This book contains lectures from the International Conference on Human Rights and Biomedicine, held in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, December 10-12, 2008. The conference was organized by the Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Erasmus Observatory on Health Law. Eminent scholars from a variety of disciplines - medicine, law, ethics, and philosophy - discuss the meaning of underlying principles of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) and the fundamental rights in healthcare, contemporary dilemmas in (...) healthcare (policy), and the Convention's impact on national health legislation and daily practice. In particular, the contributions discuss the following topics: human rights and health ethics, equitable access to health care, medical research, human genetics, and organ transplants. (shrink)

This book contains a collection of treaty documents and soft law on health care rights and health ethics which are used in health law training programs. Regional documents and explanatory reports on health care rights, which are derived from international human rights law, provide a way of "unwrapping" government obligations in health care, making rights more specific, accessible, and (judicially) accountable. In addition, soft law declarations and medical ethics contribute to understanding the moral meaning of human rights in health care. (...) As such, the principles and standards provide practical guidance for States when dealing with equal access to health care services, the rights of patients, biomedical research, organ donations and transplants, genetics, and public health. The book covers the basic documents, while general comments and explanatory reports amplify the principles embodied in the human rights treaties. The authoritative interpretations clarify a 'European approach' on a State's obligations concerning health care rights and ethics. (shrink)

In the Netherlands, access to healthcare has been guaranteed by social health insurance legislation. But since the introduction of the Health Insurance Act in the 1960s, the health insurance system has been in a state of flux. Numerous reforms have changed the system gradually, of which the latest is the introduction of a competitive health insurance scheme for the entire population.Cutting across the various reforms has, however, been the goal of access to healthcare services as defined by international treaty law, (...) including European Union law. In particular the leverage of Community law in strengthening the patient’s right to healthcare is remarkable. Since the European Court of Justice has accepted that healthcare should be considered as a service in terms of the EC Treaty, rights to healthcare have become inextricably linked with the free movement principles and are no longer restricted to the jurisdiction of the country of origin. (shrink)

Too often, the right to healthcare has been considered an illusory right that is not even a legal right, but merely an aspirational norm that cannot be adjudicated before the court. In modern human rights law, considering individual and social rights as interdependent and indivisible, such an approach is untenable. Both legal doctrine and recent case law from domestic and international courts have elaborated and confirmed the specific obligations under the right to healthcare, countering the general complaint of “shrouded vagueness”. (...) Landmark cases have even provided a functional remedy to enforce individual healthcare claims successfully. This paper will examine the revised legal status and content of such a right to healthcare from a European perspective. (shrink)

Este artigo reexamina o posto de Ramon Llull na história da pregação da Baixa Idade Média ocidental, tendo em vista as novas abordagens sobre o tema da pregação e sua relação com o espaço do político. Discute-se também o projeto luliano de fundação de uma Ordem militar unificada cuja finalidade era dar suporte à pregação e conversão do infiel consoante a função eclesial da cavalaria cristã. O estudo da concepção luliana de conversão do muçulmano exige uma posição metodológica cuidadosa, uma (...) vez que envolve sentimentos ligados à alteridade, à violência e à intolerância. Diante disso, evitar-se-á qualquer dissociação entre discurso e seus enunciadores, certo de que a violência se origina das relações sociais, não de pensamentos coletivos transistóricos descolados de uma específica situação espaciotemporal. As obras lulianas são apologéticas e polemistas e, por isso, não podem ser tomadas por descrições imediatas de uma suposta mentalidade intolerante ou persecutória, característica de um medievo anárquico, mas, ao contrário, registros, isto é, mediações em que certa retórica está sendo mobilizada para a promoção de interesses de certos sujeitos em detrimento de outros; é um jogo de poder em que alguns sujeitos se autolegitimam enquanto procuram deslegitimar os outros. (shrink)

Tous les philosophes reconnaissent que tous les hommes aspirent au bonheur mais ils se divisent en deux groupes. Les premiers affirment le caractère illusoire ou accessoire du bonheur au regard de fins supérieures. Pour Pascal, l'homme est impuissant à atteindre le bonheur ; sa quête est la marque et la trace d'un vide que seul Dieu peut remplir. Selon Kant, le bonheur est un concept indéterminé et purement empirique, idéal de l'imagination ; s'il en fait son but, l'individu ne répond (...) pas à l'impératif moral qui est de prendre pour fin le bonheur d'autrui. Kant reconnaît qu'exiger de chacun le sacrifice de son propre bonheur est une maxime contradictoire. Il professe aussi que seule la vertu rend digne du bonheur, mais doit admettre que dans le monde il n'y a pas de lien nécessaire entre la moralité et le bonheur. Pour échapper à ces apories, la raison pratique doit postuler l'immortalité de l'âme et l'existence de Dieu. Les seconds récusent cette hypothèque religieuse et prônent l'acceptation de la vie et la confiance en la raison comme guide dans la conduite de l'existence et la recherche du bonheur. Ils invitent à aimer la vie telle qu'elle nous est donnée et à jouir de son être comme Montaigne le recommande au chapitre XIII du Livre III des Essais. L'indispensable corrélat est de recourir à «la raison vigilante qui recherche avec soin les motifs de ce qu'il faut choisir et de ce qu'il faut éviter et rejette les vaines opinions à cause desquelles le plus grand trouble s'empare des âmes» (Epicure, Lettre à Ménécée). Cet essai s'inscrit dans cette filiation et vise à esquisser une démarche possible. Tout bonheur ne peut être cherché qu'à travers la confrontation avec l'existence. Elle comporte de nombreuses épreuves : consentir aux limites qui enserrent notre condition, dépasser les figures obligées qui se répètent dans nos parcours, assumer les difficultés des relations avec autrui, écarter les illusions dont la dissipation est amère. A l'issue de ce cheminement, il incombe à chacun d'inventer ses propres règles, de tracer son itinéraire afin de saisir les promesses de la vie et de l'art. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of some recent theories of truth. The theories fall into three groups: The Revision Theories, the context-sensitive theories, and the "Chrysippian theories". ;The "Chrysippian theories" are based on the intuition that pathologicalities arising from the concept of truth can be recognized and acknowledged with the concept of truth itself. Thus, from the pathologicality of the Liar, for example, we can conclude that the Liar is not true. This leads to immediate difficulties since the Liar claims (...) just that--that it is not true--and it would thus seem to be true. The Chrysippian theories are designed to avoid these difficulties while preserving the motivating intuition. Haim Gaifman's Pointer Semantics, and Brian Skyrms' Intensional Fixed-Point Theory of Truth are examples of such theories. They are exposited and criticized. ;The context-sensitive theories dealt with are Tyler Burge's Indexical Theory of Truth and the theory of Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy. These theories claim that an ambiguity due to a contextual parameter is the reason for the difficulties we encounter. Burge offers a theory of Tarskian levels coupled with a pragmatic theory that explains the assignment of levels to occurrences of 'true'. Barwise and Etchemendy make explicit a situational parameter in their account of propositions. They consider the ambiguity with respect to the situation a propositions is about a main source of the paradoxes. ;Finally, the Revision Theories of Truth of Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap and two variations of this theory are considered. One is due to Aladdin Yaqub, the other, the "fully-varied theory", is due to Gupta and Belnap but remains largely unexplored. Revision theories are put forward as the most promising account of the difficulties. They are based on a definitional reading of all Tarski biconditionals. The circularity implied by such a reading is handled by Gupta's and Belnap's general theory of definitions. ;Yaqub's objections raised against the standard theory are examined, and his proposed solution is shown to be inadequate. The fully-varied Revision Theory is shown to provide a better solution. (shrink)

Logic; Predicate calculus; Axiomatic systems; Knowledge representation and reasoning; Logic and revisable reasoning; Formal grammars and logic programming; Prolog and logic programming.

Philosophical critiques are prone to relapse into a sort of entrenchment in which the basic elements of a philosophy are kept from exposure, so that instead of advancing, philosophy easily becomes compartmentalized into specific trends. This article thus seeks the conditions of a non-entrenched, open-field philosophical critique in general and, in particular, of an open-field critique of Harman’s OOO (object-oriented ontology). For that purpose, the idea of precariousness is introduced, which is then confronted with some ideas concerning philosophical critique and (...) practice, in particular those of François Laruelle. Since we can find in Harman’s OOO an outline of what we call here an open-field critique, the field of combat against Harman will be the one concerning the idea of an open field itself. (shrink)

Let S∞ denote the topological group of permutations of the natural numbers. A closed subgroup G of S∞ is called oligomorphic if for each n, its natural action on n-tuples of natural numbers has onl...

Este trabalho tem por objetivo demonstrar elementos argumentativos apresentados por Kant em seu trabalho final: Opus Postumum, que comprovaria a tentativa de Kant em desenvolver ali uma dedução, contudo, demonstraremos que esta dedução em desenvolvimento no Opus articula elementos que a aproximaria significativamente da dedução transcendental de 1781. Com isto, temos a comprovação que no Opus há uma reavaliação da parte subjetiva da dedução transcendental exposta na primeira edição da Crítica, o que incide numa retomada desta investigação subjetiva por Kant, (...) buscando nesta a tentativa de preenchimento da lacuna que ele considera impedir o fechamento de seu sistema. (shrink)

On peut distinguer, dans l'histoire du marxisme contemporain, deux tendances qui n'ont cessé de se confronter sous des formes plus ou moins radicales et qui tiennent à deux lectures apparemment inconciliables de l'oeuvre de Marx. La première, selon laquelle le marxisme se résorbe essentiellement en une théorie scientifique , en une sociologie . Cette tendance trouve son expression culminante dans l'althussérisme, dans le primat des relations constitutives de la structure sociale sur les individus-sujets. La seconde, qui veut que le marxisme (...) soit d'abord et avant tout un humanisme et/ou une philosophie de la praxis, tout travail théorique se trouvant subordonné à sa visée historico-pratique : celle de l'instauration de rapports sociaux dans lesquels seraient abolis les rapports d'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme. Poser la question de l'existence d'une éthique marxiste, c'est tenter de résoudre théoriquement cette épineuse dichotomie entre l'objectivisme des « déterminations » sociales des représentations de conscience morales et la capacité des individus-sujets de produire un ordre social, d'orienter le développement historique conformément à ces représentations . Pour un matérialiste, n'y a-t-il pas là une contradiction interne au marxisme? L'auteur de l'article a tenté de faire voir, à travers quelques propositions sommaires, comment une telle contradiction peut être dépassée.In the history of contemporary Marxism one can distinguish two conflicting tendencies which continue to confront each other in a more or less radical manner, and which give rise to two apparently irreconcilable readings of Marx's work. The first is that by which Marxism is essentially absorbed into a scientific theory , into a sociology. This tendency finds its ultimate expression in 'althussérisme', in the primacy of the constituent relations of the social structure involving individual subjects. In the second, which sees Marxism as essentially humanist and/or a philosophy of praxis, all theoretical work is subordinated to the practical-historical aim, that of establishing social relations in which the exploitation of persons by persons will be done away with. To ask whether a Marxist ethic exists is an attempt to resolve theoretically this thorny dichotomy between the objectivism of the social determinants of the prescriptions of moral conscience, and the capacity of individual subjects to produce a social order to orient historical development in accordance with these prescriptions. For a materialist, is there not here an apparent contradiction within Marxism? The author has attempted to clarify, by means of a few succinct propositions, how such a contradiction may be resolved. (shrink)

The paradox of propositions, presented in Appendix B of Russell's The Principles of Mathematics (1903), is usually taken as Russell's principal motive, at the time, for moving from a simple to a ramified theory of types. I argue that this view is mistaken. A closer study of Russell's correspondence with Frege reveals that Russell carne to adopt a very different resolution of the paradox, calling into question not the simplicity of his early type theory but the simplicity of his early (...) theory of propositions. (shrink)

Why is it that forgetting moral knowledge, unlike other paradigmatic examples of knowledge, seems so deeply absurd? Previous authors have given accounts whereby moral forgetting in itself either is uniformly absurd and impossible (Gilbert Ryle, Adam Bugeja) or is possible and only the speech act is absurd (Sarah McGrath). Considering findings in moral psychology and the experimental philosophy of personal identity, I argue that the knowledge of some moral truths—especially those that are emotional, widely held, subjectively important, and contribute to (...) social relationships—cannot be forgotten because they’re too tightly tied to one’s true self. Moral knowledge at the level of individual propositions, when it does not have these attributes and so is not so tied to the agent’s identity, can sometimes be forgotten. I identify two such cases: (1) where the moral knowledge results partly from an emotional trigger that has been forgotten, and (2) where the moral knowledge results partly from a process of reflection that has been forgotten. (shrink)

1. Partir en philosophie -- 2. La condition humaine.

Il apparaîtra, en des termes explicites, que nous cherchons, prioritairement, à nous distinguer de cette lecture à livre ouvert, immédiate, qui caractérise une certaine école du commentaire de l'œuvre, qui suppose que la vérité du ...