Within the framework of the assemblage theory formulated by Manuel De Landa, in this article, we develop the following points: the definition of the concept of assemblage, the explanation of its historical character and the problematization of this theory from its relation with epistemology, ethics, and ontology. In addition, we show briefly how this flat ontology is linked to political philosophy and, again, to epistemol-ogy. Problematizing the assemblage theory, whose philosophical source is in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, allows us to (...) recognize the scope of an ontology that postulates the existence of a world composed of historical and heterogeneous multiplicities. To conclude, we clarify the concept of matter underlying this philosophy. (shrink)

This text consists of the development of two critical discourses of the project of progress that, despite having different philosophical bases, are linked by the need to radically question the deployment of capitalist modernity. On the one hand, it is the critique of progress proposed by Theodor W. Adorno, whose main philosophical reference is G. W. F. Hegel’s dialectic; on the other hand, the notion of progress is disarticulated through Manuel de Landa’s conception of history, which is based on the (...) Gilles Deleuze’s ontology and Fernand Braudel’s historical science. This paper also proposes the thesis that both critical discourses of progress converge in a common challenge: the type of relationship that social practices must sustain with nature, if their purpose is to break with the domination and destructiveness that accompany the evolution of capitalist modernity. (shrink)

Dentro del marco de la teoría de los ensamblajes formulada por Manuel De Landa, en este artículo se desarrollan los siguientes puntos: el esclarecimiento del concepto de ensamblaje, la explicación de su carácter histórico y la problematización de esta teoría a partir de su relación con la epistemología, la ética y la ontología. En la conclusión, se clarifica el concepto de materia presupuesto en esta filosofía. Además, se muestra brevemente cómo esta ontología plana se vincula con la filosofía política y, (...) de nuevo, con la epistemología. Problematizar la teoría de los ensamblajes, cuya fuente filosófica se encuentra en la obra de Gilles Deleuze y Félix Guattari, permite reconocer los alcances de una ontología que postula la existencia de un mundo compuesto de multiplicidades históricas y heterogéneas. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo explicitar la presencia de determinados con- ceptos de la filosofía alemana del siglo XIX en la ficción de lo extraño de Thomas Ligotti. Por consiguiente, en el texto se sostiene que la voluntad, parte del pensamiento de Arthur Schopenhauer; la voluntad de morir, correspondiente a la metafísica de Philipp Mainländer y el devenir, propio de la filosofía de Nietzsche, se encuentran presentes, respectivamente, en las siguientes narraciones de Ligotti: “La sombra, la oscuridad”, “Dulce velada de (...) expiación” y “El Tsalal”. Así también, se discurre brevemente sobre el pesimismo y se explica que la estructura de tales narraciones está articulada por un problema común: el fatalismo. Estas reflexiones permiten explorar las capacidades que la filosofía y la literatura fantástica poseen para ensamblarse entre sí. (shrink)

In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to challenge (...) the assumption that computational systems are necessarily heteronomous systems, to try and motivate in enactivism a more nuanced and less rigid conception of computational systems, and to demonstrate to computational theorists that they might find some interesting material within the enactivist tradition, despite its historical hostility towards computationalism. (shrink)

The autopoietic theory and the enactive approach are two theoretical streams that, in spite of their historical link and conceptual affinities, offer very different views on the nature of living beings. In this paper, we compare these views and evaluate, in an exploratory way, their respective degrees of internal coherence. Focusing the analyses on certain key notions such as autonomy and organizational closure, we argue that while the autopoietic theory manages to elaborate an internally consistent conception of living beings, the (...) enactive approach presents an internal tension regarding its characterization of living beings as intentional systems directed at the environment. (shrink)

Context: The majority of contemporary enactivist work is influenced by the philosophical biology of Hans Jonas. Jonas credits all living organisms with experience that involves particular “existential” structures: nascent forms of concern for self-preservation and desire for objects and outcomes that promote well-being. We argue that Jonas’s attitude towards living systems involves a problematic anthropomorphism that threatens to place enactivism at odds with cognitive science, and undermine its legitimate aims to become a new paradigm for scientific investigation and understanding of (...) the mind. Problem: Enactivism needs to address the tension between its Jonasian influences and its aspirations to become a new paradigm for cognitive science. By relying on Jonasian phenomenology, contemporary enactivism obscures alternative ways in which phenomenology can be more smoothly integrated with cognitive science. Method: We outline the historical relationship between enactivism and phenomenology, and explain why anthropomorphism is problematic for a research program that aspires to become a new paradigm for cognitive science. We examine the roots of Jonas’s existential interpretation of biological facts, and describe how and why Jonas himself understood his project as founded on an anthropomorphic assumption that is incompatible with a crucial methodological assumption of scientific enquiry: the prohibition of unexplained natural purposes. We describe the way in which phenomenology can be integrated into Maturana’s autopoietic theory, and use this as an example of how an alternative, non-anthropomorphic science of the biological roots of cognition might proceed. Results: Our analysis reveals a crucial tension between Jonas’s influence on enactivism and enactivism’s paradigmatic aspirations. This suggests the possibility of, and need to investigate, other ways of integrating phenomenology with cognitive science that do not succumb to this tension. Implications: In light of this, enactivists should either eliminate the Jonasian inference from properties of our human experience to properties of the experience of all living organisms, or articulate an alternative conception of scientific enquiry that can tolerate the anthropomorphism this inference entails. The Maturanian view we present in the article’s final section constitutes a possible framework within which enactivist tools and concepts can be used to understand cognition and phenomenology, and that does not involve a problematic anthropomorphism. Constructivist content: Any constructivist approach that aims for integration with current scientific practice must either avoid the type of anthropomorphic inference on which Jonas bases his work, or specify a new conception of scientific enquiry that renders anthropomorphism unproblematic. (shrink)

This paper examines a fundamental philosophical difference between two radical postcognitivist theories that are usually assumed to offer the same view of cognition; namely the autopoietic theory and the enactive approach. The ways these two theories understand cognition, it is argued, are not compatible nor incompatible but rather incommensurable. The reason, so it is argued, is that while enactivism, following the traditional stance held by most of the cognitive theories, understands cognitive systems as constituting a natural kind, the autopoietic theory (...) understands them as constituting only a conventional kind. Additionally, the paper shows that AT’s conventionalist stance about cognition, far from being an undesirable or useless position, offers some methodological virtues that might be timely and welcome in the agitated and revolutionary climate of current cognitive science. (shrink)

Many current problems surrounding science revolve around the complex epistemological framework that shapes a new vision of knowledge about reality. The traditional epistemological positions are characterized by the explanation of nature by means of concatenated facts; that is, as bricks attached to each other giving shape to the edifice of science. A conception of this nature showed that the idea of certainty was nothing more than a mere illusion, opening the way, on the contrary, to the idea of the uncertainty (...) of knowledge based on the descriptions of quantum physics, also a product of the non-reductionist conception of reality, thus criticizing the specular representation. This article addresses the main problems surrounding the critical conceptions that the emerging epistemology reveals about knowledge, pointing towards a much more complex vision of reality. (shrink)

Se analizan los desafíos de futuro de la sociedad digital. Desde perspectiva fenomenológico-hermenéutica, la idea de una ética de la tecnología considera la sociedad digital como dispositivo técnico. La literatura pertinente permite, primero, estudiar la tecnología disruptiva como generadora de cambios sociales, los cuales, a su vez, transforman las formas de la facticidad de la vida. De esta manera, la ética de la sociedad material, sirve de argumento para analizar la ética en la sociedad digital. Tomando la bioética filosófica como (...) instrumento, se concluye que la sociedad digital antepone retos para la vida, los cuales debe afrontar para la supervivencia. (shrink)

Recently, Michael Wheeler has argued that despite its sometimes revolutionary rhetoric, the so called 4E cognitive movement, even in the guise of ‘radical’ enactivism, cannot achieve a full revolution in cognitive science. A full revolution would require the rejection of two essential tenets of traditional cognitive science, namely internalism and representationalism. Whilst REC might secure antirepresentationalism, it cannot do the same, so Wheeler argues, with externalism. In this paper, expanding on Wheeler’s analysis, we argue that what compromises REC’s externalism is (...) the persistence of cognitively relevant asymmetries between its purported cognitive systems and the environment. Complementarily, we argue that an antirepresentationalist ancestor of enactivism, the autopoietic theory of cognition, is able to deliver and secure externalism, thus offering the explosive combination that Wheeler claims us needed for a revolution in cognitive science. (shrink)

Durante las últimas décadas, ha resurgido la polémica sobre la existencia de la “Filosofía en México”. Además del universalismo y el particularismo, hay una cuestión que aparece reiteradamente en esta polémica: la de la la distinción entre “Filosofía en México” y “Filosofía Mexicana”. Sin embargo, no todos la significan de la misma manera. Así, para Aureliano Ortega, ha existido una “Filosofía Mexicana” en términos de una filosofía dispersa; para Mauricio Beuchot, ha habido y puede seguir habiendo una “Filosofía Mexicana”, en (...) el sentido de un Universalismo analógico (en el esfuerzo de replantear el universalismo concreto de Hegel); Guillermo Hurtado, por su parte, propone hablar de una meta filosofía práctica, para abordar la cuestión; y, por último, Carlos Pereda sugiere que, para hablar de “Filosofía Mexicana”, en buenos términos, es necesario cambiar un vicio, el del entusiasmo nacionalista, por una virtud, el del nacionalismo responsable. (shrink)

This introduction to a special issue of Topoi introduces and summarises the relationship between three main varieties of 'enactivist' theorising about the mind: 'autopoietic', 'sensorimotor', and 'radical' enactivism. It includes a brief discussion of the philosophical and cognitive scientific precursors to enactivist theories, and the relationship of enactivism to other trends in embodied cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

The study explores communication strategies of ethno-nationalist terrorists with respect to their framing and identity building. Strategies of eight ethno-nationalist terrorist groups were analyzed using 70 articles published on the groups’ websites. Three cluster-analytic procedures and a correlational analysis were applied to strategies of problem definition, cause and responsibility attribution, treatment recommendations, and identity building. The analysis revealed various dimensions on which terrorists frame their content. No group-specific strategies of framing and identity building have been found yet, suggesting that the (...) strategies were universal across terrorist groups, and they were applied on a case-by-case basis. Knowledge about these strategies should advance counter-terrorism efforts, and assist in development of alternative identities among ethnic groups at risk of conflict. (shrink)

Traditionally, computational theory (CT) and dynamical systems theory (DST) have presented themselves as opposed and incompatible paradigms in cognitive science. There have been some efforts to reconcile these paradigms, mainly, by assimilating DST to CT at the expenses of its anti-representationalist commitments. In this paper, building on Piccinini’s mechanistic account of computation and the notion of functional closure, we explore an alternative conciliatory strategy. We try to assimilate CT to DST by dropping its representationalist commitments, and by inviting CT to (...) recognize the functionally closed nature of some computational systems. (shrink)

This article re-presents the concept of truth applied in the field of communications from the perspective of Hannah Arendt. It begins with an explicit affirmation: truth constitutes the central focus of social communication, because its principal responsibility is to inform truthfully what occ..

La filosofía de María Zambrano como superación del racionalismo nos plantea una perspectiva desde la que advertir nuevas extensiones del pensamiento viquiano. Este texto, aunque no analiza tales conexiones y puntos comunes, nos dibuja un paralelo emergente desde la conciencia de crisis en nuestra propia época. La crisis del racionalismo y su superación, la razón poética, la verdad de cada época, el valor de la palabra, etc., marcan en el horizonte la línea de una Aurora de la razón que, sin (...) necesidad de ser mostrada expresamente, alumbra emparentada con la misma luz que emerge con Vico, "un pensador auroral". Cualquier estudioso de Vico encontrará en las ideas de Zambrano, que en este texto se tratan, un perfil de afinidad en el que ambos pensadores "tientan una nueva época".Maria Zambrano’s philosophy, understood as a overcoming of Rationalism, provides us with a new perspective from which light can be shed upon new extensions of the Vichian Thought. This text, though it does not analyze such a connections and common points, draws an emerging parallelism from our own age consciousness of crisis. The crisis of Rationalism and its own superation, the poetical Reason, each age’s own reason, the worth of the wordings, etc., draw upon the horizon the lines of the Reason’s Dawning which, without being necessarily shown, gives birth –related with same light of that of Vico– to a "Downing thought". Any Vichian scholar will be able to find in Zambrano’s ideas, with which this paper is concerned, a profile of certain resemblance in which both thinkers "attempt to a new age". (shrink)

Despite the encyclopedic knowledge accumulated in contemporary biology, it is still frustratingly elusive to find an uncontroversial answer to the (apparently) simple question, “What are living beings?” Since the traditional approach to answering this question has been by means of definitions, it has been pointed out that an alternative might be to change the strategy and, following the example of other sciences, try to find not a definition but a theoretical identity for living beings. However, according to some critics, such (...) a move is neither possible nor advisable since current biology, limited to only earthly samples of life, does not have enough empirical basis and theoretical development to formulate a theoretical identity for living beings. In this paper, contrary to this diagnosis, I make room for and propose a theoretical identity statement for living beings. First, I argue that the limitations to proposing such an identity are not as severe as it is assumed. Second, I suggest answering the question, “What are living beings?” with the theoretical identity statement, ‘Living beings are exoautopoietic bodies.’ I explain this proposal’s theoretical grounds and defend it against potential objections. (shrink)

In contrast to Capra’s interpretation of Maturana’s work, I argue that the autopoietic theory does not establish an intrinsic, necessary link between life and cognitive/mental phenomena, and that given its functionalist approach, the theory helps very little to overcome the Cartesian division between mind and body.

In the context of the recent publication of Donner le tempts II, we question the status of the gift, its singularity, its relationship, beyond the intentional structure of decision and consciousness, with the general problematic of democracy and the archive, of Khora as an enigma that haunts the same Onto-Theo-Cosmological conjugation of metaphysics and logocentrism, to show that the question about the gift is also the question about history and about the very possibility of democracy, beyond the capitalist logic of (...) accumulation and valuation. We end up referring to the strange case of the ‘six pesos’ thematized in Miguel Angel Asturias's novel, Hombres de maiz, as a case of the incalculable. Far from an instrumental account, but also from a providential version of the gift, we try to show it as an event always already inscribed in the abyss of our exchange relations, a possibility contained in its own impossibility. (shrink)

Building on the original formulation of the autopoietic theory (AT), extended enactivism argues that living beings are autopoietic systems that extend beyond the spatial boundaries of the organism. In this article, we argue that extended enactivism, despite having some basis in AT’s original formulation, mistakes AT’s definition of living beings as autopoietic entities. We offer, as a reply to this interpretation, a more embodied reformulation of autopoiesis, which we think is necessary to counterbalance the (excessively) disembodied spirit of AT’s original (...) formulation. The article aims to clarify and correct what we take to be a misinterpretation of AT as a research program. AT, contrary to what some enactivists seem to believe, did not (and does not) intend to motivate an extended conception of living beings. AT’s primary purpose, we argue, was (and is) to provide a universal individuation criterion for living beings, these understood as discrete bodies that are embedded in, but not constituted by, the environment that surrounds them. However, by giving a more explicitly embodied definition of living beings, AT can rectify and accommodate, so we argue, the enactive extended interpretation of autopoiesis, showing that although living beings do not extend beyond their boundaries as autopoietic unities, they do form part, in normal conditions, of broader autopoietic systems that include the environment. (shrink)

This article analyzes the legal-philosophical situation of Artificial Intelligence and the intelligent robot on being a subject of Law to be considered a creative person or author. The contradiction involved in allowing an object to present the legal duality of being protected as an object that it is and at the same time being considered a subject by the resulting work is analyzed, an impairment or vulgarization for the subject of Law as a moral subject when proposing the fictio legis (...) de a moral object, which is not conceivable. Instead, an alternative to such an aporia is proposed, more fictitious than real. (shrink)

El materialismo salvaje desarrollado por Jacques Lezra no solo se opone a las cosmologías y ontologías modernas, articuladas en torno a un principio de organización de lo que hay, sino que también se expresa políticamente bajo la forma de un republicanismo salvaje que difiere no solo del republicanismo liberal sino también del llamado republicanismo normativo ilustrado. ¿De qué trata este republicanismo salvaje, abierto a la diferencia entre terror y terrorismo?, ¿qué consecuencias tiene su desmontaje de los presupuestos normativos y soberanos (...) del pensamiento onto-político occidental? Y, finalmente, ¿qué función/posición cumple/ocupa el poema, no solo el poema lucreciano, sino el poema en general (si hay tal cosa), para esta imaginación política aleatoria, defectiva y salvaje? Con estas preguntas procedemos a interrogar una de las múltiples aristas de un pensamiento concernido con la mundanidad del pensar, cuya relevancia parece ser evidente. Al final, incorporaremos algunas reflexiones sobre el poema de Néstor Perlongher, “Cadáveres” (1987), como caso de la proliferación lucreciana de lo que hay. (shrink)

Este ensayo aborda el estudio filosófico de la pintura de Diego Velázquez, desde la perspectiva de una hermenéutica de sus pinturas que, comparándolas con otras creaciones poiéticas y con la creación noética , nos aproxime a la creación poética velazqueña y nos acerque al pensamiento de Velázquez sobre mundo, hombre y Dios.This paper is concerned with the philosophical aspects of Diego Velasquez’s painting. From an hermeneutic approach it can be assessed that when his paintings are compared with other artistic creation (...) such as music, philosophy or poetry Velasquez’s generic thought on the world, man and God may be placed in its proper perspective. (shrink)

This paper suggests that the enactive approach to ethics could benefit from engaging a dialogue with the phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, a philosopher who has given ethics a decisive role in the understanding of our social life. Taking the enactive approach of Colombetti and Torrance as a starting point, we show how Levinas’ philosophy, with the key notions of face, otherness, and responsibility among others can complement and enrich the enactive view of ethics. Specifically, we argue that Levinas can provide, (...) on the one hand, a phenomenological characterisation of ethics itself, of its nature and fundamental meaning, and on the other, an account of how sociality, affectivity and embodiment, as presented in Colombetti and Torrance’s work, combine to bring about the ethical experience. However, we also point out that introducing Levinas to the enactive approach could be challenging. It is not obvious how sense-making and value-making, as centred on the precariousness and potential death of the subject, would account for the ethical experience as grounded on the precariousness and potential death of the other. (shrink)

Research traditions on cognition and depression focus on relatively unconnected aspects of cognitive functioning. On one hand, the neuropsychological perspective has concentrated on cognitive control difficulties as a prominent feature of this condition. On the other hand, the clinical psychology perspective has focused on cognitive biases and repetitive negative patterns of thinking for emotional information. A review of the literature from both fields reveals that difficulties are more evident for mood-congruent materials, suggesting that cognitive control difficulties interact with cognitive biases (...) to hinder cognitive switching, working memory updating, and inhibition of irrelevant information. Connecting research from these two traditions, we propose a novel integrative cognitive model of depression in which the interplay between mood-congruent cognitive control difficulties, cognitive biases, and rumination may ultimately lead to ineffective emotion-regulation strategies to downregulate negative mood and upregulate positive mood. (shrink)

Introduction The paradigm shift to a knowledge‐based economy has incremented the use of personal information applied to health‐related activities, such as biomedical research, innovation, and commercial initiatives. The convergence of science, technology, communication and data technologies has given rise to the application of big data to health; for example through eHealth, human databases and biobanks. Methods In light of these changes, we enquire about the value of personal data and its appropriate use. In order to illustrate the complex ground on (...) which big data applied to health develops, we analyse the current situation of the European Union and two cases: the Catalan VISC+/PADRIS and the UK Biobank, as perspectives. Discussion and conclusions Personal health‐related data in the context of the European Union is being increasingly used for big data projects under diverse schemes. There, public and private sectors participate distinctively or jointly, pursuing very different goals which may conflict with individual rights, notably privacy. Given that, this paper advocates for stopping the unjustified accumulation and commercialisation of personal data, protecting the interests of citizens and building appropriate frameworks to govern big data projects for health. A core tool for achieving such goals is to develop consent mechanisms which allow truly informed but adaptable consent, conjugated with the engagement of donors, participants and society. (shrink)

_El artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la tesis doctoral por publicaciones en México. Las universidades públicas (UNAM, IPN, UdeG) no presentan esta opción. Las universidades particulares presentan más opciones para titulación del doctorado: UEM, IESCDA cuentan con titulación automática; UBC, UNISANT presentan más de diez opciones de titulación (una por publicaciones); UNICLA, IEUM, IPEP tienen opción de titulación por publicaciones._.

Upshot: In our target article we claimed that, at least since Weber and Varela, enactivism has incorporated a theoretical commitment to one important aspect of Jonas’s philosophical biology, namely its anthropomorphism, which is at odds with the methodological commitments of modern science. In this general reply we want to clarify what we mean by anthropomorphism, and explain why we think it is incompatible with science. We do this by spelling out what we call the “Jonasian inference,” i.e., the idea that (...) we are entitled, based on our first-person experience of teleology, to take the appearance of teleology in other living beings at face value. (shrink)

Exposición del pensamiento político del filósofo krausista español Giner de los Ríos , que se mueve dentro del liberalismo, y de su concepción de la educación, ambas tratadas bajo el enfoque de su visión liberalista. El trabajo incide en el debate de un momento histórico peculiar de la cultura española apuntando a diversos aspectos del pensamiento radicalista .Explanation of the political thought of the philosopher Spanish Krausist Giner de los Ríos , who moves himself inside the liberalism, and of his (...) conception of the education, both treated under the approach of his vision "liberalista". The work affects in the debate of a historical peculiar moment of the Spanish culture pointing at diverse aspects of the thought "radicalista". (shrink)

Hutto and Satne, Philosophia propose to redefine the problem of naturalizing semantic content as searching for the origin of content instead of attempting to reduce it to some natural phenomenon. The search is to proceed within the framework of Relaxed Naturalism and under the banner of teleosemiotics which places Ur-intentionality at the source of content. We support the proposed redefinition of the problem but object to the proposed solution. In particular, we call for adherence to Strict Naturalism and replace teleosemiotics (...) with autopoietic theory of living beings. Our argument for these adjustments stems from our analysis of the flagship properties of Ur-intentionality: specificity and directedness. We attempt to show that the first property is not unique to living systems and therefore poses a problem of where to place a demarcation line for the origin of content. We then argue that the second property is a feature ascribed to living systems, not their intrinsic part and therefore does not form a good foundation for the game of naturalizing content. In conclusion we suggest that autopoietic theory can not only provide a competitive explanation of the basic responding of pre-contentful organisms but also clarify why Ur-intentionality is attributed to them in such an intuitive manner. (shrink)

Este trabajo plantea un ejercicio de ontología de la música y propone una indagación filosófica more radicale de ésta. Se recorre el camino hacia la poíesis musical a través de tres apartados, buscándose lograr una filosofía que sea capaz de explicar y comprender la música en el contexto ontológico, y no meramente desde el punto de vista estético.This piece poses an exercise of onthology of music and proposes a philosophical inquiry of it more radicale . The path to musical poíesis (...) is reached through three stages, trying to achieve a philosophy that is capable of explaining and comprehending the music in an onthological context, and not merely from an aesthetic point of view. (shrink)