Political philosophers have recently debated what role social practices should play in normative theorising. Should our theories be practice-independent or practice-dependent? That is, can we formulate normative institutional principles independently of real-world practices or are such principles only ever relative to the practices they are meant to govern? Any first-order theory in political philosophy must contend with the methodological challenges coming out of this debate. In this article, I argue that consequentialism has a plausible account of how social practices should (...) factor in normative political philosophy. I outline a version of consequentialism, Practice Consequentialism, that provides a plausible blueprint for integrating social practices in normative theorising. Second, I argue that Practice Consequentialism accounts well for the central arguments on both sides of the practice-dependence debate. Capturing arguments for practice-dependence, consequentialism brings out why real-world practices are central in formulating institutional principles. Conversely, capturing arguments for practice-independence, consequentialism offers a clear external normative perspective from which to evaluate practices. (shrink)

The tenets of critical and social realism are well supported in the literature. However, researchers following a realist paradigm have concerns about the lack of methodical guidance for qualitative...

abstract The argument that scarce health care resources should be distributed so that patients in ‘need’ are given priority for treatment is rarely contested. In this paper, we argue that if need is to play a significant role in distributive decisions it is crucial that what is meant by need can be precisely articulated. Following a discussion of the general features of health care need, we propose three principal interpretations of need, each of which focuses on separate intuitions. Although this (...) account may not be a completely exhaustive reflection of what people mean when they refer to need, the three interpretations provide a starting‐point for further debate of what the concept means in its specific application. We discuss combined interpretations, the meaning of grading needs, and compare needs‐based priority setting to social welfare maximisation. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking centre stage in economic growth and business operations alike. Public discourse about the practical and ethical implications of AI has mainly focussed on the societal level. There is an emerging knowledge base on AI risks to human rights around data security and privacy concerns. A separate strand of work has highlighted the stresses of working in the gig economy. This prevailing focus on human rights and gig impacts has been at the expense of a closer (...) look at how AI may be reshaping traditional workplace relations and, more specifically, workplace health and safety. To address this gap, we outline a conceptual model for developing an AI Work Health and Safety (WHS) Scorecard as a tool to assess and manage the potential risks and hazards to workers resulting from AI use in a workplace. A qualitative, practice-led research study of AI adopters was used to generate and test a novel list of potential AI risks to worker health and safety. Risks were identified after cross-referencing Australian AI Ethics Principles and Principles of Good Work Design with AI ideation, design and implementation stages captured by the AI Canvas, a framework otherwise used for assessing the commercial potential of AI to a business. The unique contribution of this research is the development of a novel matrix itemising currently known or anticipated risks to the WHS and ethical aspects at each AI adoption stage. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the structural concept of representation, as defined by homomorphisms, against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, theobjection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. The logical objections can be met by reserving the relation.

Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which people must relate as equals. However, not just any inegalitarian relation is unjust, i.e., the fact that parents do not relate as equals to their children is not unjust. Whereas an adult treating another adult paternalistically is objectionable from the point of view of relational egalitarianism, parent-child paternalism is not. What may explain this difference in judgment? I refer to this as the Puzzle. I discuss four justifications of the Puzzle (...) and argue that none of them is satisfactory. In the final part of the paper, I discuss where this leaves relational egalitarianism as a theory of justice. (shrink)

Many of our endeavors -- be it personal or communal, technological or artistic -- aim at eradicating all traces of dissatisfaction from our daily lives. They seek to cure us of our discontent in order to deliver us a fuller and flourishing existence. But what if ubiquitous pleasure and instant fulfilment make our lives worse, not better? What if discontent isn't an obstacle to the good life but one of its essential ingredients? In Propelled, Andreas Elpidorou makes a lively (...) case for the value of discontent and illustrates how boredom, frustration, and anticipation are good for us. Weaving together stories from sources as wide-ranging as classical literature, social and cognitive psychology, philosophy, art, and video games, Elpidorou shows that these psychological states aren't unpleasant accidents of our lives. Rather, they illuminate our desires and expectations, inform us when we find ourselves stuck in unpleasant and unfulfilling situations, and motivate us to furnish our lives with meaning, interest, and value. Boredom, frustration, and anticipation aren't obstacles to our goals--they are our guides, propelling us into lives that are truly our own. (shrink)

The objective of explainable artificial intelligence systems designed for clinical decision support (XAI-CDSS) is to enhance physicians’ diagnostic performance, confidence and trust through the implementation of interpretable methods, thus providing for a superior epistemic positioning, a robust foundation for critical reflection and trustworthiness in times of heightened technological dependence. However, recent studies have revealed shortcomings in achieving these goals, questioning the widespread endorsement of XAI by medical professionals, ethicists and policy-makers alike. Based on a surgical use case, this article challenges (...) generalising calls for XAI-CDSS and emphasises the significance of time-sensitive clinical environments which frequently preclude adequate consideration of system explanations. Therefore, XAI-CDSS may not be able to meet expectations of augmenting clinical decision-making in specific circumstances where time is of the essence. This article, by employing a principled ethical balancing methodology, highlights several fallacies associated with XAI deployment in time-sensitive clinical situations and recommends XAI endorsement only where scientific evidence or stakeholder assessments do not contradict such deployment in specific target settings. (shrink)

The choice construct (choose x: φ(x)) is useful in software specifications. We study extensions of first-order logic with the choice construct. We prove some results about Hilbert's ε operator, but in the main part of the paper we consider the case when all choices are independent.

Faced with the ongoing tragedy of poverty in our world today, many have long called for a common standard of global justice. Such a standard should not be tied to any one particular strand of justice conceptualizations and it should yet be in harmony with the central motivating beliefs of the various concerned moral worldviews. The article reframes global justice thinking by approaching a core problem, namely motivating people to care for distant needy strangers, in a concrete intercultural manner: it (...) sets out to study and compare the motivational underpinnings for an expansion of social justice, in an exemplary fashion, within two long-standing worldview traditions, namely Christian social ethics and contemporary Confucian ethics, in order to gain a more realistic impression of what a commonly shared and motivationally backed notion of global justice may look like. While the former expresses a universal concern for the poor, the latter has recently attracted interest, since Southeast Asian countries managed to lift millions of people out of abject poverty. As both traditions consider loving communal relationships to constitute the foundation of all justice considerations, the article inquires how this quest shapes each tradition’s way to motivate their adherents’ compliance with a vision of global justice. (shrink)

A central claim of biosemiotics is the ascription of semiotic competence to nonhumans. For strange historical reasons, this claim has been quite controversial in much of standard biological discourse. An analysis of ethnographic material from Greenland demonstrates that people regard animals as nonhuman "persons". i.e., as sensing and thinking beings. Like humans. animals are supposed to have knowledge about their environment. Taking this semiotic competence as a fact beyond any doubt enables skilled hunters and fishermen to rely not only on (...) their own interpretation of the environment. but also on the animals' interpretation of their environment The behaviour of fish, seals, and land animals, meditated by their acknowledged semiotic competence, can thus be interpreted as giving signs about the behaviour, e.g., of whales and icebergs. This a priori ascription of semiotic competence is also apparent in discussions about management and regulation of animals. Rather than discussing whether "the stock" is depleted, much of the discourse among fishermen and hunters focuses on whether animals can be semiotically disturbed by what people are doing. (shrink)

This paper is motivated by the question whether there exists a logic capturing polynomial time computation over unordered structures. We consider several algorithmic problems near the border of the known, logically defined complexity classes contained in polynomial time. We show that fixpoint logic plus counting is stronger than might be expected, in that it can express the existence of a complete matching in a bipartite graph. We revisit the known examples that separate polynomial time from fixpoint plus counting. We show (...) that the examples in a paper of Cai, Fürer, and Immerman, when suitably padded, are in choiceless polynomial time yet not in fixpoint plus counting. Without padding, they remain in polynomial time but appear not to be in choiceless polynomial time plus counting. Similar results hold for the multipede examples of Gurevich and Shelah, except that their final version of multipedes is, in a sense, already suitably padded. Finally, we describe another possible candidate, involving determinants, for the task of separating polynomial time from choiceless polynomial time plus counting. (shrink)

While standard forms of discrimination are widely considered morally wrong, philosophers disagree about what makes them so. Two accounts have risen to prominence in this debate: One stressing how wrongful discrimination disrespects the discriminatee, the other how the harms involved make discrimination wrong. While these accounts are based on carefully constructed thought experiments, proponents of both sides see their positions as in line with and, in part, supported by the folk theory of the moral wrongness of discrimination. This article presents (...) a vignette-based experiment to test empirically what, in the eyes of “folks”, makes discrimination wrong. Interestingly, we find that, according to folks, both disrespect and harm make discrimination wrong. Our findings offer some support for a pluralistic account of the wrongness of discrimination over both monist respect-based and monist harm-based accounts. (shrink)

In this article, Andreas Reichelt Lind explores the possibilities of a Deweyan account of education for democracy. To that end, an account emphasizing democratic habit formation, direct experience of democracy as a way of life, and the distinction between being and becoming is explicated and discussed. Lind shows how these elements together point to the issue of designing educational environments and then discusses in a preliminary way the implications of this insight from the perspective of education for democracy. The (...) article's contribution is twofold. First, it explicitly contributes to a reconstruction of Dewey in relation to the issue of educating for democracy. This represents a reframing of his writings. Second, it highlights and discusses some theoretical implications of the possibilities inherent in the Deweyan account of education for democracy. (shrink)

It is often assumed that Paul Grice, in one way or another, has made an important contribution to the theory of speech acts} Grice, as far as I can see, never expressly addresses Austin’s theory in his published work. He hardly ever uses the speech act terminology of "illocution", "perlocution", etc.2 So what does the more or less implicit Gricean contribution to the theory of speech acts consist in'? There is more than one good answer to this question. I shall (...) concentrate on a particularly influential one, which goes back to Strawson (1964). It says that Austin, in his account of the nature of illocutionary acts, over-emphasized the role of conventions; that Austin went wrong in characterizing illocutionary acts as acts which are essentially conventional. The Gricean contribution to speech act theory, according to the envisaged answer, is twofold, both diagnostic and therapeutic. First, it helps us see where and why Austin went wrong in taking illocutionary acts to be essentially conventional. Second, it suggests an essentially intentional — instead of an essentially conventional- element in illocutionary acts. In his 1964 paper Strawson tried to bring out, as regards the interplay of convention and intention in illocutionary acts, both what can be conceded to Austin and what must be learnt from Grice. Austin (1962: 115) had said that "the performance of an illocutionaiy act involves the securing of uptake". Strawson (1964: 158 ff) interprets Austin as meani_ng to say that the performance of an illocutionary act involves understanding of illocutionary force. Understanding of illocutionary force involves, according to Strawson, grasping a "compleX [speaker’s] intention" (ib.: 160), and it is here, of course, where he brings Gricean ideas into _Austin’s scheme of what the essence of illocution is. He says. (shrink)

This chapter presents “Scenic Narrative Microanalysis” and its potential contribution to research on significant interactive moments. It discusses the method’s roots at the intersection of two paradigm shifts. The first is the interactive turn in psychoanalysis, which itself is situated within the overarching cultural context of a performative turn. Second, as an approach addressing short-term interactions, SNMA points to the temporal turn in sociology, economics and technology, the background for microanalytic infant research approaches that have been influential since the 1970s. (...) Finally, the future prospects of interdisciplinary method triangulation within the research group are discussed. (shrink)

Constellations, Volume 26, Issue 3, Page 384-390, September 2019.

Organized immaturity, the reduction of individual capacities for public use of reason constrained by sociotechnological systems, constitutes a significant pushback against the project of Enlightenment. Forms of immaturity have long been a concern for philosophers and social theorists, such as Kant, Arendt, Fromm, Marcuse, and Foucault. Recently, Zuboff’s concept of “surveillance capitalism” describes how advancements in digital technologies lead to new, increasingly sophisticated forms of organized immaturity in democratic societies. We discuss how sociotechnological systems initially designed to meet human needs (...) can inhibit the multidimensional development of individuals as mature citizens. To counteract these trends, we suggest two mechanisms: disorganizing immaturity as a way to safeguard individuals’ and collectives’ negative freedoms (freedoms from), and organizing maturity as a way to strengthen positive freedoms (freedoms to). Finally, we provide an outlook on the five further articles that constitute the Business Ethics Quarterly Special Issue “Sociotechnological Conditions of Organized Immaturity in the Twenty-First Century.”. (shrink)

Several important questions in applied ethics – like whether to switch to a plant-based diet, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, or vote in elections – seem to share the following structure: if enough people ‘cooperate’ and become vegan for example, we bring about a better outcome; but what you do as an individual seems to make no difference whatsoever. Such collective action problems are often thought to pose a serious challenge to consequentialism. In response, I defend the Reactive Attitude Approach: rather (...) than focus only on the deontic status of (non-)cooperative acts – as existing consequentialist responses mostly do – consequentialists should also focus on when to praise or blame individuals. For example, even if your veganism does not change the overall outcome, consequentialists might still recommend praising you for your cooperative behavior. I make a consequentialist case for including praise and blame in our ethical practices around collective action and argue that doing so helps us capture important intuitions. I develop and defend these arguments by drawing on recent instrumentalist theories of blame and responsibility. (shrink)

In recent decades historians of science have argued that observation became something of a way of life in the early modern period. This article expands this analysis by shifting focus from observational practices within natural and experimental philosophy to a number of discourses and practices of self-examination and self-observation in eighteenth-century Germany. While the initial aim of these was therapeutic rather than scientific, therapeutic connotations were partly replaced by epistemic virtues and techniques adopted from natural and experimental philosophy toward the (...) end of the century. The article further argues that the subordination of self-observation to scientific modes of procedure reflected the increasingly radical interest in human subjectivity and, by extension, the emergence of a modern civic and individual self. (shrink)

Papers by Andreas Bartels, Ansgar Beckermann, Frédéric Bouchard, Thomas Breuer, Bruno Eckhardt, Bruce Glymour, Claus Kiefer, Roberta Millstein and Alexander Rosenberg.

Late antique Christian mysticism is a way of transcending consciousness. The culmination of the approaches of the time is represented by the writings of Gregory of Nyssa (approx. 335–390) and Pseudo-Dionys of the Areopagus (5th c.). According to them, God cannot be expressed in discursive language. Theology therefore serves to ultimately transcend consciousness and verbal language and to describe the unspeakable only in negation.

This book aims to lay bare the logical foundations of tractable reasoning. It draws on Marvin Minsky's seminal work on frames, which has been highly influential in computer science and, to a lesser extent, in cognitive science. Only very few people have explored ideas about frames in logic, which is why the investigation in this book breaks new ground. The apparent intractability of dynamic, inferential reasoning is an unsolved problem in both cognitive science and logic-oriented artificial intelligence. By means of (...) a logical investigation of frames and frame concepts, Andreas devises a novel logic of tractable reasoning, called frame logic. Moreover, he devises a novel belief revision scheme, which is tractable for frame logic. These tractability results shed new light on our logical and cognitive means to carry out dynamic, inferential reasoning. Modularity remains central for tractability, and so the author sets forth a logical variant of the massive modularity hypothesis in cognitive science. (shrink)

The commemoration of the 700th anniversary of the canonization of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) as well as the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) present an opportunity to re-examine the neo-Thomism of the contemporary French philosopher. Our aim here will be to set out the philosophical argument from which Maritain establishes an inseparable link between human rights (i.e., the dignity of the human person) and natural law. We will thus seek to expose how Maritain supports democracy from the (...) horizon of Christian philosophy. In doing so, the Thomistic democracy that Maritain proposes will appear to be distant from both totalitarian collectivism and anarchistic individualism, two current threats to the establishment of an authentic and mature democracy. (shrink)

Wer sich den Relativitätstheorien mit einem philosophischen Blick nähert, stellt fest, dass die mehr als einhundert Jahre seit ihrer Entdeckung eine schwer überschaubare Vielzahl von Interpretationen hervorgebracht haben, die noch immer die Frage aufwerfen, was diese Theorien über die Natur von Raum und Zeit aussagen. Wer hat Recht, der Einstein des Jahres 1916, der in seinem Aufsatz Die Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie behauptet, die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie nehme „Raum und Zeit den letzten Rest physikalischer Gegenständlichkeit“ (Einstein 1916, S. 776), Tim Maudlin (...) (2012), der in Philosophy of Physics. Space and Time fast einhundert Jahre später ausführt, die Theorie schreibe der Raumzeit eine objektive, intrinsische Geometrie zu, oder Harvey Brown (2005), der in Physical Relativity: Space-time structure from a dynamical perspective die Annahme einer intrinsischen geometrischen Natur von Raum und Zeit zurückweist und stattdessen die relativistischen Effekte bei Maßstäben und Uhren auf die Lorentz-Invarianz der Gesetze materieller Wechselwirkungen zurückführt? (shrink)

In this paper I review empirical methods applied in recent analysis of decision-making on priorities in health care. I outline a number of discrete methods and discuss their applicability and efficacy in the field of bioethics. Three key methodological issues seem to be important: choice of subject group; choice of approach and the extent of background information given to respondents. I conclude that a combination method is needed to give a comprehensive representation of values in priority setting and thus to (...) meet the overall objectives of empirical ethics. (shrink)

This article argues that it is possible to act paternalistically towards future people, as long as the following requirements are met: the act/choice is not such that it will prevent the future person from coming into existence; the action/choice is such that it can be taken by the future person herself without significant disadvantage to her; and the act/choice is not such that there is significant uncertainty at the time of choice about the preferences of the future person. I argue (...) that the possibility of acting paternalistically towards future people is of practical as well as theoretical importance. This is true since some of the policies we might choose to pursue on behalf of future people are paternalistic, in particular constitutional policies implemented because we do not trust future people to choose wisely. I end the paper by pointing out why it is valuable to approach intergenerational issues through both the paternalistic prism and the prism of theories of justice. (shrink)