Introduction: liberal-rationalism and the progress model i This study stands primarily as an essay in morals. It is governed by Nietzsche's contention that ...

This chapter discusses the importance of developing an explicitly metaphysical approach to the study of terrorism. Taking its cue from John Carroll’s Break-Out from the Crystal Palace and Terror: A Meditation on the Meaning of September 11, the chapter sheds light on the character of the “terrorist persona” as a means of understanding how individuals become capable of perpetrating crimes of horrific and indiscriminate violence. Identifying a persona that seeks self-realisation through violent overthrow of alienating moral and political institutions, the (...) chapter identifies a specific kind of terrorism that finds its origins in a misreading of Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche. (shrink)

This article argues that Durkheim's theory of suicide is deficient because of its monocausal reasoning, its conception of suicide as an action without subjects, and its characterization of preliterate societies as harmonious, self-contained, and morphologically static. It shows that these deficiencies can be overcome by including cultural and social-psychological considerations in the analysis of suicide-specifically by including culture as a causal force in its own right and drawing links between social circumstances, cultural beliefs and values, and individual dispositions. The (...) authors make their case by analyzing ethnographic and quantitative data on the preliterate Guarani-Kaiowá of southwestern Brazil, one of the most suicide-prone groups in the world. (shrink)

This article explores the psychological logics underpinning key perspectives in the ‘turn to affect’. Research on affect raises questions about the categorization of affective states, affective meaning-making, and the processes involved in the transmission of affect. I argue that current approaches risk depopulating affecting scenes, mystifying affective contagion, and authorizing questionable psychobiological arguments. I engage with the work of Sedgwick and Frank, Thrift, and Ahmed to explore these points and suggest that the concept of affective practice offers a more (...) promising social psychological grounding. Notions of affective practice are more commensurate with trends in contemporary psychobiology, explain the limits on affective contagion, and emphasize relationality and negotiation, attentive to the flow of affecting episodes. A practice approach positions affect as a dynamic process, emergent from a polyphony of intersections and feedbacks, working across body states, registrations and categorizations, entangled with cultural meaning-making, and integrated with material and natural processes, social situations and social relationships. (shrink)

Using interviews and group discussions, researchers and students from the Free University of Berlin and psychological practitioners work together in a project called 'The Analysis of Psychological Practice', theoretically based on 'Critical Psychology'. The aim is to find out whether and how practitioners deal with the contradictions between experimental-statistical orientation of traditional academic psychology and the single-case-orientation of psychological practice. Can practitioners relate to 'scientific' psychology at all? How do they deal with the contradiction that psychological (...) practitioners are expected to cure psychological problems without having the possibility to change objective conditions with reference to which alone psychological problems are understandable? How are 'official' academic or clinical theories and individual or team-related experiences combined? What can we learn from the explication and development of a 'social-subjective knowledge of the context and contradictions' of professional practitioners of psychology? We discuss theoretical foundations and problems in the empirical development of the project, and resent - from our workshop - three examples or dimensions of our work: life problems, problems of and alternatives to traditional diagnostics, and common sense normative ideas in the guise of psychological theories. (shrink)

Reviews the book, Animal models of human psychology: Critique of science, ethics, and policy by Kenneth J. Shapiro . The principle focus of most of this text is on the present-day use of animals in psychological research. In particular, Shapiro examines contemporary animal models of eating disorders, showing how psychology came to rely so heavily on animal models in the first place and how prevalent scientific attitudes about the use of animals in the laboratory have taken shape over (...) the past several decades. In addition, he traces the recent rise of the animal rights movement and highlights the several philosophies upon which it is based. Drawing upon certain historical and empirical analyses, as well as certain themes in contemporary sociology of knowledge, Shapiro attempts to navigate his reader through the twin minefields of impassioned rhetoric and insufficiently examined conceptual commitment to a better understanding of the core issues surrounding the role of animals in scientific psychological investigation. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

One aim of this essay is to understand why white evangelical Christians, more than any other religious adherents in the United States, are deeply invested in denying the emergency of anthropogenic climate change and in obstructing action to address anthropogenic climate change. Michael S. Hogue, in his recent book, American Immanence, blames a religious imaginary he names the “redeemer symbolic.” This symbolic complex inspires the devotion of the politically powerful white evangelical Christian and nationalist movement in the United States at (...) the present time. A second aim of the essay is to analyze the redeemer symbolic. Through a reading of Maurice Sendak’s much-loved illustrated children’s book, Where the Wild Things Are, the essay suggests that U.S. white evangelical devotees of the redeemer symbolic share a kind of inability to come to terms with a vital and ineliminable wildness in persons and cultures; further, that this inability correlates with a political-theological failure, even refusal, to grasp the emergency of anthropogenic climate change. The essay first explicates the redeemer symbolic, with a particular focus on its implication in the legitimation of climate skepticism. Then, with the aid of key concepts from the psychoanalytic theory of D.W. Winnicott, it interprets the story of Max, the protagonist in Where the Wild Things Are, as a fable of healthy development of what Winnicott calls “transitional space” and a related “capacity to be alone.” Unsuccessful development of those resources, it is suggested, contributes to an account of why adherents of the redeemer symbolic typically refuse wildness and thus may be prone to climate negligence. More importantly, though, recognizing the cultural-psychological importance of “wild things” may help fire imaginative ways around the obstructiveness of the redeemer symbolic, to more effectively address climate change in particular, and human well-being in nature in general. (shrink)

Do mainstream psychologists think critically? And are the many critiques of the mainstream made by its critics “on target”? Answering both questions requires consensus about what critical thinking consists in, and there seems to be little consensus in sight. I begin by accepting Slife, Yanchar, and Reber's claim that “rigorous thinking” itself is insufficient for critical thinking in and about psychology, and I then consider various suggestions made by critics of the mainstream about thematic assumptions that should be included in (...) critical thinking about the mainstream. After identifying three areas of mainstream research in which some of these assumptions seem to have been challenged from within the mainstream, I conclude by considering how both critique and metacritique may be combined, repositioned, and/or recontextualized, to advance the important cause of critical thinking in and about psychology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The subject matter of psychology is humans and their experiences and actions. This subject matter differs from the subject matter of physical science by being more highly contextualized, uncertain, and morally saturated. As a consequence, psychological theory must concern itself with context and moral significance and with the formulation of principles rather than causal laws. The development of psychological theory can be assisted by programs of inquiry that emphasize conceptual clarification and moral consideration, in addition to empirical demonstration. (...) Programs of inquiry in psychology also should place a high value on reasoned criticism derivative from a wider array of scholarly methods and traditions. In all of this, psychology should be guided first and foremost by the nature of its subject matter. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This book proposes a series of interconnected arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves the use of a 'folk' or 'commonsense' psychology. Ratcliffe suggests that folk psychology, construed as the attribution of internal mental states in order to predict and explain behaviour, is a theoretically motivated and misleading abstraction from social life. He draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology to offer an alternative account that emphasizes patterned interactions between people in shared social situations.

Reviews the general orientation of cognitive psychology, some contemporary difficulties and problems noted by cognitive psychologists, and apparent commonalities between phenomenological and cognitive psychologies. It is argued that the problems of cognitive psychology are inevitable consequences of its natural scientific orientation, which is far more traditional than it is revolutionary. A phenomenologically based, human science approach to psychology is offered as a solution of fundamental disciplinary problems. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

This early study is a key work, along with several other preliminary essays, for understanding the genesis of Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Well translated and with an excellent introduction and notes, the book contains the critical thesis that former theories of the imagination confused perception with imagination, and that imagination was properly recognized first by Husserl and was subsequently further clarified by Sartre in his notion of the nihilating consciousness. --E. S. C.

Popper's three?world doctrine differs significantly from an earlier position which insisted on a dualism of facts and norms. This dualism, combined with a hostility to that version of psychologism which holds that logical principles are descriptive psychological laws, initially led him to espouse the view that we are free to reject rules of inference as norms shaping our reasoning. However, in some formulations of his recently developed pluralistic epistemology, Popper appears to deny this freedom to the individual. Feyerabend has (...) condemned him for this. My critique conflicts with Feyerabend's, in that I develop an alternative view of the relationship between logic and psychology which retains the compulsive aspect of the third realm, but rejects that version of anti?psychologism which holds that truths of logic do not have normative implications for people's psychological states. More specifically, it is argued that it is logically possible, though logically impermissible, for people to be irrational: the categories of logic are inescapably evaluative and critical. (shrink)

An English translation of Politzer's 1928 critique of psychoanalysis. Contents Include: The Kalevala Metre and its Development; The Ingrian Epic Poem and its Models; The Wife-Killer Theme in Karelian and Russian Songs; Ale, Spirits, and Patterns of Mythical Fantasy; Song in Ritual Context: North Karelian Wedding Songs; Women's Songs and Reality.

This paper criticises evidence-based practice in psychology (EBPP) for not actually being a tripartite model. According to the American Psychological Association, EBPP is defined as the integration of the best available research with clinical expertise in the context of patient characteristics, culture, and preferences. Nonetheless, EBPP fails to be a tripartite model because it is defined by science alone. This paper aims at explaining why this conflation may have come about. It also shows why clinical expertise and patient preferences (...) should be defined extra-scientifically. (shrink)

This essay is one of ten contributions to a special editorial feature in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 49.2, in which authors were invited to address the following questions: What is the future of Nietzsche studies? What are the most pressing questions its scholars should address? What texts and issues demand our urgent attention? And as we turn to these issues, what methodological and interpretive principles should guide us? The editorship hopes this collection will provide a starting point for discussions (...) about the most fruitful directions for Nietzsche scholarship to take and the most promising avenues for building on the best recent work. (shrink)

The paper critically reconstructs the crowd psychological heritage in phenomenological and social science emotion research. It shows how the founding figures of phenomenology and sociology uncritically adopted Le Bon’s crowd psychological imagery as well as what I suggest calling the disease model of emotion transfer. Against this background, it can be examined how Le Bon’s understanding of emotional contagion as an automatic, involuntary, and uncontrollable mechanism has remained a dominant force in emotion research until today. However, a closer (...) look at phenomenological descriptions and empirical investigations of how emotion’s spread shows that there is little evidence supporting Le Bon’s crowd psychological framework. Thus, I suggest that the disease model should be dismissed in favor of more plausible approaches to interpersonal emotion dynamics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Kant's Target The First and Second Edition Versions of the Paralogisms Logical Subject versus Substantial Subject Logical versus Substantial Simplicity of the Subject Materialism, Spiritualism, Immaterialism Logical versus Substantial Identity of the Subject The Thinking Subject and the Existence of External Objects From Rational Psychology to Empirical Psychology From Logical Subject to Moral Subject Conclusion.

This paper explores the relationship between empirical psychology, transcendental critique, and phenomenology in Kant’s discussion of respect for the moral law, particularly as that is found in the Critique of Practical Reason. I first offer an empirical-psychological reading of moral respect, in the context of which I distinguish transcendental and empirical perspectives on moral action and defend H. J. Paton’s claim that moral motivation can be seen from two points of view, where “from one point of view, (...) [respect] is the cause of our action, but from another point of view the moral law is its ground.” Then, after a discussion of a distinction between first- and second-order transcendental/practical perspectives where reasons for action are first-order practical judgments while the conditions of possibility for those reasons’ authority are expressed in second-order judgments, I turn to a third kind of perspective: the properly phenomenological one. I explain the general notion of Kantian phenomenology with an example of the experience of time from Kant’s Anthropology before applying this to a phenomenological reading of the discussion of respect in the Critique of Practical Reason. I end by noting that on my account, in contrast to that of Jeanine Grenberg, the distinctive phenomenology of respect is not systematically important for grounding claims in moral philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues that the new science of positive psychology is founded on a whole series of fallacious arguments; these involve circular reasoning, tautology, failure to clearly define or properly apply terms, the identification of causal relations where none exist, and unjustified generalisation. Instead of demonstrating that positive attitudes explain achievement, success, well-being and happiness, positive psychology merely associates mental health with a particular personality type: a cheerful, outgoing, goal-driven, status-seeking extravert.

An empirically based version of the good life as proposed by positive psychology is a donut with something missing at the core--the moral map. This paper addresses ramifications of this lacuna, and suggests ways to narrow the gap between science and life. By applying an extended version of the self-regulation theory of Higgins to a cross cultural analysis of the good life as envisioned by Seligman and Confucius, respectively, this paper sheds light on the culturally encapsulated value judgments behind positive (...) psychology, examines issues at stake in an empirically based version of the good life, and suggests, for future research, alternative approaches that may better fulfill the promises of positive psychology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Thought experimental methods play a central role in empirical moral psychology. Against the increasingly common interpretation of recent experimental data, I argue that such methods cannot demonstrate that moral intuitions are produced by reflexive computations that are implicit, fast, and largely automatic. I demonstrate, in contrast, that evaluating thought experiments occurs at a near-glacial pace relative to the speed at which reflexive information processing occurs in a human brain. So, these methods allow for more reflective and deliberative processing than has (...) commonly been assumed. However, these methods may still provide insight into some human strategies for navigating unfamiliar moral dilemmas. (shrink)

Teo describes two centuries of challenges to mainstream psychological thinking along with the mainstream's reactions.

In this accessible integration of psychology and theology, Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe offers a comprehensive understanding of personhood from both perspectives, examining the intersection of biblical perspectives with established theories of social development as proposed by Erik Erikson, B. F. Skinner, Evoluntionary Psychology, and more.

This chapter contains sections titled: Epicurean Empiricism Critiques of Cartesianism Conclusion.

In this paper, I critique arguments made by philosopher David Buller against central evolutionary-psychological explanations of human mating. Specifically, I aim to rebut his criticisms of Evolutionary Psychology regarding (1) women's long-term mating preferences for high-status men; (2) the evolutionary rationale behind men's provisioning of women; (3) men's mating preferences for young women; (4) women's adaptation for extra-pair sex; (5) the sex-differentiated evolutionary theory of human jealousy; and (6) the notion of mate value. In sum, I aim to (...) demonstrate that Buller's arguments contra Evolutionary Psychologists are left wanting. (shrink)

The Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS) task force was assembled by the American Psychological Association (APA) to guide policy on the role of psychologists in interrogations at foreign detention centers for the purpose of U.S. national security. The task force met briefly in 2005, and its report was quickly accepted by the APA Board of Directors and deemed consistent with the APA Ethics Code by the APA Ethics Committee. This rapid acceptance was unusual for a number of (...) reasons but primarily because of the APA's long-standing tradition of taking great care in developing ethical policies that protected anyone who might be impacted by the work of psychologists. Many psychological and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as reputable journalists, believed the risk of harm associated with psychologist participation in interrogations at these detention centers was not adequately addressed by the report. The present critique analyzes the assumptions of the PENS report and its interpretations of the APA Ethics Code. We demonstrate that it presents only one (and not particularly representative) side of a complex set of ethical issues. We conclude with a discussion of more appropriate psychological contributions to national security and world peace that better respect and preserve human rights. (shrink)

(1980). A critique of the laws of moral psychology in Rawls’ a theory of justice. World Futures: Vol. 16, Nationalism in an Interdependent World II, pp. 281-300.

Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already (...) constitute a form of inference and hence undermine the possibility of noninferential justification. The goal of my paper is to defend foundationalism against Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism. After presenting his challenge, I first argue that the most promising objection to it fails. This objection makes the case that defeater-defeaters are not part of the justification, but merely preserve the justification which the original claim provides. I object to this argument by distinguishing between weak and robust defeaters; only weak defeaters, I argue, fall outside the scope of justification, and it is an open question whether Sinnott-Armstrong’s defeaters fall into that category. This leads the way to my own criticism of Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge: foundationalists in moral epistemology are entitled to the use of defeater-defeaters as part of the justification for moral beliefs as long as those defeater-defeaters themselves do not entail moral claims. Therefore, Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge does not undermine foundationalism. (shrink)

Learning and development are well established as concepts in educational psychology. Gert Biesta has used terms such as “learnification” and “developmentalism” to describe a tendency that, in his view, removes existential qualities from teaching and education. Although important in the right contexts, the concepts do not represent the core of what education should be about, he claims. Jostein Sæther notes that in many ways he shares Biesta's view on the most fundamental quality of education, i.e., helping young people exist as (...) independent subjects in confrontation with their own will, responsibility, and freedom. In this paper, he addresses the overarching question of whether it is possible and desirable to think educationally about psychology in educational theory, specifically through relating Biesta's critique to selected handbooks, reviews, and metaliterature. Sæther does not propose integrating educational psychology into Biesta's existential theory but rather hopes to open a dialogue on different points of view that challenge each other in fruitful ways. The process of discussing certain principles, problems, and examples should yield a certain kind of “unclean” educational psychology, one that is relevant to “subjectification.” There are problems related to eclecticism and the tension between essence and existence, yet, in this context, Sæther sees a dialogical project as the only way forward. (shrink)

More than two decades after his seminal paper ‘Subjective Well-Being’, Ed Diener wrote that he substituted happiness with well-being to obtain scientific credibility. Are the arguments echoed in positive psychology rigorous enough to justify this substitution? This article focuses on the historical examination of the word happiness, covering the lexical universes of ancient Greek, Latin, and English, seeking to identify the connections between them. We found that arguments for such substitution are sustained by a fragile appreciation of the semantic depth (...) of happiness. Although it favors quantification, the current understanding of well-being obliterates the plurality of the debate about happiness and the recognition of other ideals of life. Thus, we conclude that well-being and happiness are semantically close, but conceptually, metaphysically, and empirically distinct, demanding, as objects, particular investigations. (shrink)

Positive psychology is one of the biggest growth industries in the discipline of psychology. At the present time, the subfield of 'positive education' seems poised to take the world of education and teacher training by storm. In this first book-length philosophical study of positive psychology, Professor Kristján Kristjánsson subjects positive psychology's recent inroads into virtue theory and virtue education to sustained conceptual and moral scrutiny. Professor Kristjánsson's interdisciplinary perspective constructively integrates insights, evidence and considerations from social science and philosophy in (...) a way that is easily accessible to the general reader. He offers an extended critique of positive psychology generally and 'positive education' in particular, exploring the philosophical assumptions, underpinnings and implications of these academic trends in detail. This provocative book will excite anyone interested in cutting-edge research on positive psychology and on the virtues that lie at the intersection of psychology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, education, and daily life. (shrink)

The essay attempts to contextualize the German-Scandinavian tradition of Critical Psychology (GSCP) that bases on Cultural-Historical Activity Theory in today's critical psychologies. It is argued that adding to a psychology and ideology critique the positive dimension of ”foundational” theory is important to counteract the currently prevailing “negative” ideology of liberalism. It is also claimed that an ”instrumental” version of critical psychology, which takes up elements from psychology for tactical purposes will remain dependent on the given discipline of psychology and (...) unable to reflect on its own subject position. GSCP is then rendered as developing the Marxist ontology of social practice (rather than its utopianism) toward a concept of a subjectivity constituted in social practice but with the criteria of action potency and productive needs on the part of the individual. It is suggested that this approach solves important problems in contemporary critical psychology. Finally, it is described how GSCP, too, might grow from the encounter, by developing a theory of collective subjectivity to include – us. (shrink)

I focus on two main points in Ian Proops’s reading of Kant’s Paralogisms of Pure Reason: the structure of the paralogisms in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and the changes in Kant’s exposition of the paralogisms from A to B. I agree with Proops that there are defects in the A exposition and that Kant attempted to correct those defects in B. But I argue that Proops fails to give its due to what remains fundamental (...) in both editions: Kant’s criticism of the rational psychologist’s confusion between the subjective (albeit universally subjective) standpoint thinkers have on themselves just in virtue of thinking, and the objective, metaphysical standpoint on a thinking thing. In short, Proops fails to give sufficient attention to Kant’s opening statement in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason: ‘“I think” is the sole text of rational psychology’. (shrink)

Psychological hedonism is the theory that all of our actions are ultimately motivated by a desire for our own pleasure or an aversion to our own pain. Peirce offers a unique critique of PH based on a descriptive analysis of self-controlled action. This essay examines Peirce's critique and his accounts of self-controlled action and of desire.

Introducing the concept of tradition and its importance for critical-intellectual development, traditions of radical philosophy and psychology are presented. Emphasizing the role of Marxist and post-Marxist thought in various critical approaches, critical programs are presented as theoretical endeavors that share the critique of ideology. These approaches examine knowledge production and knowledge biases in the sciences and psychology from the perspective of social categories or in terms of power. It is suggested that critical thinking in psychology could benefit from incorporating (...) categories from this tradition. Consequences for critical thinking in psychology are discussed. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)