Critical social theory has long been marked by a deep, creative, and productive relationship with psychoanalysis. Whereas Freud and Fromm were important cornerstones for the early Frankfurt School, recent thinkers have drawn on the object-relations school of psychoanalysis. Transitional Subjects is the first book-length collection devoted to the engagement of critical theory with the work of Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, and other members of this school. Featuring contributions from some of the leading figures working in both of these (...) fields, including Axel Honneth, Joel Whitebook, Noëlle McAfee, Sara Beardsworth, and C. Fred Alford, it provides a synoptic overview of current research at the intersection of these two theoretical traditions while also opening up space for further innovations. Transitional Subjects offers a range of perspectives on the critical potential of object-relations psychoanalysis, including feminist and Marxist views, to offer valuable insight into such fraught social issues as aggression, narcissism, “progress,” and torture. The productive dialogue that emerges augments our understanding of the self as intersubjectively and socially constituted and of contemporary “social pathologies.” Transitional Subjects shows how critical theory and object-relations psychoanalysis, considered together, have not only enriched critical theory but also invigorated psychoanalysis. (shrink)

I reply to criticisms of the divine command theory with an eye to noting the relation of ethics to an ontological ground. The criticisms include: the theory makes the standard of right and wrong arbitrary, it traps the defender of the theory in a vicious circle, it violates moral autonomy, it is a relic of our early deontological state of moral development. I then suggest how Henry Veatch's view of good as an ontological feature of the world (...) provides a context in which the divine command theory can be reasonably justified. (shrink)

Trois sortes de définitions sont présentées et discutées: les définitions nominales, les définitions contextuelles et les définitions amplificatrices. On insiste sur le fait que I’elimination des definitions n’est pas forcement un procede automatique en particulier dans le cas de la logique paraconsistante. Finalement on s’int’resse à la théorie des objets de Meinong et l’on montre comment elle peut êrre considéréecomme une théorie des descripteurs.Three kinds of definitions are presented and discussed: nominal definitions, contextual definitions, amplifying definitions. It is emphasized that (...) the elimination of definitions is not necessarily straightforward in particular in the case of paraconsistent logic. Finally we have a look at Meinong’s theory objects and we show how it can be considered as a theory of descriptors. (shrink)

A number of philosophers today endorse the view that material substances (e.g., cats, stones, atoms) can be analyzed as bundles of “particular properties” or “tropes”. Among several developments, the theory that Peter Simons proposed is seen as the most successful one. Simons’ theory seems to owe its high reputation to mainly two advantages which he claims for his theory: the capacity for avoiding infinite regress, and the explanatory adequacy for the phenomenon of change. In this paper, however, (...) I try to object to this high appraisal, by showing that the two alleged advantages in fact cannot be simultaneously secured by Simons’ position. To this aim, I proceed as follows: First, I present Simons’ theory and explain its alleged two advantages. Next, I take up Arda Denkel’s criticism and show that the explanatory adequacy will be lost unless Simons accepts a certain revision of his theory. Finally, I show that as a result of the revision needed, Simons’ position comes to lose the capacity for avoiding infinite regress in turn. (shrink)

Reprising and revising a question from Longino regarding an earlier phase of standpoint theory, I raise some issues regarding the place of a substantive normative social theory in the strong objectivity project in Harding’s recent book, Objectivity and Diversity. I offer reasons to think the issue needs to be reframed in the co-constructionist and pluralist setting of the new book but that interesting issues continue to arise in thinking about the philosophical resources feminist philosophies of science can or (...) might rely on. (shrink)

The paper advances the hypothesis that some difficulties in René Descartes reflections on the idea of mind in his ‘Objections and Responses’ would unintentionally lead him to a ‘bundle theory’. In this sense, Descartes would not have been successful in showing that the mind would be something beyond the set of its modes or attributes. This hypothesis is based upon Descartes’ replies to Thomas Hobbes, Antoine Arnauld, Pièrre Gassendi and Marin Mersenne – third, fourth, fifth and sixth sets of (...) objections respectively. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property possession is not analysed as bundle-membership, as in traditional bundle theories, since accidental properties are not included in the object’s bundle. We have a different story to tell about accidental property possession. This move reaps (...) many benefits. Essential bundle theory delivers a simple theory of the essential properties of material objects; an explanation of how object coincidence can arise; an actual-world ground for modal differences between coincident objects; a simple story about intrinsic properties; and a plausible account of certain ubiquitous cases of causal overdetermination. (shrink)

What objects exist in the social world and how should we understand them? Is a specific Pizza Hut restaurant as real as the employees, tables, napkins and pizzas of which it is composed, and as real as the Pizza Hut corporation with its headquarters in Wichita, the United States, the planet Earth and the social and economic impact of the restaurant on the lives of its employees and customers? In this book the founder of object-oriented philosophy develops his approach (...) in order to shed light on the nature and status of objects in social life. While it is often assumed that an interest in objects amounts to a form of materialism, Harman rejects this view and develops instead an “immaterialist” method. By examining the work of leading contemporary thinkers such as Bruno Latour and Levi Bryant, he develops a forceful critique of ‘actor-network theory’. In an extended discussion of Leibniz’s famous example of the Dutch East India Company, Harman argues that this company qualifies for objecthood neither through ‘what it is’ or ‘what it does’, but through its irreducibility to either of these forms. The phases of its life, argues Harman, are not demarcated primarily by dramatic incidents but by moments of symbiosis, a term he draws from the biologist Lynn Margulis. This book provides a key counterpoint to the now ubiquitous social theories of constant change, holistic networks, performative identities, and the construction of things by human practice. It will appeal to anyone interested in cutting-edge debates in philosophy and social and cultural theory. (shrink)

In this paper, we compare two theories, modal Meinongianism and object theory, with respect to several issues that have been discussed recently in the literature. In particular, we raise some objections for MM, undermine some of the objections that its defenders raise for OT, and we point out some virtues of the latter with respect to the former.

This chapter is divided into three parts. First I outline what makes something an objective list theory of well-being. I then go on to look at the motivations for holding such a view before turning to objections to these theories of well-being.

One of the most formidable challenges to the Error Theory is the Normative Objection, according to which the Error Theory ought to be rejected because of its deeply implausible first-order normative implications. Recently, Bart Streumer has offered a novel and powerful defence of the Error Theory against this objection. Streumer argues that the Error Theory’s plausibility deficit when viewed against the background of our normative beliefs does not show the theory’s falsity. Rather, it can be (...) explained by the fact that this theory, though true, cannot be believed. In this paper, I argue that Streumer’s defence does not succeed. I show that, even if we grant Streumer that we cannot believe the Error Theory, we can still formulate what I call the Undermining Normative Objection, an argument that proceeds only from believable premises to a believable conclusion and shows that the arguments supporting the Error Theory cannot all be sound. (shrink)

We reply to various arguments by Otavio Bueno and Edward Zalta (‘Object Theory and Modal Meinongianism’) against Modal Meinongianism, including that it presupposes, but cannot maintain, a unique denotation for names of fictional characters, and that it is not generalizable to higher-order objects. We individuate the crucial difference between Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory in the former’s resorting to an apparatus of worlds, possible and impossible, for the representational purposes for which the latter resorts to a distinction (...) between two kinds of predication, exemplification and encoding. We show that encoding has fewer forerunners in the history of philosophy than Bueno and Zalta want, and that there’s a reason why the notion has been found baffling by some. (shrink)

Kuhn argued that scientific theory choice is, in some sense, a rational matter, but one that is not fully determined by shared objective scientific virtues like accuracy, simplicity, and scope. Okasha imports Arrow’s impossibility theorem into the context of theory choice to show that rather than not fully determining theory choice, these virtues cannot determine it at all. If Okasha is right, then there is no function (satisfying certain desirable conditions) from ‘preference’ rankings supplied by scientific virtues (...) over competing theories (or models, or hypotheses) to a single all-things-considered ranking. This threatens the rationality of science. In this paper we show that if Kuhn’s claims about the role that subjective elements play in theory choice are taken seriously, then the threat dissolves. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue for an instrumental form of existence, inspired by Hilbert’s method of ideal elements. As a case study, we consider the existence of contradictory objects in models of non-classical set theories. Based on this discussion, we argue for a very liberal notion of existence in mathematics.

I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequateconceptions of objective probability (in connection with such desiderata as causal and explanatory significance, applicability to single cases, etc.), they have failed to satisfy amethodological standard — roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood (...) independently of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of the suggested methodological standard, is then briefly discussed. (shrink)

Naïve realists typically hold that mind-independent objects and their properties directly constitute the presented elements in perception, which in turn determine our perceptual experience—this is known as the Difference Principle. However, cases of illusion show that even when perceiving the same object, our perceptual experiences can vary significantly. Supporters of the Difference Principle argue that such variations arise because differences in perceptual environments alter the presented elements. Yet, this move, which introduces additional elements into the presented content, has been (...) criticized as a rejection of austerity, leading some to conclude that the Difference Principle should be abandoned. This paper argues that the Difference Principle and a commitment to austerity are compatible. To support this claim, it develops a new theory called the New Object Theory. According to this theory, in different perceptual environments, we direc... (shrink)

This note presents an argument to show that trope theory, as usually conceived, gets into difficulties in handling certain ways in which two objects can resemble one another. Ways out of the difficulties are discussed briefly.

The philosopher Graham Harman argues that contemporary debates about the nature of reality as such, and about the nature of objects in particular, can be meaningfully applied to social theory and practice. With Immaterialism, he has recently provided a case-based demonstration of how this could happen. But social theorists have compelling reasons to oppose object-oriented social theory’s 15 principles. Fidelity to Harman’s aesthetic foundationalism, and his particular use of serial endosymbiosis theory as a mechanism of social (...) change, constrain the very practices which it is supposed to enable. However, social theory stands to benefit from object-oriented philosophy through what we call posthuman relationism – characterised as a commitment to the reality of the nonhuman, but not divorced from the human. The emphasis in object-oriented social theory on how objects withdraw from cognitive or affective capture and representation needs to be tempered by an equal focus on how objects appeal. (shrink)

Abstract: In this article, I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, which I call enlightened value maximization. Enlightened value maximization utilizes much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders, and specifies long-term value maximization or value seeking as the firm’s objective. This proposal therefore solves the problems (...) that arise from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, which is the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory, explaining how this theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard that gives no score—that is, no single-valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organization or division (and it must be consistent with the organization’s strategy), and as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organization it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm. (shrink)

Recent debate about the error theory has taken a ‘formal turn’. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the error theory should be rejected because of its difficulties in providing a convincing formal account of the logic and semantics of moral claims. On the other hand, there are those who claim that such formal objections fail, maintaining that arguments against the error theory must be of a substantive rather than a formal kind. In this (...) paper, we argue that formal objections to the error theory cannot be eschewed but must be met head-on. (shrink)

Theories are conceptualized as predictors of phenomena using computable functions acting on prior world information. Formally, the concept of bounded prior world recursive function is defined and used as a candidate for a potential theory. An artificial world of fact is then constructed for which there exist two inconsistent best theories, in that they cannot be improved upon, and these theories are maximally inconsistent in that every best theory is a compromise. It is argued that in such a (...) world the scientific objective would be to find these maximally inconsistent theories. The construction is motivated as an attempt to illustrate the status of theory in the social sciences and in economics, in particular. (shrink)

In this paper I explore a version of standard (expected utility) decision theory in which the probability parameter is interpreted as an objective chance believed by agents to obtain and values of this parameter are fixed by indicative conditionals linking possible actions with possible outcomes. After reviewing some recent developments centering on the common-cause counterexamples to the standard approach, I introduce and briefly discuss the key notions in my own approach. (This approach has essentially the same results as the (...) causal approach in common-cause cases.) I then discuss the Rule of Dominance and find, in the context of the present proposal, that it cannot serve as an independent source of action justification. Turning next to Newcomb''s Problem, I argue that the much discussed issue of back-tracking counterfactuals is something of a red herring for decision theory. Once the twin distractions of back-tracking counterfactuals and Dominance Reasoning are set aside the 1-box solution emerges as a natural consequence of the present proposal. It is of interest that this proposal agrees with the causal approach in the standard common-cause examples and the expected-utility approach in the Newcomb case: one can be smart and rich and keep on smoking. (shrink)

Philosophers have explored objective interpretations of probability mainly by considering empirical probability statements. Because of this focus, it is widely believed that the logical interpretation and the actual-frequency interpretation are unsatisfactory and the hypothetical-frequency interpretation is not much better. Probabilistic assertions in pure mathematics present a new challenge. Mathematicians prove theorems in number theory that assign probabilities. The most natural interpretation of these probabilities is that they describe actual frequencies in finite sets and limits of actual frequencies in infinite (...) sets. This interpretation vindicates part of what the logical interpretation of probability aimed to establish. (shrink)

The philosopher Graham Harman argues that contemporary debates about the nature of reality as such, and about the nature of objects in particular, can be meaningfully applied to social theory and practice. With Immaterialism, he has recently provided a case-based demonstration of how this could happen. But social theorists have compelling reasons to oppose object-oriented social theory’s 15 principles. Fidelity to Harman’s aesthetic foundationalism, and his particular use of serial endosymbiosis theory as a mechanism of social (...) change, constrain the very practices which it is supposed to enable. However, social theory stands to benefit from object-oriented philosophy through what we call posthuman relationism – characterised as a commitment to the reality of the nonhuman, but not divorced from the human. The emphasis in object-oriented social theory on how objects withdraw from cognitive or affective capture and representation needs to be tempered by an equal focus on how objects appeal. (shrink)

J.J.C. Smart famously complained that rule utilitarianism is incoherent, and that rule utilitarians are guilty of rule worship . Much has been said about whether Smart’s complaint is justified, but I will assume for the sake of argument that Smart was on to something. Instead, I have three other goals. First, I want to show that Smart’s complaint is a specific instance of a more general objection to a moral theory—what I will call the Incoherence Objection. Second, I want to (...) illustrate how the Incoherence Objection can apply both to consequentialist and, surprisingly, some nonconsequentialist theories. Finally, I want to demonstrate at least one way nonconsequentialist theories that make use of rules, principles, and the like can dodge the Incoherence Objection. (shrink)

Trois sortes de définitions sont présentées et discutées: les définitions nominales, les définitions contextuelles et les définitions amplificatrices. On insiste sur le fait que I’elimination des definitions n’est pas forcement un procede automatique en particulier dans le cas de la logique paraconsistante. Finalement on s’int’resse à la théorie des objets de Meinong et l’on montre comment elle peut êrre considéréecomme une théorie des descripteurs.Three kinds of definitions are presented and discussed: nominal definitions, contextual definitions, amplifying definitions. It is emphasized that (...) the elimination of definitions is not necessarily straightforward in particular in the case of paraconsistent logic. Finally we have a look at Meinong’s theory objects and we show how it can be considered as a theory of descriptors. (shrink)

This essay argues for the importance of developing theories of nonexistent objects. The grounds are utility and smoothness of logical theory. In the latter case a parallel with the theory of negative and imaginary numbers is exploited. The essay concludes with a counterexample to a general argument against the enterprise of developing theories of nonexistent objects, and outlining the foremost problem an adequate theory of nonexistent objects must solve.

Presented here are translations of two essays of the Austrian logician, philosopher and experimental psychologist Ernst Mally, originally delivered at the Third International Congress of Philosophy in Heidelberg, Germany. Both essays conclude with discussion between Mally and Kurt Grelling. Mally was a student of Alexius Meinong and a contributor to logical investigations in the field of object theory (Gegenstandstheorie). In these essays, Mally introduces a vital distinction between formal and extra-formal ?determinations? (Bestimmungen), and he argues that formal determinations are (...) not part of the identity conditions for intended objects, but provide the basis for a theory of pure logical and mathematical relations. Mally then proceeds to develop a formal logic of formal and extra-formal determinations, whose interrelations of ontic and modal predications provide an analysis of fundamental object theory concepts. (shrink)

This book examines the role of British object relations theory in order to explore our understanding and treatment of depression. It challenges current conceptualizations of depression while simultaneously discussing the complex nature of depression, its long-lasting and chronic implications and the susceptibility to relapse many may face. Illuminated throughout by case studies, areas of discussion include: Freud’s theory of depression analytic subtypes of depression a theoretical contribution to the problem of relapse the correlation between dream work and the (...) work of mourning. _Object Relations in Depression_ offers a psychoanalytic discussion of the multifaceted nature of depression and as such will be of great interest to all those in the psychoanalytic field. (shrink)

최근 온/오프라인에서 자주 등장하는 페미니즘에 대한 공격은 페미니즘을 주관주의나 특권주의로 간주하는 경향을 갖는다. 이에 이 글에서 나는 페미니즘에 대한 적대시가 페미니즘 입장론에 대한 오해나 무지에서 비롯된 것임을 보여주고자 한다.BR이를 논증하기 위해 나는 이 글에서 1991년도에 『누구의 과학이며 누구의 지식인가?』에서 정식화된 샌드라 하딩(Sandra Harding)의 “지적으로 강력한 페미니스트 입장론”과 도나 해러웨이(Donna Haraway)의 『유인원, 사이보그 그리고 여자』에서 논의되는 “상황적 지식들”을 분석하는 가운데 이들의 입장을 “비판적 입장론”으로 수렴시키고자 한다. 페미니스트 비판적 입장론은 무위치나 상대적 위치에서 출발하는 인식론을 비판하는 가운데 여성의 삶이라는 체현된 위치에서 시작하는 인식론이 (...) 덜 왜곡된 지식을 위한 토대를 제공한다고 본다. 나아가 비판적 입장론은 대상뿐 아니라 대상을 다루는 주체에 대한 성찰성과 비판성을 강조하는 가운데 전통과학보다 더 강한 객관성을 보장하고자 한다. 나아가 비판적 입장론은 주체에 대한 비판 능력을 담보하는 가운데 다양한 모순들을 가로질러 생각할 수 있는 교차적 사고로 나아갈 수 있게 된다.BR이를 통해 나는 비판적 입장론이 기계적 평등에 기반하는 추상적 민주주의를 권력의 차이에 민감한 깊이 있는 민주주의로 한 단계 발전시키는 데 매우 중요한 역할을 수행하고 있음을 분명히 하고자 한다. (shrink)

s book, Hermeneutic Dialogue and Social Science: A critique of Gadamer and Habermas, intends to present an account of debates on objectivity in the social sciences, in stressing the political and epistemological responsibility, in public spheres, to those who want to create a fairer understanding of societies and history, without demonizing natural enterprises or leaving social studies out of acute critical questioning. Key Words: dialogue • hermeneutic • social sciences • natural sciences • method.

In this paper, I explore a line of argument against one form of realism about fictional characters : abstract artifact theory, the view according to which fictional characters like Harry Potter are part of our reality, but, they are abstract objects created by humans, akin to the institution of marriage and the game of soccer. I will defend artifactualism against an objection that Mark Sainsbury considers decisive against it: the category-mistake objection. The objection has it that artifactualism attributes (...) to people who produce and process sentences and thoughts about Harry Potter massive error, indeed, a category mistake about what kind of thing Harry Potter is; for an abstract object isn’t the sort of thing that can wear glasses, ride a double-decker bus, attend school. Given problems with this objection, artifactualism, I shall conclude, remains a tenable contender. (shrink)

: Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics. The objection that DCM "has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible". This article criticizes Wielenberg's argument. Section 1 will expound Wielenberg's new "psychopath" argument in the context of the recent debate over the Promulgation Objection. Section 2 will discuss two ambiguities in the argument; in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous between whether Wielenberg (...) uses the word "obligation" in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 will argue that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that that psychopaths "have no moral obligations". By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that Divine command theorists are committed to denying psychopaths have obligations. (shrink)

In a well-known footnote in Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume calls William Wollaston's moral theory a "whimsical system" and purports to destroy it with a few brief objections. The first of those objections, although fatally flawed, has hitherto gone unrefuted. To my knowledge, its chief error has escaped attention. In this paper I expose that error; I also show that it has relevance beyond the present subject. It can occur with regard to any moral (...) class='Hi'>theory which, like Wollaston's, locates the wrongness of an act in a property that can reside in non-actions no less than in actions. (shrink)

We advance two objections to the selfish gene theory formulated by Richard Dawkins, which states that natural selection operates on genetic replicators. These objections target three of the essential features of the theory. The first feature is the exclusivity that the theory ascribes to genetic replicators as objects of natural selection. We call it “the exclusivity clause”. The second and third features correspond to two criteria that genetic replicators must satisfy for Dawkins’ theory to hold. (...) We call them “the stability criterion” and “the fidelity criterion”. The first objection we advance is that, given the findings of transgenerational epigenetics, genetic replicators do not appear to satisfy the exclusivity clause and some of them do not seem to meet the stability criterion. The second objection is that the existence of the molecular phenomena known as alternative splicing and trans-splicing seems to entail that many genetic replicators do not satisfy neither the stability criterion nor the fidelity criterion. (shrink)

The recent work of Paul Teller and Sunny Auyang in the philosophy of Quantum Field Theory (QFT) has stimulated the search for the fundamental entities in this theory. In QFT, the classical notion of a particle collapses. The theory does not only exclude classical, i.e., spatiotemporally identifiable particles, but it makes particles of the same type conceptually indistinguishable. Teller and Auyang have proposed competing ersatz-ontologies to account for the 'loss of particles': field quanta vs. field events. Both (...) ontologies, however, suffer from serious defects. While quanta lack numerical identity, spatiotemporal localizability, and independence of basis-representations, events--if understood as concrete measurement events--are related to the theory only statistically. I propose an alternative solution: The entities of QFT are events of the type 'Quantum system, S, is in quantum state, Ψ '. These are not point events, but Davidsonian events, i.e., they can be identified by their location within the causal net of the world. (shrink)

Towards the end of the 19th century there were those who wished to see the kinetic theory abandoned. This paper attempts to show that this reaction was primarily due to philosophical objections rather than the result of scientific difficulties encountered by the kinetic theory. First the relevant philosophical background is examined as well as the relation between the kinetic theory and thermodynamics. Next the scientific difficulty known as the specific heats ratio anomaly is discussed and finally Boltzmann's (...) philosophy of science is examined. (shrink)

: Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness. I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than (...) the neural processes triggered by the banana. The bottom line is that one’s conscious experience of an object is the object one experiences. First, I outline the main hypothesis and the relation between mind, body, and object. Eventually, I address a series of traditional obstacles such as hallucinations, illusions, and commonsensical assumptions. Keywords: Identity Theory; Mind/Body Problem; Consciousness; Hallucinations; Illusions Le esperienze sono oggetti. Verso una teoria dell’identità della mente in quanto oggetto Riassunto: Le teorie dell’identità tra mente e corpo di tipo tradizionale hanno affermato una relazione di identità tra coscienza e attività neurale. Si consideri una teoria dell’identità di carattere alternativo – propriamente una teoria dell’identità che intenda la coscienza come un oggetto. Suggerisco di considerare la possibilità che la coscienza di qualcuno possa essere trattata come identica a un oggetto del mondo esterno. Sulla base di questa ipotesi, quando percepisco una banana gialla, ciò che coincide con la mia coscienza della banana gialla è proprio la banana gialla che si può prendere e mangiare, piuttosto che il processo neurale innescato dalla banana. In definitiva l’esperienza cosciente di un oggetto che ciascuno ha è l’oggetto che si esperisce. In una prima parte, procederò con il delineare l’ipotesi principale e la relazione tra mente, corpo e oggetto. Successivamente cercherò di risolvere alcuni problemi di tipo tradizionale, quali le allucinazioni, le illusioni e gli assunti di senso comune. Parole chiave: Teoria dell’identità; Problema mente/corpo; Coscienza; Allucinazioni; Illusioni. (shrink)

What should be done theoretically regarding those " virtual objects" that James J. Gibson refers to several times in his last book? Does not Gibson's view that we visually perceive, sometimes, items that are merely " virtual " produce a contradiction within his theory of visual perceiving? How can something unable itself to have effects on what occurs in the visual system justifiably be claimed to be an object of visual perceiving? I address among other issues: whether there (...) is a sense in which a theory that treats of perceiving as direct can allow for the visual perceiving of " virtual objects." Also, with specific reference to seven cases of perceived " virtual objects" according to Gibson, I argue against the notion that something " virtual " is what is visually perceived. In the seven cases, the visually perceived items either are, have been, or will be actual parts of the one and only world that we all inhabit or they have no existence. I conclude with comment pertaining to the question: Should physical presence &emdash; that is, an item's stimulational presence in relation to our visual system &emdash; be necessary for us to be said to perceive that item? (shrink)