In the clinical setting, not enough attention is paid to the role that emotion plays. It is at worst ignored or avoided, isolating those who are suffering, at best treated as something to help another to endure. This is the result, in part, of an impoverished idea that views emotion as mere feelings. However, emotions are not just feelings, they are cognitive. If we look beneath the surface, emotions can provide information about values and beliefs, some of which may be (...) false or unreasonable. When they are motivating decisions that seriously affect the lives of others, there is a moral obligation to ferret them out and correct or deal with them. Attention needs to be paid to the emotions of healthcare providers as well as to the emotions of patients and their loved ones, and more done to train healthcare providers to deal effectively and productively with emotion – their own and others’. A son tearfully requests everything be done for his dying father. He fears limiting treatment means his father will be ignored. A physician orders another course of chemotherapy because she cannot bear for this patient to die. The patient, fearing he will painfully suffocate to death, agrees. Paying attention to emotions and bringing to light the beliefs and values behind them can only enhance the care and consideration of all involved. (shrink)

The number of admissions to hospitals of patients without a proxy decision maker is rising. Very often these patients need fairly immediate medical intervention for which informed consent—or informed refusal—is required. Many have recommended that there be a process in place to make these decisions, and that it include a variety of perspectives. People are particularly wary of relying solely on medical staff to make these decisions. The University Hospitals Case Medical Center recruits community members from its Ethics Committee to (...) serve on a subcommittee, the Patients Without Proxies (PWP) Committee, which works with medical staff during the decision-making process for these patients. Generally, the community members go to the bedside to observe patients. This article looks at how those unused to observing hospitalized patients who are sick and/or dying are affected, comparing them to mock jurors in a research study who are exposed to graphic photographs related to a fabricated crime scene. Judgments made by the mock jurors are affected by viewing such images. The personal experience of witnessing unfamiliar and shocking scenes affects their subsequent judgments. While it may be difficult to tease out whether observing patients causes PWP members to be benefited or harmed, they are affected by what they see. If a variety of perspectives is desirable to reduce possible bias or error, this article argues that at least one community member should refrain from seeing the patient in order to add a different and valuable voice to the decision-making process. Members of the subcommittee base their judgments on the various kinds of information available. Sometimes the things they see, hear, or feel may affect them particularly deeply, and affect their judgments as well. In this article I explore the idea that something like this may be happening in a particular kind of clinical ethics case consultation. (shrink)

For the last fifty years, the United States healthcare system has done an extremely poor job of delivering healthcare in a just and fair manner. The United States holds the dubious distinction of being the only industrialized nation in the world lacking provisions to ensure universal coverage. We attempt to provide some of the reasons this dysfunctional system has persisted and show that healthcare should not be a commodity. We begin with a brief historical overview of healthcare delivery in the (...) United States since WWII. This is followed by a critical analysis of the for-profit model including reasons to support the view that healthcare should not be a free market commodity. We also demonstrate how special interest groups have been able to win support for their practices based on propaganda rather than fact. A brief analysis of the Affordable Care Act is offered along with critical comments regarding its ineffectiveness. We conclude with a brief overview of international approaches that have resulted in universal coverage and suggest the United States ought to adopt an approach similar to those outlined so that it no longer stands as the only industrialized nation to ignore the glaring problems that exist. (shrink)

The existence of free will has been both an enduring presumption of Western culture and a subject for debate across disciplines for millennia. However, little empirical evidence exists to support the almost unquestioned assumption that, in general, Westerners endorse the existence of free will. The few studies that measure belief in free will have methodological problems that likely resulted in underestimating the true extent of belief. Recently, Rakos et al. (Behavior and Social Issues 17:20–39, 2008 ) found a stronger endorsement (...) of free will when demand characteristics were eliminated. The current study builds on this work by sampling incarcerated adolescents and adults, whose freedom to act is externally constrained. Belief in free will as well as attitudes toward punishment, self-esteem, and locus of control were measured. The results indicate that free will is strongly endorsed in Western society even when freedom to act is severely restricted. However, incarcerated adolescents endorsed free will to a slightly lesser extent than their nonincarcerated counterparts from Rakos et al. (Behavior and Social Issues 17:20–39, 2008 ), while incarcerated and nonincarcerated adults offered equally strong endorsements. The comparable endorsement by adults is consistent with the hypothesis that the belief in agency is an evolutionary adaptation. The small decrease found for incarcerated adolescents may reflect the interaction between developmental factors and the expression of an evolutionary adaptation. Additionally, incarcerated adolescents and adults associated beliefs in free will with viewing punishment as a means of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Incarcerated adults, but not incarcerated adolescents, associated beliefs in free will with greater self-esteem and with an external locus of control. Finally, though both incarcerated adults and adolescents endorsed free will strongly, the former manifested the belief by emphasizing free agentic choice whereas the latter focused on the personal responsibility that is interwoven with free choice. The implications of these findings are discussed in the context of evolutionary, cultural, and developmental factors. (shrink)

In virtually all the developed countries of the Western world, people are living longer and reproducing less. At the same time, costs for the care of the elderly and infirm continue to rise dramatically. Given these facts, it should come as no surprise that we are experi encing an ever-increasing concern with questions relating to the proper care and treatment of the aged. What responsibilities do soci eties have to their aging citizens? What duties, if any, do grown chil dren (...) owe their parents? What markers should we use to determine one's status as "elderly"? Does treatment of pain in aged patients present special medical and/or moral problems? How can the com peting claims of autonomy and optimal medical care be reconciled for elderly persons who require assisted living? When, if ever, should severely demented patients be included in nontherapeutic clinical tri als? These questions, and others of similar interest to those con cerned with the proper treatment of the aged, are discussed in depth in the articles included in this text. The essays in this volume of Biomedical Ethics Reviews fall loosely into two broad categories. The first four articles-those con tributed by Sheila M. Neysmith, Allyson Robichaud, Jennifer Jackson, and Susan McCarthy-raise general questions concerning the propri ety of Western society'S current mechanisms for dealing with and treat ing elderly citizens. The remaining four articles-those by Simon Woods and Max Elstein, Marshall B. (shrink)

According to the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the application of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the norms governing its application. But this view faces some serious objections. In particular, according to Rosen, Glüer and Wikforss, this view leads to a vicious regress of norms. The purpose of this paper is to defend a version of the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts (...) against this objection. I argue that we can deal with this problem along the lines of a coherentist account of justification. (shrink)

It has been a popular theory in English, Japanese, and Chinese scholarship that a “victory of Confucianism” occurred during the Han dynasty. Some members of these academic communities challenge this theory. However, it has long been overlooked that they do so by adopting different terminology and research frameworks. English scholarship uses the expression “victory/triumph of Confucianism” to refer to the dominance or growth of Confucianism during that period, while the Japanese use “the establishment of Confucian doctrine/religion as the state doctrine/religion” (...) and the Chinese use “dismissing the hundred schools and revering only the Confucian arts”. The expressions, as the current issue illustrates, exemplify three different ways of studying the history of Han Confucianism. (shrink)

The first Ethics Bowl competition was established in the 1990s by Dr. Robert Ladenson of the Illinois Institute of Technology to help students reason through ethical challenges they will face in their personal and professional lives, and help them develop responsibilities as citizens of a democracy. Since then, the Ethics Bowl format and its pedagogical goals have been adapted to many other academic disciplines and a variety of student and professional populations. Our aim was to quantify the growth of the (...) Ethics Bowl concept by enumerating and describing extant Ethics Bowl programs, outlining both pedagogical goals and operational aspects. Using respondent-driven sampling, we identified 20 Ethics Bowl programs across the globe, reaching tens of thousands of participants annually, and an additional two programs preparing to launch in the near future. We conclude by making recommendations for pedagogical and operational dimensions of the programs. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a coherentist justification of induction along the lines of a Sellarsian coherence theory. On this coherence theory, a proposition is justified if we can answer all objections raised against it in our social practice of demanding justification and responding to such demands. On the basis of this theory of justification, I argue that we are justified in accepting the uniformity of nature partly because we have no alternative but to accept it for rationally pursuing our (...) epistemic goal. In addition, my coherentist view explains which inductive inferences it is rational to accept. Furthermore, my coherentist view also explains why we can hardly determine a particular numerical value x such that we can draw the conclusion ‘it is rational to accept that p’ from the premise ‘the numerical probability of p is greater than or equal to x’. (shrink)

It is usual to read nomina, with which three interpretations are possible. The stronger arrogates to himself the titles of moderation and justice. So in the excellent Rumanian translation of 1871 by Gavrilu J. Munteanu: ‘Cându are sâ decida pumnulu, celu mai tare si atribue titlu de moderatu şi de onestu.’.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In this paper, the author reflects on why students so frequently have the false intuition that statements like (i) “If someone is a criminal then he comes from a single parent family,” imply their converse, namely (ii) “If someone comes from a single parent family then he is a criminal.” The author argues that this intuition is not baseless. In everyday speech, conditional statements very often refer to finite populations, meaning that while (i) does not imply (ii), (i) stands in (...) an evidential relationship to (ii). That is, given a finite population, (i) implies that if someone comes from a single family home, it is more probable that he is a criminal. While teaching first order logic, however, conditional statements are treated as referring to infinite samples, which renders the evidential relationship insignificant. The author concludes by addressing why these differing interpretations of conditional statements should be taken into account when teaching logic. (shrink)

Church's thesis, that all reasonable definitions of “computability” are equivalent, is not usually thought of in terms of computability by acontinuouscomputer, of which the general-purpose analog computer (GPAC) is a prototype. Here we prove, under a hypothesis of determinism, that the analytic outputs of aC∞GPAC are computable by a digital computer.In [POE, Theorems 5, 6, 7, and 8], Pour-El obtained some related results. (The proof there of Theorem 7 depends on her Theorem 2, for which the proof in [POE] is (...) incorrect, but for which a correct proof is given in [LIR]. Also, the proof in [POE] of Theorem 8 depends on the unproved assertion that a solution of an algebraic differential equation must be analytic on an open subset of its domain. However, this assertion was later proved in [BRR].) As in [POE], we reduce the problem to a problem about solutions of certain systems of algebraic differential equations (ADE's). If such a system is nonsingular (i.e. if the “separant” does not vanish along the given solution), then the argument is very easy (see [VSD] for an even simpler situation), so that the essential difficulties arise fromsingularsystems. Our main tools in handling these difficulties are drawn from the excellent (and difficult) paper [DEL] by Denef and Lipshitz. The author especially wants to thank Leonard Lipshitz for his kind help in the preparation of the present paper.We emphasize here that our proof of the simulation result applies only to the GPAC as described below. The GPAC's form a natural subclass of the class of all analog computers, and are based on certain idealized components (“black boxes”), mostly associated with the technology of past decades. One can easily envisage other kinds of black boxes of an input-output character that would lead to different kinds of analog computers. (For example, one could incorporate delays, or spatial integrators in addition to the present temporal integrators, etc.) Whether digital simulation is possible for these “extended” analog computers poses a rich and challenging set of research questions. (shrink)

An increasingly popular view in the literature on rationality attempts to vindicate the strong normativity of rationality by giving a unifying account of rational requirements and what one ought to do in terms of reasons that fall within one’s perspective. In this paper, I pose a dilemma for such a view: one’s rationality is determined by a narrower set of reasons, such as the set of reasons that one is attending to, whereas what one ought to do is determined by (...) a broader set of reasons that comprises reasons one is not attending to. Thus, no single set of reasons can play the dual role of determining what one is rationally required to do and determining what one ought to do: either it is too broad to determine what one is rationally required to do or it is too narrow to determine what one ought to do. [*published with open access]. (shrink)

Murray N. Rothbard argued that there are many philosophic and non-philosophic arguments that provide a satisfactory basis for individual liberty. Rarely, however, did he discuss the claims of Christianity to be a suitable foundation for individual freedom. By looking at the Christian libertarians of the Old Right, between 1950 and 1971, the article contends that religious values were the most important reason for libertarians pursuing a society composed of free individuals during that period. By examining the journals Faith and Freedom, (...) Christian Economics, and the Freeman, and the positive views of Rev. Carl McIntire, the author explains the philosophy of Christian libertarianism. It is the belief that individual freedom is only the highest political end; the necessary means for God’s Creation to develop unhindered their conscience and the full ‘sacredness of their personality.’ Christian libertarians maintain that individuals cannot be coerced by government to lead a virtuous life. They must instead be persuaded, by a true understanding of the life of Jesus especially, to choose to follow the moral life sanctioned by the Bible. The desire to follow the Golden Rule voluntarily, Christian libertarians explain, is the God-given template that allows a society of individuals to live in freedom. It was this Christian ethic, Christian libertarians insist, couched in terms of the Natural Law, that inspired the founding fathers to establish a system of government where the individual is free to enjoy their ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ The article concludes by discussing Frank S. Meyer’s ‘fusionist’ attempt to find a uniting theme for traditionalists and libertarians, and suggests that it was the Christian libertarian philosophy in all but name. It also suggests that if America has any valid claim to be ‘Exceptional,’ then it is based on the nation’s traditional defence of individual freedom as a God-given grant. (shrink)

In the original publication of an article the name “Idhe” occurs incorrectly including in the very beginning, in the title of the review. Now the correct name has been published in this correction.

It is widely agreed that there is a rational requirement, “Enkrasia”, which requires that you intend what you believe you ought to do. This paper argues that Enkrasia is not an independent requirement of practical rationality: it is a special case of the requirement to be instrumentally rational. I argue for this view of Enkrasia through an analysis of an all‐things‐considered belief about what you ought to do. Believing, all‐thing‐considered, that you ought to φ implies being settled on a set (...) of options from which to take an option. I argue that this state of being settled on a set of options cannot be a matter of believing. Rather, it should be understood as intending that you do what you ought to do out of that set. If an all‐things‐considered belief implies such an intention, however, satisfying Enkrasia is a matter of satisfying the requirement to intend a necessary means to an end that you intend [*published with open access]. (shrink)

This essay defends the role of law-like explanation in the social sciences by showing that the "argument from complexity" fails to demonstrate a difference in kind between the subject matter of natural and social science. There are problems internal to the argument itself - stemming from reliance on an overly idealized view of natural scientific practice - and reason to think that, based upon an analogy with a more sophisticated understanding of natural science, which makes use of "redescriptions" in the (...) face of obstacles like complexity, we have reason to be optimistic about the prospects for a nomological social science. (shrink)

Recommender systems assist users in receiving preferred or relevant services and information. Using such technology could be instrumental in addressing the lack of relevance digital mental health apps have to the user, a leading cause of low engagement. However, the use of recommender systems for digital mental health apps, particularly those driven by personal data and artificial intelligence, presents a range of ethical considerations. This paper focuses on considerations particular to the juncture of recommender systems and digital mental health technologies. (...) While separate bodies of work have focused on these two areas, to our knowledge, the intersection presented in this paper has not yet been examined. This paper identifies and discusses a set of advantages and ethical concerns related to incorporating recommender systems into the digital mental health ecosystem. Advantages of incorporating recommender systems into DMH apps are identified as a reduction in choice overload, improvement to the digital therapeutic alliance, and increased access to personal data & self-management. Ethical challenges identified are lack of explainability, complexities pertaining to the privacy/personalization trade-off and recommendation quality, and the control of app usage history data. These novel considerations will provide a greater understanding of how DMH apps can effectively and ethically implement recommender systems. (shrink)

Never before has there been a greater need for deeper listening and more open communication to cope with the complex problems facing our organizations, businesses and societies. Renowned scientist David Bohm believed there was a better way for humanity to discover meaning and to achieve harmony. He identified creative dialogue, a sharing of assumptions and understanding, as a means by which the individual, and society as a whole, can learn more about themselves and others, and achieve a renewed sense of (...) purpose. (shrink)

"Oser examines the twentieth-century literary clash between a dogmatically relativist modernism and a robust revival of Christian humanism.

This article explores the connection between critical reading and Jurgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action. It proposes that Habermas’s criteria used for evaluating validity claims in communicative action can be applied in reading texts critically. Analyses of different types of texts are presented to show how critical reading is done in a Habermasian way. This article ends with a discussion of the application of Habermas’s theory in addressing educational issues.