expressivity of these logics and other related logics, including a logic of false beliefs from the literature. The four main logics are all less expressive (...)
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  26.  47
    O Ponto Ómega de Teilhard de Chardin. Do Contraponto com o Átomo Primitivo de Georges Lemaître à Projeção em Teorias Cosmológicas (Teilhard de Chardin’s Omega Point. From the Counterpoint with the Primitive Atom by Georges Lemaître to Projection in Cosmological Theories).João Barbosa - 2020 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 76 (4):1743-1760.
    This article focuses on the Omega Point, an essential concept in Teilhard de Chardin’s evolutionary metaphysics. In certain passages about the Omega Point, Teilhard mentions the primeval atom hypothesis, a theory about the beginning of the universe proposed by Georges Lemaître, another contemporary Jesuit priest who was also a scientist. Although Teilhard and Lemaître are essentially evolutionists, besides being Jesuit priests, their evolutionary metaphysics and their philosophies of science are radically divergent, and two important differences are presented here – about (...)
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  27. On the Origin of Afterlife Beliefs by Means of Memetic Selection.Steve Stewart-Williams - 2015 - In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
    Somewhere in the mists of the past, we somehow picked up the idea of an afterlife from our culture. So, where did this idea come from in the first place? The problem is not that there aren’t any plausible theories to explain it; the problem is that there are too many. Some claim that the belief in an afterlife is wishful thinking; others that it’s a way of encouraging socially desirable behavior; and others still that it represents ancient people’s best (...)
     
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  28.  76
    There must be more to development of mindreading and metacognition than passing false belief tasks.Mikolaj Hernik, Pasco Fearon & Peter Fonagy - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):147-148.
    We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.
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  29.  21
    Kant: on the Way to Understanding the Spiritual Nature of Man.A. O. Osypov - 2023 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 24:118-134.
    _Purpose._ The main purpose of the study is to examine Kant’s first experience in creating a methodology for determining the holistic, spiritual nature of man, firstly, in terms of identifying the range of phenomena that should be included in the analysis of the spiritual essence of man, and secondly, this experience may be indicative for identifying dead ends in the research of spirituality of modern philosophers. _Theoretical__ basis._ The study is based on the methodology of philosophical anthropology formulated by M. (...)
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  30.  39
    “Borboletas Azuis” de Campina Grande: crenças e lutas de um movimento milenarista ("Borboletas Azuis" of Campina Grande: belief and fighting of a millenarist movement) - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2009v7n14p46. [REVIEW]Lidiane Cordeiro Rafael de Araújo & Magnólia Gibson Cabral da Silva - 2009 - Horizonte 7 (14):46-61.
    Resumo Os “Borboletas Azuis” de Campina Grande/PB alcançaram destaque nacional devido à propagação de uma profecia que afirmava a ocorrência de um dilúvio para o dia 13 de maio de 1980. O movimento é uma contestação às transformações da Igreja Católica Romana a partir do Concílio Vaticano II, onde foram tomadas medidas em favor de liturgias mais adequadas às culturas locais e em idioma próprio, assim como mudanças significativas nos textos e na linguagem utilizados na missa e na administração dos (...)
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  31. Freud on the Uncanny: A Tale of Two Theories.Mark Windsor - 2020 - Philosophy and Literature 44 (1):35-51.
    Freud’s famous essay “The ‘Uncanny’” is often poorly understood. In this paper, I clear up the popular misconception that Freud identifies all uncanny phenomena with the return of repressed infantile complexes by showing that he offers not one but two theories of the uncanny: “return of the repressed,” and another explanation that has to do with the apparent confirmation of “surmounted primitive beliefs.” Of the two, I argue that it is the latter, more often overlooked theory that faces (...)
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  32.  29
    Wildlife Gardening and Connectedness to Nature: Engaging the Unengaged.Amy Shaw, Kelly Miller & Geoff Wescott - 2013 - Environmental Values 22 (4):483-502.
    An often overlooked impact of urbanisation is a reduction in our ability to connect with nature in our daily lives. If people lose the ability to connect with nature we run the risk of creating a nature-disconnect, which is hypothesised to have an impact on our empathy for other species and our desire to help conservation efforts. Understanding how a sense of connection with nature can impact upon people's decisions to seek out nature in their daily lives is important if (...)
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  33.  59
    A common ontology of agent communication languages: Modeling mental attitudes and social commitments using roles.Guido Boella, Rossana Damiano, Joris Hulstijn & Leendert van der Torre - 2007 - Applied ontology 2 (3-4):217-265.
    There are two main traditions in defining a semantics for agent communication languages, based either on mental attitudes or on social commitments. These traditions share speech acts as operators with preconditions and effects, and agents playing roles like speaker and hearer, but otherwise they rely on distinct ontologies. They refer not only to either belief and intention or various notions of social commitment, but also to distinct speech acts and distinct kinds of dialogue. In this paper, we propose a common (...)
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  34.  59
    Origin of the Symbol in the Spirit of Music.Marius Schneider & Edith Cooper - 1959 - Diogenes 7 (27):39-62.
    The symbol is a form composed by man more unconsciously than consciously. With primitive peoples, this form seems to have been born from the desire to penetrate to the kernel of supernatural or magical power by means of a concise formula, all-inclusive or ambiguous, particularly through a magic incantation or a song. This penetration, however, is only possible if one understands the inner structure of such a power. According to primitive belief, the true seat of this power is (...)
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  35. Can an atheist be a fundamentalist?A. C. Grayling - manuscript
    It is time to put to rest the mistakes and assumptions that lie behind a phrase used by some religious people when talking of those who are plain-spoken about their disbelief in any religious claims: the phrase "fundamentalist atheist". What would a non-fundamentalist atheist be? Would he be someone who believed only somewhat that there are no supernatural entities in the universe - perhaps that there is only part of a god (a divine foot, say, or buttock)? Or that gods (...)
     
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  36.  21
    On Turner’s Anti-Normativism.Pietro Salis - 2023 - In Raffaela Giovagnoli & Robert Lowe (eds.), The Logic of Social Practices II. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 159-176.
    Stephen Turner’s anti-normativism is based on the idea that the normative can be explained away by social science. Exploiting the idea fostered by the sociology of scientific knowledge that reasons can be understood naturalistically as the causes of the beliefs of scientists and endorsing a non-normative conception of rationality, Turner has argued that normative accounts are better understood as “Good Bad Theories” (GBT). GBT are understood as false accounts that play a role in social coordination like magical or religious (...)
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  37. Does persuasion really come at the "end of reasons"?Pietro Salis - 2017 - In Pier Luigi Lecis, Giuseppe Lorini, Vinicio Busacchi, Pietro Salis & Olimpia G. Loddo (eds.), Verità, Immagine, Normatività. Truth, Image, and Normativity. Macerata: Quodlibet Studio. pp. 77-100.
    Persuasion is a special aspect of our social and linguistic practices – one where an interlocutor, or an audience, is induced, to perform a certain action or to endorse a certain belief, and these episodes are not due to the force of the better reason. When we come near persuasion, it seems that, in general, we are somehow giving up factual discourse and the principles of logic, since persuading must be understood as almost different from convincing rationally. Sometimes, for example, (...)
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  38. What is "real" in Probabilism?H. Orri Stefánsson - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):573-587.
    This paper defends two related claims about belief. First, the claim that unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real. Second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.
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  39.  74
    Hope as an irreducible concept.Claudia Blöser - 2019 - Ratio 32 (3):205-214.
    I argue for a novel answer to the question “What is hope?”. On my view, rather than aiming for a compound account, i.e. analysing hope in terms of desire and belief, we should understand hope as an irreducible concept. After criticizing influential compound accounts of hope, I discuss Segal and Textor's alternative of describing hope as a primitive mental state. While Segal and Textor argue that available developments of the standard definition do not offer sufficient conditions for hope, I (...)
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  40. Introspection without Judgment.Anna Giustina - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86:407-427.
    The focus of this paper is introspection of phenomenal states, i.e. the distinctively first-personal method through which one can form beliefs about the phenomenology of one’s current conscious mental states. I argue that two different kinds of phenomenal state introspection should be distinguished: one which involves recognizing and classifying the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of a certain experience type, and another which does not involve such classification. Whereas the former is potentially judgment-like, the latter is not. I (...)
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  41.  51
    Different cultures, different rationalities?Steven Lukes - 2000 - History of the Human Sciences 13 (1):3-18.
    Winch’s ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ addressed the question of how to interpret apparently irrational alien beliefs and practices. Criticizing Evans-Pritchard’s study of Zande witchcraft, Winch argued that across cultures there are divergent conceptions of what is rational and real and that, where they diverge, it is mistaken to apply ‘our’ standards and conceptions to ‘their’ beliefs. Winch’s position is here re-examined in the light of the current debate about whether the Hawaiians thought Captain Cook was divine. Sahlins (...)
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  42.  76
    Objective chance: not propensity, maybe determinism.Carl Hoefer - 2016 - Lato Sensu, Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 3 (1):31-42.
    One currently popular view about the nature of objective probabilities, or objective chances, is that they – or some of them, at least – are primitive features of the physical world, not reducible to anything else nor explicable in terms of frequencies, degrees of belief, or anything else. In this paper I explore the question of what the semantic content of primitive chance claims could be. Every attempt I look at to supply such content either comes up empty-handed, (...)
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  43.  30
    Our animal condition and social construction.Jorge A. Colombo (ed.) - 2019 - New York, USA: NOVA Science Publisher.
    Which and how much of our current drives –individually and as a global community– are driven by ancestral, inherited traits or imprinted on our animal condition? An attempt to approximate this intriguing query is explored here. It pertains to our identity, social constructions, and our ecological interaction. The origin of our species has its roots in ancestral habits, behaviors and a survival drive, transformed from changing environmental conditions. We were not born in a mother-of-pearl cradle nor were protected by magical (...)
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  44. La riduzione sociologica della normatività. Tre osservazioni sull’argomento di Stephen Turner.Pietro Salis - 2022 - L'ircocervo 21 (2):110-130.
    Stephen Turner claims that social science can explain away normativity. By exploiting a non-normative view of rationality and a causal view of belief, he claimed that normativist views are akin to what he calls Good Bad Theories (GBT). GBT are false accounts that play a role of social coordination like primitive rituals (Taboo and the like). Hence, “norms”, “commitments”, and “obligations” are just like Taboo and can be explained away as GBT. Normativism, as a consequence, is doomed to disappear (...)
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  45. Understanding self‐ascription.Frank Jackson & Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):141-155.
    David Lewis argues that believing something is self‐ascribing a property rather than holding true a proposition. But what is self‐ascription? Is it some new mysterious primitive? Is Lewis saying that every belief you have is about you? Several recent authors have suggested that, in the light of these questions, Lewis's theory should be rejected, despite its enormous influence. But this neglects the fact that Lewis makes two relevant proposals about belief: one about belief de se , another about belief (...)
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  46.  59
    Xenophanes, Aeschylus, and the doctrine of primeval brutishness.Michael J. O'Brien - 1985 - Classical Quarterly 35 (02):264-.
    The belief that primitive men lived like beasts and that civilisation developed out of these brutal origins is found in numerous ancient authors, both Greek and Latin. It forms part of certain theories about the beginnings of culture current in late antiquity. These are notoriously difficult to trace to their sources, but they already existed in some form in the fifth century b.c. One idea common to these theories is that of progress, and for this reason a fragment of (...)
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  47. The Importance of Being Erroneous.David Beisecker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
    The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in a way that is unavailable to the non-linguistic, and that would be necessary for proper attributions of intentionality. To attribute mental states (...)
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  48. The Status of the Future and the Invisible World.Raymond Ruyer & R. Scott Walker - 1980 - Diogenes 28 (109):37-53.
    The primitive conception is that the future already exists like a terra incognita which one can dimly make out with or without the help of the gods. This idea is at the basis of fatalism and of belief in prophets, oracles and astrologers. This ancient concept was replaced in the nineteenth century by the vocabulary of scientific determinism which said that actual beings can only function. If one knew in detail their structures and their movements, one could calculate the (...)
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    Eligible Contraction.John Cantwell - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):167-182.
    When a belief set is contracted only some beliefs are eligible for removal. By introducing eligibility for removal as a new semantic primitive for contraction and combining it with epistemic entrenchment we get a contraction operator with a number of interesting properties. By placing some minimal constraint upon eligibility we get an explicit contraction recipe that exactly characterises the so called interpolation thesis, a thesis that states upper and lower bounds for the amount of information to be given (...)
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    On being certain: believing you are right even when you're not.Robert Alan Burton - 2008 - New York: St. Martin's Press.
    You recognize when you know something for certain, right? You "know" the sky is blue, or that the traffic light had turned green, or where you were on the morning of September 11, 2001--you know these things, well, because you just do. In On Being Certain , neurologist Robert Burton challenges the notions of how we think about what we know. He shows that the feeling of certainty we have when we "know" something comes from sources beyond our control and (...)
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