Przemysł farmaceutyczny oferuje coraz to nowe leki, które mają przedłużać życie osób cierpiących na nieuleczalne choroby. Innowacyjne terapie są często w jakimś stopniu skuteczniejsze, ale też (w co najmniej takim samym stopniu) droższe. Upoważnieni decydenci reprezentujący społeczeństwo muszą zatem rozstrzygać, które z nich będą finansowane ze środków publicznych. Jednym z głównych kryteriów, na których podstawie podejmuje się takie decyzje, jest stosunek dodatkowych kosztów, związanych z nową terapią, do czerpanych z niej dodatkowych korzyści. Dodatkowe korzyści, wynikające z nowych leków dla osób (...) śmiertelnie chorych, wydają się jednak często niezbyt wielkie w porównaniu do ich zawrotnych dodatkowych kosztów. Rodzi się zatem wątpliwość, czy refundacja tych leków, do której opinia społeczna skądinąd na ogół się skłania, daje się pogodzić z równie powszechnie akceptowaną zasadą ekonomicznej efektywności. Pewną próbą uzgodnienia tych postaw byłoby przyjęcie, że z pozoru niewielkie korzyści, przysparzane osobom zbliżającym się do śmierci — jak marginalne zwiększenie długości ich życia lub nieznaczne podniesienie jego jakości — w rzeczywistości mają większą wartość, ponieważ życie tych osób trzeba cenić wyżej. W przedstawianym artykule zastanawiam się nad tym, czy ta koncepcja jest do utrzymania — czy wartość życia wzrasta wobec bliskiej śmierci. (shrink)

In the evolution of the vertebrates and probably a few other animals (Metazoa), biological values have been translated (subjectivized) into affective experience that necessarily involves the consciousness of external objects/events (as different from one’s body), which is tantamount to the origins of subjectivity. Mammals, birds and other vertebrates are experiencing subjects even though their negative and positive experience greatly vary in scope. Some mammals are capable of vicarious experience and may act as empathic agents, and some of them, at least (...) the great apes, use true reflective self-consciousness and thus perceive themselves as agents, which generates attributive feelings. The balance of positive and negative experience determines the intrinsic value of (an individual) life. Every subjective life is autotelic in striving to maximize this balance. A subjective life may also have a social value that is measured in terms of the impact on intrinsic values of other lives. The social value of life is contingent upon an agency, that is, conscious intentional actions that impact intrinsic value of other lives. The difference between the social value of a subjective life and an instrumental value of an individual comes down to the difference between agent causation and event causation. The moral agency refers to a subcategory of agent causation that involves the awareness of impact on another subject’s wellbeing (interests). The moral agency is at present known only in the hominids (including the chimpanzees) which understand causality and use reflective self-consciousness, which in turn enables them to perceive themselves as agents and attribute to themselves responsibility. The moral agency originated as a motivational mechanism of reciprocity execution , and thus as an adaptation for group life, which is why it favors ingroup members and often promotes norms that harm other groups. The human moral agency is frequently used by third parties to implement group norms that are based on ideologies (religious or secular) and may actually harm both group members and the entire groups. Any received, bioculturally evolved morality is unlikely to be good in either absolute or universal sense. Therefore, the moral capacity alone does not make a human life categorically more valuable, even if human motivation were dominated by moral agency (which is true only of some people). The life of a vertebrate has, therefore, two values, intrinsic and social. Each can be negative or positive, and may vary to a large extent independently of the other, whereby a joint value of a subjective life cannot be sensibly assessed and compared without prior assessments of the intrinsic and social component separately. In the absence of objective reasons to rate the intrinsic value of a human life as categorically higher than that of other mentally advanced mammals, and in consideration of the observed range of social values of human lives, some of which approach zero and some are highly negative (lower than any thinkable negative values of non-human lives), the doctrine of extraordinary and inalienable (innate) human „dignity” is groundless and unethical, as it leads to a depreciation of the lives of non-human subjects, and often preempts the need to impart a real social value to one’s own life. (shrink)

The topic of the article is the logical relation between things that are intrinsically good and things that are extrinsically good to value as such. Three main conceptions pertaining to this problem have been identified. In the first conception adverbs,,intrinsic” and,,extrinsic” specify which of the two meanings of the word “good” has been meant, and the terms “intrinsic value” and “extrinsic value” stand for two different meanings of the term “value”. In the second conception the two adverbs modify the meaning (...) of the term “valuable” so much that the intrinsic value and the extrinsic values turn out to be two different kinds of value, or two different cases of value. In the third conception the two adverbs modify the sense of the word “good” and both the intrinsic and the extrinsic value is only a component of value and not two separate entities. The author argues in favor of the last conception. (shrink)

What is the meaning of pain or suffering in philosophy? What is the difference between the idea of pain in the antiquity, the notion of suffering in Christian philosophy and our contemporary approach to this problem? How has the idea changed through centuries? The author tries to find answers to these questions.

The cognitive value of film art. The implications of Stanisław Lem’s philosophy of literatureSince the mid-twentieth century, audiovisuality has taken over the means of communication. Progress in technology has contributed to the dynamic development of media such as film and television. Today we can safely admit that life is under the pressure of audiovisual media. The film is an element of common experience, part of everyday life. The question is whether it is also cognitively valuable? Can a movie be a (...) model that helps you to know yourself, your place in the world, relationships with others? And if so, how much can you trust such knowledge? The aim of this article is to reflect on the cognitive value of films, in the light of Stanislaw Lem’s theory of the reception of literature. The author compares a literary work to a model that represents a fragment or the whole of reality. Modeling is a design that lets us look at old problems from a new perspective or sheds light on the issues we did not realize before. An artwork becomes a model when, over time, it is recognized as outstanding by the public. Then the presented vision of the world begins to function as cognitively valuable. However, this is largely a random process. Similarly, it can be applied to a movie. The use of Lem’s theory for the analysis of literature and film aims to illustrate the importance of cognitive and culture-creating role of these arts. (shrink)

Short paper about debate on cognitive meaning of religious use of language in early analytic philosophy of religion. Published in Companion to Philosophy of Religion, edited by Janusz Salamon, Cracow: WAM, 2016.

Każdy człowiek funkcjonuje w jakimś systemie - rodzina, polityka, religia, to tylko niektóre z nich. Trudno określić, na ile pozostajemy niewolnikami systemów, do czasu, w którym zadamy sobie pytanie o prawdę. Jest to jednocześnie pytanie o istoty człowieczeństwa, stanowiące punkt zwrotny w pojmowaniu własnego miejsca na ziemi, w przestrzeni i w czasie, w świecie materii i poza nim. Jesteśmy współtwórcami sieci interakcji i wzajemnych zależności. Aby mimo to określić proporcje naszej wolności do konieczności, jak im podlegamy, musimy poznać prawdy o (...) osobie ludzkiej. Pytanie to przenosi nas w obszary wartości podstawowych - obok prawdy znajdujemy piękno i dobro, stanowiące o treści i jakości życia. Istnieje przy tym duży problem z hierarchizacją wartości, jeszcze większy zaś ze stworzeniem systemu, w którym czerpiąc z pojmowanych prawd nasycalibyśmy egzystencję głębią autentycznego istnienia. Max Scheler - gdyż to jego spojrzenie nas tu interesuje, ukazał nową i odmienną perspektywę widzenia wartości, a mianowicie jako obiektywnej, samodzielnej i nieredukowalnej jakości. To także Scheler wprowadził kategorię iluzji aksjologicznej, będącej poniekąd antytezą ukształtowanego przez pozytywizm przekonania o identyczności wyobrażeń o wartościach z samymi wartościami. (shrink)

Niektórzy filozofowie twierdzą, że można kogoś skrzywdzić albo wyświadczyć mu dobrodziejstwo, powołując go do istnienia. Twierdzenie to opiera się na założeniu, że możliwe jest porównanie aktualnego poziomu dobrostanu osoby z poziomem dobrostanu, jaki osoba ta miałaby, gdyby nigdy nie zaistniała. Celem tej pracy jest zbadanie, czy możliwe jest dokonanie takiej porównawczej oceny w sensowny, logiczny i metafizycznie niewadliwy sposób. Analizuję argumenty sformułowane przez Nilsa Holtuga i Melindę Roberts na rzecz tezy, że istnienie może być gorsze albo lepsze dla osoby od (...) nieistnienia. Zaczynam od przedyskutowania Holtugowskiej obrony, która odwołuje się do trzech klasycznych teorii dobrostanu: teorii stanów mentalnych, teorii preferencji oraz teorii listy obiektywnej. Formuję zarzuty przeciwko jego argumentacji, w tym „zarzut braku odniesienia”, „zarzut braku podmiotu wartości”, „zarzut nieporównywalności”, „zarzut zrównania bezwartościowości z wartością zerową” oraz „zarzut naruszenia logiki relacji”. Z analiz tych wyciągam wniosek, że nie można twierdzić, że ktoś ma się gorzej albo lepiej niż miałby się, gdyby nie został powołany do istnienia. Na koniec, krótko omawiam argumentację Holtuga odwołującą się do teorii preferencji w ujęciu obiektu preferencji. Sugeruję, że również ten sposób obrony tezy, że istnienie może być gorsze albo lepsze dla osoby od nieistnienia, nie jest przekonujący, ponieważ teoria preferencji w ujęciu obiektu preferencji nie jest dobrym kandydatem na teorię dobrostanu. (shrink)

Does the alleged religious experience of a mystic constitute a reliable source of knowledge about the object of his or her experience? Or does it rationally justify a move from such experience to meaningful beliefs about God or the Absolute which is supposed to be the object of that experience? And are religious beliefs in need of being grounded in religious experience in order to be rationally justified? Although it seems pretty obvious that a great many adherents of all religions (...) find reasons for their beliefs in their religious traditions rather than in their personal religious experiences, one could note that usually these traditions present religious experiences of their founder figures as constituting evidence for their authenticity and truthfulness ; the supposed mystical experiences of some adherents of a given religious tradition are often treated by their co-believers as an important evidence which increases credibility of their own religious convictions. (shrink)

The article concentrates on attempts of treating the maternal perspective as valuable in moral philosophy. The author traces the evolution of maternal behaviours in history and reconstructs the development of ethical theories determining women’s proper role in society. She raises the question why none of the philosophers gave any consideration to the maternal experience. Her conclusion is that traditional philosophical discourse assumes motherhood as just part of a wide group of issues determined as,,family”. Classical philosophers claim that maternal love is (...) natural and innate so it cannot be valuable. Their analyses fail to take account of maternal experience as a source of moral virtues like self-sacrifice, patience, responsibility, care or devalues this terms as not so important as male virtues like impartiality, non-interference, justice or individual’s autonomy. The author presents an alternative, new, female approach to morality. Simone de Beauvoir, Lucy Irigaray and Adrienne Rich criticize classical vision of motherhood in Western culture. They challenge traditional conviction of producing children as a natural destiny of all women determined by inborn maternal instinct. They treat maternal function in category of independent and deliberate choice. This new perspective replace traditional approach describing motherhood in terms of reproduction and,,natural obligation”. Motherhood in modern thinking is something more than biological production of children. The figure of mother could become an important symbol in ethics and various aspects of our culture. Acceptance of women’s culture would show that women have the same moral and social authority as man. In conclusion the author emphasize the need to present motherhood as a remarkable philosophical and moral value in modern ethics. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that if reproductive human cloning were available to parents who lost a child the possibility of replication of the child would lead to its devaluation. This argument seems to presuppose a view of the relationship between parents and children according to which parental love is loosely linked to children’s identities. The value of a child for a parent, it is assumed, stems from its being a person or genetically linked to its parents. Against this view I (...) offer a more adequate account of parental relationship. It is based on the idea that the value of a child to its parents is grounded in how it shapes their lives and personalities. If reproductive cloning were ever available it would be no viable option for parents who lost a child. Parents who value their child for who it is, and not just for its being a person or a progeny genetically related to them, value the child too much to want to replicate it when it dies. Parents who value their child for reasons other than who it is, value it too little to clone it when it is lost. (shrink)

The core of the local self-government stems from the Western (Latin) civilization values. European Nations have always fought for the qualities and perseverance of local self government. Currently it is considered an attribute of local democracy, although in the European tradition it has long been related to the pluralist values of social life organization. The communes; freedom, and their independence from the local government have been derived from natural law and seen as a condition for a healthy social system. Contemporarily, (...) local self-government as a law and ability for local communities to manage a range of public matters independently, has been anew recognized as a social system value in uniting Europe. Yet there have also revived certain historical threats to the local selfgovernment arisen from central and local bureaucracy, particularism, and bribing local power elites. In such case, the fight for a local government that complies with Latin civilizational values acquires a special meaning. (shrink)

The starting point of the article is the thesis that Hippocrates’ rule: “the health of an ill person is the highest right” is not only the main rule of the conduct of medical staff but also includes a defined method of evaluation. According to the author, the consequence of such evaluation is a detailed rule “Firstly, not to harm”. This rule has got a universal character and cannot only be restricted to medical staff. Healthcare is not the domain of doctors (...) alone. It is everybody’s obligation, as it is to ensure that people don’t risk their own health or others’. In support of this approach, Władysław Tatarkiewicz’s considerations have been mentioned in the article, especially those that combine an individual sense of happiness with a state of health. In the end, the author refers to empirical research, which shows dependence on the state of health on and acquired lifestyle and points to the greater rationale of health prevention rather than institutional medical care. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper was the trial to answer the question if norms can function as premises or conclusions in logical inferences. According to definition of logical inference, the parts of its may be only sentences (in indicative mood) which are true or false. The logic, which accepts that norms are the true and false propositions, can be named the Logic of Norms. Otherwise the logic, which reject that norms are true and false propositions, we name Deontic Logic. (...) The last one, in order to use the logical inference, changes each of norms N into normative sentences: W exists\' or W exists for the sake of set of norms\'. The normative sentences are sentences in indicative mood and thereby are true or false. The whole consideration about two types aforementioned logic is preceded by some remarks about variety of the meanings of the word \'norm\', the linguistic structures of norm and the views of the truth value of norms. (shrink)

The analysis of the notion of need reveals two possible approaches to it — an objectivist and a subjectivist one, In the former, needs are regarded as conditions necessary for a subject’s normal functioning, existence in society, or, most broadly, for the preservation of the subject’s identity, A need is attributed to a given person on the ground of studying real links between the subject’s postulated character and external states of things, and so needs are independent of any inner condition (...) of the given person’s wants, preferences, desires etc. In the subjectivist approach, need is regarded as the subject’s inner condition marked by a sense of want along with the concomitant motive. The notion of value may be connected with both approaches to need; value can be defined as something which meets objective needs half way, or as something that satisfies a person’s own subjective needs. Every definition of value has important consequences for the exercise of normative research. Objectivism goes along, among other theories, with absolutism, paternalism or ascetism, whereas subjectivism fits relativism, phenomenalism or hedonism. Historical materialism supplies strong evidence in support of both of these axiological approaches, However, it is the validity of the subjectivist approach that seems to be propped by more arguments. But then, subjectivism has to cope with the problem of valuating needs. (shrink)

Horizontal relationships unite the society and level off the differences from other sources. A solidary political community is based not only on common property but also on private property, and at the same time levels off the economic disproportions so that economic conflicts would not become political, which could in turn cause the emergence of antagonized social groups. In this sense, solidarity can stabilize the political community. A case in point being the Western European democracies, which after the Second World (...) War became welfare states. Solidarity could play this role now, even though there are organizations such as Occupy Wall Street or Indignants Movement, which rebel against the inequalities. The current idea of solidarity may be achieved on different levels. The first is the local level, where the most is known of the citizens’ situation; the state level, where there are institutions which aim at a unified political community according to economy and culture; and finally, the supranational level, to level off the dangers which a growing economic stratification entails. (shrink)

On Relation between the Individual Character of Propositional Knowledge and Its Value -/- The paper presents two aspects of human propositional knowledge, objective and subjective. The former is based on the truth condition, and the latter on the belief condition. Then several problems of the value of knowledge are briefly presented. The last part contains two arguments for the sine qua non belief condition of knowledge, one of which concerns the problem of epistemic luck assumed in virtue.