In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martha Nussbaum on Dickens's Hard TimesPaulette KidderAt the heart of Martha Nussbaum's work in capability ethics is a rejection of utilitarianism. Nussbaum has repeatedly recounted a pivotal moment in Dickens's Hard Times (1854), in which the young Sissy Jupe delivers an innocent but devastating critique of the utilitarian system.1 Nussbaum's most extended and compelling reading of Hard Times appears in Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life.2 Nussbaum (...) convincingly shows that Dickens's novel is a "deep attack" on utilitarianism, going to the heart of the assumption that the human good consists in maximizing the satisfaction of preferences of the greatest aggregate of persons.In what follows, I will review Nussbaum's philosophical reading of the novel and its critique of utilitarianism, and then return to Hard Times to show that Nussbaum has systematically omitted references to the Biblical themes and references that pervade the novel. Arguing that Dickens's attack on utilitarianism draws much of its power from the resonance of these historically rooted symbols of transcendence, I will conclude with a reflection on the reasons for Nussbaum's avoidance of these themes in her own reading of the book.Hard Times, which focuses on a set of characters living in the polluted and class-divided manufacturing city of "Coketown," is known as Dickens's most polemical novel. The novel announces its central theme immediately in the opening speech by Thomas Gradgrind to the young students of the Gradgrind School: "Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach [End Page 417] these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else...."3From the youngest age, the children in Gradgrind's school are taught to avoid wonder and imagination and only to focus on science and mathematics—the study of what is observable and measurable. This education leaves his two eldest children, Tom and Louisa, miserably unequipped for the choices they face as adults. Young Tom Gradgrind grows up to be an undisciplined wastrel, incurring gambling debts that lead him to embezzle money and then to frame a factory worker, Stephen Blackpool, for the crime. Louisa Gradgrind endures a miserable marriage to her father's wealthy friend, Josiah Bounderby.At the moral center of the novel is Sissy Jupe, a girl who proves impervious to Gradgrind's educational system. Sissy, the daughter of a horse trainer who works for Sleary's Circus, is abandoned by her father and taken into the Gradgrind home. Sharing the moral center with Sissy is Stephen Blackpool, a weaver whose honesty and conviction cause him to run afoul of both his employer Bounderby and the demagogic Slackbridge, organizer for the trade union.In her reading of Hard Times, Nussbaum identifies four elements of utilitarianism: commensurability, aggregation, maximizing, and exogenous preferences, all of which are both dramatized in the novel and critiqued by it (PJ, p. 14). Commensurability means that "all the valuable things under consideration [are regarded as] valuable because they contain some one thing that itself varies only in quantity" (PJ, p. 14). Characters that Dickens presents as memorable individuals are seen by Gradgrind's system as "parcels of human nature." Students in Gradgrind's School are called by number instead of name, and the workers of Coke-town are seen as "hands and stomachs," and are likened to "ants and beetles." Individuality is erased by what Nussbaum terms Gradgrind's "abstracting mathematical mind" (PJ, p. 21).Aggregation, the second utilitarian element, means that data about individual lives is pooled, "without regarding the boundaries between lives as especially salient for the purposes of choice" (p. 14). Louisa Gradgrind is taught, for example, to view the working classes as "Something to be worked so much and paid so much, and there ended; something to be infallibly settled by laws of supply and demand; something that blundered against those laws, and floundered into difficulty; something that was a little pinched when wheat was dear, and overate itself when wheat was cheap... But, she had scarcely thought more of separating [End Page 418] [the people of Coketown] into units, than of separating the sea itself into its... (shrink)

Au centre de ce livre : la différence sexuelle dans les écrits d'Emmanuel Levinas. Différence qui hante la philosophie depuis ses débuts mais dérange les systèmes de pensée. Le féminin serait alors un nom pour ce reste qui échappe aux systèmes de pensée. L'enjeu de Levinas consistant à penser l'Autre comme irréductible au Même, il rompt avec l'apparente neutralité du sujet philosophique. Il établit corrélativement un rapport entre la femme, le féminin et l'hospitalité. A travers l'irruption du féminin, de la (...) voix féminine dans le champ philosophique, le présent ouvrage propose une nouvelle image de la pensée. A partir de l'examen de la " différence des sexes " comme " douce défaillance ", se trouve dégagée la " subjectivité au féminin " qui ramène à l'immémorial. De cet examen à la fois précis et vivant de ses occurrences dans le texte de Levinas, émerge la trace du féminin dans l'un des textes majeurs de la philosophie contemporaine de l'altérité. (shrink)

Historien – ses thèses sur l’archéologie de la Grande-Bretagne romaine font encore autorité – philosophe, penseur engagé, analyste intransigeant de la barbarie, en particulier nazie, R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943) connaît aujourd’hui en Angleterre un regain de renommée. Ses œuvres – dont on croyait la plus importante, The Principles of History, disparue – sont rééditées; de nombreux critiques les commentent. The New Leviathan, rédigé à Londres sous les bombes, a été traduit en français (Kimé, 2001). Les philosophes français commencent enfin à s’intéresser (...) à ce penseur prophétique. De nombreux manuscrits inédits, en particulier sur la magie, sont stimulants. (shrink)

Si les sympathies de Toland pour le régime «républicain» (en anglais de l’époque, « commonwealthman » pour le substantif, « republican » pour l’adjectif ou le substantif) ne sont guère mises en doute aujourd’hui, encore faut-il s’entendre sur ce que signifie ce terme de «républicain». Les éditions que donna Toland d’ouvrages dont les thèses antiabsolutistes étaient connues de tous et les préfaces dont il les munit sont un argument sérieux en faveur d’un Toland « républicain ». Il faut cependant mettre (...) en lumière les différents sens que Toland accepterait ou refuserait de donner à la notion de « république ». De nombreuses thèses de l’auteur sont communes aux whigs et aux républicains, et pourtant il manifeste sa méfiance à l’égard des partis. Ce qui est certain, c’est que Toland défend vivement les libertés – liberté de conscience, liberté de la presse, liberté du commerce – et aussi l’idée d’équilibre tant à l’intérieur des divers pouvoirs de l’État que dans le concert des nations. (shrink)

Robin George Collingwood , né dans une famille de musiciens, de peintres et d’archéologues, fit toute sa carrière à l’Université d’Oxford, comme archéologue, historien et philosophe. Il fut fellow et tutor au collège de Pembroke puis à celui de Lincoln, de 1912 à 1928, puis University..

"In Poverty: A Philosophical Approach, the author studies various philosophical issues concerning poverty in the Program for Education, Health and Food (PROGRESA) that was in effect in Mexico, from 1997 to 2002, and shows how theoretical discussion is necessary to clarify some ideas concerning the application of a social policy." "The book considers social policies applied to poverty, and their occasional abuse of utilitarian instruments. Many are implemented without considering cultural differences, including varying patterns of conduct in diverse communities."--BOOK JACKET.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:My Ability to FlourishPaulette KoehlerIn twenty years of convulsions, I’ve never heard a neurologist mention the word “epilepsy.” Over this time, the intensity of my original simple partial seizures, “simple” signifying retained consciousness and “partial” indicating disturbances restricted to a specific area of my brain, grew to the complex level on my left temporal lobe. I believe this development was influenced by my use of prescribed medications. Several neurologists (...) from Los Angeles to San Francisco directed various electroencephalograms (EEGs), including a week–long, prescription–free EEG in the hospital; magnetic resonance imaging tests (MRIs); computed tomography (CT) scans anywhere from forty–five minutes to four hours each; and blood profiles to help determine my situation. For legal reasons, one neurologist even had me sign a release stating that he was not able to diagnose my situation.Test results present limited information about my brain and without ever saying, “I don’t know,” these neurologists communicated my test results by utilizing technical terms and thus not always answering my questions. After explaining that my head turns to the left while my right hand shakes, symptoms that have been recognized and reported by several friends and family members, my doctor replied that a seizure on the left side of my brain should cause my head to turn to the right and then changed the subject. I felt like asking, “Am I doing it wrong?”The brain is different from other parts of our anatomy in that it can’t be replaced like a kidney, heart or other organ. It cannot be removed like tonsils, an appendix or even a limb. It can be physically studied or repaired while functioning but the resulting percentage of survival or proper operation of the body after surgery is minimal and the number of people requiring such attention is so low that the amount is scanty. A dead brain limits the analysis of its functions.My “disabilities” involve spontaneous uncontrolled loss of consciousness, exhaustion, mood swings, and the suspension of driving privileges. Activity interference, extra naps, losing friends and not being able to get around are definite disadvantages. However, everyone needs to manage personal problems. No one is perfect.Public transit schedules and directions don’t always offer me the transportation I need. Fortunately, the combination of a bus ride with walking or running can serve my needs while also helping me to keep physically healthy.Limited benefits include discounted transit and the option to ride instead of walking or running. A trip to Nana’s on the train is always a treat.I’d rather not be branded “disabled” even though those who understand my situation address me with compassionate, sympathetic attention, [End Page E4] always asking how I physically feel. I feel fine. A seizure is only a quick, conscious loss of time and an occasional scrape on the knee. I’m more annoyed when I notice strangers looking suspiciously at my public transport discount card as if I don’t really deserve it.Like the “disability” brand, the medications I’ve taken, Dilantin, Neurontin, Depakote, Keppra and Lamictal, among others, all of which produced serious side effects without reducing the frequency of my seizures have only been a cover–up, preventing a search for the true cause and effective treatment of my seizures. Being identified as disabled has only limited my daily schedule. I am not disabled, as society has unfortunately characterized me.My seizures began in 1993, the year our FDA started approving rBGH, recombinant bovine growth hormone, man–made for the use on dairy cows to enhance their milk production. As a result, milk on the market increased while keeping the price from rising, as demonstrated in Economics I. Can the use of rBGH act on my brain in any way?One neurologist, in order to avoid the responsibility of inappropriate recommendations, presented his thoughts in the form of questions, encouraging me to consider options.“You’ve tried all of these medications?”“Has your diet alteration made any difference in your seizures?”“Have you tried organic foods?”His inquiries persuaded me to contemplate whether drugs are an answer to my problem, pay attention to differences in my life and... (shrink)

This article is a phenomenological study of students' lived experience in a computer conference learning environment. Issues for students in computer conferences revolved around spatial disorientation: existential location, appearances in space, imagined space, word space, secret space, and being alone within a group. Within these spatial issues the students grappled with getting into a computer space, familiarity of use, getting stuck, and the class as a "necessary evil. " The article poses critical questions for educators to consider the use of (...) computer conferencing as a learning environment. (shrink)

1. L'EXPLICATION PAR LES OBJETSNous ne pouvons penser, ou plus généralement agir, sans nous appuyer sur la considération d'objets, ce terme devant être pris ici dans son acception la plus générale, et désignant aussi bien des objets abstraits par exemple , ou même des objets logiques , que des objets soumis plus ou moins immédiatement à notre expérience sensible . Ce sont eux que vise notre besoin d'explication, et en même temps ce sont eux qu'il utilise, qu'il s'agisse de la (...) connaissance la plus vulgaire ou de la iplus évoluée. Chaque objet comme tel possède une individualité significative constituée par l'union de propriétés caractéristiques et douées d'une certaine permanence, par exemple pour les objets matériels la propriété d'être localisés dans telle partie de l'espace. Distinguer un objet, c'est donc à la fois introduire une certaine discontinuité dans le monde extérieur, et affirmer une certaine continuité dans les limites du découpage ainsi effectué; trouver une explication consiste à opérer de nouvelles différenciations à l'intérieur de ce continu, grâce à des comparaisons entre les objets, à le définir comme composant ou composé d'autres objets. (shrink)

Quelle a été la place des femmes dans la vie religieuse au Moyen Âge, quand on sait que le millénaire médiéval est imprégné de christianisme, que la femme est par essence inférieure à l’homme et sa sujette, donc d’abord écartée du sacerdoce ? Les images qui surgissent sont fortement contradictoires. L’ombre de grandes figures surgit. Les unes « s’élevant au dessus de leur sexe » : martyres, prophétesses, mystiques, fondatrices, savantes ; d’autres en incarnant les pires tares : les hérétiques (...) et les sorcières. Mais qu’en est-il de l’immense troupeau discret qui cherche son salut dans des monastères toujours trop peu nombreux, les béguinages ou les tiers ordres qu’invente le bas Moyen Âge sans jamais combler, semble-t-il, ni les aspirations spirituelles ni les besoins sociaux, économiques et culturels auxquels sont censées répondre les structures d’encadrement de la vie religieuse ? (shrink)

Doing research in a globalized context – regardless of the discipline – requires language decisions at different stages of the research process. Many of these language decisions have ethical implications. Existing literature and ethical guidance tend to focus on ethical concerns that arise in communication with participants who use a language different from the main research language. As this article shows, language decisions with potential ethical implications can occur in many additional ways. Two questions guided this work: how do language (...) decisions and research ethics intersect at different stages of the research process, and what potential harm is related to language decisions and how can such concerns be mitigated? Relevant literature – combined with practical research experiences – show that language decisions can potentially result in harm at the conception stage of research projects, when working with participants, during data analysis, interpretation, and dissemination, as well as when managing a research project. Thus, the article highlights that the role of language-related ethical dilemmas is not only organizational (e.g., ensuring participants can understand what the research is about), but also social (e.g., developing trust and relationships in research teams) as well as ideological (e.g., awareness of power structures and diverse worldviews). In order to support researchers in globalized contexts, this article offers a reflective framework that complements regulatory guidance issued by ethical bodies and facilitates a deeper awareness of ethical implications related to language decisions in a multilingual world. (shrink)

Very little has been done to find out what corporations have done to build ethical values into their organizations. In this report on a survey of 1984 Fortune 1000 industrial and service companies the Center for Business Ethics reveals some facts regarding codes of ethics, ethics committees, social audits, ethics training programs, boards of directors, and other areas where corporations might institutionalize ethics. Based on the survey, the Center for Business Ethics is convinced that corporations are beginning to take steps (...) to institutionalize ethics, while recognizing that in most cases more specific mechanisms and strategies need to be implemented to make their ethics efforts truly effective. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that, because it is subject to twinning and fusion, the early human embryo cannot hold strong moral standing. Supposedly, the fact that an early human embryo can twin or fuse with another embryo entails that it is not a distinct individual, thus precluding it from holding any level of moral standing. I argue that appeals to twinning and fusion fail to show that the early human embryo is not a distinct individual and that these appeals do not (...) provide us with plausible reasons for denying the strong moral standing of the early human embryo. I recognize one possible exception to this general assessment, a particular version of the appeal to fusion. Embryo fusion that results in tetragametic chimerism provides some reason for doubting the early human embryo's moral standing. But twinning and fusion are otherwise irrelevant in this context. (shrink)

Leisure activities account for much of our time - and money. But are contemporary forms of leisure good for us? Are they really leisure? And how much does (and should) leisure matter? Classical philosophers paid attention to these questions. Increasingly, modern philosophers too are realizing the importance of leisure, and of a good leisure / work balance. Hayden Ramsay looks at the meaning of leisure, and the links between recreation, relaxation, virtue, and happiness. By focusing on leisure activities such (...) as sport, travel, music and reading, Ramsay explores the need for good play in a good life. (shrink)

Ethical theories do not always focus sufficiently on the correct characterization of morally bad choices. Standard accounts include: acts that are unprincipled, low‐utility, badly directed, or in violation of contracts. These standard accounts of immorality are inadequate. The concept of vices – a key part of virtue theory – offers a better account of bad choice. Most virtue ethics focuses on the warm vices (greed, lust, pride, anger, acquisitiveness …), but the cool vices – the vices of insensitivity – may (...) pose as many dangers to human life and happiness. I discuss a range of insensitivities and the ways in which they can infiltrate personality, often spreading so as to affect the entire character. I address the objection that insensitivity is a weak account of bad choice since insensitivity is often an involuntary characteristic. I borrow from Adam Smith the concept of ‘piacularity’ to explain how involuntary habits (and the acts they cause) can be bad despite the fact they are not culpable. (shrink)

The paper presents Aquinas’s account of conscience, and argues that key elements of this account are key elements too of Aristotle’s moral theory. The paper’s purpose is to encourage debate over conscience as not only a Stoic/Christian concept but one with deeper— and more widespread—roots in western ethical tradition.

The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible moral principle, one (...) that provides a suitable moral basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Contrary to Temkin, freedom, autonomy, virtue, and rights can all be understood in person-affecting terms, while equality of outcome cannot. Moreover, the Slogan is open to a variety of different ideas about how we should weight or rank people's gains and losses. This flexibility allows the Slogan to accommodate ideals such as prioritarianism and desert. (shrink)

Volume 51, Issue 1, March 2024, Page 145-162.

Instance ontology, or particularism - the doctrine that asserts the individuality of properties and relations - has been a persistent topic in Western philosophy, discussed in works by Plato and Aristotle, by Muslim and Christian scholastics, and by philosophers of both realist and nominalist positions. This book by D.W. Mertz is the first sustained analysis that applies the rules and systems of mathematics and logic to instance ontology in order to argue for its validity and for its problem-solving capacities and (...) to associate it with a version of the realist position that Mertz calls "moderate realism.". (shrink)

This book tries to explain how decisions to act develop in the mind. Emphasis is on group decisions not only of the present but also from the past, where laboratory techniques can t apply. What emerges is a description of a process rather than the definition of a word. The description points to kinds of data that need special consideration: data regarding ideas of right and wrong, cultural traditions, emotional packaging.".

This Article is made up of two parts. The first part reflects on the dominant functionalist approach to comparative consumer bankruptcy and suggests that this might be supplemented by a political economy analysis that addresses the role of national and international interest groups, including professionals, and ideology in understanding different national responses to overindebtedness in North America and Europe. The second part examines current reforms to consumer bankruptcy and responses to overindebtedness in the UK through this political economy lens and (...) concludes that competition among professional groups, the role and interests of the Insolvency Service, and the ideology of the Third Way in consumer policy will influence the ultimate structure adopted for addressing consumer insolvency. A study of the English experience suggests that there is also an element of national path dependency to consumer insolvency reform that may resist pressures towards convergence of approaches between countries in addressing issues of consumer insolvency. (shrink)

This article focuses on the moral assumptions underpinning the notion of social responsibility implied in the above slogan. It critically examines arguments which derive obligations to meet needs from shared moral agency and from social relations of reciprocity. Obligations to contribute according to ability are established by a series of arguments which justify regarding undeserved natural abilities and socially produced abilities as common assets, and which demonstrate that under certain conditions the maxim ‘ought implies can’ is reversible as ‘can implies (...) ought’. The problem of motivation and voluntary action is tackled by arguing that there are intrinsic and extrinsic incentives to contribute unconnected with special rewards and that moral incentives replace material incentives to produce.The notion of responsibility is an essential concept for social life, but since its justification and adoption depends on an inclusive moral community with overlapping ends and purposes, it is not surprising that the duty to contribute is absent from liberal theory, and had no positive connotations in liberal society. Politicians of every hue are increasingly appealing to the responsibilities citizens are expected to fulfil; yet they fail to account for the conditions for their development and exercise. For this reason, the assumptions expressed in the socialist slogan are an important corrective to liberal perspectives. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Je discute dans le présent article le concept de vertu naturelle chez Aristote et Thomas d’Aquin. J’analyse l’idée de Thomas d’Aquin de vertus qui sont naturelles à tous les être humains en m’aidant de la théorie contemporaine de la loi naturelle; et je défends son idée de vertus qui sont naturelles à certains êtres humains en discutant quelques problèmes en éthique contemporaine de la vertu et en comparant ses conceptions à celles de David Hume. Finalement, je recours au concept (...) de vertu naturelle pour examiner la question de l’unité des vertus et le problème du «courageux meurtrier nazi». Je comprends cette exploration du thème de la vertu naturelle comme une contribution à la réflexion sur la vertu en général et, plus particulièrement, au débat entre une éthique de la vertu et une éthique des principes. (shrink)

Conceptions of desert and responsibility have had a powerful influence in justifying economic inequality. Currently, they are being reaffirmed in policies advocated by the centre left in Britain. In contrast, luck egalitarianism, one of the dominant theoretical positions in contemporary political philosophy, puts equality at the top of the agenda and notoriously undermines traditional notions of desert and rejects the conception of personal responsibility on which traditional ideas rely. Although luck egalitarians are sceptical about desert and redefine responsibility to reduce (...) its role in arguments for just distribution, they nevertheless retain a commitment to holding people responsible for the distributive consequences of what they freely choose to do. They attempt to demonstrate that equality can be reconciled with responsibility. I will argue that luck egalitarians have not gone far enough in eliminating desert and responsibility from the armoury of social justice, and that their own arguments should have led them to do so. My aim in this article is to push the ideas implicit in luck egalitarian's arguments to their logical conclusion. I argue that for practical and conceptual reasons, they should have formulated their theories as though hard determinism is true, or nearly true, even if it is not. Denying the pertinence of judgements of desert and responsibility to questions of distributive justice removes an obstacle to egalitarian aims by suggesting a more egalitarian distribution than one that is hostage to voluntary choice. It could be accepted that luck egalitarianism cannot accommodate the concept of personal responsibility without accepting the conclusion that considerations of responsibility should be abandoned. However, any plausible account of responsibility would demonstrate that existing inequalities are undeserved, and that these inequalities make a mockery of politicans current emphasis on personal responsibility. (shrink)

This addition to the St Andrews Studies series contains a wide-ranging collection of essays on all aspects of moral philosophy and its impact upon public life in the twenty-first century. The book brings together ethicists from a variety of traditions interested in moral truth and its relation to religious faith. A key theme is interaction between major Catholic thinkers with philosophers from non-religious traditions. Topics include reason and religion, natural law, God and morality, anti-consequentialism, rights and virtues.

Rawls's burdens of judgment are a list of factors that explain why reasonable persons in a diverse society are likely to hold different, often incompatible, conceptions of the good. According to Charles Larmore, the burdens of judgment satisfy political liberalism's ambition of supporting liberal political principles through a minimalist moral conception. By using the burdens, we ground liberal politics in the modest notion of reasonable disagreement, avoiding reliance on controversial comprehensive notions such as autonomy, individuality, skepticism about the good, or (...) value pluralism. In this paper I argue that the burdens of judgment cannot provide adequate support for liberal political principles unless they are read in a way that comports with Kymlicka's modest version of autonomy liberalism. As it renounces fallibilism, political liberalism's moral minimalism can be manipulated in a way that reconciles it with decidedly illiberal results. The only way to avoid this problem is to recognize that the justification of liberal principles cannot be detached from notions of fallibilism and critical reflection about the good. Ultimately, political liberalism's emphasis on moral minimalism deprives it of the conceptual resources it needs to deal with contemporary controversies concerning the defence and clarification of liberal policies. (shrink)

Rolls demonstrates how reward/punishment systems are key mediators of cognitive appraisal, and this suggests a fundamental, causal role for emotion in thought and behaviour. However, this causal role for emotion seems to drop out of Rolls's model of consciousness, to be replaced by the old idea that emotion is essentially epiphenomenal. We suggest a modification to Rolls's model in which cognition and emotion activate each other reciprocally, both in appraisal and consciousness, thus allowing emotion to maintain its causal status where (...) it matters most. (shrink)

Freedom of expression is often treated as a right held by speakers, with hearers holding only a derivative right to receive expression. Roger Shiner in particular argues that we should recognize hearers rights. However, Larry Alexander argues that, if there is a moral right of freedom of expression, it is most plausibly a hearer's right to receive expression, not a speaker's right. I argue that hearers have a basic (or original) right to receive a speaker's expression, one that stands alongside (...) a speaker's right to express herself. The hearer's right to receive is no less fundamental than the speaker's right to express and, contra Alexander, the hearer's right is not more fundamental than that of the speaker. As a consequence, both Shiner's case against freedom of commercial expression and Alexander's case against so-called Track Two freedom of expression jurisprudence are weakened. (shrink)

The article focuses on motivation, proposing the equation in its title and opposing the contrary view, that what moves people to action is the rational calculation of their material interests. The latter view is most familiar in economics, where it was for generations seen as the best (meaning, most ‘scientific’) mode of explanation. It had a great deal of influence on historiography and found a great deal of support among psychologists also. From these three areas of research it is being (...) challenged, however, even to some extent displaced, in recent decades. The importance of emotions or feelings in explaining behavior is increasingly acknowledged, and the validity of conclusions reached about feelings in historical contexts through the operation of empathy. Illustrations of how this works can be easily supplied. (shrink)

Nussbaum argues for a (limited) transcendence through contemplation which is compatible with practical reasoning and aspiration towards other human goods. This paper raises difficulties for this account based on a) the relation of thinking to human freedom, and b) the self‐constitutive nature of human thinking. It explores connections Thomas Aquinas makes between contemplation, transcendence and happiness, and explains the relation between (unlimited) transcendent experience and rationality by considering individuals who lack rational judgement but do seem capable of contemplation (young children, (...) certain mentally disordered persons). What contemplation by these individuals and by rational, mature adults have in common is awareness (by the less than perfectly rational) of the possibility of a life of unlimited rationality. I claim this awareness does not come naturally to us but is made possible by some super‐natural cause acting in a way that does not violate human nature but rather perfects our contemplative faculty and enables our happiness. (shrink)

Our standard model-theoretic definition of logical consequence is originally based on Alfred Tarski’s (1936) semantic definition, which, in turn, is based on Rudolf Carnap’s (1934) similar definition. In recent literature, Tarski’s definition is described as a conceptual analysis of the intuitive ‘everyday’ concept of consequence or as an explication of it, but the use of these terms is loose and largely unaccounted for. I argue that the definition is not an analysis but an explication, in the Carnapian sense: the replacement (...) of the inexact everyday concept with an exact one. Some everyday intuitions were thus brought into a precise form, others were ignored and forgotten. How exactly did the concept of logical consequence change in this process? I suggest that we could find some of the forgotten intuitions in Bernard Bolzano’s (1837) definition of ‘deducibility’, which is traditionally viewed as the main precursor of Tarski’s definition from a time before formalized languages. It turns out that Bolzano’s definition is subject to just the kind of natural features—paradoxicality of everyday language, Platonism about propositions, and dependence on the external world—that Tarski sought to tame by constructing an artificial concept for the special needs of mathematical logic. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: John Kekes soutient que l’objectif libéral de maximiser l’autonomie individuelle menace de compromettre nos tentatives pour prévenir les actions mauvaises. Il doit être clair, selon lui, qu’un accroissement de l’autonomie individuelle aura pour résultat une augmentation des actes mauvais dans les démocraties libérales existantes. Je soutiens pour ma part que Kekes ne fournit aucune raison plausible pour penser que la maximisation de l’autonomie individuelle menace ainsi de compromettre nos efforts pour prévenir les actions mauvaises. Aucune des stratégies qu’il propose (...) n’entre en conflit avec la conception libérale de l’autonomie individuelle. Il ne fournit aucune base plausible pour admettre la connexion causale qu’il allègue entre l’autonomie individuelle et la fréquence ou la gravité des actions mauvaises. (shrink)

Concussions are a significant public health problem worldwide. This brain injury is problematic in the paediatric population for a variety of reasons; however, the enquiry into these problems has been mainly through the biomedical perspective. This approach has impacted nursing knowledge and practice of children and youth with a concussion, primarily since other perspectives are viewed as not being objective. In this manuscript, I draw on Thomas Kuhn's view of objectivity to evaluate the biomedical perspective of concussion. I utilize current (...) research and clinical examples to illustrate the advantages and drawbacks of this perspective for nursing. From this discussion, I propose an alternative perspective to capture the complexity of paediatric concussions for nursing, a systems perspective. Although I argue for an alternative perspective to approach paediatric concussions for nursing, I maintain that the biomedical perspective can be incorporated as one part of nursing knowledge and practice for paediatric concussion. (shrink)

Providing a critique of the concepts central to liberal political philosophy, this book analyzes both the major strands of 17th- and 18th-century thought and contemporary developments and modifications of classical liberalism. In each chapter, concepts and theories central to the liberal tradition are viewed from a variety of perspectives - Marxist, socialist, anarchist, communitarian and radical feminist. The contemporary relevance of these concepts is explored, with particular relevance to social issues, including the protection of minorities, the provision of welfare and (...) the problem of political violence. (shrink)

In _Politics and Progress_, Muir aims to outline the political and social aims of liberalism and how it differs from conservatism and socialism as well as philosophising what a truly liberal society would look like. Originally published in 1923, this study details the political situation as it stood then, the past achievements of liberalism and what immediate problems society is facing that need to solved. This title will be of interest to students of politics.