The paper deals with Aquinas’ theory of intentional forms, so-called species, insofar as it gives an account of the validity of human cognitive acts. Its focus is on the objectivity of knowledge and the basis of radical (Cartesian) scepticism, therefore the comparisons to the modern theory of ideas are employed. However, the author’s aim is not a defence against scepticism; her aim is rather to provide certain insights into its origins. -/- .

The paper deals with Aquinas’ theory of intentional forms, so-called species, insofar as it gives an account of the validity of human cognitive acts. Its focus is on the objectivity of knowledge and the basis of radical (Cartesian) scepticism, therefore the comparisons to the modern theory of ideas are employed. However, the author’s aim is not a defence against scepticism; her aim is rather to provide certain insights into its origins. -/- .

John Christman has argued that constitutively relational accounts of autonomy, as defended by some feminist theorists, are problematically perfectionist about the human good. I argue that autonomy is constitutively relational, but not in a way that implies perfectionism: autonomy depends on a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external, critical perspectives on one's action-guiding commitments. This type of relationality carries no substantive value commitments, yet it does answer to core feminist concerns about autonomy.

Human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are three-dimensional in vitro cell cultures that mimic the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. In just a few years this technique has produced brain models that are already being used to study diseases of the nervous system and to test treatments and drugs. Currently, HCOs consist of tens of millions of cells and have a size of a few millimeters. The greatest limitation to further development is due to their lack of vascularization. (...) However, recent research has shown that human cerebral organoids can manifest the same electrical activity and connections between brain neurons and EEG patterns as those recorded in preterm babies. All this suggests that, in the future, HCOs may manifest an ability to experience basic sensations such as pain, therefore manifesting sentience, or even rudimentary forms of consciousness. This calls for consideration of whether cerebral organoids should be given a moral status and what limitations should be introduced to regulate research. In this article I focus particularly on the study of the emergence and mechanisms of human consciousness, i.e. one of the most complex scientific problems there are, by means of experiments on HCOs. This type of experiment raises relevant ethical issues and, as I will argue, should probably not be considered morally acceptable. (shrink)

In order to accommodate for the present shortage of oocyte donors, oocyte-donation programs place ads in college newspapers and provide large monetary compensation to encourage participation. Large compensation acts as a strong incentive for young women to undergo the potentially risky procedure of donation. In this enticing situation, it is particularly important for programs to fully inform prospective donors of the risks of the procedure so that they can accurately weigh the costs and benefits of donating. However, because oocyte-donor programs (...) must alleviate the shortage of donors if they wish to maintain a financially viable business, there is reason to fear that they may minimize or misrepresent risks when recruiting egg donors. In this pilot study, the risk information provided by programs (n=19) to prospective oocyte donors in a preliminary phone call inquiry was investigated. The majority of the programs provided incomplete and/or inaccurate risk information. Policy changes are recommended to reduce the potential for undue influence and to standardize and regulate the risk information provided to prospective egg donors. (shrink)

Gao presents a new mentalistic reformulation of the well-known measurement problem affecting the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. According to this author, it is essentially a determinate-experience problem, namely a problem about the compatibility between the linearity of the Schrödinger’s equation, the fundamental law of quantum theory, and definite experiences perceived by conscious observers. In this essay I aim to clarify that the well-known measurement problem is a mathematical consequence of quantum theory’s formalism, and that its mentalistic variant does not (...) grasp the relevant causes which are responsible for this puzzling issue. The first part of this paper will be concluded claiming that the “physical” formulation of the measurement problem cannot be reduced to its mentalistic version. In the second part of this work it will be shown that, contrary to the case of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and GRW theories provide clear explanations of the physical processes responsible for the definite localization of macroscopic objects and, consequently, for well-defined perceptions of measurement outcomes by conscious observers. More precisely, the macro-objectification of states of experimental devices is obtained exclusively in virtue of their clear ontologies and dynamical laws without any intervention of human observers. Hence, it will be argued that in these theoretical frameworks the measurement problem and the determinate-experience problem are logically distinct issues. (shrink)

In der zeitgenössischen Erkenntnistheorie ist die Idee verbreitet, dass der Erwerb von Wissen davon abhängig ist, dass das Subjekt des Wissens an einer bestimmten Lebensform teilhat, die grundlegender als sein Wissen ist. Das ist eine Lesart der Position Wittgensteins, deren exemplarischer Vertreter etwa Stanley Cavell ist. Meine These dagegen lautet, dass die Lebensformtheorie einem erkenntnistheoretischen Dogma aufruht, dessen Überwindung Wittgensteins eigentliches Anliegen war: Es ist das Dogma, dass die grundlegende Bedeutung des Wissensbegriffs in der Beschreibung eines einzelnen Aktes besteht, und (...) nicht in der Beschreibung von etwas, das auf einer logisch anderen Ebene steht: nämlich einer Fähigkeit. Damit soll nicht bestritten werden, dass die Idee einer bestimmten Lebensform wesentlich ist für die Beschreibung erkenntnisfähiger Subjekte. Doch diese ist nicht grundlegender als die Idee des Wissens selbst. (shrink)

I formulate and criticise a condition that captures some recent ideas on the nature of pretence, namely, the disbelief condition. According to an initial understanding of this condition, an agent who is pretending that P must also disbelieve that P. I criticise this idea by proposing a counterexample showing that an agent may be in a state of pretence that does not imply disbelief in what is pretended. I also draw some general conclusions about the nature of pretence.

One of the major issues for user assistance systems consists of “providing help at an appropriate level”. In this paper we analyze the problem of modeling task experience — a prerequisite for provisioning adequate help. In contrast to level-based approaches we propose an ontology-based model, which allows fine-grained modeling of task experience using the concepts of the task domain as granules. The model is semantic in the sense that it allows to take advantage of the relations between concepts to provide (...) novel semantic services and interactions. We present the SACHS (Semantic Annotations for a Controlling Help System, a semantic help system for a spreadsheet-based financial controlling system) software as an exemplary application of the proposed task experience model. (shrink)

We present original remarks on some possible applications of classical results of Calculus. Suggestions to the higher schools teachers are also given.

Until is a notoriously difficult temporal operator as it is both existential and universal at the same time: A∪B holds at the current time instant w iff either B holds at w or there exists a time instant w' in the future at which B holds and such that A holds in all the time instants between the current one and ẃ. This “ambivalent” nature poses a significant challenge when attempting to give deduction rules for until. In this paper, in (...) contrast, we make explicit this duality of until by introducing a new temporal operator ∇ that allows us to formalize the “history” of until, i.e., the “internal” universal quantification over the time instants between the current one and ẃ. This approach provides the basis for formalizing deduction systems for temporal logics endowed with the until operator. For concreteness, we give here a labeled natural deduction system N(LTL∇) for a linear-time logic LTL∇ endowed with the new history operator. We show that LTL∇ is equivalent to the linear temporal logic LTL with until, which follows by formalizing back and forth translations between the two logics. We also define an indirect translation from LTL∇ into LTL via temporal logics with past operators; such a result provides an upper bound to the problem of satisfiability for LTL∇ formulas. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize Claude Romano’s recent characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology as a form of Cartesianism. Contra Romano, Husserl is not committed to the view that since individual things in the world are dubitable, then the world as a whole is dubitable. On the contrary, for Husserl doubt is a merely transitional phenomenon which can only characterize a temporary span of experience. Similarly, illusion is not a mode of experience in its own right but a retrospective way of characterizing (...) a span of experience. Therefore, Husserl cannot be plausibly characterized as either a disjunctivist or a conjunctivist. The common premise of both theories – namely, that perception and illusion are two classes of conscious acts standing on equal footing – is phenomenologically unsound. I propose to call Husserl’s theory a hermeneutical theory of perception, i.e., one that interprets perception as a temporal and self-correcting process. In the last part of the paper I argue that Husserl’s positive appraisal of Cartesian doubt is only pedagogical in nature. Husserl does not take Cartesian doubt to be practicable, but the attempt to doubt universally has the positive effect of revealing transcendental subjectivity as the subject matter of phenomenology. (shrink)

I discuss an interpretation, recently proposed by Mark Siderits, of the claim that within the Buddhist tradition the self is a convenient fiction. I subsequently propose a novel approach to fictionalism in contemporary metaphysics, outline an application of such an approach to the case of the self and then specify one version of fictionalism combined with some basic tenets of Buddhism.

On several occasions in his work, R. S. Peters identifies a difficulty inherent in teaching that underscores the complexity of this relationship: the teacher has the task of passing on knowledge while at the same time allowing knowledge that is passed on to be criticised and revised by the learner. This inquiry asks: first, how does Peters envisage these two tasks coming together in teaching, and, second, does he go far enough in developing what it means for the teacher to (...) recognise the difference and otherness of the learner? At the heart of the matter in answering these questions is how to conceive of the connection between learning and the transformation of the individual. Before turning to Peters, this inquiry begins by discussing connections between transformation and learning in classical and contemporary philosophical discourse. In this context, notions of discontinuity and interruption are shown to be central to understanding transformational learning processes. Peters' thought is then located within this discourse and taken up in three central ways: (1) by analysing his notion of teaching (2) by examining the ideas of learning and transformation embedded in his concept of teaching, and (3) by inquiring into how these issues relate to his idea of philosophy of education as a central part of teacher education. (shrink)

In the last decades of the twentieth century universities in Europe and other OECD countries have undergone a profound transformation. They have evolved from mainly élite institutions for teaching and research to large (public and private) organisations responsible for mass higher education and the production and distribution of new knowledge. Increasingly, new knowledge is produced by universities not only for its own sake but also for potential economic gains.

Aristotle's discussion of time is part of his Physics, which was an important part of the philosophical curriculum of late antiquity. Aristotle says that it is because nature is a principle of change that people must establish what change is. This chapter focuses on his scientific treatment of time. Aristotle begins his discussion of time by engaging in the examination of a set of puzzles (aporiai). He clearly indicates that this examination is embedded in the two‐stage inquiry. Aristotle develops, within (...) his positive account of time, the conceptual tools to deal with a puzzle. The chapter shows how the definition of change advanced in the third book of the Physics contributes to the discussion of time developed in the fourth book. (shrink)

What distinguishes theology from the other uses of language? Is theology a specific language, or is it a specific situation of language, a specific way to consider language? I start with the issue of language’s inadequacy before divine revelation. By analyzing the variety of answers to this inopia verborum, I show that the theological inadequacy of language is not conceptual, but formal: it concerns the metalinguistic definition of inadequacy. Then, I formalize the relationship between metalanguage and object language, and I (...) argue that theology applies precisely to this formal relationship. From this, I deduce that the function of theology is to question the need for metalinguistic foundation and validation—given that this need characterizes human language, that is, what is not divine revelation. I end with two applications: on one hand, to the axiomatization of theology; on the other hand, to the methodology for inter-religious dialogue. (shrink)

1. La logica è la teoria del ragionamento corretto. O come si dice di solito, è una teoria normativa del ragionamento. Non intende fornire una descrizione del modo in cui di fatto si ragiona, ma cerca piuttosto di chiarire in che modo si dovrebbe ragionare. Questo però non significa che la logica possa prescindere dall’osservazione dei ragionamenti che di fatto sono ritenuti corretti. Qualsiasi teoria che pretenda di fissare norme per un certo ambito deve tenere conto dei giudizi preteorici i...

Name der Zeitschrift: Naharaim Jahrgang: 9 Heft: 1-2 Seiten: 128-150.

Kritik: Peter Remmers, Film als Wissensform. Eine Philosophische Untersuchung der Wahrnehmung filmischer Bewegungsbilder, Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter 2018.

This paper reports on the findings of a qualitative study to understand how active adherence to the Christian faith influences the way SME owner–managers conceptualise their business practices. The study was based on in-depth interviews with 21 Christian SME owner–managers in Germany and the UK. Using a socio-psychological approach, the data analysis yielded a range of linguistic and conceptual resources that are peculiar to Christian discourse and that have the potential to influence business activity in rather distinctive ways. This paper (...) particularly focuses on those Christian concepts that could be regarded as distinct ‹frames’ for action. It outlines what effect these concepts had on the respondents and how they were related to business practices. The paper also discusses how this study could inform further research into the influence of other socio-cultural forms of identity on economic actors’ conceptualisations of their own practice. (shrink)

There are indications of a positive trend in education. International comparative investigations on academic achievement (Programme for International Student Assessment, PISA) and longitudinal studies on life courses prove the need for and the importance of children’s high intellectual knowledge. At the same time, new research initiatives and projects comply with the demand that aesthetic/cultural education1 be “more” than a marginal complement to intellectual education and instead be “fundamental for thinking and acting.”2 Aesthetic education is to provide soft skills, to shape (...) children’s characters, and to improve their social competences, representing “the Other of school.”3 The text below deals with poetry for .. (shrink)

O artigo sugere que o Estado se diferencia de uma máfia sofisticada por sua pretensão de possuir autoridade legítima. Procedemos à análise do significado de tal pretensão, o que nos leva ao paradoxo denunciado pelo “anarquismo filosófico”, segundo o qual autoridade nenhuma poderia ser legítima, já que a obediência a qualquer autoridade implicaria, necessariamente, no abandono da racionalidade prática. Então, apresentamos uma teoria formal da razão prática destinada a resolver o paradoxo anarquista. Por fim, analisamos se, concretamente, poderia haver um (...) argumento em prol da legitimidade da autoridade política que preenchesse as condições formais de legitimidade expostas naquela teoria. (shrink)

Generation of Animals is one of Aristotle's most mature, sophisticated, and carefully crafted scientific writings. His overall goal is to provide a comprehensive and systematic account of how animals reproduce, including a study of their reproductive organs, what we would call fertilization, embryogenesis, and organogenesis. In this book, international experts present thirteen original essays providing a philosophically and historically informed introduction to this important work. They shed light on the unity and structure of the Generation of Animals, the main theses (...) that Aristotle defends in the work, and the method of inquiry he adopts. They also open up new avenues of exploration of this difficult and still largely unexplored work. The volume will be essential for scholars and students of ancient philosophy as well as of the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

In light of the impact of work on human flourishing, an intractable problem for political theorists concerns the distribution of meaningful work in a community of moral equals. This article reviews a number of partial solutions that a well-ordered society could draw upon to provide equality of opportunity for eudemonistically meaningful work and to minimize the impact of bad work upon those who perform it. Even in view of these solutions, however, it is not likely that opportunities for meaningful work (...) can be guaranteed for all people, which carries an implication that, even in well-ordered societies, it is likely that not all people will flourish. The author argues that the limitedness of meaningful work is not a reason to reject the normative claim that meaningful work is integral in flourishing, nor is it a reason against working to transform social and political institutions to increase opportunities for meaningful work. (shrink)

According to Ronald Dworkin, political obligation is to be justified as an associative obligation through membership in certain political communities. In this regard, I first argue that the concept of an associative obligation cannot help us to account for precise moral obligations. Second, I analyze certain disanalogies between paradigmatic cases of associative obligation and political obligation in order to show the inability of the former to justify the enforcement of a comprehensive obligation such as the latter. Finally, I argue that (...) Dworkin could not have provided a better argument: His theory of law makes him incapable of justifying political obligation. (shrink)

As Aristotle himself says, A.Po. 2.13 is an attempt to provide some rules to hunt out the items predicated in what something is, namely to discover definitions. Since most of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of some rules of division , it may be inferred that somehow division plays a central role in the discovery of definitions. However, in the following pages I shall not discuss what this role is. Nor shall I discuss what place division has in (...) the wider discussion of definition and explanation as it emerges from A.Po. 2. 1 shall rather focus on the argument that Aristotle reports and discusses in A.Po. 2.13.97a6–22, and which our extant sources ascribe to Speusippus. As will become clear later on, this argument undermines the possibility of giving any definition, and Aristotle deals with it here because he can block it by exploiting some properties of the method of division. (shrink)

In terms of ethical implications, Boers, van Delden and Bredenoord have made an interesting step forward with their model of organoids as hybrids, which seeks to find a balance between subject-like value and object-like value. Their framework aims to introduce effective procedures not to exploit donors and to increase their engagement, but it does not seem to take sufficient account of how organoids are used and how donors and society as a whole may want to act about such uses. I (...) will concentrate my remarks on three points that I consider relevant. The first comment concerns the so-called mini-brains. The second one is related to the issue of consent and long-term ‘control’ over the organic material granted by donors. The last comment focuses on ‘genetic minorities’. (shrink)

Procuro esclarecer e precisar o que seria o pluralismo moral com base em uma caracterização do que julgo ser a forma mais profunda e radical de conflito moral: o conflito entre valores incomensuráveis. A seguir, lido com os limites do papel da sensibilidade moral nos cenários de conflitos práticos. Por fim, introduzo um modelo de racionalidade prática consistente com o pluralismo moral mais radical. Concluo que, longe de significar a abdicação da racionalidade no domínio prático, o pluralismo, uma vez absorvido (...) pela nossa cultura moral e política, traria importantes lições de tolerância para nossa época. (shrink)