The article explores a number of closely related concepts in Eric Santner’s wide-ranging and yet concentrated oeuvre: the concept of the flesh, which is at the center of The Royal Remains, along with two more recent additions to Santner’s lexicon, the “void of knowledge” and “surplus scarcity,” both developed in Untying Things Together. Examining the logic and correlation of these concepts, the paper seeks to highlight certain tensions in Santner’s thought but also the possibilities his analyses of human stasis offer. (...) Alfred Döblin’s modernist classic Berlin Alexanderplatz then serves as a short test case (but also counterexample) of what we might call, taking our cues from Santner’s thinking, the “dreamwork of modernism.”. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende esboçar alguns apontamentos sobre o conceito de montagem nos escritos de Walter Benjamin e a relação desse conceito com a teoria crítica benjaminiana. Em fragmentos metodológicos ligados ao projeto de um livro sobre Charles Baudelaire, que só vieram a público no fim dos anos 1960, encontra-se um dos raros registros da expressão “teoria crítica” (kritische Theorie). Ela é utilizada por Benjamin para caracterizar sua autocompreensão teórico-metodológica, numa vinculação direta dessa expressão a procedimentos de enquadramento e montagem associados (...) à objetiva fotográfica ou fílmica. Sustentar o nexo explicitado nas notas metodológicas entre teoria crítica – na acepção benjaminiana dessa prática teórica – e montagem impõe algumas questões. Primeiro, é preciso saber o que vem a ser, para Benjamin, a montagem. Sobretudo nos anos 1930, o desenvolvimento dessa noção é prismado em diversos objetos, em ensaios sobre o cinema, o teatro épico de Brecht, as vanguardas dadá e surrealista, a literatura de Alfred Döblin e a historiografia materialista. Além disso, é preciso indicar em que sentido o procedimento oriundo das artes e dos novos aparelhos de reprodução técnica pode contribuir para a teoria. Benjamin não considera a montagem apenas do ponto de vista procedimental, mas enfatiza, por exemplo, a função pedagógica e o ganho cognitivo propiciados através de experimentos teatrais. Igualmente, Benjamin chama atenção para a possibilidade de expansão da percepção, propiciado pela técnica cinematográfica por meio do desrecalque do inconsciente ótico. (shrink)

This essay, in the form of a letter written to director László Nemes in the immediate aftermath of viewing Son of Saul, is at once a critical reading of the film within a larger theoretical framework and a subjective emotional response to seeing on the screen something of the author’s own “most harrowing nightmares.” While bringing Nemes’s film into conversation with Maurice Blanchot, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, the Hassidic tale and ancient myths, Georges Didi-Huberman returns to his reflections in Images (...) in Spite of All (2008) on the four photographs taken clandestinely of the gas chambers in Auschwitz by one of the Sonderkommando. Son of Saul presents the allegory of Saul whose job as a Sonderkommando is to drag countless corpses to the crematorium where they will be reduced to ashes but who sets out on a mad, single-minded quest to give a proper burial, complete with the recitation of kaddish, to the body of one boy. According to the author, the film marks the invention of the “documentary tale” genre, combining Benjamin’s notions of montage based on the document, as manifested in the work of Marcel Proust, James Joyce, and Alfred Döblin, and that of the dying art of storytelling, intimately bound up as it is with the authority of the dying. Thus, the dead child drowning at the end of the film stands as an inversion of the story of Moses, a living child saved from drowning, just as the real historic death of the Jewish people reverses the mythical Biblical birth of the Jewish people. (shrink)

This article takes up the concept of montage that has defined scholarship on Alfred Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz: Die Geschichte von Franz Biberkopf since its publication. Against interpretations that understand the novel’s technique of montage as related to film and the avant-garde, I show that the novel is more strongly tied to paper objects and practices, above all the nineteenth-century serial novel and its medial environment in the newspaper. Approaching the novel from this perspective directs attention – in opposition to (...) the scholarship that has emphasized the experience of disruption produced by montage – to the significance of the plot and its highly gendered violence.ZusammenfassungSeit seiner Erstveröffentlichung wird Alfred Döblins Berlin Alexanderplatz: Die Geschichte von Franz Biberkopf durchweg unter dem Begriff der Montage verhandelt. Entgegen dieser Lektüre, die die Ästhetik des Montageschnitts mit Praktiken des Films und der Avantgarde verbindet, zeige ich, dass der Roman in einer Geschichte von Papierobjekten und Papierpraktiken zu verorten ist, zu der vor allem der Feuilletonroman des 19. Jahrhunderts mitsamt dessen medialem Umfeld gehört. Im Gegensatz zum Forschungskonsens, der die Erfahrung der Diskontinuität hervorhebt, lenkt eine Annäherung an den Roman aus der Perspektive von Papierpraktiken unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die Bedeutung der Romanhandlung und die genderspezifische Gewalt, die sie kennzeichnet. (shrink)

Peter Jelavich's new study pursues a double agenda: while it examines the role of radio and film in the broader context of cultural politics in Weimar Germany, it at the same time explores the transformation of Alfred Döblin's novel Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929) into a radio play (1930) and then a film (1931). The detailed and intriguing intermedial comparison serves to demonstrate Jelavich's main thesis that the death of the innovative and critical culture of the first German Republic predates the (...) end of the democracy. Challenging the widely shared assumption that only Hitler's rise to power put an end to the…. (shrink)

This paper criticizes the conjunction of two theses: 1) cognitivism about first-person moral ought-beliefs, the thesis (roughly) that such beliefs are attitudes with truth-valued contents; 2) robust internalism about these beliefs, the thesis that, necessarily, agents' beliefs that they ought, morally, to A constitute motivation to A. It is argued that the conjunction of these two theses places our moral agency at serious risk. The argument, which centrally involves attention to clinical depression, is extended to a less demanding, recent brand (...) of internalist moral cognitivism. Philosophers discussed include Dancy, McDowell, McNaughton, and Nagel. (shrink)

In the first section, I will argue that the folk concept of necessary conditions for intentional action needs refinement. In the second and third sections, I will identify some additional issues one would need to explore in con- structing a statement of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for intentional action. I will conclude with a brief discussion of the conceptual analyst’s task.

As this passage from a recent book on the psychology of decision-making indicates, deciding seems to be part of our daily lives. But what is it to decide to do something? It may be true, as some philosophers have claimed, that to decide to A is to perform a mental action of a certain kind – specifically, an action of forming an intention to A. (Henceforth, the verb ‘form’ in this context is to be understood as an action verb.) Even (...) if this is so, we are faced with pressing questions. Do we form all of our intentions? If not, how does forming an intention differ from other ways of acquiring one? Do we ever, in fact, form intentions, or do we rather merely acquire them in something like the way we acquire beliefs or desires? These are some of the questions that will occupy me here. My aim is to clarify the nature of deciding to act and to make a case for the occurrence of genuine acts of intention formation. (shrink)

Claims about agents’ abilities—practical abilities—are common in theliterature on free will, moral responsibility, moral obligation, personalautonomy, weakness of will, and related topics. These claims typicallyignore differences among various kinds or levels of practical ability. Inthis article, using ‘A’ as an action variable, I distinguish among threekinds or levels: simple ability toA; ability toAintentionally; and a morereliable kind of ability toAassociated with promising toA. I believe thatattention to them will foster progress on the topics I mentioned. Substan-tiating that belief—by making progress (...) on these topics in light of suchattention—is a project for other occasions. My aim here is to lay a partialfoundation for that project. (shrink)

This paper is an edited form of a letter written by the two authors (in the name of Tarski) to Wolfram Schwabhäuser around 1978. It contains extended remarks about Tarski's system of foundations for Euclidean geometry, in particular its distinctive features, its historical evolution, the history of specific axioms, the questions of independence of axioms and primitive notions, and versions of the system suitable for the development of 1-dimensional geometry.

We obtain some new results on the topology of unary definable sets in expansions of densely ordered Abelian groups of burden 2. In the special case in which the structure has dp‐rank 2, we show that the existence of an infinite definable discrete set precludes the definability of a set which is dense and codense in an interval, or of a set which is topologically like the Cantor middle‐third set (Theorem 2.9). If it has burden 2 and both an infinite (...) discrete set D and a dense‐codense set X are definable, then translates of X must witness the Independence Property (Theorem 2.26). In the last section, an explicit example of an ordered Abelian group of burden 2 is given in which both an infinite discrete set and a dense‐codense set are definable. (shrink)

Intention, intentional action, and the connections between them are central topics of the philosophy of action, a branch of the philosophy of mind. One who regards the subject matter of the philosophy of mind as having at its core some aspect of what lies between environmental input to beings with minds and behavioural output may be inclined to see the philosophy of action as concerned only with the output end of things. That would be a mistake. Many intentional actions depend (...) for their development on the processing of input — both from the environment and from the body. (shrink)

Let me begin somewhat perversely by making clear what I do not intend to do in this paper. I do not propose to offer a general defense of Ockham's resolution of the metaphysical perplexities engendered by the dogma of the Incarnation. In fact, I have argued elsewhere that his account of the hypostatic union is seriously deficient. 1..

What is integrity and why is it valuable? One account of the nature of integrity, proposed by John Cottingham amongst others, is The Integrated Self View. On this account integrity is a formal relation of coherence between various aspects of a person. One problem that has been raised against this account is that it isn’t obvious that it can account for the value of integrity. In this paper I will respond to this problem by providing an account of the value (...) of an integrated self. I will do so by first looking closely at two examples from literature: John Sassal in John Berger’s A Fortunate Man and Tetrius Lydgate in George Eliot’s Middlemarch. Based on my comparison of these two case studies I will argue that an integrated self is valuable as it makes people more likely to act in line with their moral judgements. (shrink)

According to immunology’s prevailing paradigm, immunity is based on self/nonself discrimination and thus requires a construction of identity. Two orientations vie for dominance: The original conception, conceived in the context of infectious diseases, regards the organism as insular and autonomous, an entity that requires defense of its borders. An alternate view places the organism firmly in its environment in which both benign and onerous encounters occur. On this latter relational account, active tolerance allows for cooperative relationships with other organisms in (...) the larger ecological economy. These contending orientations —one derived from biomedicine and the other from the ecological sciences— have drawn the attention of social scientists and culture critics. On the one hand, feminists have portrayed immune theory as based upon borrowed social notions of identity that reflect male aggressive values and thus distort more balanced accounts of immunity; and, on the other hand, other commentary projects immune theory as a framework in which analysis of Western societies putatively reveals analogous patterns of ‘self’ and ‘other’ interactions, where autoimmunity and immunization are understood as expressions of the insular understanding of identity. Here, a meta-interpretation is presented that shows how these critiques place the immune self on a spectrum stretching from its formulation as an autonomous agent, a modernist conception of the independent individual, to a postmodern portrayal in which this conception of selfhood has been deconstructed. Accordingly, immunology is drawn into a wide-ranging debate about agency, where differing interpretations of immunity serves as a template in which competing understandings of human social intercourse is modeled.Según el paradigma dominante en inmunología, la inmunidad está basada en la discriminación entre yo/noyo y requiere, por tanto, una construcción de la identidad. Dos orientaciones compiten por dominar: la concepción original, concebida en el contexto de las enfermedades infecciosas contempla al organismo como aislado y autónomo, como una entidad que necesita defender sus fronteras. Una visión alternativa sitúa firmemente al organismo en su entorno, en el cual suceden tanto encuentros beneficiosos como costosos. En este enfoque relacional, la tolerancia activa permite relaciones cooperativas con otros organismos en una economía ecológica más amplia. Estas orientaciones en liza —una derivada de la biomedicina y otra de las ciencias ecológicas— han llamado la atención de los científicos sociales y de los críticos de la cultura. Por una parte, el feminismo ha descrito la teoría inmunológica como basada en nociones sociales prestadas de identidad que reflejan los valores agresivos del macho y que, de este modo, impiden una explicación más equilibrada de la inmunidad. Por otra parte, otro comentario proyecta la teoría inmunológica como un marco en el que el análisis de las sociedades occidentales revela aparentemente patrones análogos de interacciones ‘yo’ y ‘otros’, en las que la autoinmunidad y la inmunización son entendidas como expresiones de la comprensión insular de la identidad. Se ofrece aquí una meta-representación que muestra cómo estas críticas sitúan al yo inmune en un espectro que va desde su formulación cómo un agente autónomo, una concepción modernista del individuo independiente, a una visión postmoderna en la que esta concepción de la identidad ha sido deconstruida. De acuerdo con esto, la inmunología recoge un amplio debate sobre la agencia en el que diferentes interpretaciones de la inmunidad sirven como molde en el que se modelan comprensiones competidoras de la comprensión de las relaciones sociales humanas. (shrink)

Starting from the question of whether Ernst Mach's well-known notion of "Elemente" (elements) must lead to the verdict that the arch-anti-metaphysician himself may be justly accused of holding an essantially metaphysical position, the idea of metaphysical neutrality is explained in Section I. Section II deals with Quine's verdict on abstract entities, among which Mach's elements would have to be counted if there were no way out of the Quinean test. Such a way out, it is proposed in section III, is (...) Carnap's Remedy: the distinction of external and internal questions. Finally, in Section IV, the empirical meaning of Mach's notion of elements is explained, from whence it's argued that Mach's "philosophy" is good, non-metaphysical, empirical science. (shrink)

The teaching of John Paul II clearly articulates the strain of human rights. The Pope initiates a dialogue with the Enlightenment tradition and develops the theological and philosophical foundations of the culture of human rights. Karola Wojtyła’s personalistic thought appears to be a very coherent and reliable key to understand the doctrine of human rights. Wojtyła stresses subjectivity and non-reducibility of the person as a concrete human „I.” It is both autonomy and transcendence that constitute dignity of the person towards (...) other personal and impersonal beings. (shrink)

This concise volume is at once an excellent introduction to Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasonand an original analysis of Kant's ideas.

A major point of dispute among libertarian theorists and thinkers today as always revolves around the age—old question of whether man can live in total anarchy or whether the minimal state is absolutely necessary for the maximization of freedom. Lost in this dispute is the question of whether man is capable of getting out of anarchy at all. Can we really abolish anarchy and set up a Government in its place? Most people, regardless of their ideological preferences, simply assume that (...) the abolition of anarchy is possible, that they live under Government and that anarchy would be nothing but chaos and violence}. (shrink)

The thesis may be expressed as: An agent intentionally A's if and only if she A's for a reason. My aim in this paper is to show that the spirit of the thesis, if not its letter, survives a variety of criticisms and to illuminate, in the process, the nature of reasons for action, acting for reasons, and acting intentionally.

Many issues at the heart of the philosophy of action and of philosophical work on free will are framed partly in terms of causation. The leading approach to understanding both the nature of action and the explanation or production of actions emphasizes causation. What may be termed standardcausalism is the conjunction of the following two theses: firstly, an event's being an action depends on how it was caused; and secondly, proper explanations of actions are causal explanations. Important questions debated in (...) the literature on free will include: is an action's being deterministically caused incompatible with its being freely performed? Are actions free only if they are indeterministically caused? Does the indeterministic causation of an action preclude its being freely performed? Does free action require agent causation? This article concentrates on issues about action and free will that centrally involve causation. (shrink)

Changing Perspectives – From the Experimental to the Technological Turn in History and Philosophy of Science. In the 1960s the philosophy of science was transformed through the encounter with the history of science, resulting in a collaborative venture by the name of “History and Philosophy of Science” (HPS). Philosophy of science adopted ever more regularly the format of the case study to reconstruct certain episodes from the history of science, and historians were mostly interested in the production of scientific knowledge. (...) The so‐called “experimental turn” of the 1980s owed to this interaction between philosophy and history. Its guiding question remained quite traditional, however, namely “How do the sciences achieve an agreement between representation and reality?” Only the answers to this question broke with tradition by focusing not on theory but on the role of instruments and experiments. – Roughly 30 years after the experimental turn, another transformative encounter appears to be taking place. HPS is being transformed in the encounter with philosophy of technology. From the point of view of philosophy of technology, the question does not arise whether and how the agreement of mind and world, representation and reality can be achieved. When things are constructed, built or made, human thinking and physical materiality are inseparably intertwined. Instead of seeking to describe a mind‐independent reality, technoscientific researchers are working to acquire and demonstrate capabilities of experimental or predictive control. When science is regarded as a kind of technology, a program of study opens up for epistemology and so do avenues for the historiography of science. History of science might now show how the problems and procedures of the sciences arise from and impinge back upon a world that is itself a product of science and technology. It thereby abandons its traditional HPS niche existence and joins forces with environmental history, history of technology, social, labor, and consumer history. (shrink)

This article offers a contrast between European and US-American approaches to the convergence of enabling technologies and to associated issues. It identifies an apparently paradoxical situation in which regional differences produce conflicting claims to universality, each telling us what can and will happen to the benefit of humanity. Those who might mediate and negotiate these competing claims are themselves entangled in the various positions. A possible solution is offered, namely a universalizable strategy that aims to disentangle premature claims to unity (...) and universality as in the case of the greater "efficiency" of nanomedicine. This is the strategy by which Science and Technologies Studies (STS) can analytically tease apart what it has helped produce and sustain in the first place. The virtues and limits of this strategy are briefly presented, deliberation and decision-making under conditions of productive disillusionment recommended. (shrink)

This essay defends the compatibility of a pair of popular theses in the philosophy of action and rebuts arguments of Hugh McCann’s (1995) designed to show that my earlier efforts, in Springs of Action, to resolve the apparent tension were unsuccessful. One thesis links what agents intentionally do at a time, t, to what they are most strongly motivated to do at t. The other is a thesis about the nature and functions of intent.