Self-regulation, especially the regulation of emotion, is an important component of athletic performance. In our study, we tested the effect of a self-distancing strategy on athletes’ performance in an aggression-inducing experimental task in the laboratory. To this end, we modified an established paradigm of interpersonal provocation [Taylor Aggression Paradigm ], which has the potential to complement field studies in order to increase our understanding of effective emotion regulation of athletes in critical situations in competitions. In our experimental setting, we first (...) tested the applicability of the self-distancing perspective and the athletes’ ability to dynamically adapt besides the self-distanced perspective a self-immersed perspective to provocation in the TAP. Secondly, we investigated how this altered perspective modulated regulatory abilities of negative affectivity, anger, and aggression. The experiment consisted of two conditions in which the participant adopted either a self-immersed or a self-distanced perspective. Forty athletes from different team and individual sports with a mean age of 23.83 years competed individually in a reaction-time task against a opponent. Results show that athletes are equally able to adopt both perspectives. In addition, within-person analyses indicate that self-distancing decreased aggressive behavior and negative affect compared to the self-immersed perspective. Our results suggest that self-distancing modulates different levels of athletes’ experience and behavior. Furthermore, this demonstrates the feasibility of testing self-regulation of emotion in athletes in a laboratory setting and allows for further application in research in sports and exercise psychology. (shrink)

Context: Varela’s neurophenomenology was conceived from the outset as a criticism and dissolution of the “hard problem” of the physical origin of consciousness. Indeed, the standard (….

This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I (...) defend the thesis that cognitive experts should be identified by their ability to perform the latter function rather than the former, as novice-oriented accounts, unlike research-oriented ones, fail to comply with the rules of a functionalist approach to expertise. (shrink)

Consciousness scientists have not reached consensus on two of the most central questions in their field: first, on whether consciousness overflows reportability; second, on the physical basis of consciousness. I review the scientific literature of the 19th century to provide evidence that disagreement on these questions has been a feature of the scientific study of consciousness for a long time. Based on this historical review, I hypothesize that a unifying explanation of disagreement on these questions, up to this day, is (...) that scientific theories of consciousness are underdetermined by the evidence, namely, that they can be preserved “come what may” in front of (seemingly) disconfirming evidence. Consciousness scientists may have to find a way of solving the persistent underdetermination of theories of consciousness to make further progress. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article aims to add an important new dimension to the historical scholarship on early socialism by analysing the Saint-Simonian encounter with Owenism during the first decades of the nineteenth century. The article shows how the Saint-Simonian interpretation of Owenism was shaped by the manner by which the Saint-Simonians disseminated their doctrine. It draws on a number of neglected texts to show what the Saint-Simonians drew from Owen’s work and how they set out to distinguish themselves from Owen and (...) his French followers. The article focuses on key Saint-Simonian publications, including Le Globe and those edited by women members of the movement, Jeanne-Désirée Veret and Marie-Reine Guindorf’s La Tribune des femmes, and its early iterations. The article shows in detail the extent to which the Saint-Simonians saw Owen’s work as threatening to their cause, and how they formulated a thoroughgoing critique of it. (shrink)

Nous publions une inscription connue à Délos depuis le début des années 1990, à la suite de travaux menés par l’École française d’Athènes dans la zone du Portique des Naxiens. La pierre, mise au jour par Alexandre Farnoux, et connue des spécialistes d’épigraphie délienne, est restée inédite jusqu’à ce jour, malgré des mentions ponctuelles dans la bibliographie. Le décret pour Apollônidès de Chersonèsos rejoint le corpus des décrets de la cité indépendante et réactive la question des relations entre Délos et (...) les cités du Pont-Euxin, déjà bien représentées dans le paysage des honneurs déliens. (shrink)

Art historians and philosophers often talk about the interpretive significance of titles, but few have bothered with their historical origins. This omission has led to the assumption that an artwork's title is its proper name, since names and titles share the essential function of facilitating reference to their bearers. But a closer look at the development of our titling practices shows a significant point of divergence from standard analyses of proper names: the semantic content of a title is often crucial (...) to the identification, individuation, and interpretation of its associated artwork. This paper represents a first step towards an empirically centred study of our titling practices. I argue that, in order to accept titles as proper names, we must first recognize the social, rather than the referential, function of naming. (shrink)

This book’s basic argument is that the Freudian unconscious, far from constituting a radical break with the philosophy of consciousness, is merely the latest exemplar in a heritage of philosophical misunderstanding of the Cartesian cogito that interprets “I think, therefore I am” as “I represent myself, therefore I am” (in the classic interpretation of Heidegger, one of the targets of the book).

Most discussions frame the Liar Paradox as a formal logical-linguistic puzzle. Attempts to resolve the paradox have focused very little so far on aspects of cognitive psychology and processing, because semantic and cognitive-psychological issues are generally assumed to be disjunct. I provide a motivation and carry out a cognitive-computational treatment of the liar paradox based on a cognitive-computational model of language and conceptual knowledge within the Predictive Processing framework. I suggest that the paradox arises as a failure of synchronization between (...) two ways of generating the liar situation in two different PP sub-models, one corresponding to language processing and the other to the processing of meaning and world-knowledge. In this way, I put forward the claim that the liar sentence is meaningless but has an air of meaningfulness. I address the possible objection that the proposal violates the Principle of Unrestricted Compositionality, which purportedly regulates the conceptual competence of thinkers. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a detailed critical review of current approaches to ecthesis in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, with a view to motivate a new approach, which builds upon previous work by Marion & Rückert (2016) on the dictum de omni. This approach sets Aristotle’s work within the context of dialectic and uses Lorenzen’s dialogical logic, hereby reframed with use of Martin-Löf's constructive type theory as ‘immanent reasoning’. We then provide rules of syllogistic for the latter, and provide proofs of (...) e-conversion, Darapti and Bocardo and e-subalternation, while showing how close to Aristotle’s text these proofs remain. (shrink)

These thirteen lectures on the 'punitive society,' delivered at the Collège de France in the first three months of 1973, examine the way in which the relations between justice and truth that govern modern penal law were forged, and question what links them to the emergence of a new punitive regime that still dominates contemporary society. Praise for Foucault's Lectures at the Collège de France Series “Ideas spark off nearly every page...The words may have been spoken in [the 1970s], but (...) they seem as alive and relevant as if they had been written yesterday.”—Bookforum “Foucault is quite central to our sense of where we are...[He] is carrying out, in the noblest way, the promiscuous aim of true culture.”—The Nation “[Foucault] has an alert and sensitive mind that can ignore the familiar surfaces of established intellectual coded and ask new questions...[He] gives dramatic quality to the movement of culture.”—The New York Review of Books. (shrink)

Etrange parcours que celui du Logos qui, de Heraclite a nos jours, tend a s'effacer, dans ce monde actuel, tout entier voue a la science, au tout numerique. Cette vision heracliteenne de la totalite s'est estompee, transformee qu'elle fut deja des les premiers siecles de notre ere dans sa postulation religieuse, puis dans la modernite, et s'est perdue dans un monde ou, science et technique prenant leur envol, l'homme avait comme horizon de " devenir comme maitre et possesseur de la (...) Nature ". Michel Blay analyse cet etat qui nous laisse de plus en plus en desherence ; et dans un monde ou " Dieu est mort, et c'est nous qui l'avons tue ", comment ne pas sombrer dans cette illusion d'un homme tout-puissant, dans lequel meme le psychique est traite a l'aune des neuro-sciences ou l'homme a perdu sa completude et ne pense meme plus a la chercher? Ne serait-ce pas la poesie, elle seule, " dans ces temps de detresse " qui offrirait une voie pour retrouver sa voix? Certes " Il n'y a pas de paradis " nous dit Andre Frenaud. " Etait-ce l'aube, ou le soir deja perce? Qu'avions-nous espere que nous allons cherchant? ". (shrink)

In the course of his work on optics and electrodynamics in systems moving through the ether, the 19th-century medium for light waves and electric and magnetic fields, Lorentz discovered and exploited the invariance of the free-field Maxwell equations under what Poincaré later proposed to call Lorentz transformations. To account for the negative results of optical experiments aimed at detecting the earth’s motion through the ether, Lorentz, in effect, assumed that the laws governing matter interacting with light waves are Lorentz invariant (...) as well. Like Lorentz, Einstein first encountered the Lorentz transformations in electrodynamics. Unlike Lorentz, for whom the transformation merely provided convenient mathematical substitutions, but like Poincaré, Einstein recognized that the Lorentz-transformed quantities are the measured quantities for the moving observer. More importantly, Einstein recognized that the Lorentz invariance of all physical laws had nothing to do with electrodynamics per se, but reflected the kinematics in a new relativistic space-time, to be named after Minkowski who worked out its geometry a few years later. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the constitutive problems and other several aspects of what a research entitled 'formal epistemology' should be. The interest in this subject has to do with the possibility of reaching a privileged point of view or axis of research - i.e., the 'formal' one - that would allow, a better grasp of the richness and variety of the facts and problems tackled by precise (local) epistemology of theories (for example, in physics). This approach is likely to (...) enable one to hold the main structural lines that organize those theories according to a more com prehensive, unifying and synthetic intelligibilit. By the same token, it would eventually allow a better handling of the changes required in the organization of knowledge, putting emphasis on its main directions, drawing up a rational inventory of this knowledge, and perhaps anticipating others. At first, we deal with the `thought of changes' that no approach of the 'form' can afford to leave aside, since the meaning of this concept is inseparable from the contents that come with constructions and modifications. We examine then the notion of 'epistemic operation' as an instrument to create new forms on the theoretical as well as on the meta-theoretical levels. ln the wake of it, we analyze the characteristics of the form and of the formal, as well as their relationship with the contents of knowledge. We also take the notion of object into account, since it depends upon the decision of a subject and upon conventional choices. We finally inquire about the link between `epistemic operations' as specified above and algorithmic functions for knowledge statements, and emphasize the risk of reductionism that might follow from a naturalistic conception of representation. (shrink)

Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on (...) a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral individualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three important questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics? (shrink)

According to the traditional view, meaning presents itself under the form of some kind of identity.

Scientists working on the wave theory of light in the 19 th century took it for granted that there had to be a medium for the propagation of light waves. This medium was called the luminiferous [= “light carrying”] ether. One of the central questions about this medium concerned its state of motion. There were two options: (1) The ether is completely undisturbed by matter moving through it (stationary or immobile ether); (2) Matter drags along the ether in its vicinity (...) and/or in its interior (dragged-along ether). Stellar aberration provided the main argument for the first option (even though a special dragging effect in the case of transparent matter had to be built into the theory to account for refraction). Polarization provided the main argument for the second option. These two options and the arguments pro and con will be explained in more detail below. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen’s views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called “semantic” or “model-theoretic” construal of theories does not give proper due to the (...) role played by true propositions in successful representing practices. Thirdly, I attempt to show that the force of van Fraassen’s pragmatic - and antirealist - “dissolution” of the “loss of reality objection” loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phenomena is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about them. (shrink)

This essay explores the research practice of French geometer Michel Chasles, from his 1837 Aperçu historique up to the preparation of his courses on ‘higher geometry’ between 1846 and 1852. It argues that this scientific pursuit was jointly carried out on a historiographical and a mathematical terrain. Epistemic techniques such as the archival search for and comparison of manuscripts, the deconstructive historiography of past geometrical methods, and the epistemologically motivated periodization of the history of mathematics are shown to have (...) played a crucial role in the shaping of Chasles's own theories. In particular, we present Chasles's approach to the ‘material history’ of algebraic symbolism and argue that it motivated and informed his subsequent invention of a novel notational technology for the writing of geometrical proofs and propositions. In return, this technology allowed Chasles to carry out a programme for the modernization of geometry in keeping with epistemic requirements he had also delineated via a form of historical writing. (shrink)

Going beyond the debate between positivists and proponents of natural law, there is a controversy over whether there can or ought to be “philosophy in law” (i.e., whether anything within the subject‐matter of philosophy can also become part of the subject‐matter of law). According to Luhmann's autopoietic theory, law is a normatively closed system and accordingly remains completely independent from philosophy. Dworkin, on the other hand, asserts that constitutional law depends for its coherence and integrity on being encompassed within a (...) particular political philosophy. This essay approaches “philosophy in law” from a functional rather than a legitimating perspective, and concludes against both Luhmann and Dworkin that the integration of philosophy in law is interstitial and limited. The consequence of this for law's validity and legitimacy is a likely increase in contestation and contestability. The essay concludes that by embracing pluralism as a philosophy, one can reduce and better manage contestability without ever becoming able to eliminate it. (shrink)

The article examines how Gadamer reads, interprets and critiques Dilthey inTruth and Method. The author proposes to reconstruct this reading, placing it the contemporary hermeneutic debate, according to three transversal views : first relative to Dilthey’s position in the history of hermeneutics ; second relative to the criticism of methodological hermeneutics ; and third relative to the diltheyen contribution to a philosophy of life. The main thesis is that Gadamer’s relation to Dilthey is not univocal, even if Dilthey is quite (...) central to appreciate the scope ofTruth and Method. There is a problem of Diltheyenne inspiration that animates the project of this work — through a questioning on the foundation of the sciences of the spirit — but Gadamer gives a response of Heideggerian inspiration. (shrink)

Cet article explore les méthodes et moyens à mettre en œuvre pour reconstruire la séparation entre espaces public et privé, mise à mal par la connexion continue sur les réseaux. Il est difficile et pourtant indispensable de proposer un nouveau paradigme garantissant l'exercice de la liberté individuelle car celle-ci n'est plus assurée selon le cadre fixé par la Déclaration des droits de l'homme. Dans une première partie, nous abordons les contradictions de la situation actuelle, avant de proposer ensuite des solutions (...) autour de la pseudonymisation et de terminer par une réflexion sur les conditions à réunir pour la nécessaire multiplicité des identités numériques gérée par la personne assurant ainsi l'exercice de sa liberté. (shrink)

Puisque l’ouvrage de Meier s’intéresse au Jésus historique et qu’il s’efforce d’en préciser peu à peu le « portrait », il est légitime de se demander si les enquêtes ainsi menées permettent d’envisager aujourd’hui une nouvelle théologie de la vie de Jésus, et, si oui, à quelles conditions. Les trois séries de réflexions ici proposées – sur la position de Jésus dans le monde juif, sur ses miracles, et finalement sur la question de son identité – permettent d’apporter une première (...) réponse à cette question.Since Meier’s work deals with the historical Jesus and aims at gradually drawing up a ‘portrait’ of him, it seems legitimate to ask whether such an inquiry today enables us to envisage a new theology of the life of Jesus, and if so, under what conditions. The three series of reflections proposed here – on the position of Jesus within the Jewish world, on his miracles, and finally on the question of his identity – allow us to propose a tentative answer to this question. (shrink)

A geometrical model is proposed that describes the emergence of a primordium at the shoot apex in Dicotyledons. It is based on recent fundamental results on plant morphogenesis, viz.: – the emergence is preceded by the reorganization of the microtubules of the cortical cytoskeleton, leading to a new orientation of the synthesis of the cell wall microfibrils; – the resulting global stress is related to the general orientation of the cell growth.

In Kant, remarkably, and for the first time perhaps in the history of philosophy, the problem of the Ego receives an ontological signification. The critique of the paralogisms of rational psychology concerns, explicitly, this fundamental problem of the being of the ego. Kant’s examination of this problem constitutes an essential moment of the history of modern philosophy. This examination results finally in the complete failure to determine such a being, a failure that Kant attempts to pass off ultimately as a (...) metaphysical impossibility. This is affirmed constantly through the labyrinthine analysis of the Transcendental Dialectic: what emerges from its difficulties, and obscurities, is that the being of the Ego can be neither determined, nor posited, metaphysically. The conclusion is unquestionably the following: the ego cogito does not contain in itself any sum, at least if, by the latter, one intends, as does rational psychology, the metaphysical and, in some way, absolute being of the ‘I’. (shrink)