This article is concerned with the status and stakes of Gilles Deleuze’s “break” with structuralism. With a particular focus on a transitional text of Deleuze, the 1967/1972 article “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” it asks how Deleuze understood structuralism and why, after his encounter with Félix Guattari and Guattari’s own transitional text, 1969’s “Machine and Structure,” Deleuze felt the need to break with structuralism. It argues that reading these two texts together allows us to see that (...) Deleuze already perceived tensions within the structuralist project, and argues that Guattari’s non-structural account of the machine allowed Deleuze to clarify this perception, and see it as necessitating a departure from structuralism. To close, however, it turns to recent work by philosophers such as Étienne Balibar and Patrice Maniglier that re-examines the structuralist moment and identifies an ongoing legacy that the “poststructuralism” of Deleuze and Guattari may be part of. By considering Deleuze and Guattari’s break with structuralism in light of this work, this article considers how the polemical rejection of structuralism by Deleuze and Guattari may not fully account for the ongoing legacy of the structuralist program and the persistence of a structuralist problematic in their thought. (shrink)

This paper has two goals. The first goal is to show that the structuralists’ claims about dependence are more significant to their view than is generally recognized. I argue that these dependence claims play an essential role in the most interesting and plausible characterization of this brand of structuralism. The second goal is to defend a compromise view concerning the dependence relations that obtain between mathematical objects. Two extreme views have tended to dominate the debate, namely the view that (...) all mathematical objects depend on the structures to which they belong and the view that none do. I present counterexamples to each of these extreme views. I defend instead a compromise view according to which the structuralists are right about many kinds of mathematical objects (roughly, the algebraic ones), whereas the anti-structuralists are right about others (in particular, the sets). I end with some remarks about how to understand the crucial notion of dependence, which despite being at the heart of the debate is rarely examined in any detail. (shrink)

Within the scope of the POPULISMUS research project, we have engaged in a methodological cross-fertilization between Essex School-inspired methods of analysis and computer-assisted text analysis. In this chapter, emphasis is placed on the Greek case and the material analyzed involves newspaper articles from the 2014–5 period. In particular, the analysis focuses on the antagonistic language games developed around representations of ‘the people’ and ‘populism’. Highlighting the need to study anti-populism together with populism, something that has not attracted much attention (...) in the relevant bibliography, and focusing on their mutual constitution from a discourse-theoretical as well as lexicometric perspective, we articulate a comprehensive analysis of the populist and anti-populist press in Greece, with broader implications for populism research globally. (shrink)

The chapter takes structuralism to be the thesis that if F and G are alike causally, then F and G are the same property. It follows that our beliefs about the world can be true in various brain-in-a-vat scenarios, giving us refuge from skeptical arguments. The trouble is that structuralism doesn’t do justice to certain metaphysical aspects of property identity having to do with fundamentality, intrinsicality, and the unity of the world. A closely related point is that the (...) relation…lies-at-some-spatial-distance-from…obeys necessary truths that need not apply to other relations with the same causal profile. This observation is especially important if, as David Lewis argued, the only alternatives to skepticism are structuralism and an anti-Humean stance toward modality. Some pertinent views of David Chalmers’s are discussed, and parallels are drawn between the structuralist response to skepticism and functionalism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Structural realism has recently re-entered mainstream discussions in the philosophy of science. The central notion of structure, however, is contested by both advocates and critics. This paper briefly reviews currently prominent structuralist accounts en route to proposing a metaphysics of structure that is capable of supporting the epistemic aspirations of realists, and that is immune to the charge most commonly levelled against structuralism. This account provides an alternative to the existing epistemic and ontic forms of the position, incorporating elements (...) of both. Structures are here identified with relations between first order, causal properties: properties that confer specific dispositions for relations. This form of structuralism constitutes an explicit proposal for what seem implicit structuralist tendencies in sophisticated but more traditional characterizations of realism. An outline of the proposal's response to the anti-realist's pessimistic induction on the history of scientific theories is considered. (shrink)

This paper proposes to examine the contribution of Goldstein’s biological thinking to French philosophy in the immediate post-war years. We will begin by reiterating the idea of mankind in Goldstein’s contemporary neurology. We will then recount the quarrel which took place between mechanist and vitalist biologists to show that criticism of the reflex concept is the condition to envision biology as a creative act. Finally, we will expose the ways French structuralist criticism of the subject used German structuralism to (...) fuel its contestation of the idea of a human nature based on reason. (shrink)

Inductive Metaphysics combines an anti-aprioristic emphasis on an empirical and scientific basis for metaphysics with an insistence on a specifically philosophical abductive theory-building. Since the latter specifically philosophical work is not empirical itself, it may in a liberal sense be called apriori. This paper highlights this apriori dimension within IM by a case study on Structuralism, the view that fundamental reality consists of a network of relations, which a number of philosophers consider to be suggested by modern physics. (...) Focussing on Dasgupta’s algebraic Generalism, the author argues that Structuralism suffers from a severe entailment problem, because the relations-spanning apparatus must stand for metaphysically fundamental forms. Schaffer’s contention that there are no entailment problems is rejected. Advocates of IM are well advised to take seriously their own insistence on metaphysical abduction and not to one-sidedly emphasise the empirical input: the elaboration of exact metaphysical theories and the apriori evaluation of their inherent tenability is a constituent of IM no less important than the consideration of scientific input. More traditional ways of metaphysical reasoning inevitably survive as an essential dimension within IM. (shrink)

Under what conditions does a physical system implement or realize a computation? Structuralism about computational implementation, espoused by Chalmers and others, holds that a physical system realizes a computation just in case the system instantiates a pattern of causal organization isomorphic to the computation’s formal structure. I argue against structuralism through counter-examples drawn from computer science. On my opposing view, computational implementation sometimes requires instantiating semantic properties that outstrip any relevant pattern of causal organization. In developing my argument, (...) I defend anti-individualism about computational implementation: relations to the social environment sometimes help determine whether a physical system realizes a computation. 1 The Physical Realization Relation2 Semantics and Computational Implementation3 Conforming to Instructions4 Implementing a Computer Program4.1 The denotational semantics of Scheme4.2 Worries about intentionality4.3 Worries about the natural numbers5 Implementing a Machine Model6 Bounded Structuralism7 Triviality Arguments8 Anti-individualism about Computational Implementation. (shrink)

This book fundamentally challenges the radical credentials of post-structuralism. Though Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze claim to have 'deconstructed' metaphysics, their work has much in common with previous attempts to 'end' the metaphysical tradition, from Kant to Nietzshe and Heidegger, and by sociology in general. Gillian Rose shows that this anti-metaphysical writing always appears in historically specific jurisprudential terms, which themselves found and recapitulate metaphysical categories. She reconsiders post-structuralism in this light and assesses the relationship between deconstruction and (...) the earlier structuralism of Saussure and Levi-Strauss. She argues in conclusion that the choice between post-structuralist nihilism and Hegelian and Marxist dialectic is spurious. (shrink)

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s post-Marxist analysis pushed Gramsci’s anti-determinism to its limits, embracing a post-structuralist, discourse-centred politics. Mouffe’s subsequent programme for radical democracy has sought a renewed democratic left project. While radical democracy’s post-structuralism enables important insights into political subjectivity and antagonism in contemporary democracies, it also weakens its own critical and strategic capacity. By recuperating its Gramscian heritage, radical democracy could be more theoretically and politically effective. In contrast to discourses operating in an entirely open and (...) contingent political field, Gramscian theory offers a more realist – but non-determinist – account of the structural, enabling and constraining properties of ideologies. It also allows for a distinctive institutional space for society. Society is the site upon which political identities are articulated, and from which existing power relations are challenged. But a conception of society also points to the institutional limits to politics, notable by their absence in post-structuralism and radical democracy. (shrink)

This paper reassesses the criticism of the Lucas-Penrose anti-mechanist argument, based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, as formulated by Krajewski : this argument only works with the additional extra-formal assumption that “the human mind is consistent”. Krajewski argues that this assumption cannot be formalized, and therefore that the anti-mechanist argument – which requires the formalization of the whole reasoning process – fails to establish that the human mind is not mechanistic. A similar situation occurs with a corollary to the (...) argument, that the human mind allegedly outperforms machines, because although there is no exhaustive formal definition of natural numbers, mathematicians can successfully work with natural numbers. Again, the corollary requires an extra-formal assumption: “PA is complete” or “the set of all natural numbers exists”. I agree that extra-formal assumptions are necessary in order to validate the anti-mechanist argument and its corollary, and that those assumptions are problematic. However, I argue that formalization is possible and the problem is instead the circularity of reasoning that they cause. The human mind does not prove its own consistency, and outperforms the machine, simply by making the assumption “I am consistent”. Starting from the analysis of circularity, I propose a way of thinking about the interplay between informal and formal in mathematics. (shrink)

In line with a recent rise in anti-LGBTQ discourse within conservative Russian politics, Aleksandr Dugin has increasingly critiqued “postmodern” theories that allegedly underpin social diversity (sexual, gender, racial, etc.) within the West: queer theory, post-structuralism, and other theoretical accounts of identity and alterity. In Dugin’s argument for a political philosophy of Eurasianism, the Western endorsement of multiculturalism and pluralism is indicative of individualism and “Atlanticist” liberalism, therefore at odds with the traditional, nationalist collectivism of Eurasia. In this light, (...) queer theory is a Western imposition whose philosophical premises directly contradict native, Russian traditions. Dugin’s attack on queer theory, however, mark a departure from the philosopher’s earlier career within the National Bolshevik movement. Throughout the nineties, Dugin was relatively sympathetic with the nascent LGBT movement in Russia: specifically within the political and philosophical circles of National Bolshevism, in which such figures as Eduard Limonov and Slava Mogutin coalesced with fascists and communists around a broad critique of Western capitalism and openly embraced homoeroticism and countercultural, queer dissidence. Dugin’s links to the LGBT movement are even relatively mainstream: his first wife, Evgeniia Debrianskaia, was a prominent gay activist, and both Debrianskaia and Dugin for a time viewed the Eurasianism’s goals as aligned with that of LGBT activism in Russia. This article examines the development of Dugin’s political philosophy in the context of his reading of queer theory. It first discusses the link in historical terms, in the connections between Dugin’s early post-Soviet career and post-Soviet Russian gay activism. The article then focuses on Dugin’s philosophy of “multipolarity,” as a form of resistance to universalist, American hegemony, in order to illustrate how Dugin’s Eurasianist account of political “anti-normativity” both aligns and contradicts with his reading of queer theory. The article concludes with comments on the globalization of queer theory, cultural imperialism, and its relationship to Dugin’s geopolitics. (shrink)

France saw a great intellectual upsurge in a variety of different academic fields in the 1970s, principally in philosophy, but also in the social sciences, linguistics, anthropology, history, and psychiatry. Different strands of thinking, from the linguistic school of structuralists, Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist anthropology, Louis Althusser’s reconsiderations of the basis of Marxism, Derrida’s philosophical critique of phenomenology and structuralism, Lacan’s of Freud and the unconscious, and Michel Foucault’s historical genealogy, all seemed to be coalescing in a reconsideration of the centrality (...) of Man in what had been assumed to be a human-centred universe. Often seen as representing the triumph of subjectivity over objective reality, this chapter will show how the theories of deconstruction were really a critique of the Subject. (shrink)

Knafo and Teschke’s 2020 article, ‘Political Marxism and the Rules of Reproduction of Capitalism: A Historicist Critique’, is an important contribution to the debate between structuralist and historicist interpretations of Marxism. As such, it presents important implications for how Marxism is presented in broader academic debates. My aim is to highlight the contribution of its radical historicism and its methodological emphasis on agency for questioning Eurocentric macro-narratives, through an engagement with the ways in which Marxism (and the problem of Eurocentric (...) structuralism) is presented in Post- and Decolonial traditions. I end by drawing briefly upon examples from my previous work on Brazilian state-formation and development. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an account of the conceptual shift that occurs between the work completed by Gilles Deleuze prior to 1969 and his later work with Félix Guattari, beginning in 1972 with Anti-Oedipus. Against previous interpretations, which have concentrated on the developments initiated by Deleuze, I argue for the primary importance of Guattari's influence, especially his insistence on a theory of “machinic processes.” The importance of these processes is made manifest in Deleuze and Guattari's move away from (...) theories of structuralism. In order to carry out this task, I offer a close reading of Guattari's essay “Machine and Structure.” This essay was first written as a review of Deleuze's acclaimed work in Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense and formed the basis for Deleuze and Guattari's first meeting. In the concluding sections of the paper, I show how the integration of the concept of the machine allows Deleuze and Guattari to develop a theory of the unconscious that operates outside of the boundaries traditionally set by structuralist analysis. (shrink)

The author reviews and summarizes, in as jargon-free way as he is capable of, the form of anti-platonist anti-nominalism he has previously developed in works since the 1980s, and considers what additions and amendments are called for in the light of such recently much-discussed views on the existence and nature of mathematical objects as those known as hyperintensional metaphysics, natural language ontology, and mathematical structuralism.

Mathematical objects, if they exist at all, exist independently of our proofs, constructions and stipulations. For example, whether inaccessible cardinals exist or not, the very act of our proving or postulating that they do doesn’t make it so. This independence thesis is a central claim of mathematical realism. It is also one that many anti-realists acknowledge too. For they agree that we cannot create mathematical truths or objects, though, to be sure, they deny that mathematical objects exist at all. (...) I have defended a mathematical realism of sorts. I interpret the objects of mathematics as positions in patterns, and maintain that they exist independently of us, and our stipulations, proofs, and the like. (shrink)

This article develops an analogy proposed by Stachel between general relativity (GR) and quantum mechanics (QM) as regards permutation invariance. Our main idea is to overcome Pooley's criticism of the analogy by appeal to paraparticles. In GR, the equations are (the solution space is) invariant under diffeomorphisms permuting spacetime points. Similarly, in QM the equations are invariant under particle permutations. Stachel argued that this feature—a theory's ‘not caring which point, or particle, is which’—supported a structuralist ontology. Pooley criticizes this analogy: (...) in QM the (anti-)symmetrization of fermions and bosons implies that each individual state (solution) is fixed by each permutation, while in GR a diffeomorphism yields in general a distinct, albeit isomorphic, solution. We define various versions of structuralism, and go on to formulate Stachel's and Pooley's positions, admittedly in our own terms. We then reply to Pooley. Though he is right about fermions and bosons, QM equally allows more general types of particle symmetry, in which states (vectors, rays, or density operators) are not fixed by all permutations (called ‘paraparticle states’). Thus Stachel's analogy is revived. (shrink)

I trace a brief history of philosophical discussion of the concept WOMAN and identify two key points at which, I argue, things went badly wrong. The first was where when it was agreed that the concept WOMAN must identify a social not biological kind. The second was where it was decided that the concept WOMAN faced a legitimate challenge of being insufficiently “inclusive”, understood in a certain way. I’ll argue that both of these moves are only intelligible, if at all, (...) in the context of an anti-naturalist picture drawn from either post-structuralism or radical feminism. They become incoherent when adopted by methodological naturalists, who – especially when concerned to track oppression and discrimination – have no good reason to deny that WOMAN refers to a pre-given, biological kind. (shrink)

Georges Bataille (1887–1962) is one of the most significant thinkers of the 20th century, whose anti-humanist anthropology influenced subsequent existentialist and post-structuralist philosophy. His wide-ranging writings (across philosophy, archaeology, economics, sociology, poetry, erotica and history of art) frequently mention children, childhood and childishness, and yet there has hitherto been little to no attention paid to this aspect of his work. This article opens up a neglected theme in Bataille studies, and also explores the consequences of Bataille's presentation of the (...) human condition for our understanding of the pedagogical relationship. Of particular interest is the idea of the agentic child, which occupies such an important place in childhood studies, educational theory and public policy. In the light of Bataille's anthropology, I shall explore the idea that the pursuit of children's agency is the victim of its vaunting ambition. (shrink)

At the turn of 1960s and 1970s, Stanisław Lem devoted some of his non-fiction writing to a discussion and considerations of semiotics. Most of them were expressions of a critical approach mainly directed against structuralism. However, Lem also formulated some positive statements although they were not developed systematically. The article offers an analysis of Lem’s semiotic ideas from the perspective of semiotic functionalism of Jerzy Pelc, mainly considering its two main components: contextualism and typological approach. Special attention is paid (...) to the latter because both Pelc and Lem proposed some original solutions in this respect. What is meant here is the multidimensional typology of symbolic uses of signs developed by Pelc and Lem’s multidimensional typology of the situations of the reception of texts. Although they are independent form each other, these proposals show some convergence both in their ways of construction and roles they are supposed to perform. Henceforth, one can say that Lem was a crypto-functionalist. (shrink)

This paper discusses the theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of the use or non-use of expert-based information in policy-making. Special attention is paid to the Narrative Policy Framework introduced by Jones & McBeth in 2010. This theory of the policy process adopts a quantitative, structuralist and positivist approach to the study of policy narratives. The Narrative Policy Framework is useful for the analysis of the use of expert-based information to resolve so-called wicked problems, which are characterized by intense (...) value-based conflict between policy coalitions. The methodological approach of the Narrative Policy Framework is illustrated using the policy issue of mandatory vaccination. (shrink)

This long digression into language was necessary because we cannot understand verbal narrative unless we are aware of the iconic and indexical dimensions of language. Narrative is not just a sequencing, or the illusion of sequence, as the title of our conference would have it; narrative is a sequencing of something for somebody. To put anything into words is to sequence it, but to enumerate the parts of an automobile is not to narrate them, even though the enumeration must mention (...) each part in the enumeration's own discursive order. One cannot narrate a picture, or a person, or a building, or a tree, or a philosophy. Narration is a word that implicates its object in its meaning. Only one kind of thing can be narrated: a time-thing, or to use our normal word for it, an "event." And strictly speaking, we require more than one event before we recognize that we are in the presence of a narrative. And what is an event? A narrated event is the symbolization of a real event: a temporal icon. A narration is the symbolic presentation of a sequence of events connected by subject matter and related by time. Without temporal relation we have only a list. A telephone directory is a list, but we can give it a strong push in the direction of narrative by adding the word "begat" between the first and second entries and the words "who begat" after each successive entry until the end. This will resemble certain minimal religious narratives, even down to the exclusion of female names from most of the list . Robert Scholes is professor of English and comparative literature and director of the semiotics program at Brown University. He is the author of Structuralism in Literature: An Introduction, Fabulation and Metafiction, and Reading, Writing, and Semiotics. "Toward a Semiotics of Literature," his previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, appeared in the Autumn 1977 issue. (shrink)

Genealogies of Speculation looks to break the impasse between the innovations of speculative thought and the dominant strands of 20th century anti-foundationalist philosophy. Challenging emerging paradigms of philosophical history, this text re-evaluates different theoretical and political traditions such as feminism, literary theory, social geography and political theory after the speculative turn in philosophy. With contributions from leading writers in contemporary thought this book is a crucial resource for studying cultural and art-theory and continental philosophy.

1. IntroductionIn February 2019, the film Black Panther was awarded three Oscars in Los Angeles. Some reviewers embraced it for its anti-racist message against the resurgence of racism under U.S. president Donald Trump.1 It tells the story of a black hero who tries to steer the development of an ethnically pure, isolationist hereditary monarchy in Africa. The imaginary state of Wakanda, which presents itself to the rest of the world as a third-world country, has highly developed technologies at its (...) disposal–at the same time, one recalls archaic African myths there.2. (shrink)

This is the Portuguese translation of Kathleen Okruhlik's paper "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism" (2014) Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, (...) his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science. (shrink)

Two key themes in contemporary social theory are particularly relevant to the interpretation and critique of figurational sociology. On the one hand, some recent critiques of the sociological tradition — Touraine's attempt to deconstruct the received image of society is the most important example — have called into question a dominant paradigm that underlies both Marxist and structural-functional theories. Norbert Elias has not only anticipated some of the most important criticisms but also suggested correctives to some of the currently fashionable (...) alternatives. More specifically, his relationship to the sociological traditions and to its contemporary offshoots can be described in terms of six antitheses: his approach is anti-economistic, anti-normativistic, anti-reductionistic, anti-functionalist, anti-structuralist and anti-individualistic. On the other hand, the impact of all these critical strategies is somewhat blunted by the one-sided emphasis on power. A more balanced version of figurational sociology would need a concept of culture to match and counter-balance Elias's insights into the problematic of power. Further exploration of this issue could draw both on the classics (especially Weber) and on post-Parsonian debates about cultural power and their interconnections. Cultural interpretations of power are the most important link between those two dimensions of social life; although Elias has never explicitly thematized them, his recent writings touch upon some aspects of their specifically modern variants. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article proposes an interpretation of the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure and Mikhail Bakhtin that seeks to relate them not through an epistemological point of view, but based on a concept proposed by Henri Meschonnic, according to which one author can be linked to another without an explicit reference to an affiliation between them. The starting point is a comment made by Bakhtin about the translation of François Rabelais’ work into Russian, which Meschonnic cites in his anti-structuralist (...) interpretation of Saussure. Finally, a reflection is made on the relevance of addressing metalinguistic comments that discuss the condition of the speaker, which can be the object of an enunciative-anthropological theorization. (shrink)

This paper elucidates the notion that action is creative through the social imaginaries perspective. Hans Joas’s critique of sociological theories on action developed in The Creativity of Action (1996 [1992]) argued that creativity is an essential concept to better understand social action. Cornelius Castoriadis and Paul Ricoeur employ an understanding of action as being inextricably connected to the social imaginary and capable of bringing forth historically novel forms of being and doing. An elucidation of Castoriadis’s dichotomy between the instituted and (...) instituting imaginaries and Ricoeur’s distinction of the ideological and utopian poles of the cultural imagination bring to the surface points of convergence and divergence in their respective understandings of the social imaginary and historical novelty. Inspired by Joas’s critique of sociological theories of action through pragmatism, which is underlined by a critique of the philosophical anthropological assumptions held by structuralism, this essay argues that Castoriadis’s and Ricoeur’s distinct insights on the creative dimension of social action and the way in which social reality emerges can elucidate further an anti-structuralist philosophical anthropology that can help inform sociological theories of action. (shrink)

Dispositional Essentialism is a unified anti-Humean account of the metaphysics of low-level physical properties and laws of nature. In this paper, I articulate the view that I label Canonical Dispositional Essentialism, which comprises a structuralist metaphysics of properties and an account of laws as relations in the property structure. I then present an alternative anti-Humean account of properties and laws. This account rejects CDE’s structuralist metaphysics of properties in favour of a view of properties as qualitative grounds of (...) dispositions and it rejects CDE’s view of laws as relations in favour of a view of laws as features of an efficient description of possible property distributions. I then defend this view over CDE on the grounds that it can overcome an explanatory shortcoming of CDE and that it achieves a level of continuity with science that CDE fails to achieve. The upshot of this paper is a significant narrowing of the range of possibilities in which the absolutely best unified account of laws and properties resides. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I will examine Foucault’s “The Confessions of the Flesh”, with the purpose of understanding firstly why we find in Christianity and especially in Augustine’s work the most advanced matrimonial technology as an institution of internment of desire and fundamental of society. Then, starting from the thesis that “The Confessions of the Flesh” can be appreciated as another Anti-Oedipus, I will propose that they are not only an anti-psychoanalytic work, but also an anti-structuralist one, (...) with the recognition that Judeo-Christian societies are not regulated by parenting deduced from the prohibition of incest, but by a conjugality prior to parenthood and metaphysically pre-incestuous. Finally, I will rehearse an interpretive experiment of “The Confessions of the Flesh” to reconsider theological foundations of man, in comparison with The Pseudo Anti-Narcissus, by Viveiros de Castro. (shrink)

This article identifies and assesses a way of thinking that might help to explain why some compatibilists are attracted to what is variously called an internalist, structuralist, or anti-historicist view of moral responsibility—a view about the bearing of agents’ histories on their moral responsibility. Scenarios of two different kinds are considered. Several scenarios feature heavy-duty manipulation that radically changes an agent’s mature moral personality from admirable to despicable or vice versa. These “radical reversal” scenarios are contrasted with a scenario (...) featuring “original design”: a supernatural designer determines exactly how an agent’s life will go before the agent comes into existence. It is explained why scenarios of these two different kinds generate very different challenges to compatibilism. Partly in light of that explanation, it is argued that the way of thinking at issue is misguided. (shrink)

L’envers de la psychanalyse, Séminaire XVII sur les quatre discours, est la réponse de Lacan aux événements de 1968. Son postulat est bien résumé par son détournement du célèbre graffiti anti-structuraliste lu sur les murs de Paris en 1968 : « Les structures ne marchent pas dans les rues ! »..

This paper is an exposition as well as a critical examination of M. Frank's response to the Derrida/Searle debate. It argues that Frank's critique of Derrida and Searle is partly justified but suffers from a number of shortcomings. The author agrees with Frank's argument that Derrida fails to explain how linguistic meaning is possible on the basis of purely differential relations between signs (différance) and supports his view that the human subject, in spite of its lack of complete self-transparency, is (...) endowed with more autonomy and semantic creativity than Derrida is willing to grant it. The paper tries to show, however, that much of Frank's critique of linguistic theory as represented by the work of Searle is unjustified because it is informed by a questionable notion of linguistic determinism rooted in Schleiermacher and Saussurean structuralism, a notion of ineffable or non-conceptual individual meaning that remains insufficiently explicated, and a generally anti-naturalist attitude towards language which leads to a misunderstanding of the role linguistics and related cognitive sciences can (and cannot) play in the hermeneutic sciences. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze was born in 1925, and died by his own hand 70 years later. He taught philosophy in the French lycée system, at the University of Lyon, and then—after the institutional fragmentation that was the government‟s response to the student-driven near-revolution of 1968—at the University of Paris VIII (Vincennes). Although his work is only now coming to prominence in the Anglophone world, he has achieved great notoriety in France: he is widely credited with inaugurating the post-structuralist movement with his (...) 1962 Nietzsche and Philosophy, as well as with providing its definitive text, the 1972 Anti-Oedipus (co-written with Félix Guattari). His colleague and friend, Michel Foucault, has gone so far as to suggest that 'perhaps one day this century will be known as Deleuzian'. (shrink)

Foucault’s philosophy and history of science offer contradictory suggestions. His history of science is erudite, challenging, interesting, uncovering new and rich analogies between various disciplines. But his philosophy of science fosters problematic extreme anti-realism combined with elements of strong relativism. The style is rich in ambiguous, even dark pronouncements, often sounding bombastic. In the paper I develop the hypothesis that there are two opposing pressures coming all the way from the early structuralist model which I sketch briefly. On the (...) one hand, structuralist approach is good for suggesting organizational principles, on the other bad in excluding issues of truth, explanatory potential of theories, and even their empirical adequacy. It has proved quite poor in offering explanatory tools on meta-level. If the pressure of evidence is,not seen as the prime mover of scientific change, and if change has nothing to do with the search for more adequate picture then the seduction of the power-model, with its political potential, becomes very strong. It is ubiquitous in continental philosophy of 20th century. I am afraid that the two components of structuralist heritage have been yielding a very mixed result: bad philosophy of science disfiguring the history of science. The interesting and challenging material from the latter is used for very dubious generalizations in the former. (shrink)

The superfunctionality claim is that phenomenal experiences are more than functional (objective, causal) relations. This is one of the most widely used but least attacked claims in the anti-physicalist literature on consciousness. Coupled with one form of structuralism, the view that science only explains functional relations, the superfunctionality claim entails that science will not explain phenomenal experience. The claim is therefore essential to many anti-physicalist arguments. I identify an open question argument for the superfunctionality claim that expresses (...) an intuition deserving of explanation. Using the experience of fear as an example, I show that this intuition cannot distinguish between whether conscious experiences are more than functional relations, or whether instead they are just very complex (including, constituted by very complex functional relations). I give reasons to suspect that the latter is more likely the case. This renders physicalism safe from the superfunctionality claim. This also provides a challenge to the proponents of the superfunctionality claim: they should explain why paradigmatically mysterious phenomenal experiences are correlated with extensive and complex physical correlates. (shrink)

The use of "theory" in feminist analysis has been said to threaten feminism as a political force. This collection of work by leading feminist scholars engages with the question of the political status of poststructuralism theory within feminism. Against the view that the use of post-structuralism necessarily weakens feminism, 'Feminists Theorize the Political' affirms the contemporary debate over theory as politically rich and consequential. In laying the theoretical groundwork for the volume, Butler and Scott posed a number of questions (...) to prominent legal scholars, literary critics, philosophers, political theorists, historians, and cultural theorists. The essays do not settle the questions but generate new and productive directions for them. The volume as a whole valorizes the unsettling power and politics of theory. The essays in 'Feminists Theorize the Political' speak to the questions that emerge from the convergence of feminism and poststructuralism: What happens to feminist critique when traditional foundations--experience, history, universal norms--are called into question? Can feminist theory problematize the notion of the subject without losing its political effectivity? Which version of the subject is to questioned, and how does that questioning open up possibilities for reformulating agency, power, and sites of political resistance? What are the consequences of a specifically feminist reformulation of difference? What are the uses and limits of a poststructuralist critique of binary logic for the theorization of racial and class differences, the position of the subaltern? This anthology represents a diverse array of theoretical work within feminist theory with strong political stakes. Although not all of the authors subscribe to poststructuralism, (and few would concede post-structuralism is a monolithic enterprise), each offers an innovative feminist analysis that is in some way motivated in and by the poststructuralist challenge. 'Feminists Theorize The Political' addresses a range of feminist concerns, including productive freedom, anti-discrimination law, rape, and formulating power in terms of exclusion, difference and hierarchy. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze was born in 1925, and died by his own hand 70 years later. He taught philosophy in the French lycée system, at the University of Lyon, and then—after the institutional fragmentation that was the government‟s response to the student-driven near-revolution of 1968—at the University of Paris VIII (Vincennes). Although his work is only now coming to prominence in the Anglophone world, he has achieved great notoriety in France: he is widely credited with inaugurating the post-structuralist movement with his (...) 1962 Nietzsche and Philosophy, as well as with providing its definitive text, the 1972 Anti-Oedipus (co-written with Félix Guattari). His colleague and friend, Michel Foucault, has gone so far as to suggest that 'perhaps one day this century will be known as Deleuzian'. (shrink)

This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three key issues. First, it starts by exploring how philosophers have recently challenged our understanding of radical skeptical arguments. It then unpacks and critically evaluates some influential reactions to radical skepticism: structuralism, knowledge-first epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, and hinge epistemology. Third, it explores some novel developments of pragmatism, like pragmatic skepticism, gauges its anti-skeptical import, and reflects on the ways in which radical skeptical epistemology (...) and ethics might meet. (shrink)

In this comment on the work by Ulises Moulines I shall not refer to the interesting analysis of the ontological commitments that depends the treatment of the so-called «data models», nor shall I debate the general metaphysical principles proposed in his approach, adopting an experimentalist, instrumentalist, anti-realistic, positivist or empirical stance. I shall focus on the last part of his article in which he elaborates on the links between Wesley Salmon's causalist approach and the structuralist analysis of explanation viewed (...) as theoretical embedding, as he relates it to the structural analysis of the theoretical terms in light of a certain general shared understanding of epistemology's job. (shrink)

“Structuralism, Fictionalism, and the Applicability of Mathematics in Science”. This article has two objectives. The first one is to review some of the most important questions in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics: What is the nature of mathematical objects? How do we acquire knowledge about these objects? Should mathematical statements be interpreted differently than ordinary ones? And, finally, how can we explain the applicability of mathematics in science? The debate that guides these reflections is the one between mathematical realism (...) and anti-realism. On the other hand, the second objective is to discuss the arguments that use the applicability of mathematics in science to justify mathematical realism, and show that none of them reaches its aim. To this end, we will distinguish three aspects of the problem of the applicability of mathematics: the utility of mathematics in science, the unexpected utility of some mathematical theories, and the apparent indispensability of mathematics in our best scientific theories - in particular, in our best scientific explanations. Finally, I argue that none of these aspects constitutes a reason to adopt mathematical realism. (shrink)

Until now post-structuralism is widely regarded as an opposite to phenomenology. This is also true for the relation of Butler’s post-structuralism and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to show how close they are to each other. For this purpose, I will focus on Butler’s poststructuralist theory of performativity to confront it with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory of expression. While Butler accuses theories of expression of being essentialist, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s theory of experience resists such a (...) criticism. “Expressivity” and “performativity”, and thus phenomenology and post-structuralism, are not opposites but partners in the search for an anti-essentialist concept. (shrink)

Until now post-structuralism and phenomenology are widely regarded as opposites. Contrary to this opinion, I am arguing that they have a lot in common. In order to make my argument, I concentrate on Judith Butler’s poststructuralist concept of performativity to confront it with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological concept of expressivity. While Butler claims that phenomenological theories of expression are in danger of essentialism and thus must be replaced by non-essentialist theories of performativity, I hold that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expressivity must (...) strictly be understood in anti-essentialist terms. Following this line of interpretation, “expressivity” and “performativity”—as well as phenomenology and post-structuralism—are not opposites but partners in the search for an anti-essentialist gender concept. Consequently, feminist phenomenology turns out to be a non-essentialist approach that combines phenomenological and post-structural insights. (shrink)

Bas van Fraassen's anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts (...) to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen's empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens's epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science. (shrink)

J. E. Malpas discusses and develops the ideas of Donald Davidson, influential in contemporary thinking on the nature of understanding and meaning, and of truth and knowledge. He provides an account of Davidson's holistic and hermeneutical conception of linguistic interpretation, and, more generally, of the mind. Outlining its Quinean origins and the elements basic to Davidson's Radical Interpretation, J. E. Malpas' book goes on to elaborate this holism and to examine the indeterminacy of interpretation and the principle of charity. The (...) metaphysical and epistemological consequences of Davidson's approach are considered, particularly in relation to scepticism and relativism, the realist/anti-realist debate, and the problem of truth. Parallels are drawn between the Davidsonian emphasis on the centrality of the notion of truth and Heidegger's notion of truth as aletheia, as the book looks to structuralist, hermeneutical and phenomenological sources to illuminate Davidson's position. (shrink)

The main theme of the article, which by genre falls into the area of semiotically influenced philosophy, is a reflection on the relationship between the human and the non-human, using two partial but parallel discourses. The first discourse is the perspective of general semiotics, which is defined in the article on the basis of two distinct forms of rationality that, in different guises, still intervene in debates about the nature of the humanities and social sciences today. The first form of (...) this rationality is semiological, which can be classified under the encyclopaedic rubric of structuralism, and which has its main source of inspiration in general linguistics and its continuation in philosophical anti-humanism. The second perspective has its origins in Peirce’s logicist theory of the sign and his pragmatist metaphysics, and opens up thinking about the sign, the human, and the non-human to a non-language-centric view of the world. Despite their demonstrable theoretical and methodological incompatibility, the present text treats them as incompatible but largely complementary perspectives. It is in their mutual exposition that one can see the moments in which the view of modern human as a semiological and semiotic animal takes shape. The text brings this fundamental and founding theoretical schism into focus by examining two images from post/modern art: Ted Chiang’s “The Great Silence” and Jorge Luis Borges’ “Averroës’s Search.”. (shrink)

Moving beyond both realist and anti-realist accounts of mathematics, Shapiro articulates a "structuralist" approach, arguing that the subject matter of a mathematical theory is not a fixed domain of numbers that exist independent of each other, but rather is the natural structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle.