In an attempt to explore further the Madelung fluid-like representation of quantum mechanics, we derive the small perturbation equations of the fluid with respect to its basic states. The latter are obtained from the Madelung transform of the Schrödinger equation eigenstates. The fundamental eigenstates of de Broglie monochromatic matter waves are then shown to be mapped into the simple basic states of a fluid with constant density and velocity, where the latter is the de Broglie group velocity. The normal modes (...) with respect to these basic states are derived and found to also satisfy the de Broglie dispersion relation. Despite being dispersive waves, their propagation mechanism is equivalent to that of sound waves in a classical ideal adiabatic gas. We discuss the physical interpretation of these results. (shrink)

The Old Nyāya believes that a cause has a causal power of some kind, and it is possible to have valid cognition of a causal event. But Nāgārjuna (2nd century) challenged the very idea of causality. Also, he attacked the concept of epistemic instruments (_pramāṇa_). Śrīharṣa (12th century) too found counterexamples to the Nyāya definition of valid cognition. These attacks raised fundamental questions about the Naiyāyika’s take on the validity of causal statements. In 14 th century, Gaṅgeśa defended the Nyāya (...) theories of causality by shifting the starting point, and redefined causality. He completely bypassed the ontological issues raised by Nāgārjuna, and sought to answer an epistemic question: Is the knowledge about a causal event possible? In this essay, I shall critically examine his answer. He adopted the Old Nyāya view that a valid cognition leads one to pragmatic success, and stated that all pragmatically successful cognitions about causal events were valid. But he was aware of the fact that success could also be accidental. His ‘inferential defeater’ has the potential to rule out cases of accidental success or epistemic luck in the inferential context, although his definition of valid cognition seems to apply to those. In this essay, I shall formulate a definition of ‘epistemic defeater’ by modifying Gaṅgeśa’s definition of ‘inferential defeater’, and shall use the new concept for modifying Gaṅgeśa’s definition of valid cognition. This modified definition of valid cognition—I shall argue—will be able to rule out most of the problematic cases cited by Śrīharṣa. (shrink)

The article attempts to deal with the proposition that human being’s incapacity to imagine its own death, the state of non-being necessitates the thinking of the animal. A critical and close reading of specific Brāhmaṇa and Mahābhārata texts would spotlight that it is man’s rationalizing capacity that disavows and denies the question of intelligibility of the actions of the animal. The animal is the undisclosable which man keeps and brings to light as such. The article would further investigate if the (...) question of our forgetfulness toward the fact that we are born in debt to death has any linkage to the sacrificial logic of killing animals as elaborated in Brāhmaṇical hermeneutics. It examines how the ethical is thoroughly coextensive with the animal’s act of hospitality/hostility as an affective, purposive and reasoned response toward the other. In the course of the analysis of the jantu and pakshî upākhyāns in the Àraṇyak and Śanti Parvas of the Mahābhārata, the article tries to understand and explore if the experience of the animalitas is intrinsic to the structure of human reason, complicating the nature and notion of a priori. (shrink)

Through the ages we have been fond of monolithic ethics, which is either synthetic or analytic; the former covers ethical interests such as the normative, descriptive, empirical, and the practical and professional, whereas the latter covers the metaethical interests covering those of the analysis of language, and the interface of the ethics, logic and epistemology, particularly the issues of proving, justification and the epistemic claims about moral value. Monolithic ethics has its own problems, which troubles us today more than it (...) did before, as it is difficult to see why both these interests cannot be assimilated though each of them well protected for their specific tasks. Rethinking in ethics today leads us to break away from the monolithic ethics – the paper argues why this should be the case. (shrink)

Utilitarianism has always been a dominant forceful position in ethical philosophy since its inception. However, it is not without its critiques. This paper attempts to answer the question what is it that is lacking in utilitarianism that makes it vulnerable to these critiques and causes it to fail to meaningfully talk about human morality. The paper attempts to answer the question by taking recourse to two concepts not considered in utilitarianism – emotivism and separateness of persons. The paper ultimately tries (...) to show that emotions are an important part in the consideration of ethical or moral judgements or actions. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to explicate Bertrand Russell’s articulation of acquaintance and knowledge by acquaintance. The main aim of this paper is to show how the acquaintance might lead to knowledge of truths, owing to its foundational nature. In talking about acquaintance and it difference from knowledge by acquaintance we realize that acquaintance is foundational in nature and may lead to knowledge of truths owing to the very same nature.

I present a Third World critique of the trend in American environmentalism known as deep ecology, analyzing each of deep ecology’s central tenets: the distinction between anthropocentrism and biocentrism, the focus on wildemess preservation, the invocation of Eastem traditions, and the belief that it represents the most radical trend within environmentalism. I argue that the anthropocentrism/biocentrism distinction is of little use in understanding the dynamics of environmental degredation, that the implementation of the wildemess agenda is causing serious deprivation in the (...) Third World, that the deep ecologist’s interpretation of Eastem traditions is highly selective, and that in other cultural contexts radical environmentalism manifests itself quite differently, with a far greater emphasis on equity and the integration of ecological concems with livelihood and work. I conclude that despite its claims to universality, deep ecology is firmly rooted in American environmental and cultural history and is inappropriate when applied to the Third World. (shrink)

The classical Indian variety of history may be called ‘istory’. It is not completely true that no real importance was attached to istory in classical India. But much of oral istorical literature is lost since—perhaps—narrating istory was considered a performance. Unlike historical narratives, istorical narratives are presentative, not representative. Istory can be understood as a system of narrating past events that has a purpose and poetic beauty. Finally, the paper will argue that istory is based on cognitive tools of two (...) types: epistemic tools such as testimony, inference, tarka and aesthetic tools. Thus, it has a hybrid cognitive method. (shrink)

Articles on aesthetics with special reference to India.

A speaker utters the grammatically correct phrase ‘x y’, and the hearer understands its meaning. The Naiyāyika claims that the only epistemic instrument that generates the semantic connection between the meaning of x and the meaning of y is testimony. This connection is essentially the phrase-meaning. The Vaiśeṣika wants inference to generate this connection. After presenting the Vaiśeṣika view on this topic, this paper will argue that, the hearer considers the generic categories of |x| and |y|, and infers their ontic (...) relation which finally will figure in the testimonial cognition. For example, when John tells Smith that ‘Jones smokes’, Smith first cognizes the meanings of the words, i.e., the individual called Jones and the activity of smoking. Then Smith infers that ‘John intends to say that the activity of smoking inheres in Jones, since an activity inheres in an individual.’ Thus, inherence which appears as the sematic connection is inferred in this case. If John is a reliable speaker, Smith will have a piece of testimonial knowledge. This is how the Vaiśeṣika’s inference could possibly support linguistic creativity. (shrink)

Environmental philosophy is well discussed in contemporary times. Yet, skeptics raise an important question: What is philosophical in environmental philosophy? The question is pertinent enough when one does not find anything philosophically substantive in environmental philosophy, namely substantive metaphysical, epistemological, axiological, and ethical inquiries in this field. At best a few fashionable philosophers talk about intrinsic value in nature. This is a serious threat to environmental philosophy that there is hardly any philosophy in it. In this paper, I argue that (...) the “real business of philosophy” should go for an urgent makeover because metaphysics apart, philosophically relevant inquiries into environmental matters include epistemological, axiological, and ethical inquiries. Interestingly, these important inquiries are not watertight in so far as environmental matters are in question. In the first part of the paper, I take a renewed look at environmental epistemology and then proceed to consider environmental metaphysics. Furthermore, I argue for a comprehensive epistemological–metaphysical–axiological–ethical inquiry that makes environmental philosophy, a vibrant philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

This essay reads John Locke’s Two Treatises through its nonhuman animal presences, especially the emblematic figures of cattle and “noxious creatures” like “lyons,” “tygers,” and wolves. It argues that the real ground of Lockean human equality is an ongoing practice of subjugating nonhuman animals, and not any attribute of the human species as such. More specifically, the Lockean social compact founded on this equality relies on a “dominion covenant,” an existential “agreement” in which God lends the power of dominion to (...) man and any threats to this order require punishment. This dynamic enables violence toward humans, in the name of their humanity, if they do not properly exert their power of dominion. Critics have connected Locke’s theory of property to indigenous dispossession and his theory of punishment to carceral systems; both processes, I argue, intimately rely on the dominion covenant. Lockean racism is the fulfillment of, and not a deviation from, his account of human equality. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a modality-free pre-rough algebra. Łukasiewicz Moisil algebra and Wajsberg algebra are equivalent under a transformation. A similar type of equivalence exists in our proposed definition and standard definition of pre-rough algebra. We obtain a few modality-free algebras weaker than pre-rough algebra. Furthermore, it is also established that modality-free versions for other analogous structures weaker than pre-rough algebra do not exist. Both Hilbert-type axiomatization and sequent calculi for all proposed algebras are presented.

Using different quantum states (e.g., two mode squeezed-state, multipartite GHZ-like-states) as quantum resources, two protocols for "continuous variable (CV) controlled quantum conference" are proposed. These CV protocols for controlled quantum conferences (CQCs) are the first of their kind and can be reduced to CV protocols for various other cryptographic tasks. In the proposed protocols, Charlie is considered the controller, having the power to terminate the protocol at any time and to control the flow of information among the other users by (...) using a parameterised control switch. Based on the information shared by Charlie with the participants of the conference, the control power of Charlie is evaluated and compared to the proposed protocols. The comparison of the efficiency of the proposed protocols has revealed that, under certain constraints, the 4-mode GHZ state-based protocol is more efficient than the two-mode squeezed state-based protocol. The control power Charlie is evaluated for the proposed protocols under certain constraints. A security analysis is also performed, and it is observed that the proposed protocols are secure against a variety of attacks, including but not limited to disturbance attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, Trojan horse attacks, laser seeding attacks, cloning attacks, beam splitter attacks, and malicious user(s) attacks. (shrink)

In response to Ferrario _et al_’s 1 work entitled ‘Ethics of the algorithmic prediction of goal of care preferences: from theory to practice’, we would like to point out an area of concern: the risk of artificial intelligence (AI) paternalism in their proposed framework. Accordingly, in this commentary, we underscore the importance of the implementation of safeguards for AI algorithms before they are deployed in clinical practice. The goal of documenting a living will and advanced directives is to convey personal (...) preferences regarding the acceptance of therapies, including life support, for future use in case of losing one’s capacity. This is standard practice in the care of incapacitated critically ill patients as it is considered to extend the individual’s autonomy. Notably, most of the documents that intensivists encounter in clinical practice are written in a generic fashion and lack context. This problem usually leads to the reliance on... (shrink)

Maintenance of skeletal muscle mass and strength throughout life is crucial for heathy living and longevity. Several signaling pathways have been implicated in the regulation of skeletal muscle mass in adults. TGF‐β‐activated kinase 1 (TAK1) is a key protein, which coordinates the activation of multiple signaling pathways. Recently, it was discovered that TAK1 is essential for the maintenance of skeletal muscle mass and myofiber hypertrophy following mechanical overload. Forced activation of TAK1 in skeletal muscle causes hypertrophy and attenuates denervation‐induced muscle (...) atrophy. TAK1‐mediated signaling in skeletal muscle promotes protein synthesis, redox homeostasis, mitochondrial health, and integrity of neuromuscular junctions. In this article, we have reviewed the role and potential mechanisms through which TAK1 regulates skeletal muscle mass and growth. We have also proposed future areas of research that could be instrumental in exploring TAK1 as therapeutic target for improving muscle mass in various catabolic conditions and diseases. (shrink)

Arthāpatti does not depend on observation of pervasion or background belief. It is certain in the sense that when S cognizes P through postulation, no other epistemic instrument would invalidate P. The Naiyāyika tries to reduce postulation to anumāna and/or tarka. I shall argue that it is neither. Due to its explanatory role, one may think that postulation plays an essential role in lakṣaṇā or indication. But this too is a misconception. Both tarka and lakṣaṇā depend on observation and background (...) knowledge. Neither of them has the epistemic certainty postulation enjoys. I think, due to its observation-independent nature and certainty, postulation can be seen as the source of the knowledge of the truths of reason. (shrink)

A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason is normally an omnipresent property. Its Target is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an (...) inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators. (shrink)

With the rise of Practical and Professional Ethics has risen Environmental Ethics. Ethical reflections pertaining to environmental and ecological problems is not new; in the recent times we have been discussing these issues in a more methodical and organised way. Methodicity taking centre stage in moral philosophical scrutiny of matters pertaining to life and world finds sceptics throwing stiff challenges to the method of ‘activism’ involving common men for their moral perceptions and resolution of the said ethical issues. Sceptics also (...) challenge those who prefer ‘theoreticism’ involving ethicists and their sacred normative theories for the resolution of the said ethical issues. The paper tries to expound and face these sceptical challenges so that environmental ethics is not turned to a bundle of nonsense. (shrink)

The strainer tests the strength of a definition of a particular kind. Suppose the definition D is stated in terms of an absence, and x is a definiendum of D. The strainer collects each x-token or x-individual that dissatisfies D in a specific case. Then, all the x-individuals put together would be equivalent to the type x. Hence—one would be forced to conclude that—in a sense, x dissatisfies D. This is a case of under-application of D, since, despite being a (...) definiendum of D, x dissatisfies D. Therefore, D would be too narrow. Similarly, the strainer may detect over-application too. By using the strainer, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi demonstrated that Gaṅgeśa’s conclusive definition of pervasion had a defect, and redefined pervasion. The strainer test is based on intuitive principles. It may disqualify a definition that has an absence in its definiens. Therefore, strainer-proofing becomes an important consideration that must be borne in mind every time we formulate such a definition. (shrink)

When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their words cannot get semantically connected. Still metaphorical uses succeed in conveying the message of the speaker, since lakṣaṇā, a meaning-generating faculty of language, yields the suitable secondary meanings. Gaṅgeśa claims that lakṣaṇā is a faculty of words themselves. One may argue: “Words have no such faculty. In these cases, the hearer uses observation-based inference. They have observed that sometimes competent speakers use the word w in order to mean s, when p, (...) the primary meaning of w does not make any semantic sense. In all such cases, s is actually related to p. After having observed this, when the hearer hears the utterance of w, and realizes that w’s primary meaning p is semantically unfit for the sentence-meaning, they infer on the basis of their prior observation that ‘the competent speaker must mean s by uttering w’. Thus lakṣaṇā becomes a success.” This apparently well-argued reduction does not stand the critical examination; neither in Gaṅgeśa’s framework, nor even in the general theory of language. For one can compose and interpret potentially infinite novel sentences based on lakṣaṇā while the observational inferences one can make are finite. Gaṅgeśa says very clearly that as far as the secondary meaning is concerned, no prior observation is required. This paper will argue that not only does language yield secondary meanings through lakṣaṇā, but it also restricts the use of secondary meanings; for one cannot mean just anything by saying something. Lakṣaṇā is a creative function with infinite potential within the limits set up by the language faculty. (shrink)

The meaning of the term ‘tarka’ is not clear in the modern literature on Classical Indian Philosophy. This paper will review different modern readings of this term and try to show that what the Nyāyasūtra and its classical commentaries called a ‘tarka’ should be understood as the following: a tarka is a cognitive act that validates a content (of a doubt or a cognition or a speech-act) by demonstrating its logical fitness or invalidates a content by demonstrating its logical unfitness. (...) A tarka can act as a metatheory too. Generating certainty is, according to the Classical Nyāya, a job assigned to an epistemic instrument ( pramāṇa ). It fails to do so when there arises a doubt regarding it. The moment a tarka dispels the doubt, the epistemic instrument generates certainty. Tarkas of different types will be exemplified by critically analyzing Gaṅgeśa’s applications of tarka in his magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi . These examples will clarify the definition of tarka formulated in this paper. (shrink)

Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators. The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’. This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the (...) reverse. In the case of ‘the black pot’, the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of ‘the qualified object is the mere object’, the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological ‘entity’ gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham’s razor and the grammatical classification of objects. (shrink)

This article will critically examine the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of substance (_dravya_). The Buddhists are reductionists, who believe that there is no substance over and above its attributes (_guṇa_) or parts (_avayava_). Thus, a pot is a set of a certain shape, size, color, texture, etc. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher thinks that a pot is a substance that houses all of its attributes and actions (_karman_). It holds all these together. Also, it binds its parts. Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school defines a (...) substance, it does not seem to offer any theory of the diachronic identity of a substance; it does not discuss a Theseus’-ship-like case. In this article we shall offer a theory of diachronic identity of a substance based on a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of substance. (shrink)

In this paper, we test the philosophical endurance of the Nyāya theory of the permanent self. We present a debate between those, who believe in a permanent self, and their opponents in a dialogical form. In our imaginary debate, there are two participants; Gautama—somebody who has studied Udayana’s Ātmatattvaviveka (a text that claims that a self must be a permanent and irreducible entity) and finds its arguments convincing—and, Sugata, who does not believe in a permanent and irreducible self. Although Udayana (...) and other philosophers of the Old Nyāya school were mostly fighting the Buddhist philosophers, Sugata’s arguments are not confined to the Buddhist theories only; he presents several reductionist arguments proposed by Hume, Galen Strawson and Parfit. (shrink)

This article investigates the question concerning moral deskilling in the context of autonomous weapon systems. To this end, it interrogates the appropriateness of deskilling as an analytical tool, the consequences of the conflation of the terms “the warrior” and “the soldier,” and the impact of the dominant, but commonplace, understanding of autonomous weapons that underwrites the concerns that have been expressed thus far. While affirming the critical importance of the question regarding moral deskilling in the context of advanced weapons and (...) technologies, this article argues (a) that the notion of deskilling may not be an adequate or even appropriate analytical tool to investigate the matter on hand; (b) that the conflation of the terms “the warrior” and “the soldier” only serves to obfuscate the critical issues at stake; and (c) that the understanding of autonomous weapons that underwrites the concern is highly speculative. To this extent, the concern regarding moral deskilling in the context of autonomous weapon systems is ill-served. By way of a conclusion, the article calls for a more careful and nuanced approach and makes some preliminary suggestions as to how the question regarding moral deskilling in the context of autonomous weapon systems may be addressed. (shrink)

Serious thinking about the models of application of ethics has enabled us to move away from ethical engineering and adopting a social-scientific vocation that is an aid to moral-engineering. Time is ripe to rethink about the charge of “structuralism” on the non-engineering model of applied ethics. If we fail to resolve this issue, a structuralist application of ethics will be unavoidable, leading way to the old engineering. The paper argues why “structuralism” is undesirable and how it is avoided in a (...) model of discourse, that clears off engineering of any kind. (shrink)

The objective of the paper is to explicate and critically appreciate two forms of consequentialism, namely objective and subjective consequentialism. Consequentialism is a substantive moral theory according to which moral value or good is to produce/promote best consequences (in a sense welfare); and morally right consists in acting so as to promote maximum good (in case of utilitarianism) or to promote best or most good. However, the paper considers important questions, replies to which give us two forms of consequentialism, namely (...) subjective and objective consequentialism, each having their unique features, nuances and limits. Moot problems are as follows: Whether consequentialism as a theory of good is to promote actual good, that is good as matter-of-fact or expected good, that is good expected by the moral agent; and whether as a theory of right, it urges to make decisions for the promotion of good based on some heuristic devices or subjective motives, commitments and so on. Objective consequentialism, as a theory of good prefers promotion of actual good than expected good, and as a theory of right decision-making urges the moral agents to rely on heuristic devices than subjective factors. The contest has been absorbing and fierce, each having so-called strong arguments. The paper reconsiders these contesting arguments and critically examines those to conclude in favour of objective consequentialism on important counts notwithstanding, the value of motives, motivations and commitments of moral agents. (shrink)

Mary Midgley challenges the dominant conceptions of human nature, ethics, community and ecology taught at A-Level. This article considers some of the key themes of her thinking.

How does one give voice to the unspeakable, inhuman violence that shapes the present, and what remains of humanity in its wake? Adriana Cavarero offers an answer that roots human speech in embodied vulnerability, in contrast to philosophical emphases on disembodied rationality. In the face of what she calls horrorism, which puts humans in proximity to animality, she calls for resuscitating vocality, and therefore humanity, from loss. This article reads Kafka’s short story “A Report to an Academy” – which structurally (...) resembles a slave narrative and concerns a kidnapped ape who learns to speak – to extend Cavarero’s emphasis on vulnerability while challenging her humanism. In Kafka, modern horror’s locus is not animality but the abstract human, and it projects the unstable distinction between voice and noise onto blackened humans and nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Under mounting pressure from the international communities and organizations to curb carbon emission causing disturbing climate change, and the growing pressure of domestic environmentalists and the common man in India, the government is hard-pressed to enact laws on carbon emission. However, the moot problem is whether to consider a pro-active rule of action seriously to curb carbon emission while keeping the collective scenario in view or to consider a case-by-case scenario in view. A number of people argue that a collective (...) approach is much better, and for that matter, pro-active general rules of actions are desirable for their outcomes or consequences are good or worthwhile. This is what we now call rule consequentialism, which is much different from the case-by-case act consequentialism. In this case, the rightness of political action is determined by following some rules (or policies) which are amenable to worthwhile consequences. Similarly, we may conceive of a number of general rules of action such as “curb corruption”, “curb apartheid”, “curb exploitation of woman” and so on. In this paper, I would like to revisit rule consequentialism as a normative theory of rightness of action that is not immoderately overdemanding on moral agents. However, I would justify why rule consequentialism is not only overdemanding of moral agents but immoderate as well. Hence, it is an untenable normative theory of rightness of action. (shrink)

The work of three present-day Sankritist-philosophers, _God and the World's Arrangement_ allows readers to engage directly with writings of the classical Indian philosophers Śaṅkara and Vācaspati, as well as some of their most acute critics, on the question of whether the existence of a creator God can be known by reason alone. Carefully selected and annotated with the needs of students foremost in mind, these new translations will be of interest to anyone wishing to see up close a newly set (...) gem of our philosophical inheritance from global antiquity. (shrink)