An ontology of Leibnizian relationalism, consisting in distance relations among sparse matter points and their change only, is well recognized as a serious option in the context of classical mechanics. In this paper, we investigate how this ontology fares when it comes to general relativistic physics. Using a Humean strategy, we regard the gravitational field as a means to represent the overall change in the distance relations among point particles in a way that achieves the best combination of (...) being simple and being informative. (shrink)

This is a short, nontechnical introduction to features of time in classical and relativistic physics and their representation in the four-dimensional geometry of spacetime. Topics discussed include: the relativity of simultaneity in special and general relativity; the ‘twin paradox’ and differential aging effects in special and general relativity; and time travel in general relativity.

I argue that there is natural relationist interpretation of Newtonian and relativistic non-quantum physics. Although relationist, this interpretation does not fall prey to the traditional objections based on the existence of inertial effects.

This volume develops a fundamentally different categorical framework for conceptualizing time and reality. The actual taking place of reality is conceived as a “constellatory self-unfolding” characterized by strong self-referentiality and occurring in the primordial form of time, the not yet sequentially structured “time-space of the present.” Concomitantly, both the sequentially ordered aspect of time and the factual aspect of reality appear as emergent phenomena that come into being only after reality has actually taken place. In this new framework, time functions (...) as an ontophainetic [H1] platform, i.e., as the stage on which reality can first occur. Events are merely the “tracks” that the actual taking place of reality leaves behind on the co-emergent “canvas’’ of local spacetime. -/- The view of time proposed here is particularly relevant to the recent debate over the “ER=EPR” conjecture targeting the relation between quantum physics and general relativity theory. The novelty of this radically different framework is that it allows quantum reduction and singularities to be addressed as inverse transitions into and out of the factual layer of reality: In quantum physical state reduction, reality “gains” the chrono-ontological format of facticity, and the sequential aspect of time becomes applicable. In singularities, by contrast, the opposite happens: Reality loses its local spacetime formation and reverts back to its primordial, pre-local shape – making the use of causality relations, Boolean logic and the dichotomization of subject and object obsolete in the process. -/- For our understanding of the relation between quantum and relativistic physics, this new view opens up fundamentally new perspectives: Both are legitimate views of time and reality; they simply address very different chrono-ontological portraits, and thus should not lead us to erroneously prefer one view over the other. -/- The task of the book is to provide a formal framework in which this radically different view of time and reality can be suitably addressed. The mathematical approach is based on the logical and topological features of the Borromean Rings, and draws upon concepts and methods from algebraic and geometric topology – especially the theory of sheaves and links, group theory, logic and information theory in relation to the standard constructions employed in quantum mechanics and general relativity, shedding new light on the problems of their compatibility. The intended audience includes physicists, mathematicians and philosophers with an interest in the conceptual and mathematical foundations of modern physics. (shrink)

A theorem due to Bob Geroch and Pong Soo Jang ["Motion of a Body in General Relativity." Journal of Mathematical Physics 16, ] provides a sense in which the geodesic principle has the status of a theorem in General Relativity. I have recently shown that a similar theorem holds in the context of geometrized Newtonian gravitation [Weatherall, J. O. "The Motion of a Body in Newtonian Theories." Journal of Mathematical Physics 52, ]. Here I compare the interpretations of (...) these two theorems. I argue that despite some apparent differences between the theorems, the status of the geodesic principle in geometrized Newtonian gravitation is, mutatis mutandis, strikingly similar to the relativistic case. (shrink)

What is it that determines the identity of an entity? Processualism is a theoretical perspective that offers a startling answer to this question. The identity of an entity—whether human or nonhuman, animate or inanimate—depends on the set of relations in which this entity is located. And as the sets of relations are several, so are the identities that an entity can take. This article discusses this conclusion by integrating processual accounts from different fields of inquiry, such as relativistic (...) class='Hi'>physics and actor-network theory. According to a processual interpretation of relativistic physics, speaking of states of things is but an abstraction. For states come from the introduction of arbitrary breakups of the spacetime continuum. Therefore, processes precede states, a process being a set of relations that confers identity on a physical state. According to a processual interpretation of actor-network theory, the same holds true for actors. Again, speaking of states of actors is but an abstraction. For what really acts is heterogeneous networks. When one describes actors in isolation, one is neglecting a whole array of relations with other actors whereby that actor can act or is made to act in such and such a way. These strands of processualism come to the same conclusion as to the identity of entities. These are not characterized by individuality but by individuality: they can be differently individuated according to the set of relations one is able to take into account. The main methodological consequence is that, if one intends to describe what an entity is, knowledge of this entity—whether human or nonhuman, animate or inanimate—should be based on progressively less narrow localizations and mappings of the relations it has to other entities. (shrink)

Some philosophers say that in special relativity, four-dimensional stuff is invariant in some sense that three-dimensional stuff is not. I show that this claim is false.

This book, explores the conceptual foundations of Einstein's theory of relativity: the fascinating, yet tangled, web of philosophical, mathematical, and physical ideas that is the source of the theory's enduring philosophical interest. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of (...) the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Several studies have emphasized the limits of invariance-based approaches such as Klein’s and Cassirer’s when it comes to account for the shift from the spacetimes of classical mechanics and of special relativity to those of general relativity. Not only is it much more complicated to find such invariants in the case of general relativity, but even if local invariants in Weyl’s fashion are admitted, Cassirer’s attempt at a further generalization of his approach to the spacetime structure of general relativity seems (...) to obscure the fact that the determination of this structure requires a completely different approach that is derived from Riemann rather than Klein. This paper aims to reconsider these issues by drawing attention to the combination of subtractive and additive strategies (more in line with Riemann’s) in Klein’s own considerations about the determination of the structure of spacetime from 1897 to 1910. I will point out that Cassirer relied on Klein’s argument in some central passages from Substance and Function (1910), and elaborated further on his combined approach in Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (1921), also taking into account the application of Riemannian geometry in general relativity. My suggestion is that an appreciation of Cassirer’s continuing commitment to a variety of geometrical traditions may shed light on his particular understanding of a priori elements of knowledge and avoid some of the classical objections to the idea of a relativization of the a priori. (shrink)

Gyrogroup theory and its applications is introduced and explored, exposing the fascinating interplay between Thomas precession of special relativity theory and hyperbolic geometry. The abstract Thomas precession, called Thomas gyration, gives rise to grouplike objects called gyrogroups [A, A. Ungar, Am. J. Phys.59, 824 (1991)] the underlying axions of which are presented. The prefix gyro extensively used in terms like gyrogroups, gyroassociative and gyrocommutative laws, gyroautomorphisms, and gyrosemidirect products, stems from their underlying abstract Thomas gyration. Thomas gyration is tailor made (...) for hyperbolic geometry. In a similar way that commutative groups underlie vector spaces, gyrocommutative gyrogroups underlie gyrovector spaces. Gyrovector spaces, in turn, provide a most natural setting for hyperbolic geometry in full analogy with vector spaces that provide the setting for Euclidean geometry. As such, their applicability to relativistic physics and its spacetime geometry is obvious. (shrink)

The problem of getting a relativistic generalization of the CSL dynamical reduction model, which has been presented in part I, is discussed. In so doing we have the opportunity to introduce the idea of a stochastically invariant theory. The theoretical model we present, that satisfies this kind of invariance requirement, offers us the possibility to reconsider, from a new point of view, some conceptually relevant issues such as nonlocality, the legitimacy of attributing elements of physical reality to physical systems (...) and the problem of establishing causal relations between physical events. (shrink)

The possibility of algorithmic consciousness depends on the assumption that conscious states can be copied or repeated by sufficiently duplicating their underlying physical states, leading to a variety of paradoxes, including the problems of duplication, teleportation, simulation, self-location, the Boltzmann brain, and Wigner’s Friend. In an effort to further elucidate the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions by analyzing the implications of special relativity on evolutions of identical copies of a mental state, particularly the divergence of these evolutions (...) due to quantum fluctuations. By assuming the supervenience of a conscious state on some sufficient underlying physical state, I show that the existence of two or more instances, whether spacelike or timelike, of the same conscious state leads to a logical contradiction, ultimately refuting the assumption that a conscious state can be physically reset to an earlier state or duplicated by any physical means. Several explanatory hypotheses and implications are addressed, particularly the relationships between consciousness, locality, physical irreversibility, and quantum no-cloning. (shrink)

The physical meaning of gauge groups in bimetrical, Riemannian, and Hermitian theories of gravitation is discussed. In Hermitian relativity, Einstein's A-invariance means a super-gauge group which characterizes the Einstein-Schrödinger equations as the only nondegenerate general-relativistic field theory.

This paper deals with a specific version of metaethical moral relativism, known as “speaker-relativism”. It starts by explaining the position, focussing on the views of two prominent contemporary relativists, Gilbert Harman and James Dreier. Both authors draw an analogy between ethics and modern physics: just as Einstein showed that judgments about time or mass were always relative to a specific frame of reference, Dreier and Harman argue that “absolutist” judgments about moral rightness or wrongness need to be reinterpreted as (...) relative to some particular moral system. They also claim that this analogy allows us to salvage ordinary moral talk. I consider a number of possible objections to their argument, beginning with one, concerning the possibility of moral disagreement, which I think can be successfully answered, and then presenting two criticisms that I take to be more problematic for the relativist. I argue that despite its initial appeal, Harman and Dreier’s suggestion regarding our use of moral language seems to be a source of confusion in certain cases of moral disagreement, and does not appear able to preserve specifically moral normativity – which leads me to conclude that it is best viewed as a variant of an error theory about morality, rather than as the distinct metaethical position it purports to be. (shrink)

The standpoint of realism has been widely used to argue in favour of, or against, particular physical theories. An analysis is made of the adequacy of such arguments, taking an argument by Einstein as a starting point.Some reflexions are given on relativism and invariance. Invariances can be seen as generators of both regularity and paradox in physics.

In a pair of articles and in his recent book, Miklos Redei has taken enormous strides toward characterizing the conditions under which relativistic quantum field theory is a safe setting for the deployment of causal talk. Here, we challenge the adequacy of the accounts of causal dependence and screening off on which rests the relevance of Redei's theorems to the question of causal good behavior in the theory.

Some problems relating to the probabilistic description of a free particle and of a charged particle moving in an electromagnetic field are discussed. A critical analysis of the Klein-Gordon equation and of the Dirac equation is given. It is also shown that there is no connection between commutativity of operators for physical quantities and the existence of their joint probability. It is demonstrated that the Heisenberg uncertainty relation is not universal and explained why this is so. A universal uncertainty relation (...) for canonically conjugate coordinates and momenta is suggested. (shrink)

Over forty years after the foundations of the special theory of relativity had been securely laid, a heated debate, beginning in 1965, about the correct formulation of relativistic thermodynamics raged in the physics literature. Prior to 1965, relativistic thermodynamics was considered one of the most secure relativistic theories and one of the most simple and elegant examples of relativization in physics. It is, as its name apparently suggests, the result of the application of the special (...) theory of relativity to thermodynamics. The basic assumption is that the first and second laws of thermodynamics are Lorentz-invariant, and, as a result, a set of Lorentz transformations is derived from thermodynamic magnitudes, such as heat and temperature. (shrink)

상대성 이론에 대한 라이헨바흐의 철학적 분석을 대표하는 저술은 그의 1924년 저서 『상대성 이론의 공리화』이다. 이 책은 상대성 이론에서 제시된 시공간에 대한 일 종의 ‘합리적 재구성(rational reconstruction)’을 담고 있으며, 그는 이러한 재구 성을 통해 상대성 이론이 제시한 중요한 철학적 문제인 ‘시공간의 객관성’ 문제를 해 명하고자 했다. 우선 나는 논문 2장에서 라이헨바흐의 구성적 공리체계 속 공리와 정 의 및 단순성의 의미에 대해 논함으로써 이 체계가 갖는 ‘경험적 특성’을 밝힌다. 논문 3장에서 나는 ‘일치(coincidence)’에 대한 라이헨바흐의 해명 및 그가 구성적 공리체 계를 통해 재구성한 (...) 상대론적 시공간의 주요 내용을 기술한다. 이상의 논의를 통해 나는 라이헨바흐가 합리적 재구성을 통한 철학적 해명 과정에서 시공간의 물리적 객 관성에 관해 이론의 창시자였던 아인슈타인과는 다른 철학적 결론에 이르렀음을 보일 것이다. 논문 4장에서 나는 라이헨바흐의 구성적 공리화가 갖는 의의를 평가했던 주 요 철학적 논자들의 입장을 검토한다. 그중에서도 특히 나는 신칸트주의적 관점에서 라이헨바흐의 구성적 공리체계가 갖는 의의를 비판한 철학자 토머스 리크먼의 입장을 검토한 후, 이와 같은 리크먼의 부정적인 평가가 라이헨바흐의 구성적 공리체계에 대 한 일종의 오해에서 비롯되었음을 보인다. 리크먼의 주장과 달리 라이헨바흐는 강체 막대와 시계가 갖는 구조적 복잡성을 최소화하기 위해 빛 공리들과 물질 공리들을 분 리하였으며, 그는 물질 공리들과 계량적 공리들이 더 이상 적용되지 않는 일반 상대성 이론에 이르러서도 빛 신호로 구성된 위상적 공리들은 여전히 적용됨으로써 시공 간의 객관성이 유지됨을 보이고자 했다. 논문의 결론에서 나는 물리학자와 철학자의 이와 같은 의견 차이가 이후 물리적 기하학의 경험적 결정 가능성에 대한 아인슈타인 -라이헨바흐 논쟁으로 이어졌음을 지적하며 논의를 끝맺는다. (shrink)

Dennett's intended rapprochement between physical realism and intentional relativism fails because it is premised upon conflicting arguments governing the status of design. Indeed, Dennett's remarks on design serve to highlight tensions buried deep within his theory. For inasmuch as Dennett succeeds in objectifying attributions of design, attributions of intentionality readily follow suit, leading to a form of intentional realism. But inasmuch as Dennett is successful in relativizing attributions of design, scientific realism at large is subject to renewed anti-realistic criticism. Dennettian-inspired (...) considerations of adaptationism substantiate the former move towards intentional realism, while considerations of the relativity of artifactual design encourage the latter move towards physical relativism. The ambivalence intrinsic to Dennett's ``mild realism'' can be viewed as a function of these two conflicting positions on design, for Dennett can no more avoid objectifying intentionality when he is realistic about design than he can avoid relativizing physical causality when relativistic about design. (shrink)

Considerable work within the modern 'space-time theory' approach to relativity physics has been devoted to clarifying the role and meaning of the principle of relativity. Two recent discussions of the principle within this approach, due to Arntzenius (1990) and Friedman (1983), are found to contain difficulties.

Metaethical relativists sometimes use an interesting analogy with relativism in physics to defend their view. In this article I comment on Erler’s discussion of this analogy and take the discussion further into methodological matters that it raises. I argue that Erler misplaces the analogy in the dialectic between relativists and absolutists: the analogy cannot be dismissed by simply pointing to the fact that we have absolutist intuitions – this is exactly the kind of objection the analogy is supposed to (...) be a defence against. To decide if the analogy works we need to answer the following two questions: (i) Why does it work to say that people refer to relative physical properties (like simultaneity, mass and motion) even though they intend to speak about absolute physical properties? And (ii) does the answer carry over to the moral case? I argue for a specific answer to (i), and argue that it gives us reason to answer (ii) in the negative – so the analogy does not hold. However, looking at the issue more closely also raises questions about a fundamental assumption in metaethical discussion: perhaps we cannot assume that one single analysis holds for everyone’s moral judgments. (shrink)

I discuss the idea of relativistic causality, i.e., the requirement that causal processes or signals can propagate only within the light-cone. After briefly locating this requirement in the philosophy of causation, my main aim is to draw philosophers' attention to the fact that it is subtle, indeed problematic, in relativistic quantum physics: there are scenarios in which it seems to fail. I set aside two such scenarios, which are familiar to philosophers of physics: the pilot-wave approach, (...) and the Newton-Wigner representation. I instead stress two unfamiliar scenarios: the Drummond-Hathrell and Scharnhorst effects. These effects also illustrate a general moral in the philosophy of geometry: that the mathematical structures, especially the metric tensor, that represent geometry get their geometric significance by dint of detailed physical arguments. (shrink)

The presented study deals with philosophical analysis of modern and postmodern notions of public space. The actual problem of relativism in European culture is a consequence of essentialism, the belief that the world, reality or universe, has some inner essence which cannot be grasped in the language. Text analyzes the two main themes. Firstly, the treatise attempts at an philosophical analysis of the category – public space. It points out the dissension between the traditional and postmodern definition of this conception (...) and the consequences resulting from these different attitudes. As far as the methodology is concerned, the study is based on French postmodern philosopher J. F. Lyotard, presenting the postmodern approach as a greater contribution. In postmodern public area we can meet two basic types of dissentions, while only the first of them can be solved by further grow of specialization and the expertlike know. The second part of the study discusses Richard Rorty's philosophy, influence of Rorty's ideas on solving some traditional philosophical topics, especially the question of relativism. Richard Rorty's untraditional, provocative and inspiring version of neo-pragmatism enables us to view all the theories created so far by human culture as a case with tools. Physics and astronomy can be seen as a way to cope with some aspects of the Universe, philosophy, religion or literature as ways that help us cope with other aspects of the reality. One form of research results in statements, another in images, mathematical equations or stories. The emphasis is put on the analysis of the influence of neo- pragmatism and continental postmodernism on Rorty's writings. The main motto of the article is the statement that if we take care of free and critical public space, the truth will take care of itself. (shrink)

The analysis of this article is entirely within classical physics. Any attempt to describe nature within classical physics requires the presence of Lorentz-invariant classical electromagnetic zero-point radiation so as to account for the Casimir forces between parallel conducting plates at low temperatures. Furthermore, conformal symmetry carries solutions of Maxwell’s equations into solutions. In an inertial frame, conformal symmetry leaves zero-point radiation invariant and does not connect it to non-zero-temperature; time-dilating conformal transformations carry the Lorentz-invariant zero-point radiation spectrum into (...) zero-point radiation and carry the thermal radiation spectrum at non-zero temperature into thermal radiation at a different non-zero temperature. However, in a non-inertial frame, a time-dilating conformal transformation carries classical zero-point radiation into thermal radiation at a finite non-zero-temperature. By taking the no-acceleration limit, one can obtain the Planck radiation spectrum for blackbody radiation in an inertial frame from the thermal radiation spectrum in an accelerating frame. Here this connection between zero-point radiation and thermal radiation is illustrated for a scalar radiation field in a Rindler frame undergoing relativistic uniform proper acceleration through flat spacetime in two spacetime dimensions. The analysis indicates that the Planck radiation spectrum for thermal radiation follows from zero-point radiation and the structure of relativistic spacetime in classical physics. (shrink)

We study the non-relativistic (NR) limit of relativistic spacetimes in relation with the topology of the Universe. We first show that the NR limit of the Einstein equation is only possible in Euclidean topologies, i.e., for which the covering space is \(\mathbb {E}^3\). We interpret this result as an inconsistency of general relativity in non-Euclidean topologies and propose a modification of that theory which allows for the limit to be performed in any topology. For this, a second reference (...) non-dynamical connection is introduced in addition to the physical spacetime connection. The choice of reference connection is related to the covering space of the spacetime topology. Instead of featuring only the physical spacetime Ricci tensor, the modified Einstein equation features the difference between the physical and the reference Ricci tensors. This theory should be considered instead of general relativity if one wants to study a universe with a non-Euclidean topology and admitting a non-relativistic limit. (shrink)

This chapter provides a few approaches aiming to review the interpretation of matter, nature and the universe by trying to reframe the physical sciences in the context that has taken shape: arrangement, communication and information. In relation to what has just been presented, action regards more a mechanical type of physics with forces, arrangement, movements and orientations. Rational mechanics is the result. The existence of the two types of physics is associated with two great scientists. First of all, (...) Galileo, who established the principle of relativity and the addition of velocities by perfecting mathematical physics. Second, Planck, who elaborated the famous formula “E = hv” to account for blackbody radiation. If the distinction between a physics of communication and a physics of arrangement is applicable, then it must be validated in quantum theory and the description of the universe. Classical mechanics and relativistic cosmology describe arrangements of matter. Quantum physics describes communications. (shrink)

The physical motivations for the dynamical group are presented and it is shown how Barut's mathematical speculations were combined with the idea of an elementary length to provide group theoretical models of relativistic extended objects. Then the simplest nonrelativistic and relativistic models are described.

Gibson's ecological approach to depiction is compared with Nelson Goodman's relativist theory of representation. Goodman's commitment to radical relativism and Gibson's to direct realism would make these thinkers unlikely candidates for comparison if Goodman himself had not indicated a substantial body of agreement with Gibson in the area of picture perception. The present study analyzes this agreement through systematic discussion of the following theses: realism in representation is not a function of geometrical optics, physical similarity to what is depicted, or (...) deception; pictures differ in density and articulation from words, so that picturing has no explicit vocabulary; and artists can teach us new ways to see the world. The agreement between Goodman and Gibson has wide-ranging implications for the further development of what might be called a Gibsonian relativism. (shrink)

In recent decades, the scientific study of consciousness has significantly increased our understanding of this elusive phenomenon. Yet, despite critical development in our understanding of the functional side of consciousness, we still lack a fundamental theory regarding its phenomenal aspect. There is an “explanatory gap” between our scientific knowledge of functional consciousness and its “subjective,” phenomenal aspects, referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is the first-person answer to “what it’s like” question, and it (...) has thus far proved recalcitrant to direct scientific investigation. Naturalistic dualists argue that it is composed of a primitive, private, non-reductive element of reality that is independent from the functional and physical aspects of consciousness. Illusionists, on the other hand, argue that it is merely a cognitive illusion, and that all that exists are ultimately physical, non-phenomenal properties. We contend that both the dualist and illusionist positions are flawed because they tacitly assume consciousness to be an absolute property that doesn’t depend on the observer. We develop a conceptual and a mathematical argument for a relativistic theory of consciousness in which a system either has or doesn’t have phenomenal consciousness with respect to some observer. Phenomenal consciousness is neither private nor delusional, just relativistic. In the frame of reference of the cognitive system, it will be observable and in other frame of reference it will not. These two cognitive frames of reference are both correct, just as in the case of an observer that claims to be at rest while another will claim that the observer has constant velocity. Given that consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, neither observer position can be privileged, as they both describe the same underlying reality. Based on relativistic phenomena in physics we developed a mathematical formalization for consciousness which bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem. Given that the first-person cognitive frame of reference also offers legitimate observations on consciousness, we conclude by arguing that philosophers can usefully contribute to the science of consciousness by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures. (shrink)

In his book Struktura rewolucji relatywistycznej i kwantowej w fizyce (The Structure of the Relativistic and Quantum Revolution in Physics, 2020), Wojciech Sady presents his vision of the two greatest scientific revolutions in the 20th century. The book provides an illuminating account of the way these revolutions proceeded and strongly supports the thesis that, contrary to Thomas Kuhn’s famous suggestions, the revolutions involved no breaches in the continuity in scientific development but progressed in an evolutionary (although swift) step-by-step (...) way, and were products of collective interactive processes in the scientific community rather than individual achievements of geniuses. On the other hand, it makes a number of controversial claims. In this article, I contest Sady’s claims that new scientific theories (including the most revolutionary ones) logically follow from the theoretical and experimental knowledge already available (the Entailment thesis) or, at least, their emergence is necessary, inevitable, given the available knowledge, the thought style of the scientific community, and some minimally necessary conditions for the development of science (the Necessitation thesis), and that the role of extra-logical and extra-empirical factors, that can be designated as “creative imagination,” in the development of science is either negative or neglectable. (shrink)

Physical Relativity explores the nature of the distinction at the heart of Einstein's 1905 formulation of his special theory of relativity: that between kinematics and dynamics. Einstein himself became increasingly uncomfortable with this distinction, and with the limitations of what he called the 'principle theory' approach inspired by the logic of thermodynamics. A handful of physicists and philosophers have over the last century likewise expressed doubts about Einstein's treatment of the relativistic behaviour of rigid bodies and clocks in motion (...) in the kinematical part of his great paper, and suggested that the dynamical understanding of length contraction and time dilation intimated by the immediate precursors of Einstein is more fundamental. Harvey Brown both examines and extends these arguments, after giving a careful analysis of key features of the pre-history of relativity theory. He argues furthermore that the geometrization of the theory by Minkowski in 1908 brought illumination, but not a causal explanation of relativistic effects. Finally, Brown tries to show that the dynamical interpretation of special relativity defended in the book is consistent with the role this theory must play as a limiting case of Einstein's 1915 theory of gravity: the general theory of relativity.Appearing in the centennial year of Einstein's celebrated paper on special relativity, Physical Relativity is an unusual, critical examination of the way Einstein formulated his theory. It also examines in detail certain specific historical and conceptual issues that have long given rise to debate in both special and general relativity theory, such as the conventionality of simultaneity, the principle of general covariance, and the consistency or otherwise of the special theory with quantum mechanics. Harvey Brown' s new interpretation of relativity theory will interest anyone working on these central topics in modern physics. (shrink)

This book develops new forms of logic: Operator Logic, Probabilistic Operator Logic and Quantum Operator Logic. It then proceeds to create a new view of metaphysics, Relativistic Quantum Metaphysics, for physical Reality. It then derives the form of The Standard Model of Elementary Particles. In particular it derives the origin of parity violation, the origin of the Strong interactions, and the origin of its peculiar symmetry. Also developed are new formalisms for Logic that are of interest in themselves. While (...) mathematics is essential in the latter stages of the book it is presented with sufficient text discussion to make what it is doing understandable to the non-mathematical reader. Generally the jargon of Philosophy, Logic and Physics is avoided as much as possible. But the second part of this book is very mathematical of necessity. In it the form of The Standard Model is derived in detail from a fundamental set of principles. (shrink)

The analysis of interacting relativistic many-particle systems provides a theoretical basis for further work in many diverse fields of physics. After a discussion of the nonrelativisticN-particle systems we describe two approaches for obtaining the canonical equations of the corresponding relativistic forms. A further aspect of our approach is the consideration of the constants of the motion.

The book is drawn from the Tarner lectures, delivered in Cambridge in 1993. It is concerned with the ultimate nature of reality, and how this is revealed by modern physical theories such as relativity and quantum theory. The objectivity and rationality of science are defended against the views of relativists and social constructionists. It is claimed that modern physics gives us a tentative and fallible, but nevertheless rational, approach to the nature of physical reality. The role of subjectivity in (...) science is examined in the fields of relativity theory, statistical mechanics and quantum theory, and recent claims of an essential role for human consciousness in physics is rejected. Prospects for a 'Theory of Everything' are considered, and the related question of how to assess scientific progress is carefully examined. (shrink)

I discuss candidates for definitions of determinism in the context of general relativistic spacetimes, and argue that a definition which does not make recourse to any particular region of spacetime should be preferred over alternatives; one such notion is discussed in detail in the light of various physical examples. The emerging picture of determinism is a pluralist one: sometimes there is no unique way of making our intuitive concept of determinism precise. Instead, what is crucial for assessment of determinism (...) of the theory are auxiliary conditions under which it counts as deterministic or indeterministic, and justification for using them in a given situation. (shrink)

A number of arguments have been given to show that the modal interpretation of ordinary nonrelativistic quantum mechanics cannot be consistently extended to the relativistic setting. We find these arguments inconclusive. However, there is a prima facie reason to think that a tension exists between the modal interpretation and relativistic invariance; namely, the best candidate for a modal interpretation adapted to relativistic quantum field theory, a prescription due to Rob Clifton, comes out trivial when applied to a (...) number of systems of physical interest. However, it is far from clear whether this difficulty for the modal interpretation is traceable to relativistic invariance per se or to the infinite number of degrees of freedom involved. In any case, the proponents of the modal interpretation have work to do. (shrink)

Spin-half fermions are considered to be limited in a spherical potential well with periodic boundary conditions. The whole system is treated like a relativistic Fermi Gas. Solving the corresponding Dirac equation, the density of states, the Fermi energy, the average energy, the density of states of nucleons and the total energy of the ground-state are obtained.