The essay considers two sets of interrelated difficulties that follow from our kinship to animals: those that arise chronically from our individual psychologically complex and often ambivalent relations to animals, and those that reflect the intellectually and ideologically criss-crossed connections among the various discourses currently concerned with those relations, including the movement for animal rights, ecological ethics, posthumanist theory, and such fields as primatology and evolutionary psychology. I begin with some general observations on classification and then turn to the increasingly (...) complex play of claims and counter-claims regarding the so-called species barrier. (shrink)

Background: Providing nursing care for patients with end-stage renal disease entails dealing with existential issues which may sometimes lead not only to ethical problems but also conflicts within the team. A previous study shows that physicians felt irresolute, torn and unconfirmed when ethical dilemmas arose. Research question: This study, conducted in the same dialysis care unit, aimed to illuminate registered nurses’ experiences of being in ethically difficult situations that give rise to a troubled conscience. Research design: This study has (...) a phenomenological hermeneutic approach. Participants: Narrative interviews were carried out with 10 registered nurses working in dialysis care. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Medicine, Umeå University. Results: One theme, ‘Calling for a deliberative dialogue’, and six sub-themes emerged: ‘Dealing with patients’ ambiguity’, ‘Responding to patients’ reluctance’, ‘Acting against patients’ will’, ‘Acting against one’s moral convictions’, ‘Lacking involvement with patients and relatives’ and ‘Being trapped in feelings of guilt’. Discussion: In ethically difficult situations, the registered nurses tried, but failed, to open up a dialogue with the physicians about ethical concerns and their uncertainty. They felt alone, uncertain and sometimes had to act against their conscience. Conclusion: In ethical dilemmas, personal and professional integrity is at stake. Mistrusting their own moral integrity may turn professionals from moral actors into victims of circumstances. To counteract such a risk, professionals and patients need to continuously deliberate on their feelings, views and experiences, in an atmosphere of togetherness and trust. (shrink)

Based on his famous final year undergraduate lectures on theoretical physics at Birkbeck College, Bohm presents the theory of relativity as a unified whole, making clear the reasons which led to its adoption and explaining its basic meaning. With clarity and grace, he also reveals the limited truth of some of the "common sense" assumptions which make it difficult for us to appreciate its full implications. With a new foreword by Basil Hiley, a close colleague of David Bohm's, _The (...) Special Theory of Relativity_ is an indispensable addition to the work of one of greatest physicists and thinkers of the twentieth century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Difficult, Difficult, Lemon, DifficultMaggie TaylorI like to joke that my husband is a lemon—he suffers from manufacturing defects that prevent his body from functioning as intended. Illnesses other 40-somethings recover from quickly are things that land him in the hospital for weeks on end. So, it was no surprise last year that an epileptic seizure led to aspiration pneumonia, admission to the lCU, intubation, multisystem organ failure, (...) and a Helivac ride to a regional hospital for a higher level of care. I was told that his odds of survival were about fifty-fifty. At the time, I was training as a clinical ethics fellow, still relatively inexperienced but savvy enough to guess the true likelihood was probably lower. Doctors don’t usually like telling brutal truths to families.But the moral complexities of his treatment did not arise when he was on the verge of death. They came days later when he was getting better. He’d survived a major surgery, come off pressors, recovered from an acute kidney injury, did well on spontaneous breathing trials (SBTs), and tolerated sedation weaning. Ironically, this was the hardest part of the hospitalization for me. Some people tolerate endotracheal tubes. Others don’t. My husband is in the latter group. He’d even self-extubated on a prior hospitalization. This time, he was too weak to lift his arms. Instead of pulling at the tube taped to his face, he stared up at me with wild eyes that said I don’t know what’s happening but I hate it; make it stop.As his discomfort became more apparent, I pressed the intensivist, Dr. Roja1, about extubating. “He’s alert, following commands, and hit the benchmarks on his vent settings.”Dr. Roja responded by saying she didn’t feel my husband was ready. They would continue conducting SBTs and reevaluate the next day.She said the same thing the next day.And the next day. Then she suggested a trach evaluation. I rejected Dr. Roja’s proposed compromise. Forcefully.It wasn’t just that I had trouble seeing my husband in this state of confusion and discomfort, although I did. I also knew continued vent dependence was something he would not accept. Over the course of our relationship, we’ve talked a lot about what interventions my husband would tolerate under various circumstances. This makes sense, given my profession and his health problems. He doesn’t want to live no matter the costs, but only if he can do so without being a burden on those he loves or dependent on machinery long-term—which, for him, means a few weeks.This is what I told Dr. Roja. At least, this is what I think I told her. It’s doubtful I stated my reasoning [End Page 28] half that clearly, given my emotional, physical, and cognitive state. It had been two weeks since my husband was admitted, and I was depleted. I was living in a hotel across from the hospital, wasn’t eating, and had fallen back into the vice of smoking cigarettes. Exhaustion and stress had made me combative: I had to defend my husband against this doctor who refused to do the right thing and take the tube out.In what felt like a last-ditch effort to get me off her back, Dr. Roja suggested an ethics consult. It was embarrassing that the intensivist was the one to suggest ethics involvement. Consumed as I was by my job as my husband’s advocate, I had forgotten my actual job.The team was able to put together a family meeting within hours. Beforehand, the ethicist came to my husband’s room and introduced herself to me and my mother.“I work in ethics too, as a clinical ethics fellow,” I said.She responded: “Oh.”That was all. Not even a word, but a sound. I don’t know what response I wanted, but that wasn’t it. This made me suspicious of the process.My mother and I joined the ethicist, Dr. Roja, and a palliative care physician in the family room. Dr. Roja led with a summary of my husband’s clinical condition... (shrink)

It is a central aspect of our ordinary concept of time that history unfolds and events come into being. It is only natural to take this seriously. However, it is notoriously difficult to explain further what this `becoming' consists in, or even to show that the notion is consistent at all. In this article I first argue that the idea of a global temporal ordering, involving a succession of cosmic nows, is not indispensable for our concept of time. Our (...) experience does not support the existence of global simultaneity and arguments from modern physics further support the conclusion that time should not be seen as a succession of cosmic nows. Accordingly, I propose that if we want to make sense of becoming we should attempt to interpret it as something purely local. Second, I address the question of what this local becoming consists in. I maintain that processes of becoming are nothing but the successive happening of events, and that this happening of events consists entirely in the occurring of these events at their own spacetime locations. This leads to a consistent view of becoming, which is applicable even to rather pathological spacetimes. (shrink)

The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important in contemporary moral theory. Yet, providing an adequate formal account of it has proven difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction, one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on an influential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I argue that their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two serious objections. (...) I then show how to formulate a new account that follows the key insights of McNaughton and Rawling’s approach yet avoids the two objections. (shrink)

Οὐσία in Numenius: a notion which is progressively elaborated: Analysis of the difficulties linked to οὐσία and ἰδέα in fragments 22 F, 24 F and 28 F. In the Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ, Numenius refines his definition of οὐσία step by step. He uses the word at first as a synonym of τὸ ὄν and as another designation of being. Then, he associates it to the ἕξις when he refers to the specific οὐσία which possesses science : in all likelihood, this οὐσία (...) is the intellect as the essence common to God and Man in the possession of science. Finally, Numenius gives οὐσία two aspects or sides which, in our opinion, represent two manners of conceiving the intelligible it constitutes: on the one hand, οὐσία comes from Being itself and seems to represent the eidetic predicates or what we could name the “fundamental intelligibility”, a state in which the form is not determined yet, but which gives it the status of a real being ; on the other hand, οὐσία is the product of the second god and intellect and the determined aspect of the previous one, which makes it possible to distinguish the forms one from the other. In this last case, Numenius seems to name οὐσία more specifically ἰδέα, even if both words are elsewhere synonymous and used to refer to the two aspects previously mentioned according to the context in which they are employed. The paper presents the analysis of fragments 22 F, 24 F and 28 F from which we arrive at this interpretation. The distinction between two manners of conceiving οὐσία makes it possible then to discover two levels in the Being at the origin of each of them: Being itself and the ≪second≫ or ≪just≫ Being, constituted by the good demiurge which is probably the “One who is good par excellence”. From there, two ways of conceiving ἰδέα also appear: on the one hand, ἰδέα is synonymous with οὐσία, then it refers to the second aspect of οὐσία, the determined one; on the other hand, it can also refer to the level of Being which is the Good when, in fragment 28 F, it is conceived as a form and probably as the Form par excellence identified with the intellect which this Good is itself. (shrink)

Is conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible with metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism is the view that there is a world of objects and properties that (...) is independent of our thought and discourse (including our schemes of concepts) about such a world. Hilary Putnam, a former proponent of metaphysical realism, later gave it up largely because of the alleged phenomenon that he himself has given the label ‘conceptual relativity’. One of the key ideas of conceptual relativity is that certain concepts—including such fundamental concepts as object, entity, and existence—have a multiplicity of different and incompatible uses (Putnam 1987, p. 19; 1988, pp. 110 14). According to Putnam, once we recognize the phenomenon of conceptual relativity we must reject metaphysical realism: The suggestion . . . is that what is (by commonsense standards) the same situation can be described in many different ways, depending on how we use the words. The situation does not itself legislate how words like “object,” “entity,” and “exist” must be used. What is wrong with the notion of objects existing “independently” of conceptual schemes is that there are no standards for the use of even the logical notions apart from conceptual choices.” (Putnam 1988, p. 114) Putnam’s intriguing reasoning in this passage is difficult to evaluate directly, because conceptual [1] relativity is philosophically perplexing and in general is not well understood. In this paper we propose a construal of conceptual relativity that clarifies it considerably and explains how it is possible despite its initial air of paradox. We then draw upon this construal to explain why, contrary to Putnam and others, conceptual relativity does not conflict with metaphysical realism, but in fact comports well with it.. (shrink)

The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and (...) principles; Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that when ‘might’ expresses certain kinds of relative modality, the sentence ‘p and it might not be the case that p’ is in some sense inconsistent. It has proven difficult to define a formal semantics that explicates this inconsistency while meeting certain other desiderata, in particular, that p does not imply ‘Must p’. This paper presents such a semantics. The key idea is that background contexts have to have multiple levels, including an inner set (...) consisting of worlds that represent what might be true and an outer set of worlds such that a sentence must be true only if it is true in all of them. This is an open access publication. (shrink)

Peter Geach famously holds that there is no such thing as absolute identity. There are rather, as Geach sees it, a variety of relative identity relations, each essentially connected with a particular monadic predicate. Though we can strictly and meaningfully say that an individual a is the same man as the individual b, or that a is the same statue as b, we cannot, on this view, strictly and meaningfully say that the individual a simply is b. It is (...) difficult to find anything like a persuasive argument for this doctrine in Geach's work. But one claim made by Geach is that his account of identity is the account most naturally aligned with Frege's widely admired treatment of cardinality. And though this claim of an affinity between Frege's and Geach's doctrines has been challenged, the challenge has been resisted. William Alston and Jonathan Bennett, indeed, go further than Geach to argue that Frege's doctrine implies Geach's. If Alston and Bennett are right, then those who favor a broadly Fregean treatment of cardinality have no choice but to adopt Geach's doctrine of relative identity. And because contemporary set-theoretic accounts of cardinality are essentially Fregean in all respects relevant to this issue (see §11 below), it follows from Alston and Bennett's claim that virtually every standard modern treatment of cardinality requires a 'relativized' treatment of identity. The purpose of this paper is to argue against the implication claimed by Alston and Bennett. Despite some superficial similarities between Frege's treatment of cardinality and Geach's treatment of identity, the two doctrines are fundamentally opposed. Frege's account of cardinality, and its set-theoretic descendants, are all inconsistent with the claim that identity is 'relative' in Geach's sense. (shrink)

This article examines the epistemology of risk assessment in the context of financial modelling for the purposes of making loan underwriting decisions. A financing request for a company in the paper and pulp industry is considered in some detail. The paper and pulp industry was chosen because it is subject to some specific risks that have been identified and studied by bankers, investors and managers of paper and pulp companies and certain features of the industry enable analysts to quantify the (...) impact of specific risk events of a given dimension on a company's future financial performance. While companies in other industries may be subject to similar risk factors, the impact of risk events may be more difficult to gauge in those industries. The ability of financial analysts to model the impact of a risk event, and hence quantify a credit risk, increases the predictive accuracy of the model. I argue that bankers and regulators should recognise the uncertainty associated with unquantifiable credit risk in financial models, and they should view this uncertainty as a credit risk factor in and of itself. Evaluating the relative degree to which credit risk is quantifiable in financial models is a potentially significant yet largely unrecognised tool for credit risk management. I consider some possible applications of this assessment tool for managing risk within the banking industry. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the view that realism about a social kind K entails that the grounding conditions of K are difficult (or impossible) to manipulate. In other words, we define social kind realism in terms of relative frame manipulability (RFM). In articulating our view, we utilize theoretical resources from Epstein’s (Epstein, The ant trap: Rebuilding the foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford University Press, 2015) grounding/anchoring model and causal interventionism. After comparing our view with causal and (...) principle-based (Tahko, Synthese 200(2):1–23, 2022) proposals, we motivate RFM by showing that it accommodates important desiderata about the social landscape (such as recognizing the context-relativity of social properties and the emancipatory dimension of social practice). Finally, we consider three objections. First, we tackle frame-necessitarianism (FN), the view that social kind frames are metaphysically necessary (and thus unmanipulable). Secondly, we engage with what Epstein (Epstein, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(3):768–781 2019a) calls UNIVERSALITY (the view that social kinds can hold in the absence of anchors) and we argue that it should also be resisted. Finally, we tackle a recent objection from Mason’s (Mason, Philosophical Studies, 178(12):3975–3994) essentialism about social kinds. (shrink)

A rational defense of the criminal law must provide a comprehensive theory of culpability. A comprehensive theory of culpability must resolve several difficult issues; in this article I will focus on only one. The general problem arises from the lack of a systematic account of relative culpability. An account of relative culpability would identify and defend a set of considerations to assess whether, why, under what circumstances, and to what extent persons who perform a criminal act with (...) a given culpable state are more or less blameworthy than persons who perform that act with a different culpable state. (shrink)

Agents know some but not all logical consequences of what they know. Agents seem to be neither logically omniscient nor logically incompetent. Yet finding an intermediate standard of minimal rationality has proven difficult. In this paper, I take suggestions found in the literature (Lewis, 1988; Hawke, Özgün and Berto, 2020; Plebani and Spolaore, 2021) and join the forces of subject matter and impossible worlds approaches to devise a new solution to this quandary. I do so by combining a space (...) of FDE worlds (Berto and Jago, 2019) with a Lewisian (1988) understanding of subject matters as partitions. By doing so, I show how subject matters impose some order in the anarchic space of FDE worlds, while the worlds allow for distinctions between contents which would not otherwise be available. Combining the two approaches, then, brings us closer to the desired closure principles for knowledge of minimally rational agents. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dying is DifficultClarice DouilleHayden had been a constant in my life since I was eight, as our families were close. He was a single dad who loved to talk and always had a smile on his face. He was obsessed with anything related to his kids and attended every school activity or sporting event.In 2015, Hayden was diagnosed with stage III colon cancer. He was adamant that he didn't (...) want to share any information about his condition with his kids, waiting several months until the eve of his first surgery before breaking the news to them. Hayden made the operation seem trivial and underplayed the severity of the chemotherapy treatments that would follow. Despite whatever he was feeling, he seemed committed to maintaining his happy demeanor, which was probably an effort to convince himself and others to feel better about the situation.Hayden survived his first operation and rounds of chemotherapy. And, over the next several years, he chose to undergo a regimen of additional aggressive treatments, submitting to surgery after surgery, as well as several more rounds of chemotherapy, followed by radiation treatments. I was already working as a home care aide, and because of the close relationship between our families, Hayden asked me to help as his caregiver, including running errands and babysitting for his younger kids. Hayden made it clear that he wanted his kids to remain ignorant of the progression of his condition so that they wouldn't worry and become anxious. It seemed he was motivated by his desire to preserve his young kids' happiness and innocence. In hindsight, I think this prevented his kids from being able to fully savor moments with their dad or prepare for the possibility of his death. I also think Hayden was trying to shelter himself from his own fear of mortality. And it was this fear that made Hayden a "difficult patient."Hayden suffered both physically and mentally, not only from his disease and treatment but also from his fear of mortality. I noticed how he tried to hide his suffering by shutting himself in his bedroom and making excuses when he wasn't eating. He often forgot to take his medications; he refused to use pill boxes and objected to reminders from others. The consequences often meant additional hospitalizations. I wish more palliative options had been introduced to him earlier in his disease course. I believe a palliative care team would have encouraged Hayden to think about and discuss death, helped him change his outlook for treatment and living with cancer, and most importantly, enabled him to better enjoy the remainder of his life with his kids.Nevertheless, I understood why Hayden was worried about his kids, and I could see how his recent personal experiences since his initial diagnosis might have contributed to his choice for the most aggressive treatments: his sister and both his parents had died, leaving no other relatives to care for his kids. He wanted to be there for his kids, yet the side effects of treatment made him so sick that he couldn't leave his bed. He couldn't even do the very activities that made him want to live.Hayden was an extremely social person, but when he found out his cancer was terminal, he [End Page E6] isolated himself from his loved ones for nearly six weeks. Even though I was likely the only person he was communicating with, as the person who helped him and his family, I often didn't see him for weeks at a time. He would text me requests, leave money on the front table, and ask me to drop off the items I purchased and then leave. Hayden's kids continued their daily routines, despite comments from them about his absence.In early August 2020, Hayden was admitted to the hospital. His doctor called the kids at home and told them that their dad would immediately be enrolled in hospice care. They were, as one might expect, shocked at this news. They knew their dad was sick and had been dealing with his cancer for years. But Hayden's health deteriorated slowly, and the kids hadn't known... (shrink)

It is said that the theory of relativity and quantum theory are independent of each other. Their relationship is like water and oil. Now, it is very important for modern physics to synthesize them. In Physics and mathematics, Super String theory is studied, but instead of it, the tendimensional world appears. Our world is a three-dimensional world. What is the ten-dimensional world? It is more difficult than the string which is of Plank length. In the ten dimensional world, physics (...) is facing darkness and nothingness which man can not explain with the traditional physical words.The solution depends upon philosophy. I tried to synthesize themand succeeded.The following is an outline of my synthesis. 1. Utility and relativity of mathematical truth Mathematical truth is not absolute but relative. In the universe ( outside the solar system ), there is no perfect line. Because, by the gravitation of large astronomical bodies, space and lines are curved. Mathematical figure and numeration depend upon the promise of mankind. These are not absolute. Physics, which is grounded upon mathematics in certainty, is also relative. It expresses not the whole of the universe but a part of the universe. 2. Community and difference between the theory of relativity and quantum theory Community is the negation of absoluteness of physical attributes. Difference is the assessment for mathematics. The theory of relativity relies on mathematics but quantumtheory does not always rely on it. According to circumstances, Niels Bohr and quantum physicists abandoned a frame of reference. 3. The origin of the theory of relativity 4. The origin of quantum theory In short, the theory of relativity and quantum theory are not perfect, they only irradiate a part of the universe. Man can reach the whole of the universe only by the philosophical intuition of nothingness and infinite (the principle of nothingness and love). (shrink)

Relational reasoning is a complex form of human cognition involving the evaluation of relations between mental representations of information. Prior studies have modified stimulus properties of relational reasoning problems and examined differences in difficulty between different problem types. While subsets of these stimulus properties have been addressed in separate studies, there has not been a comprehensive study, to our knowledge, which investigates all of these properties in the same set of stimuli. This investigative gap has resulted in different findings across (...) studies which vary in task design, making it challenging to determine what stimulus properties make relational reasoning—and the putative formation of mental models underlying reasoning—difficult. In this article, we present the Multidimensional Relational Reasoning Task, a task which systematically varied an array of stimulus properties within a single set of relational reasoning problems. Using a mixed-effects framework, we demonstrate that reasoning problems containing a greater number of the premises as well as multidimensional relations led to greater task difficulty. The MRRT has been made publicly available for use in future research, along with normative data regarding the relative difficulty of each problem. (shrink)

Assigning a date to Kumārila is notoriously difficult. Kumārila’s dates are usually assigned through a relative chronology of Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers with whom Kumārila engages or is engaged. This is a precarious method because the dates of these interlocutors are equally unstable. But what if in considering systematic dialogues (_śāstra_) to be the primary medium for interreligious philosophical debate we have missed a source that does engage with Kumārila, and that can be reliably dated? In this article, (...) I turn to a religious group whom, it has been previously thought, did not respond to Kumārila until the eighth century—Jainas—as well as to a genre that is not typically viewed as a site of systematic philosophical dialogue—narrative. I argue that the _Padmacarita_, a Jaina Rāmāyaṇa composed by a Digambara writer called Raviṣeṇa, contains a narrative refutation of Kumārila’s commentary to _Mīmāṃsāsūtra_ 1.1.2. By bringing to light this refutation, and explaining how Raviṣeṇa’s _Padmacarita_ can be reliably dated, I assign Kumārila’s _terminus ante quem_ to the date of the _Padmacarita_’s composition, 676 CE. Finally, I suggest that Raviṣeṇa’s _Padmacarita_ is the earliest extant Jaina text to discuss Kumārila’s claims, and that Jainas used narrative to reflect on Mīmāṃsā before they turned to _śāstra_ as another medium for this dialogue. (shrink)

How does the language we speak affect our perception? Here, we argue for linguistic relativity and present an explanation through “language-induced automatized stimulus-driven attention” : Our respective mother tongue automatically influences our attention and, hence, perception, and in this sense determines what we see. As LASA is highly practiced throughout life, it is difficult to suppress, and even shows in language-independent non-linguistic tasks. We argue that attention is involved in language-dependent processing and point out that automatic or stimulus-driven forms (...) of attention, albeit initially learned as serving a linguistic skill, account for linguistic relativity as they are automatized and generalize to non-linguistic tasks. In support of this possibility, we review evidence for such automatized stimulus-driven attention in language-independent non-linguistic tasks. We conclude that linguistic relativity is possible and in fact a reality, although it might not be as powerful as assumed by some of its strongest proponents. (shrink)

The Principle of Universality asserts that a part retains its intrinsic value regardless of the whole in which it is a part or even whether it is part of a whole. The idea underlying this principle is that the intrinsic value of a thing supervenes on its intrinsic properties. Since the intrinsic properties remain unchanged so does the thing’s intrinsic value. In this article, I argue that, properly understood, the Principle of Universality can handle seemingly troublesome intuitions about the (...) class='Hi'>relative intrinsic value of a vicious person having pain and his having pleasure. I specifically argue that the intuition that the former state is better is explained by the nature of the basic intrinsic-value states, which involve a person having a level of well-being and desert at a time. One implication of this is that given the nature of such basic intrinsic-value states, pleasure and pain are not value-bearing parts of virtuous and vicious attitudes. (shrink)

This is not a textbook in mathematical physics—excepting for one chapter one need not possess much more than geometry and elementary algebra—rather it is a philosophically reflective examination of the cardinal features of special relativity theory. Throughout the book Bohm is not merely doing physics, but thinking about doing physics as well. This metatheoretical reflexion appears in chapters concerning pre-Einsteinian notions of relativity, attempts to save the aether theories, the "ambiguity" of space-time measurements in the new cosmology, "common sense" notions (...) of space and time, and the falsification of scientific theories. There is a long appendix dealing with physics and perception—the relation between scientific objects and perceptual processes. One will, however, by working through the text learn plenty of physics in a rigorous and concise fashion. The author wisely does not attempt to cover the mathematically far more difficult and philosophically more profound General Theory of Einstein. In the area chosen, Bohm has written clearly and felicitously; this should serve a model for others who like to take their physics with a dollop of philosophy.—P. J. M. (shrink)

One of the very difficult problems with the linguistic relativity hypothesis lies in establishing precisely what claims are being made by the hypothesis. In this work, Penn suggests that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can be effectively regarded as two hypotheses: an "extreme" one claiming that thought is dependent upon language, and a "mild" one claiming merely that language exercises some influence upon cognition.

Individual-level interventions are often interesting and easy to implement, but are unfortunately ill-equipped to solve most major global problems (e.g., climate change, financial insecurity, unhealthy eating). Resources spent developing, pursuing, and touting relatively ineffective i-frame interventions draw resources away from the development and implementation of more effective s-frame solutions. Behavioral scientists who want to develop solutions to the world's biggest problems should focus their efforts on s-frame solutions.

The problems of the tolal energy and quasilocalenergy density or an isolated spherically symmetric static system in general relativity (GR) are considered with examples of some exact suintions. The field formulation of GR dereloped earlier hy L. P. Grishchuk. el al. (1984). in ihe framework of which all the dynamical fields, including the gravitation field, are considered in a fixed background spacetime is used intensively. The exact Schwarzschild and Reissner Nordstrom solutions are investigated in detail, and the results are compared (...) with those in the recent work by J. D. Brown and J. W. York. Jr. (1993) as well as discussed with respect to the principle of nonlocalization of the gravitational energy in GR. Those examples are illustrative and simple because the background is selected as Minkowski spacetime and, in fact, the field configurations are studied in the framework of special relativity. It is shown that some problems of the Schwarzschild solution which are difficult to resolve in the standard geometrical framework of GR are resolved in the framework of the field formulation. (shrink)

Consensus in the contemporary philosophical literature has it that conserved quantity theories of causation such as that of Dowe [2000]—according to which causation is to be analysed in terms of the exchange of conserved quantities (e.g., energy)—face damning problems when confronted with contemporary physics, where the notion of conservation becomes delicate. In particular, in general relativity it is often claimed that there simply are no conservation laws for (say) total-stress energy. If this claim is correct, it is difficult to (...) see how conserved quantity theories of causation could survive. In this article, we resist the above consensus and defend conserved quantity theories from this conclusion, at least when focusing on the apparent problems posed by general relativity. We argue that this approach to causation can continue to be defended in general relativity, once one appreciates (a) the availability of approximate symmetries in generic general relativistic spacetimes, and (b) the role of modelling and idealisation in that theory. Given these points, conserved quantity theories of causation must stand or fall on other grounds. (shrink)

The use of bicycles for active commuting is an important target to reach because of the importance of increasing physical activity among the population and improving the air quality in cities. Among the models that have been utilized in previous studies, the Theory of Planned Behavior has shown good results in terms of the total variance obtained. However, establishing the relative importance of the TPB variables is difficult. In the present study, which was carried out in the Italian (...) context, the authors sought to establish the weight of the proposed variables based on the dominance analysis approach. Considering the initiatives, which the Italian government carries out, and the particular period in which the study was developed, the authors included two variables in addition to the classical factors: financial incentives and daily commuting habits. A survey was administered to 294 Italians through social networks from July to September 2020. The results have shown how the main predictor of bicycle use was use habits, followed almost at the same level by financial incentives and attitude, while norms and perceived behavioral control present low relative importance among the variables considered. Limits of the study have been discussed, and suggestions for future research have been proposed. (shrink)

BackgroundRelatives have no formal position in the practice of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EAS) according to Dutch legislation. However, research shows that physicians often involve relatives in EAS decision-making. It remains unclear why physicians do (not) want to involve relatives. Therefore, we examined how many physicians in the Netherlands involve relatives in EAS decision-making and explored reasons for (not) involving relatives and what involvement entails.MethodsIn a mixed-methods study, 746 physicians (33% response rate) completed a questionnaire, and 20 were interviewed. The (...) questionnaire included two statements on relatives’ involvement in EAS decision-making. Descriptive statistics were used, and multivariable logistic regression analyses to explore characteristics associated with involving relatives. In subsequent interviews, we explored physicians’ views on involving relatives in EAS decision-making. Interviews were thematically analysed.ResultsThe majority of physicians want to know relatives’ opinions about an EAS request (80%); a smaller group also takes these opinions into account in EAS decision-making (35%). Physicians who had ever received an explicit EAS request were more likely to want to know opinions and clinical specialists and elderly care physicians were more likely to take these opinions into account. In interviews, physicians mentioned several reasons for involving relatives: e.g. to give relatives space and help them in their acceptance, to tailor support, to be able to perform EAS in harmony, and to mediate in case of conflicting views. Furthermore, physicians explained that relatives’ opinions can influence the decision-making process but cannot be a decisive factor. If relatives oppose the EAS request, physicians find the process more difficult and try to mediate between patients and relatives by investigating relatives’ objections and providing appropriate information. Reasons for not taking relatives’ opinions into account include not wanting to undermine patient autonomy and protecting relatives from a potential burdensome decision.ConclusionsAlthough physicians know that relatives have no formal role, involving relatives in EAS decision-making is common practice in the Netherlands. Physicians consider this important as relatives need to continue with their lives and may need bereavement support. Additionally, physicians want to perform EAS in harmony with everyone involved. However, relatives’ opinions are not decisive. (shrink)

BackgroundDecision-making in end-stage dementia is a complex process involving medical, social, legal and ethical issues. In ESD, the person suffers from severe cognitive problems leading to a loss of capacity to decide matters regarding health and end-of-life issues. The decisional responsibility is usually passed to clinicians and relatives who can face significant difficulty in making moral decisions, particularly in the presence of life-threatening swallowing problems.AimThis study aimed to understand the decision-making processes of clinical teams and relatives in addressing life-threatening swallowing (...) difficulties in ESD in long-term care in Malta.MethodThe study followed a qualitative approach where six case studies, involving six different teams and relatives of six different patients, were interviewed retrospectively to understand their decision-making in connection with the management of swallowing difficulties in ESD. Data were collected through semistructured interviews with each stakeholder. All data were transcribed and subjected to thematic analysis.ResultsFour themes were identified: the vulnerability of patients in dementia decision-making; the difficult role of relatives in decision-making; the decisional conflict between aggressive care through tube feeding versus oral comfort feeding; a consensus-building decision-making process as ideal to facilitate agreement and respect for patient’s dignity.ConclusionDecision-making to manage swallowing difficulties in ESD is a challenging process, which involves an interpretation of personal values, beliefs, patient preferences, care needs and clinical practice. Better communication between clinicians and relatives in dementia helps promote agreement between stakeholders leading to a care plan that respects the dignity of patients at their end of life. (shrink)

According to what I will call a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox, vague terms are context-sensitive, and one can give a convincing dissolution of the sorites paradox in terms of this context-dependency. The reason, according to the contextualist, that precise boundaries for expressions like “heap” or “tall for a basketball player” are so difficult to detect is that when two entities are sufficiently similar (or saliently similar), we tend to shift the interpretation of the vague expression so that (...) if one counts as falling in the extension of the property expressed by that expression, so does the other. As a consequence, when we look for the boundary of the extension of a vague expression in its penumbra, our very looking has the effect of changing the interpretation of the vague expression so that the boundary is not where we are looking. This accounts for the persuasive force of sorites arguments. (shrink)

By considering situations from the paradox of the twins in relativity, it is shown that time passes at different rates along different world lines, answering some well-known objections. The best explanation for the different rates is that time indeed passes. If time along a world line is something with a rate, and a variable rate, then it is difficult to see it as merely a unique, invariant, monotonic parameter without any further explanation of what it is. Although it could, (...) conceivably, be explained by the flow of something, it is better explained by the passing of a point present, which faces the problem that there is no absolute simultaneity in special relativity so that the present for an object is confined to just that object. This raises problems about presentism, eternalism, simultaneity, and special relativity. These issues are addressed first by giving accounts of presentism and eternalism and then an account of existence and times for objects relative to world lines. Finally, an analogy between a world of relativistic objects and Leibniz’s ontology of monads. (shrink)

Philosophers have always taken an interest not only in what is actually the case, but in what is necessarily the case and what could possibly be the case. These are questions of modality. Epistemologists of modality enquire into how we can know what is necessary and what is possible. This dissertation concerns the meta-epistemology of modality. It engages with the rules that govern construction and evaluation of theories in the epistemology of modality, by using modal empiricism – a form of (...) modal epistemology – as a running example. In particular, I investigate the assumption that it is important to be able to meet the integration challenge. Meeting the integration challenge is a source of serious difficulty for many approaches, but modal empiricism is supposed to do well in this respect. But I argue that once we have a better grasp of what the integration challenge is, it is not obvious that it presents no problem for modal empiricism. Moreover, even if modal empiricism could be said to be in a relatively good position with respect to integration, it comes at the cost of a forced choice between far-reaching partial modal scepticism and non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality. Non-uniformism is the view that more than one modal epistemology will be correct. While non-uniformism might not in itself be unpalatable, it must be defined and defended in a way which squares with the modal empiricist’s other commitment. I explore two ways of doing so, both involving a revised idea of the integration challenge and its role for the epistemology of modality. One involves a bifurcation of the integration challenge, and the other a restriction of the integration challenge’s relevance. Both ways are interesting, but neither is, as it turns out, a walk in the park. (shrink)

Advances in genetic diagnostics lead to more patients being diagnosed with hereditary conditions. These findings are often relevant to patients’ relatives. For example, the success of targeted cancer prevention is dependent on effective disclosure to relatives at risk. Without clear information, individuals cannot take advantage of predictive testing and preventive measures. Against this background, we argue that healthcare professionals have a duty to make actionable genetic information available to their patients’ at-risk relatives. We do not try to settle the (...) class='Hi'>difficult question of how this duty should be balanced against other duties, such as the duty of confidentiality and a possible duty not to know one’s genetic predisposition. Instead, we argue for the importance of recognising a general responsibility towards at-risk relatives, to be discharged as well as possible within the limits set by conflicting duties and practical considerations. According to a traditional and still dominant perspective, it is the patient’s duty to inform his or her relatives, while healthcare professionals are only obliged to support their patients in discharging this duty. We argue that this perspective is a mistake and an anomaly. Healthcare professionals do not have a duty to ensure that their patients promote the health of third parties. It is often effective and desirable to engage patients in disseminating information to their relatives. However, healthcare professionals should not thereby deflect their own moral responsibility. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and alethic pluralism. Section (...) 2 presents a distinction between strong and moderate versions of monism and pluralism, understood as theses about the existence of truth properties. Section 3 introduces four pluralist positions: strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism and manifestation functionalism. These positions are classified using the basic framework from Section 2, and a further distinction between pure and mixed versions of pluralism is drawn. Interestingly, alethic disjunctivism and the two kinds of functionalism—i.e. three out of four positions— have a mixed character. They incorporate a monist thesis. The only pure form of pluralism is strong alethic pluralism. Section 4 adds another distinction to the stock: one-level and two-level views. Each of the mixed positions operates with two levels, locating certain “alethically potent”—or grounding—properties at a lower level and others at a higher level. We briefly discuss the nature of grounding. In Section 5, we answer a question about mixed, two-level views, viz. whether they are as much monist as pluralist in nature, or more. They are not. Section 6 is devoted to the task of arguing that the strong pluralist, the second-order functionalist, and the manifestation functionalist will find it hard to deny a commitment to alethic disjunctivism. (shrink)

Nurse researchers engaged in qualitative interviews with patients and spouses in healthcare may often experience being in unforeseen ethical dilemmas. Researchers are guided by the bioethical principles of justice, beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for human rights and respect for autonomy through the entire research process. However, these principles are not sufficient to prepare researchers for unanticipated ethical dilemmas related to qualitative research interviews. We describe and discuss ethically challenging and difficult moments embedded in two cases from our own phenomenological interview (...) studies. We argue that qualitative interviews involve navigation between being guided by bioethics as a researcher, being a therapist/nurse and being a fellow human being or even a friend. The researchers’ premises to react to unexpected situations and act in a sound ethical manner must be enhanced, and there is a need for an increased focus on the researchers’ ethical preparation and to continually address and discuss cases from their own interviews. (shrink)

This work penetrates difficult ethical issues by examining human experience and reasoning in conjunction with actual choices of action.

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843) was the most prolific German philosopher of science in the nineteenth century who strived to synthesize Kant’s philosophical foundation of science and mathematics and the needs or practised science and mathematics in order to gain more comprehensive conceptual frameworks and greater methodological flexibility for those two disciplines. His original contributions anticipated later developments, to some extent, though they received comparatively little notice in the later course of the nineteenth century—a fate which partly can be explained by (...) the unfortunate development of the so-called ‘First Friesian School,’ founded by E. F. Apelt, M. J. Schleiden and O. X. Schlömilch. This situation changed temporarily when Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) arrived on the philosophical stage and founded a second, so-called, ‘New Friesian School’ in 1903. In the following two decades, Fries’ specific transformation of Kantian philosophy gained influence within the vigorous discussions about ‘new’ foundations of mathematics and, thus, also played a role within the Berlin Group surrounding Hans Reichenbach, though his work had no direct impact on the philosophy of physics being expounded therein. -/- This essay will first outline some characteristics of Fries’ development of the Kantian approach. Then it will point out the limited impact of the ‘New Friesian School’ on the Berlin Group, while highlighting some missed chances for fruitful exchange. As the originality of this school and its importance for the development of logic and philosophy of mathematics—by and large merits of its early members Walter Dubislav and Kurt Grelling —is dealt with in separate chapters of this volume, and elsewhere, this article will focus on what Fries called the ‘mathematical philosophy of nature’ (i. e. the philosophical foundations of physics). More specifically, it will show how the New Friesian School reacted to Einstein’s theories of relativity, in a way that contrasts with the approach of the Berlin Group. This discussion about relativity will also be used to reveal different understandings of the nature of ‘scientific philosophy’ in general, as well as different models of how philosophy and the empirical sciences should interact. (shrink)

This article aims to make an analysis of the cultural and anthropological issues raised by synthetic biology. The novelty of the field makes it relatively difficult to compose a comprehensive analysis, even for philosophers with experience, but who are not familiar with the specifics of the field. The article will follow the synthesis of the models of ethical decision applicable in the field of ethical evaluation of technologies from a cultural and anthropological perspective, their critical analysis and will highlight (...) the limitations of each model, as well as a possible synthesis of a model of ethical evaluation of technologies. Afterwords, it can be decided whether a particular technology - such as those involved in synthetic biology - poses risks to the environment, to those involved in research, to future generations, to humanity as a whole or to present or future ecosystems. (shrink)

Mutual perceptions of ethical behaviour among managers in nine EU-countries were quantatively measured and related to perceptions concerning "ease of cooperation". A strong positive correlation obtains: the more ethical a country is perceived to be, the higher it is valued as an international business partner. Germany, however, is a typical exception to this rule: German managers are perceived as the most ethical, but are considered relatively difficult to cooperate with.

Whereas Pasteur patented the biotechnological processes that he invented between 1857 and 1873 in the agro-food domain, he did not file any patents on the artificial vaccine preparation processes that he subsequently developed. This absence of patents can probably be explained by the 1844 patent law in France that established the non-patentable status of pharmaceutical preparations and remedies, including those for use in veterinary medicine. Despite the absence of patents, the commercial exploitation of the anthrax vaccine in the 1880s and (...) 1890s led to a technical and commercial monopoly by Pasteur’s laboratory as well as the founding of a commercial company to diffuse the vaccine abroad. Pasteur repeatedly refused to transfer his know-how and anthrax vaccine production methods to foreign laboratories, on the grounds that he wished to control the quality of the vaccines produced. Indeed, it was relatively difficult to transfer a method that was not yet perfectly stabilized in the early 1880s. Pasteur also wanted to maintain the monopoly of his commercial company and to increase the profits from vaccine sales so that the Institut Pasteur could be financially independent. The ‘Pasteur anthrax vaccine’ operating licences are described and analysed in detail in this article. (shrink)

The speech-to-song illusion ( Deutsch et al., 2011 ) tracks the perceptual transformation from speech to song across repetitions of a brief spoken utterance. Because it involves no change in the stimulus itself, but a dramatic change in its perceived affiliation to speech or to music, it presents a unique opportunity to comparatively investigate the processing of language and music. In this study, native English-speaking participants were presented with brief spoken utterances that were subsequently repeated ten times. The utterances were (...) drawn either from languages that are relatively difficult for a native English speaker to pronounce, or languages that are relatively easy for a native English speaker to pronounce. Moreover, the repetition could occur at regular or irregular temporal intervals. Participants rated the utterances before and after the repetitions on a 5-point Likert-like scale ranging from “sounds exactly like speech” to “sounds exactly like singing.” The difference in ratings before and after was taken as a measure of the strength of the speech-to-song illusion in each case. The speech-to-song illusion occurred regardless of whether the repetitions were spaced at regular temporal intervals or not; however, it occurred more readily if the utterance was spoken in a language difficult for a native English speaker to pronounce. Speech circuitry seemed more liable to capture native and easy-to-pronounce languages, and more reluctant to relinquish them to perceived song across repetitions. (shrink)

Historical geographies of black people in Britain are sorely lacking within the geographical discipline. This is, perhaps, partly because finding histories of black people is relatively difficult. Photography has proved to be an interesting and practical way of recovering such histories, but the use of photography as a research tool raises questions about the inscription of race in Victorian and contemporary society. In this paper I draw attention to the methodological questions that have arisen while undertaking research that appears (...) simultaneously to undermine and to reinforce the issues of racialisation it attempts to deconstruct. (shrink)

The end-state comfort effect refers to the consistent tendency of healthy adults to end their movements in a comfortable end posture. In children with and without developmental coordination disorder, the results of studies focusing on ESC planning have been inconclusive, which is likely to be due to differences in task constraints. The present pilot study focused on the question whether children with and without DCD were able to change their planning strategy and were more likely to plan for ESC when (...) demanded by complex object manipulations at the end of a task. To this end, we examined ESC planning in 18 children with and without DCD using the previously used sword-task and the newly developed hammer-task. In the sword-task, children had to insert a sword in a wooden block, which could be relatively easily completed with an uncomfortable end-posture. In the hammer-task, children had to strike down a nail in a wooden pounding bench, which required additional force and speed demands, making it relatively difficult to complete the movement with an uncomfortable end-posture. In line with our hypothesis, the results demonstrated that children with and without DCD were more likely to plan for ESC on the hammer-task compared with the sword-task. Thus, while children with and without DCD show inconsistent ESC planning on many previously used tasks, the present pilot study shows that many of them are able to take into account the end-state of their movements if demanded by task constraints. (shrink)

The veracity of children′s memory is frequently doubted because it is assumed that first, children′s memory is generally not very good, and second, children and their memories are too vulnerable to suggestibility to be credible. In this article these two assumptions are evaluated and three experiments are presented that address constraints on the construct of suggestibility. In the first experiment, it is reported that memory for a more frequently occurring event is more resistant to suggestibility than is memory for an (...) event experienced only once. This finding is especially relevant to memory for child abuse as it is common for perpetrators to frequently abuse the same child. In two additional experiments it is reported that it is relatively difficult to suggest to a child that something occurred when it did not. These results suggest that although memories for childhood events may be imperfect, they are not likely to be confabulated. (shrink)

Nagel' s pessimistic conclusion that current welfare state arrangements approximate to the most pragmatically effective way of reconciling the demands of morality and of an egalitarian liberalism, while not removing a deep seated incoherence between these view, can be resisted. The objective/subjective dichotomy, in this case applied via the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction, is identified as his problematic assumption: understood in Hegelian terms as the "placing" of different categories of reason, even a minimal realism makes it difficult to understand how (...) embedding agent-relativity alongside the agent-neutral can be understood as adding to the relevant values, just by moving from a more particular to a less particular conception of the world. This transition also cannot be seen as giving us insight into the intrinsicality of certain values, as that would be to renege on the idea that the subjective point of view is still a point of view on value and one that is expanded, not renounced. It is argued that the standard objection that contractualism is fatally circular is even more plausible in the case of its use as a theory of political legitimacy and Nagel's use of it is quite open about this circularity. Criticising Nagel's philosophical anthropology allows one to develop his positive arguments for egalitarianism; the development of civic virtue, from a perspective in which "the personal" acknowledges the demands of others in one's political community, leads to a political egalitarianism located in a distinct political morality independent of a moralised politics. (shrink)

Until relatively recently, researchers believed that synaesthetic sensations and their triggers were arbitrarily paired, and entirely idiosyncratic from one synaesthete to the next. Put differently, they believed that no two synaesthetes would have similar experiences from the same set of triggers, unless this had occurred by chance. This position likely arose because, prior to the internet, it was extremely difficult to recruit more than a small handful of synaesthete participants, and on the surface, synaesthetes do tend to disagree on (...) their associations when compared one-on-one. However, recent advances in communication have allowed researchers access to far larger groups of synaesthete participants, and this has changed our opinion about how similar synaesthetes might in fact be. A dedicated body of research has now shown that synaesthetic associations are built, to some extent, on a set of unconscious 'rules', shared across synaesthetes. These rules dictate the choice of sensation for certain triggers, and allow us to see patterns emerging which, although not absolute, provide a type of coherence across synaesthetes as a whole. I shall also show that some of these underlying rules operate in the population at large, to allow all individuals to make intuitive pairings across the senses. This chapter describes some of these rules, across a range of different modalities, and across different variants of synaesthesia. (shrink)

Background: Relatively little is known about neonatologists' roles in helping families navigate the difficult decision to attempt or withhold resuscitation for a neonate delivering at the threshold...

It is notoriously difficult to find an intuitively satisfactory rule for evaluating populations based on the welfare of the people in them. Standard examples, like total utilitarianism, either entail the Repugnant Conclusion or in some other way contradict common intuitions about the relative value of populations. Several philosophers have presented formal arguments that seem to show that this happens of necessity: our core intuitions stand in contradiction. This paper assesses the state of play, focusing on the most powerful (...) of these ‘impossibility theorems’, as developed by Gustaf Arrhenius. I highlight two ways in which these theorems fall short of their goal: some appeal to a supposedly egalitarian condition which, however, does not properly reflect egalitarian intuitions; the others rely on a background assumption about the structure of welfare which cannot be taken for granted. Nonetheless, the theorems remain important: they give insight into the difficulty, if not perhaps the impossibility, of constructing a satisfactory population axiology. We should aim for reflective equilibrium between intuitions and more theoretical considerations. I conclude by highlighting one possible ingredient in this equilibrium, which, I argue, leaves open a still wider range of acceptable theories: the possibility of vague or otherwise indeterminate value relations. (shrink)