This volume explores the linguistic expression of modality in natural language from a cross-linguistic perspective. Modal expressions provide the basic tools that allow us to dissociate what we say from what is actually going on, allowing us to talk about what might happen or might have happened, as well as what is required, desirable, or permitted. Chapters in the book demonstrate that modality involves many more syntactic categories and levels of syntactic structure than traditionally assumed. The volume distinguishes between three (...) types of modality: 'low modality', which concerns modal interpretations associated with the verbal and nominal cartographies in syntax; 'middle modality', or modal interpretation associated to the syntactic cartography internal to the clause; and 'high modality', relating to the left periphery. It combines cross-linguistic discussions of the more widely-studied sources of modality with analyses of novel or unexpected sources, and shows how the meanings associated with the three types of modality are realized across a wide range of languages. (shrink)

La evolución jurisprudencial que el Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos ha realizado a lo largo de su historia de la Primera Enmienda de la Constitución, ha ido adaptándose tanto a la visión de la libertad de expresión modulada por parte del Tribunal, como a la realidad de la propia sociedad americana. En este artículo se presentará cuál ha sido la evolución que ha sufrido la protección que en los diferentes momentos que conforman la historia jurisprudencial de la Primera Enmienda se (...) ha ofrecido al lenguaje de odio, con el objetivo de conocer cuál ha sido su evolución y en qué momento nos encontramos en la actualidad. (shrink)

The existence of causal explanations in science has been an issue of interest in Western philosophy from its very beginnings. That is the reason this work, following an idea of Mario Bunge, makes a historical review of this matter. The modern treatment of this subject takes place since the postulation by Popper and Hempel of the D-N model of scientific explanation, whose viability is scrutinized here from different points of view in the current philosophy of science. The main object of (...) this paper is to present two arguments against the possibility of causal explanations in theoretical physics. The first one concerns the existence, in certain cases, of inter-theoretical incompatibilities, and the second refers to the need to resort, in other cases, to concatenations of laws of different theories and disciplines. The final conclusion will be the defence of a form of theoretical explanation, which follows the Popper-Hempel model, but devoid of any ontological and metaphysical connotations. (shrink)

If there is no inner model with ω many strong cardinals, then there is a set forcing extension of the universe with a projective well-ordering of the reals.

El presente artículo examina las diferentes teorías del contenido mental de Dretske y su relación con sus consideraciones epistemológicas para concluir que el hecho de conceptualizar o albergar un determinado contenido es ya un tipo de conocimiento, a saber, conocimiento animal. A continuación el autor discute dicho enfoque sosteniendo, a diferencia de Dretske, que mantener la dicotomía entre conocimiento animal y conocimiento reflexivo resulta virtuosa pues mantiene tanto aquello que puede ser naturalizado apelando a la Historia natural como da razón (...) de las practicas justificatorias que intervienen en el denominado conocimiento reflexivo y que a su juicio es irrenunciable e irreductible. (shrink)

The change from static to genetic perspective involves an enlargement of the phenomenological field. The main subject is not anymore the description of the essential notes of a phenomenon but rather the search for its origins. New levels of objects and consciousness arise as consequence of this new approach. The structures of subjectivity revealed by the genetic inquiry constitute the field of passivity.

El presente artículo desarrolla la comprensión marceliana de la esperanza como fruto de una experiencia de comunión intersubjetiva. De tal modo que la esperanza nos abre un nuevo horizonte de sentido para el itinerario vital, anunciando ya una plenitud intersubjetiva imperecedera. Así, podremos reconocer una fuente de renovación personal y comunitaria en la vivencia de la intersubjetividad, como condición metafísica de la existencia personal que responde a la profunda exigencia de trascendencia del hombre.

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. (...) The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes. (shrink)

The Militant Intellect reconceptualizes critical theory as a field tasked with cultivating the analytical skills of the general intellect to work towards the intersectional and structural death of the colonist and the materialization of that feminist decolonial communist queer marronage world that constitutes its horizon.

Review of the book "Persistencia de la pregunta por el arte", by Hernán Borisonik.

In this paper I examine the notion of ‘artifact’ and related notions in the dominant version of extended cognition theory grounded on extended functionalism. Although the term is ubiquitous in the literature, it is far from clear what ECT means by it. How are artifacts conceptualized in ECT? Is ‘artifact’ a meaningful and useful category for ECT? If the answer to the previous question is negative, should we worry? Is it important for ECT to have a coherent theory of artifacts? (...) And what are the demands and constraints that ECT imposes on this theory? I distinguish between two aspects of ECT, one narrow, aligned with extended functionalism ; and one broad or pluralistic, in which EF is combined with other theoretical resources in the context of diverse research programs. I begin by determining the problems in conceptualizing artifacts from EF. Then I address the question of why a concept of artifact may be relevant to ECT. Next, I examine the efforts of Richard Heersmink to combine ECT with dominant theories of artifacts in the philosophy of technology. I argue that both approaches fail to yield a meaningful notion of artifact, let alone one of ‘cognitive’ artifact. Finally, I argue that narrow ECT places rather strong constraints on a theory of artifacts, since it locates the specificity of ‘artifact’ in material aspects of realization that are, by definition, outside its theoretical purview. I examine, then discard, the possibility that a materialist and objectivist theory of artifacts may be of help. And finally I briefly explore some ways in which a broad, pluralistic ECT may address some of these shortcomings. (shrink)

Hegelians normally consider Hegel's philosophical system from two perspectives: metaphysics, interpreting this discipline as the central one to understand the work of the German philosopher, or non-metaphysics, being more relevant alternative interpretations that avoid it. This article presents a study on the senses of reflection. These senses can be extrinsic or absolute. These two senses are the backbones of the Hegelian system. Therefore, by means of a study of whether extrinsic and absolute reflection are notions that guide us towards metaphysical (...) or non-metaphysical readings, we try to give an answer to the debate between the possible interpretations of Hegel. (shrink)

La vida es el fundamento de los bienes, no un bien. El análisis de la sociedad moderna hace inevitable cuestionar: ¿Qué es la vida cuando se ha convertido en una mercancía? Es a través de ese concepto, vida, que se pueden advertir los movimientos de la historia. Su desarrollo genealógico en el decurso de los modos de producción es la condición de posibilidad para la comprensión del proceso histórico a través del materialismo dialéctico hasta llegar a la fase de desarrollo (...) en la cual la vida entra en una profunda contradicción con su reproducción material. Entender cada momento histórico a la luz de las contradicciones entre las fuerzas productivas materiales, las relaciones de producción existentes y sus formas jurídicas ya no en relación con la materia, sino con la vida, es decir, con el sujeto, da un nuevo sentido a la comprensión de la historia, ya no como progreso, sino como proceso. Todo esto también conduce a cuestiones de carácter moral y al insondable problema de las relaciones entre el modo de producción burgués, la vida, la apropiación de trabajo y la lógica del capital. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} The main aim of this paper is to argue on behalf of instrumentalism in the philosophy of physics. Following Theo Kuipers’ terminology of domain extension and domain restriction I claim, contradicting him, that the methodology of domain (...) revision can only support an antirealist approach to the theory of physics. The existence of both extensions and restrictions of the application domain of theoretical models and the theoretical incompatibility between successive theories provide respectively with minor and major arguments for instrumentalism in physics. (shrink)

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: belief in the opponents’ rationality, stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, self-referential beliefs, stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, projective beliefs, stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and conditionally independent beliefs, stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose (...) their strategies independently. We show that, if a player satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy. We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped. (shrink)

The idea of inclusive collective decision-making is important in establishing democratic legitimacy, but it fails when citizens are excluded. Stated-preference methods of valuation, which are commonly used in economics, have been criticised because the principle of willingness to pay may exclude low-income earners who do not have the capacity to pay. Deliberative valuation has been advocated as a way to overcome this problem, but deliberation may also be exclusive. In this review, two deliberative valuation frameworks are compared. The first is (...) grounded on the idea of rational discourse that emphasises argument at the expense of other communicative strategies. It seeks to secure inclusion through procedural rules and prerequisites, but fails to address the underlying democratic limitation of argumentation. The second does not rely on the distinction between rational and rhetorical speech, and therefore admits alternative forms of communication. This approach recognises differences in the communicative capacities and practices of those who take part in deliberation, and so is better equipped to improve, though not to guarantee, inclusion. (shrink)

Moral Seduction Theory suggests that auditors are morally compromised by the perceived consequences of their opinions. The root of the auditing problem appears to result in an unintentional bias rather than in dishonesty. Although important accounting reforms have been taken to deal with auditors' trustworthiness, their lack of independence has not been adequately addressed. The new regulation (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) is a consequence of an incorrect understanding of the main true source of auditor's biases. We have developed a cognitive approach by (...) connecting the Throughput Model (TM) to the Moral Seduction Theory. This approach allows a better understanding of how conflicts of interest lead auditors to avoid the issuance of warning signals to stakeholders. We have tested our model by conducting a hypothetical scenario with eighty experienced auditors from international accounting firms. Our results confirm auditors' unintentional reluctance to issue qualified audit opinions alerting investors due to their fear of precipitating clients' final bankruptcy. The main implication is that, more than a regulation, effort should be made in monitoring those conflicts of interest to reduce unintentional bias. (shrink)

Some versions of moral naturalism are faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that several defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that, necessarily, if anyone morally ought to do something, then s/he has a categorical reason to do (...) it. Versions of moral naturalism that deny this claim would, if widely believed, disable some crucial practical uses of moral concepts. In particular, if the existence of normative reasons for action is taken to be dependent on agents’ desires, it would breed profound skepticism about the legitimacy of evaluating others’ actions from a moral point of view. Also, it would raise doubts about whether people ought to correct their own behavior in light of moral considerations. Following Richard Joyce, I take these consequences to indicate that the concept of a categorical reason is a “non-negotiable” part of moral concepts. (shrink)

In this article I respond to Yuk Hui by revisiting the crossroads in the philosophy of technology as represented by the philosophies of Stiegler and Ihde. Whereas Hui proposes the concept of cosmotechnics as an integrating perspective, I conceive of the crossroads in other terms, namely from the perspective of substantivism. I characterize our present situation, what a philosophy of technology should address and then examine Hui’s notion of cosmotechnics from this alternative perspective. My main concern is to show future (...) paths of development for cosmotechnical thought. (shrink)

In this article I argue that anti-perfectionist liberals can accept nudging in certain areas: in particular, they can accept nudges aimed at helping people to discharge their nonenforceable duties, and to secure personal autonomy. I claim that nudging is not disrespectful since it does not involve a comparative negative judgment on people’s ability to pursue their plans, and that the judgments that motivate nudging are compatible with treating citizens as free and equal. I also claim that despite being sometimes manipulative, (...) nudging is easy to resist and so it can be employed to pursue legitimate goals. (shrink)

In this article the school of C.G. Jung is presented as a movement that, following the Swiss psychologist, tries to coimply inconscious and conscious in a symbolic language of senses. As a representative of the Jung School the psycology of Erich Neumann is offered, belonging to the Eranos Circ..

This paper critically examines the forays into metaphysics of The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program (henceforth, DNP). I argue that the work of DNP is a valuable contribution to the epistemology of certain aspects of artifact design and use, but that it fails to advance a persuasive metaphysic. A central problem is that DNP approaches ontology from within a functionalist framework that is mainly concerned with ascriptions and justified beliefs. Thus, the materiality of artifacts emerges only as the external (...) conditions of realizability of function ascription. The work of DNP has a strong programmatic aspect and much of its foray into metaphysics is tentative, so the intent of my argument is partly synthetic: to sum up these issues as they are presented in the literature and highlight some recognized problems. But I also go beyond that, suggesting that these problems are foundational, arising from the very way in which DNP poses the question of artifact metaphysics. Although it sets out to incorporate objective aspects of technology, DNP places a strong focus on the intentional side of the purported matter-mind duality, bracketing off materiality in an irretrievable manner. Thus, some of the advantages of dualism are lost. I claim that DNP is dualistic, not merely based on “duality”, but that its version of dualism does not appropriately account for the material “nature” of artifacts. The paper ends by suggesting some correctives and alternatives to Dual Nature theory. (shrink)