The international community's indifferent and double standard approach to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue for 30 years forced Azerbaijan to restore its territorial integrity through military means and political negotiations on the battlefield during the Second Karabakh War, from September 27 to November 10, 2020. Although the 44-day Patriotic War ended with the victory of the Azerbaijani army under the leadership of the President of the Republic and Victorious Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev, armed clashes occasionally occurred along the borders of Azerbaijan (...) and Armenia. On September 19-20, 2023, as a result of successful localized anti-terrorism measures carried out by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan was fully restored. On October 15, President Ilham Aliyev raised the Flag of Azerbaijan in Agdara, Askeran, Khojavend, Khojaly, and Khankendi. On December 21, 2023, as part of the 1/8 finals of the Azerbaijan Cup, the football teams “Garabagh” from Agdam and “MOIK” from Baku met for the first time at the stadium in the Khankendi region, which had been liberated from occupation. The unity of the Karabakh-Army-People is the main source of our Victory. (shrink)

In a recent book devoted to the axiology of theism, Kirk Lougheed has argued that the ‘complete understanding’ argument should be numbered among the arguments for anti-theism. According to this argument, God’s existence is detrimental to us because, if a supernatural and never completely understandable God exists, then human beings are fated to never achieve complete understanding. In this article, I argue that the complete understanding argument for anti-theism fails for three reasons. First, complete (...) understanding is simply impossible to achieve. Second, even if achieving complete understanding were possible, it would not be beneficial. Third, the only type of complete understanding that is possible to achieve and is beneficial to human beings is the understanding of that which is of primary importance to us, and not the understanding of everything, as Lougheed seems to assume. God can grant us complete understanding of that which is of primary importance to us. As a consequence, God’s existence ends up being beneficial and not detrimental to us. (shrink)

Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that (...) compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have said regarding e.g. the compatibility of anti-individualism and basic self-knowledge; and more importantly it contains the crux of a response to McKinsey-style arguments against anti-individualism. (shrink)

The idea of translating Gerdil into English is brilliant, the translation is very good and the introduction of William Frank precise and inspiring.... Rousseau proposes a complete break with tradition. A new man will arise who is severed from the whole heritage of the past. With him the history of mankind begins anew. In one sense we have here a transposition in the field of philosophy of education of the Cartesian cogito. The subject begins with himself. To this philosophical (...) project Gerdil opposes the idea of tradition. We have not made ourselves. Our parents have procreated us. The parents do not only procreate their offspring, they also introduce them into the natural and social reality, that is they educate. No education is possible without a lively dialogue with history and society. Since the beginning man stands in a close relationship to others, is made for the human society.... In these our times one form of modernity is collapsing and the mood of the day is an unclear postmodernity that in some of its versions could well be a return to barbarianism. All the more important is then that another form of modernity be rediscovered and brought to the attention of the American public. - Rocco Buttiglione, University of St. Pius V, Rome A timely translation of a compelling 18th century critique of Rousseau by the neglected Italian author, Hyacinth S. Gerdil. Gerdil's Anti-Emile may have been written as a critique of Rousseau's Emile, but it can equally be read as a critique of the philosophy embraced by the American educational establishment. Through the influence of John Dewey, Rousseau came to inform much of the educational theory regnant in the United States, with disastrous consequences, now acknowledge by nearly all. In a valuable preface to his translation, Professor Frank, drawing upon his experience both here and abroad, not only places Emile in context, but defends Gerdil's time-transcending, classical view of education against its modern detractors. "Gerdil," Frank tells us, "addressed his Anti-Emile to elders responsible for education, be they parents, teachers, or political authorities, who might find themselves swayed by the powerful rhetoric of Rousseau's Emile." The same may be said of this translation and its informative prefatory material, for it is clearly a study that will be valued by anyone interested in principled education. - Jude P. Dougherty, Catholic University of America Cover image: "Adam and Eve" by Tintoretto. St. Augustine's Press acknowledges the kind permission granted by la Scuola Grande di San Rocco, Venice, for the use of the image. All rights reserved by la Scuola Grande di San Rocco. (shrink)

This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of (...) mathematics. It belongs to anti-realism, but can meet those challenges and can perhaps convince some realists, at least those who are also naturalists. (shrink)

In much of the literature on Hobbes, he is considered a proto-liberal, that is, he is seen as setting up the apparatus that leads to liberalism but his own authoritarian streak makes it impossible for liberals to completely claim him as one of their own. In this paper, I argue that, far from being a precursor to liberalism, Hobbes offers a political theory that is implicitly anti-liberal. I do not mean this in the conventional sense that Hobbes was too (...) conservative for liberalism. On the contrary, I will argue that in his writing, Hobbes evinces a concept of collective interpretation, theories of individualism and the nature and possibilities for democratic politics, that is radical and offers a completely developed alternative to liberalism even as it eschews conservative and reactionary models as well. I focus in particular on the idea of individualism and how the model offered by liberals and conservatives offers far less in terms of individual choice and justice than Hobbes’s own theory does, however paradoxical this may seem. (shrink)

Descartes and his early followers were widely seen to be enemies of superstition and the occult. This was particularly visible in the Cartesian movement’s antagonism to astrology. However, why Descartes and his early followers were so pitted against astrology is less than clear given the flexibility afforded to them through their system of philosophy and various mechanical explanations. Claude Gadroys (1642-1678), for example, produced a short treatise that provided a mechanical explanation consistent with Cartesian physics to allow for celestial influence (...) on Earth. In doing so, he exposed a contradiction in Cartesian vortex theory that seemed to disallow any such influence. In this way, Gadroys brought against himself and then dispelled one of the strongest objections to a Cartesian astrology. Oddly, no other Cartesian relied on principles specific to Cartesianism to argue against astrology as a legitimate science. This paper’s goal is to give a survey of some of the most prominent anti-astrological influences on Descartes, as well as some of the most prominent anti-astrological Cartesians in the second half of the 17th century. In doing this, I hope to show two things. First, in mainstream Cartesianism of the period, the anti-astrological sentiment was in no way part of the debate surrounding Descartes’ philosophy. Instead, ‘Cartesian’ anti-astrological arguments were based on well-worn arguments with an emphasis on experimental difficulties in establishing an astrological science. Second, the explanation for the curious lack of distinctly Cartesian anti-astrological arguments reflects an inherent flaw in Cartesianism; namely, it lacked the theoretical tools to completely rule out ‘occult’ sciences such as astrology. (shrink)

This publication is an article 2, expanding on the topic, outlined in article 1, published earlier in “Philosophical thoughts” (1019, No. 1). The author considers the constitutional prerequisites of the anthropological anti-Utopia of the Third Reich, the main principles of which were deduced from the folk-political and folk-cultural versions of the German philosophical anthropology completed with ideological statements of the industrialism. The functional potential of the human ideals is regarded. These ideals are canonized in the ideology of the national-socialism (...) with the symbolic representation as Leader, Worker and Soldier as practical persons are conceptualized as antipodes, which in the further myth creations of the national-socialism are concretized and became the features of heroes. The idea and realities of the folk educational state are analyzed including the chronological and topological characteristics of this anti-utopia with the practically unrestricted life-time and the dialectic of the European idea with paradox prescribing to it the Nordic origin. The significance of sacral meaning of the Third Reich is clarified in the categorical schemes of the political romantic. The consequences of intentional primitivism of the world view culture of the youth are detected in the landscapes of the anthropological anti-utopia with the transforming of the normal student into “the political soldier” and recognition of the masculine community as a structuring model of society. The anti-human intentionality of biological reduction of the new world view, which is founded on the myth of the origin and the race theory, is unveiled as a distinction between a “worse” and “non- worse” life what makes this anti-utopia a repressive one and legitimates the crime practices of the re-education and liquidation. (shrink)

In this paper I scrutinize the so-called China Brain thought experiment famously articulated by Ned Block to see whether it refutes functionalism as a theory of consciousness. I argue that it does not. Block’s case rests on a single premise, P, in the following argument: a creature with a China Brain would lack qualitative experience, despite its being a functional replica of you or me, and working under the assumption that we have rich mental life complete with qualia. Yet (...) if a China Brain-creature were truly and completely R, and yet P were true as the thought experiment purports to show, functionalism would have to be false. Since I want to reject that conclusion, I must do one of the following: deny that Mr. Li is truly R in the first place; grant that Mr. Li is truly R and grant that P, but deny that we have M; or grant that Mr. Li is truly R and grant that we have M, but deny that P. I opt for the third option. First, I paint a picture according to which Mr. Li's having M would not seem as implausible as it does at first. That is, I try to make the premise P seem less intuitive. But in case I am unpersuasive in this first approach, I employ a second tactic as well. This one is to suggest that we cannot know, even in principle whether P, so it is an irrelevant intuition upon which to base the China Brain attack. In any case, the China Brain fails to provide a true counterexample to functionalism. (shrink)

Ioulia Podoroga | : Dans cet article, je pose le problème des rapports entre philosophie et littérature à partir du cas de Boris Pasternak, dont la vie et l’oeuvre permettent d’envisager une nouvelle articulation entre les deux disciplines, en mobilisant un schème paradoxalement hégélien. Schème hégélien, car fait de trois mouvements, de sa pratique musicale vers la philosophie pour aboutir à une relève dans la poésie. Mais schème anti-hégélien, parce que la triade hégélienne est inversée : la philosophie est (...) le moyen-terme, mais qui reste central, dans l’acheminement vers l’accomplissement du système par la poésie. | : In this article I raise the problem of the relationship between philosophy and literature basing it on the case-study of Boris Pasternak’s writings, whose life and work enable us to envisage a new linkage between the two disciplines by mobilizing a paradoxically Hegelian scheme. Hegelian scheme because of its three movements : from his musical practice towards poetry via philosophy. But anti-Hegelian scheme, because the Hegelian triad is reversed : philosophy is the medium-term but still central in the movement towards the completion of the system by poetry. (shrink)

With the advent of the cloud computing era, big data technology has also developed rapidly. Due to the huge volume, variety, fast processing speed and low value density of big data, traditional data storage, extraction, transformation and analysis technologies are not suitable, so new solutions for big data application technologies are needed. However, with the development of economic theory and the practice of market economy, some links in the industrial chain of natural monopoly industries already have a certain degree of (...) competitiveness. In this context, the article conducts a research on the anti-monopoly supervision mode of platform economy based on big data and sentiment analysis. This paper introduces the main idea of MapReduce, the current software implementation specifies a Map function that maps a set of key-value pairs into a new set of key-value pairs. It specifies a concurrent Reduce function that guarantees that each of all mapped key-value pairs share the same set of keys. establishes a vector space model, and basically realizes the extraction of text emotional elements. It introduces the theoretical controversy of antitrust regulation of predatory pricing behavior of third-party payment platforms, and conducted model experiments. The experimental results show that the throughput of 40 test users in 1 h of test is determined by two factors, QPS and the number of concurrent, where QPS = 40/ transactions/second. The time for each test user to log in to the system is 10 min, and the average response time is 10*60 s, then the number of concurrency = QPS*average response time = 40/*10*60 = 6.66. This paper has successfully completed the research on the anti-monopoly supervision model of platform economy based on big data and sentiment analysis. (shrink)

In The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews (2020), I defend the Complete Understanding Argument for anti-theism, which says that God’s existence makes the world worse with respect to our ability to understand it. In a recent article, Roberto Di Ceglie offers three objections to my argument. I seek to rescue my argument by showing (1) that understanding can come in degrees; (2) that I’m not a consequentialist about the value of understanding; and (3) that my argument (...) is consistent with God providing us with sufficient knowledge of important spiritual matters. Di Ceglie’s objections point to future areas for fruitful exploration but do not defeat my argument. (shrink)

" Quand aurons-nous complètement "dédivinisé" la nature? Quand nous sera-t-il enfin permis de commencer à nous rendre naturels, à nous "naturiser", nous hommes, avec la pure nature, la nature retrouvée, la nature délivrée? " (Gai savoir, Nietzsche). " L'idée de nature apparaît comme un des écrans majeurs qui isolent l'homme par rapport au réel, en substituant à la simplicité chaotique de l'existence la complication ordonnée d'un monde. " Nombre de philosophes depuis l'Antiquité se sont attachés à définir la notion de (...) nature. S'inscrivant dans cette longue tradition, Clément Rosset reprend l'opposition entre nature et artifice, analyse les philosophies artificialistes, des Sophistes à Hobbes, puis les philosophies naturalistes, de Platon à Rousseau. Il termine en soulignant l'actualité philosophique du naturalisme et les aléas modernes de l'idée de nature. " D'une certaine manière, la conclusion de ce livre est de présenter l'artifice comme vérité de l'existence et l'idée de nature comme erreur et fantasme idéologique. ". (shrink)

Giovanni Maddalena’s The Philosophy of Gesture: Completing Pragmatists’ Incomplete Revolution is an ambitious, original, and creative contribution to the re-evaluation of the history of pragmatism and its contemporary legacy in various areas of philosophy, ranging from logic and the theory of reasoning to the philosophy of science and art, as well as ethics and the philosophy of education. A reader can only admire the author’s broad and deep knowledge and learning, which extends from the hist...

showing what makes causal facts both true and accessible enough for us to have the knowledge of them that we ordinarily take ourselves to have. Some current approaches to analyzing causation were once resisted. First, analyses that use the counterfactual conditional were viewed with suspicion because philosophers also sought (and still do seek) similar understanding of counterfactual facts. Since the same can be said for the other nomic concepts--causation, lawhood, explanation, chance, dispositions, and their conceptual kin--philosophy demonstrated a preference for (...) non-nomic definitions of causation, analytic completions of (S) with no nomic terms in the analysans. Recently, however, philosophers have been less demanding regarding what terms may be used. Attention has been given to analyzing causation in terms of chance, the counterfactual conditional, and lawhood. If we reserve the term ‘causal’ for the terms and concepts that have extremely obvious connections.. (shrink)

The idea of translating Gerdil into English is brilliant, the translation is very good and the introduction of William Frank precise and inspiring.... Rousseau proposes a complete break with tradition. A new man will arise who is severed from the whole heritage of the past. With him the history of mankind begins anew. In one sense we have here a transposition in the field of philosophy of education of the Cartesian cogito. The subject begins with himself. To this philosophical (...) project Gerdil opposes the idea of tradition. We have not made ourselves. Our parents have procreated us. The parents do not only procreate their offspring, they also introduce them into the natural and social reality, that is they educate. No education is possible without a lively dialogue with history and society. Since the beginning man stands in a close relationship to others, is made for the human society.... In these our times one form of modernity is collapsing and the mood of the day is an unclear postmodernity that in some of its versions could well be a return to barbarianism. All the more important is then that another form of modernity be rediscovered and brought to the attention of the American public. - Rocco Buttiglione, University of St. Pius V, Rome A timely translation of a compelling 18th century critique of Rousseau by the neglected Italian author, Hyacinth S. Gerdil. Gerdil's Anti-Emile may have been written as a critique of Rousseau's Emile, but it can equally be read as a critique of the philosophy embraced by the American educational establishment. Through the influence of John Dewey, Rousseau came to inform much of the educational theory regnant in the United States, with disastrous consequences, now acknowledge by nearly all. In a valuable preface to his translation, Professor Frank, drawing upon his experience both here and abroad, not only places Emile in context, but defends Gerdil's time-transcending, classical view of education against its modern detractors. "Gerdil," Frank tells us, "addressed his Anti-Emile to elders responsible for education, be they parents, teachers, or political authorities, who might find themselves swayed by the powerful rhetoric of Rousseau's Emile." The same may be said of this translation and its informative prefatory material, for it is clearly a study that will be valued by anyone interested in principled education. - Jude P. Dougherty, Catholic University of America Cover image: "Adam and Eve" by Tintoretto. St. Augustine's Press acknowledges the kind permission granted by la Scuola Grande di San Rocco, Venice, for the use of the image. All rights reserved by la Scuola Grande di San Rocco. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that in portending potentially fatal harm to immunocompromised others, certain vaccine-hesitant views create a paradox for democratic deliberation on public health matters. In this paradox, either vaccine-hesitant views entailing potential harm to others are entertained as legitimate public health policy, or these views are disallowed, excluding discussion of competing harms from the deliberative process. In either case, the result is a deliberative process in which some group is not treated with the consideration owed to free (...) and equal persons as required by the terms of democratic membership. I argue for capitalizing on and refining certain epistemic traits exhibited by anti-vaxxers to address vaccine-hesitant views and minimize this paradox. However, I make the case that this paradox cannot be completely resolved, so we should focus on certain demands of justice to protect the most vulnerable. (shrink)

Stephen Turner’s anti-normativism is based on the idea that the normative can be explained away by social science. Exploiting the idea fostered by the sociology of scientific knowledge that reasons can be understood naturalistically as the causes of the beliefs of scientists and endorsing a non-normative conception of rationality, Turner has argued that normative accounts are better understood as “Good Bad Theories” (GBT). GBT are understood as false accounts that play a role in social coordination like magical or religious (...) rituals in primitive societies (e.g. Tabu and the like). According to Turner, “norms,” “obligations,” “reasons,” and “commitments” are like Tabu and can be explained away as GBT. Hence, Turner expected normative accounts to disappear completely in a fully disenchanted world. Turner focuses on the idea, widespread among philosophers, that the normative does not reduce to the causal: his main claim is that social science succeeds in the reduction of the normative in causal terms, overcoming normative/causal dualism. Furthermore, this success is presented as creating a serious challenge for normativism. By focusing on certain (supposedly normative) features of beliefs like those involved in belief change dynamics, I will point out some interesting implications and problems for Turner’s anti-normativism. (shrink)

Peirce’s anti-psychologism hinges on two main assumptions. First, logic and psychology belong to two separate disciplines – respectively, the normative sciences and the experimental sciences. Second, externalism must be understood as a crucial and inescapable epistemological criterion. The introspectionist illusion, according to which individuals have direct and epistemologically flawless access to their own internal states, should be dismissed. As Colapietro (2003) and Calcaterra (2006) observe, Peirce’s standpoint is far different from the Kantian classical account of anti-psychologism. This original (...) take on anti-psychologism leaves room for a functional distinction between logic and psychology, emerging from a semiotic and communicative continuity. This means that psychology, unlike logic as a formal doctrine of signs, will be epistemologically appropriate for dealing with internal psychological states, on the condition that this inquiry be focused on the communicative processes through which these internal states are expressed and conveyed. Such a Peircean account of anti-psychologism forms the epistemological background of this paper. My goal is to show how Peirce’s approach to communication and semiosis can be applied in order to discuss a specific psychological theory, in this case, attachment theory. Specifically, I propose employing Giovanni Maddalena’s Peircean distinction between complete and incomplete gestures (Maddalena 2015) to account for the distinction between secure, dismissing and preoccupied attachment patterns. To this end, I will be discussing three different measurements of attachment: the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI, George, Kaplan & Main 1985), the Adult Attachment Projection (AAP, George & West 2006), and the Patient Attachment Coding System (PACS, Talia, Miller-Bottome & Daniel 2015). Throughout this discussion, I will examine the connection between the semiotic and phenomenological category of completeness, and the psychological category of security. This connection involves an interesting normative import, which I briefly discuss in the conclusions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism by Richard RortyJ. A. ColenRORTY, Richard. Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism. Edited by Eduardo Mendieta. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2021. xxxv + 236 pp. Cloth, $27.95This book reproduces Richard Rorty's manuscript of the Ferrater Mora Lectures held in Spain in 1996, about ten years before his death. The preface is signed "Bellagio, July 22, 1997." Robert Brandom's foreword for the (...) book states that its publication is an "epoch-making event" since it was "long-lost" in the abysses of Catalan and Spanish languages.We could think that this should be taken with a grain of salt, considering that large sections of the book were previously published even in English. Chapter 1, "Pragmatism and Religion," was printed in the Revue Internationale de Philosophie in 1999; chapter 2, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," was collected in The Revival of Pragmatism (ed. Morris Dickstein) in 1998; and lectures 3 and 4 appear in a 2000 book edited by Robert Brandom. Chapter 7 was printed in Rorty's Philosophy and Social Hope, and 8, 9, and 10 were published in his Philosophical Papers.So truly, only chapters 5 and 6 were entirely ignored by the Anglophone reader. Rhetoric aside, it is nonetheless a very important book, and perhaps even an epoch-making one, although the Rortian scholar will never find himself in unchartered territory. It is indeed epoch-making for at least three different kinds of reasons.Firstly, the complete book with Rorty's own preface and all the lectures set together, carefully edited by Eduardo Mendieta, with notes and an insightful epilogue, presents Rorty's "mature version and vision of his path-breaking pragmatism." The oral nature of the delivery adds some charm to the text, and the recovery of the whole book-length text is epochal since, in spite of being a prolific writer of distinctive and provocative texts, Rorty's books are scarce: He wrote just four important books, in comparison with hundreds of shorter pieces. (It could even be argued that even his four main books are "fragments" that in some instances lack cogency.)Secondly, the political landscape has largely changed. People used to fight for the Truth. It may very well be that the combat of ideas by resorting to words with capital letters, interesting as it often is, doesn't make for the best arguments. When the flag of Truth (uppercase) is raised in politics, reason easily becomes the prey of the passions of the soul. Mendieta aptly titled his interviews with Rorty with the motto "take care of freedom and Truth will take care of itself." The notion that the highest [End Page 363] degree of freedom and tolerance and the lowest degree of dogmatism arise when no truth is believed was not Rorty's own invention, and in fact it has a long ancestry. But Rorty is surely among its most vocal advocates and a remarkable thinker. Right now, the situation looks entirely different. Rorty's indefatigable struggle against the idea of truth in politics was all too successful. Could it happen that the owl of Minerva rises again at dusk, and the book emerges when people are no longer fighting about truth but against fake news? In fact, a new post-truth era was just inaugurated. Thus, the book makes an amazing read for those who are interested in the genealogy of an old idea: the death of Truth—an irony that Rorty would have appreciated.Thirdly, Rorty is an unavoidable figure in contemporary political philosophy, but his pragmatism has always been somewhat mysterious. Despite his praise of the early pragmatists and his dismissive attitude towards "depth," very few doubt that his arguments are deeper and go further than, say, John Dewey's. Nor was he exactly one of the so-called new pragmatists such as Putnam, Huw Price, or Robert Brandom. Nevertheless, his bold and iconoclastic attacks on "representationalism," the naïve idea that language and thought merely mirror the world, really were influential, or even gave birth to a new pragmatism. But he was not one of them. (Etienne Gilson used to quote a saying according to which God... (shrink)

Both the phenomenology of Husserl and the pragmatist phenomenology of James can be categorized by the formula “radical empiricism,” which is explicit in James and implicit, but no less pervasive, in Husserl. For both of them, radical empiricism is additionally conjoined with an equally radical anti-psychologism. The problem is that the two terms “radical empiricism” and “anti-psychologism” take on a radically different meaning in the two authors. This essay aims to investigate the structural differences between two perspectives that, (...) while following completely different courses, seem to share the same objective: to elaborate a philosophy which at no point moves away from the experiential plane. (shrink)

We answer some questions about graphs that are reducts of countable models of Anti-Foundation, obtained by considering the binary relation of double-membership $x\in y\in x$. We show that there are continuum-many such graphs, and study their connected components. We describe their complete theories and prove that each has continuum-many countable models, some of which are not reducts of models of Anti-Foundation.

Soon after the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic outbreak, it became clear that vaccination will be the most useful tool to combat the disease. Despite the apparent safety and efficacy of the developed anti‐COVID‐19 vaccines, relatively high percentages of the population worldwide refused to get vaccinated, including many health workers and health students. The present cross‐sectional study examined the motives, attitudes, and personal characteristics of those who did not get vaccinated against COVID‐19 or vaccinated without complete willingness among (...) nursing students and nursing faculty members in Israel (n = 472). Results show that the vast majority of the study participants (97%) received at least one dose of the anti‐COVID‐19 vaccine. Nearly 37% of the participants indicated that they received the vaccine without complete willingness. As compared to faculty members, nursing students reported lower trust in the efficacy of the vaccine, perceived the COVID‐19 pandemic as a health threat to a lesser extent, exhibited lower institutional and personal trust, and had higher levels of posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. Non‐Jewish participants were at risk of vaccinating without complete willingness. These findings underscore the need for developing evidence‐based strategies to promote the safety and efficacy of the anti‐COVID‐19 vaccines in nursing schools. (shrink)

In this paper we will develop a first-order anti-intuitionistic logic withoutand with paraconsistent apartness. We will give a system of Hilbert-type counteraxioms, that we show to be correct and complete with respect to a deictic Kripkesemantics. Also we will illustrate some examples about objects being apart and notapart in some possible world.

This paper reassesses the criticism of the Lucas-Penrose anti-mechanist argument, based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, as formulated by Krajewski : this argument only works with the additional extra-formal assumption that “the human mind is consistent”. Krajewski argues that this assumption cannot be formalized, and therefore that the anti-mechanist argument – which requires the formalization of the whole reasoning process – fails to establish that the human mind is not mechanistic. A similar situation occurs with a corollary to the (...) argument, that the human mind allegedly outperforms machines, because although there is no exhaustive formal definition of natural numbers, mathematicians can successfully work with natural numbers. Again, the corollary requires an extra-formal assumption: “PA is complete” or “the set of all natural numbers exists”. I agree that extra-formal assumptions are necessary in order to validate the anti-mechanist argument and its corollary, and that those assumptions are problematic. However, I argue that formalization is possible and the problem is instead the circularity of reasoning that they cause. The human mind does not prove its own consistency, and outperforms the machine, simply by making the assumption “I am consistent”. Starting from the analysis of circularity, I propose a way of thinking about the interplay between informal and formal in mathematics. (shrink)

This paper examines two models of language philosophy. The first is the Kantian philosophy which sees language as an instrument of conveying mental content. I have selected Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl from amongst its numerous representatives. In this tradition, a language expression, i.e. an expression that has meaning, is determined by the objectively ideal character of the meanings (“rules”) given through the subject’s intellectual acts. The main task is to fix with a maximum degree of accuracy what is “seen” (...) in consciousness. This model inevitably considers words to be “markers” or “labels” which have no intrinsic power. The problem with this approach is, first, that it is impossible to determine the criteria by which this or that word should be considered adequate. Second, this approach leads to the creation of ever new philosophical languages which simultaneously challenge the tradition and yet claim to be a renewed version of it. It is shown that the fairly systematic critique of the Kant­ian approach by Johann Georg Hamann and Johann Gottfried Herder falls short of proposing an alternative philosophical system because, having a religious foundation, it does not offer a complete grounding of knowledge. In the wide range of anti-Kantian positions on the nature of language Gustav Shpet’s concept of language is singled out. It pursues the same task of creating a universal system of knowledge as Husserl’s phenomenology, but it proceeds from fundamentally different notions of philosophical knowledge. Unlike Husserl, whose thought is marked by revolutionary radicalism, for Shpet ideal knowledge is “positive”, “concrete”, “full” and “dynamic”. He considers philosophising to be dialectical and inherently dialogic. The result of philosophy meeting these ideals is the concept that our knowledge is centred on language and our experience has a sign-verbal character. (shrink)

We discuss a `negative' way of defining frame classes in (multi)modal logic, and address the question of whether these classes can be axiomatized by derivation rules, the `non-ξ rules', styled after Gabbay's Irreflexivity Rule. The main result of this paper is a metatheorem on completeness, of the following kind: If Λ is a derivation system having a set of axioms that are special Sahlqvist formulas and Λ+ is the extension of Λ with a set of non-ξ rules, then Λ+ is (...) strongly sound and complete with respect to the class of frames determined by the axioms and the rules. (shrink)

In this article I argue that The Sickness unto Death, authored by Kierkegaard under the pseudonym Johannes Anti-Climacus, has resources for an interesting critique of technology in some ways like that of Heidegger’s critiques in “Question Concerning Technology” and Being and Time. I suggest that Anti-Climacus’s account of “despair” resonates with much of what Heidegger says about inauthenticity and the self’s orientation toward death. But I also contend that in maintaining that the self can only be complete (...) by understanding itself as essentially relating and related to God, Anti-Climacus has a critique of the sort of solution that Heidegger would provide. Finally, I trace the origin of this view to fundamental differences in ontology that must be settled outside of the problems posed by technology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 1, April 1995, pp. 47-55 Hume as Dualist and Anti-Dualist PHILLIP D. CUMMINS Lome Falkenstein's recognition in "Hume and Reid on the Simplicity of the Soul" of the importance of the section of A Treatise of Human Nature entitled "Of the immateriality of the soul" is as praiseworthy as it is uncommon. His suggestion that Reid's intentionalist account of representation was motivated by (...) his desire to save the doctrine of the immaterial self from Hume's demolition of it in "Of the immateriality of the soul," though not proven, is highly provocative. Although I am going to offer a somewhat different reading of "Of the immateriality of the soul" and thereby imply that Falkenstein did not sufficiently appreciate Hume's version of mental-physical dualism, I regard his paper as both informative and insightful and consider my proposed corrections fully compatible with most, if not all, of his substantive claims. Let me begin by contrasting two questions relating to mental-physical dualism. One is whether mental states or properties are irreducibly different from physical states or properties. Materialists generally acknowledge that there is an apparent, putative, or presumed difference between them, only to argue one way or another that the only genuine properties are material ones. Defenders of what I shall call Minimal Mental/Physical Dualism insist that the distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of properties remains at even the deepest levels of metaphysical analysis. One version of the second question is: Are there any immaterial beings? This question really concerns individual subjects, the items to which states or properties are assigned; it asks: do any individual subjects have only mental properties? To answer "yes" is to Phillip D. Cummins is at the Department of Philosophy, 269 English Philosophy Building, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1408 USA. e-mail: [email protected] 48 Phillip D. Cummins hold what I shall call Strong Mental/Physical Dualism. Its opponents either answer "no" or take an agnostic stance. The two questions are not completely unrelated.1 As Descartes argued in the Sixth Meditation, an irreducible difference between mental and physical properties guarantees at least the metaphysical possibility of a disembodied mind.2 Despite this, an affirmative answer to the first question does not secure an affirmative answer to the second question. Minimal Mental/Physical Dualism does not entail Strong Mental/Physical Dualism. If it is possible for the same individual subject to have both mental and physical properties, it may be the case that whenever an individual subject has a mental property it also has a physical property.3 Consequently, an obvious strategy for establishing Strong Mental/ Physical Dualism is defending the impossibility of an individual subject's having both mental and physical properties, that is, arguing that the two kinds of properties are essentially incompatible with one another. Call this the Incompatible Properties Thesis. If it can be secured, to discover an individual with a mental property is virtually to discover an immaterial thing. Descartes utilized this strategy, also in the Sixth Meditation, where he wrote, The first observation I make at this point is that there is a great difference between the mind and the body, inasmuch as the body is by its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. For when I consider the mind, or myself in so far as I am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself; I understand myself to be something quite single and complete. Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, I recognize that if a foot or arm or any other part of the body is cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from the mind. As for the faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception and so on, these cannot be termed parts of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, and understands and has sensory perceptions. By contrast, there is no corporeal or extended thing that I can think of which in my thought I cannot easily divide into parts; and this very fact makes me... (shrink)

Recent progress in geroscience holds the promise of significantly slowing down or even reversing ageing and age-related diseases, and thus increasing our healthspans. In this paper, I offer a novel argument in favour of developing such technology and making it unconditionally available to everyone. In particular, I argue that justice requires that each person be provided with sufficient opportunities to have a ‘complete life’, that many people currently lack such opportunities, and that we would substantially improve the status quo (...) by giving them access to anti-ageing technology. (shrink)

Let us say that the proposition that p is transparent just in case it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that it is known that p, and so on, for any number of iterations of the knowledge operator ‘it is known that’. If there are transparent propositions at all, then the claim that any man with zero hairs is bald seems like a good candidate. (...) We know that any man with zero hairs is bald. And it also does not seem completely implausible that we know that we know it, and that we know that we know that we know it, and so on. (shrink)

Emile Durkheim's "Antis?mitisme et crise sociale," written in 1899 during the Dreyfus Affair in France, is introduced. The introduction summarizes the principal contributions that "Antis?mitisme et crise sociale" makes to the sociology of anti-Semitism, relates those contributions to Durkheim's broader theoretical assumptions and concerns, situates his analysis of anti-Semitism in its social and historical context, contrasts it to other analyses of anti-Semitism (Marxist and Zionist) that were prominent in Durkheim's time, indicates some of the revisions and additions (...) that a fuller and more complete Durkheimian theory of anti-Semitism would entail, and highlights the significance of Durkheim's ideas for the contemporary study of ethnic and racial antagonism. While noting the limitations of Durkheim's analysis, the introduction concludes that "Antis?mitisme et crise sociale" has sadly regained its relevance in the light of a revival of anti-Semitism at the turn of the millennium. (shrink)

The aim in this chapter is to explore the similarities and differences between the city symphony film genre of the 1920s and 1930s and the contemporary virtual city walking tours that are popular on YouTube these days, eventually discussing the change in representation of the individual in daily life over a century. The city symphony was born with modernism in the early 20th century initially to present an interpretation of the city with daily activities, human beings, their interaction with industrial (...) technology and the urban environment. A significant and pioneering film of the genre is by Walter Ruttmann titled Berlin: Symphony of a Metropolis (1927) which I will try to analyze its filmic elements in order to draft a summary of the style and vision of the director and his contemporaries. On the other hand, the virtual city walking tours on YouTube represent a very different representation of urban exploration. These videos show various cities through the act of simple walking recorded in a long one-take POV shot with a gimbal-camera. Despite minor differences in terms of commentary and music use, these videos are quite similar to each other when compared to city symphony films in general. The methodological approach for analyzing and interpreting these films and videos is guided by the neoformalist approach proposed by Bordwell and Thompson in the 1980s, along with Noël Carroll’s view on critical evaluation. Since this post-theoretical approach is non-formulaic in terms of its methodology, it fits the two examples I will provide that are stylistically very distant. After establishing the form and style of the works, I will try to follow Carroll’s suggestions in order to critically interpret, analyze and evaluate the works. The comparison between the city symphony film and virtual city walking tour reveals a complex interplay between continuity and change in regards to the individual. While both share a rather common goal of capturing the essence of urban life their differences are to be found in their stylistic choices and their interpretations of the goal itself. The city films of the 1920s and 30s were avant-garde expressions that combined artistic innovation with socio-political commentary. They were often experimental, using montage sequences, juxtaposition and abstract imagery to convey the ever changing industrialized modern city life. Ruttmann’s Berlin is emblematic of this approach, offering a poetic and critical reflection on urban existence. In contrast, the virtual city walking tours on YouTube are more accessible and immediate. They provide a first-person perspective that allows viewers to virtually traverse different cities, experiencing sights and sounds without the mediation of artistic abstraction. The similarity in these videos suggests a standardized format that prioritizes immersion over critique. This article offers a valuable contribution to the understanding of urban representation of the individual in film and digital media. By comparing the city symphony film with virtual city walking tours, I try to illuminate the evolving relationship between art, technology and urban life. I argue that not only is there a completely different representation of the individual within the frame, but there is also ethical considerations to be put forth regarding the one that makes the frame, or the camera. In the end I argue that the human-ness of a work of art or any type of video is more important than immersiveness. (shrink)

The fear of “communist subversion” in Thailand from the 1950s to the 1970s played a crucial role in the ongoing government control of public knowledge and the anti-communist propaganda. The companion piece novellas Made in USA and A Complete Idiot by Sujit Wongthes, a leading independent writer, disclosed the truth about the Vietnam War and challenged the pro-American hype in the context of 1970s Thailand. Made in USA achieved this through a blend of travelogue and journalist distance; A (...) Complete Idiot through a portrayal of the internal struggle of a young Thai man who grew up under the extensive influence of the Thai state’s pro-American, anti-communist propaganda. In A Complete Idiot, the protagonist’s state of blissful ignorance crumbles when his old “knowledge” of the “evil communist” and Thai-American relations are juxtaposed with new information about the 1971 reconciliation between the US and the People’s Republic of China. Reading the two novellas critically, this article investigates how the state-instilled perceptions of communism and propaganda construct a Thai identity that becomes inadequate vis-à-vis a different set of information. It also looks at the extent to which Thai internal politics was subsumed into the international politics of the Cold War and how such an entanglement informed Thai national identity. Finally, this article argues that the two novellas at once challenge the Thai government at the time and subvert its projection of the US. In doing so, the novellas open up a new space for alternative Thai cultural identities. (shrink)

Deflationism about truth is the claim that the concept of truth is completely explicated by the disquotational view of truth, where the latter is the specification of a device of semantic ascent that avoids the semantical paradoxes. Over the last twenty years, the plausibility of deflationism has been intensely debated by philosophers of language. A number of writers have argued that even though deflationism is a coherent view, it is false. Some maintain that this is because a complete account (...) of truth must reduce truth to purely physical concepts but that the disquotational view of truth provides no such reduction. Others hold that there are important uses of the truth predicate that cannot be assimilated to its use as a device of semantic ascent. (shrink)

To be intelligible, the finite order of human experience, for Hegel, requires infinite absolute spirit. Flay and Kolb overlook this infinite in Hegel's thought. Notwithstanding their contextualist hints in interpreting Hegel they regard Hegel as even more of a foundationalist than the epistemological foundationalists. But the notion of ground in Hegel's Logic refutes this. Hegel's systemic holism is grounded in the prospective completed infinity of spirit beyond either Foundationalism or Anti-Foundationalism. In the absence of infinite spirit we are consigned (...) to an unnecessarily attenuated human finitude. The mutual career of the Hegelian finite and infinite however frees us from this prospect. (shrink)

The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument that, starting from the plainly innocent assumption that every true proposition is knowable, reaches the strong conclusion that every true proposition is known; i.e. if there are unknown truths, there are unknowable truths. The paradox has been considered a problem for every theory assuming the Knowability Principle, according to which all truths are knowable and, in particular, for semantic anti-realist theories. A well known criticism to the Knowability Paradox is the so called (...) restriction strategy. It bounds the scope of the universal quantification in (KP) to a set of formulas whose logical form avoids the paradoxical conclusion. Specifically, Tennant suggests to restrict the quantifier in (KP) to propositions whose knowledge is provably inconsistent. He calls them Anti-Cartesian propositions and distinguished them in three kinds. In this paper we will not be concerned with the soundness of the restriction proposal and the criticisms it has received. Rather, we are interested in analyzing the proposed distinction. We argue that Tennant’s distinction is problematic because it is not completely clear, it is not grounded on an adequate logical analysis, and it is incomplete. We suggest an alternative distinction, and we give some reasons for accepting it: it results logically grounded and more complete than Tennant’s one, inclusive of it and independent from non-epistemic notions. (shrink)

Perhaps there has been no greater opportunity than in this “VOLUME FIFTEEN of our Death And Anti-Death set of anthologies” to write about how might think about life and how to avoid death. There are two reasons to discuss “life”, the first being enhancing our understanding of who we are and why we may be here in the Universe. The second is more practical: how humans meet the physical challenges brought about by the way they have interacted with their (...) environment. Many persons discussing “life” beg the question about what “life” is. Surely, when one discusses how to overcome its opposite, death, they are not referring to another “living” thing such as a plant. There seems to be a commonality, though, and it is this commonality is one needing elaboration. It ostensibly seems to be the boundary condition separating what is completely passive (inert) from what attempts to maintain its integrity, as well as fulfilling other conditions we think “life” has. In our present discussion, there will be a reminder that it by no means has been unequivocally established what life really is by placing quotes around the word, namely, “life”. Consider it a tag representing a bundle of philosophical ideas that will be unpacked in this paper. (shrink)

Isabelle Garo’s study,Foucault, Deleuze, Althusser & Marx: La politique dans la philosophie, presents a historical approach to the French philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s and its relationship to Marx and the Marxist tradition. In her view, these authors were captured by a largely mistaken understanding of the resources present in Marxist thought, and were overly affected by the prejudices instilled by the French Communist Party. Speaking from a perspective of practical commitment, she traces a path from early French Marxism (...) to an anti-totalitarian consensus. Her study renders Louis Althusser’s innovations the most pivotal in introducing a whole series of themes, with ambivalent effects on theoretical production today. Most significantly, she discerns a replacement of politics and political economy by philosophy and epistemology. She attends first to the mobilisation of psychoanalysis against humanism, which gave way to a vehement critique of the normative aspects of psychoanalysis itself. Re-reading Foucault and Deleuze as post-Althusserians, Garo suggests that this led to a championing of Friedrich Nietzsche’s viewpoints against Marx. Garo’s study is immensely valuable in contextualising the apparent innovations of poststructuralist thought. However, we can discern greater relevance for the insights of these thinkers for contemporary Marxist thought than Garo concedes, and her attempt to read them as a complete deviation from Marxist principles ultimately fails to convince. (shrink)

If Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology is to justify our capacity to know the world as it is, by examining a complete series of forms of consciousness, why and with what justification does he omit the Cartesian ego-centric predicament? By augmenting Franco Chiereghin’s explication of Hegel’s concept of thought, and of why Hegel provides it only at the start of the second half of ‘Self-Consciousness’, this paper shows how Hegel showed that Pyrrhonian, Cartesian and Humean scepticism, and also mental content internalism, (...) all depend upon the deductivist model of rational justification (scientia), and that this model is suited only to strictly formal domains, not to the non-formal substantive domain of empirical knowledge. Hegel thus refutes the epistemological presuppositions of the ego-centric predicament; hence he may omit it from the forms of consciousness examined in the Phenomenology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Like a Virgin”Levinas’s Anti-Platonic Understanding of Love and DesireBrigitta Keintzel (bio)Translated by Brigitta Keintzel, Benjamin McQuade, and Sophie UitzMy article is divided into three parts. First, I outline transformations in the understanding of love through philosophical tradition from Plato to Levinas, exploring Levinas’s anti-Platonic understanding of love via the relationship between knowledge and love. This relationship is asymmetrical: knowledge functions in the name of love, but love (...) does not function in the name of knowledge. Love is not knowledge but instead entails knowledge. As love of wisdom, knowledge serves in the name of love. The open question here is: how can Platonic love of wisdom or Levinasian ethical desire have the ability to respond to social, political, and cultural challenges — a question I will come back to in the last section.In the second section, I discuss the relationship between love and desire. As opposed to desire, which is explicitly bound to the Desired, along with some ideal position vis-à-vis that person, love possesses a plethora of connotations that often render it vague. Love is bound not only to the self but to other persons — as well as to objects, facts, attitudes, situations, ideas, institutions, cultures, and even governments. Desire, on the other hand, is a stronger term than the timeworn and [End Page 21] much-abused word “love.” It entails a stronger orientation toward the Other with a temporal, prospective connotation: in the horizon of desire, the Other is “not yet,” the Other is future in the present. For Levinas, the delineation of “not-yet”-ness is a central feature for describing alterity and virginity.My central question in the third section is on how sensual love and ethical desire relate to Levinas’s description of the relationship between “intimate” and “real” society. I will show that it is particularly Levinas’s introduction of the figure of the Third that makes it possible to finally overcome the Platonic dualism between individuality and generality. In both erotic love and in ethical desire, the figure of the Third is decisive for exploring Levinas’s understanding of justice. The figure of the Third is not only a witness of the truth between the subject and a desiring Other but also a precondition for establishing this truth. Therefore, it is not necessary to see but to hear the claims of the Third, as well the claims of the Desired.The Wisdom of LoveIn Plato’s interpretation, love is seen as a progression from the discrete, individual, erotic love to the general and comprehensive. The lover feels in him/herself a deficiency and strives to compensate this deficiency — accomplished through various activities of consciousness, involving desire, suffering, thought, perception, the striving toward the good and the beautiful. These are not considered equal in quality but rather form a progression from the particular to the general. Eros remains dutiful to the idea of the good. Renunciation of corporal love is seen as a precondition for attaining love of the good and the beautiful, this being equated with the attainment of immortality. This renunciation, as it has been argued in the dialogue between Alcibiades and Socrates, implies that spiritual, intellectual love is of higher value than corporal love. As opposed to spiritual love, corporal love is fraught with a deficiency that can never be completely assuaged. [End Page 22]This model is based on the myth — related in the Symposium — of the spherical human being, comprised originally of two people in one body, with four hands, four legs, two genders, and two faces. Only the splitting of this single human into two people with two faces and two genders created the longing for a lost unity, expressed in erotic desire for the other gender or the other face. In this narrative, erotic desire is brought into semantic proximity with lost unity and with suffering. Unisexuality is seen as a deficiency, to receive a “truer and more perfect” assuagement only on a spiritual level. The implied antagonism between spiritual (“Platonic”) and corporal love constitutes a narrative motive that — in various forms — particularly marked post-Enlightenment literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In examples... (shrink)

The Philosophy of Gesture by Giovanni Maddalena is a multilayered volume: It is a "history of philosophy" book, endorsing a challenging anti-Kantian interpretation of Peirce and pragmatism. It is a "theoretical philosophy" book, dealing with classic issues—for example, the difference between synthetic and analytic, the definition of identity—and introducing a new concept, that of complete gesture. Finally, it is a book of "applied philosophy," pointing to a further application of the new concept of complete gesture to the (...) fields of pedagogy, morality, psychology, and literature.Dealing with all these three aspects in a single review would be impossible, maybe even unfair. Therefore, I will focus here mainly on the... (shrink)

Western culture has assigned an essential role to productive activity in defining our lives. In Locke’s and Hegel’s thought, we see the model that became dominant in modern political philosophy: that of conceiving the subject as a result of, and only possible within, the triad of work–property–subject. Nowadays, this has reached the level of shaping the meaning of living, and our entire existences seem to be subjected to a concept of lives-as-work. Combining anthropology and philosophy, this article seeks to rethink (...) subjectivation beyond the process of work and appropriation, delving into worldviews different from those of the West. Specifically, we will focus on the Yanomami form of life, a non-stratified indigenous people living in the Brazilian Amazon. We will analyze how the Yanomami prevent the process of subjectification by the objectification of one’s own work through a sort of anti-work and anti-property apparatus. This is achieved through specific techniques of underproduction, which constitute another approach to work, as well as through a completely different way of conceiving subjectivity. Furthermore, the Yanomami’s view of all entities as subjects endowed with intentionality appears as de-ontologizing the subject position and deactivating the dyads of subject/object and own/common. The result is a worldview where, with everyone being subjects—humans and non-humans, living and dead, entities and things of nature—no one can be dominus of anyone. (shrink)

Lex Luthor despises Superman. He obsesses about Superman. He tries to kill Superman. Luthor takes existentialism to the extreme, though, rejecting ethics and becoming an anti‐hero. In Superman: Secret Origin, Luthor is presented as self‐directed from an early age. Friedrich Nietzsche can help us understand Luthor as an iconoclast, literally one who breaks sacred images. Luthor also explains why he is so obsessed with bringing down Superman. Luthor thinks that Superman interferes with people viewing their lives as an existential (...) project. Lex Luthor underscores the complexities of existentialist philosophy. While he is creative, self‐determined, and autonomous, he is also completely immoral. His willingness to sacrifice anything or anyone takes existentialism to an extreme that Nietzsche, Sartre, and Kierkegaard would reject. And so, we are left to wonder: is Lex Luthor an evil genius and an abomination to existentialism, or might he be a true evolution of what existentialism can become. (shrink)

Doping poses a threat to sport worldwide. Studies have revealed that, in addition to elite athletes, amateur and recreational sportsmen and sportswomen are making increasing use of performance-enhancing drugs. Worryingly this trend has been documented among young people. Anti-doping efforts seeking to deter elite athletes from doping through detection of the use of prohibited substances are costly and have not been completely effective either at the top-level or the amateur/recreational level. A thoughtful education program, inspired by honesty and respect, (...) might be more effective in shaping attitudes towards doping in young people and protecting their health. For these reasons, the Italian “Lotta al Doping” (Fight Against Doping) project sought to cause a cultural shift in young people by taking anti-doping seminars to high schools. In the 2017-2018 school year we reached more than 20,800 students from 157 high schools through 202 seminars. Before and after the seminars, we administrated anonymous, voluntarily completed surveys with a set of questions (items = 15), taken from the WADA-Play-True-Quiz. Upon completion of the 2-hour seminar, the majority of the answers given by the students resulted correct (13 out of 15 items, p<0.000001, McNemar) confirming the value of the initiative. This project stands out as promising in the doping prevention process at the youth and amateur levels. (shrink)

The paradox marking Spinoza’s reappearance in modernity is well known. If Mendelssohn wished to “give him new credence by bringing him closer to the philosophical orthodoxy of Leibniz and Wolff,” and Jacobi, “by presenting him as a heterodox figure in the literal sense of the term, wanted to do away with him definitively for modern Christianity”—well, “both failed in their goal, and it was the heterodox Spinoza who was rehabilitated.” The Mendelssohn-Jacobi debate can be grafted onto the crisis of a (...) specific philosophical model. It generates a figure of Spinoza capable of assuaging the exacerbated spiritual tension of that epoch, and of constituting the systematic preamble of the relation between power and substance—between subject and nature. Spinoza, the damned Spinoza, had a resurgence in modernity as a Romantic philosopher. Lessing won out by recognizing in Spinoza an idea of nature which was capable of balancing the relation between feeling and intellect, freedom and necessity, and history and reason. Herder and Goethe, against the subjective and revolutionary impatience of the Sturm und Drang, based themselves on this powerful image of synthesis and recomposed objectivity: Spinoza is not only the figure of Romanticism; he constitutes its grounding and its fulfillment. The omnipotence of nature was no longer to break off into the tragedy of feeling, but it was to triumph over it, by opposing it to a kingdom of completed forms. Spinoza’s first reception within Romanticism was thus an aesthetic reception, a perception of motion and perfection, of dynamism and forms. And it remained such, even when the general frame and the particular components of Romanticism were subjected to the labor of philosophical critique. Fichte, the real philosophical hero of Romanticism, considered both Spinoza’s and Kant’s systems to be “perfectly coherent,” in the incessant ontological movement of the I. For the Schelling of the 1790s, the assertion of a radical opposition between 1 critical philosophy and dogmatic philosophy—that is, between a philosophy of the absolute I founding itself on the critical philosophy and a dogmatic philosophy of the absolute object and Spinozism—was quickly resolved into an analysis of action which dialectically took on the weight of the objective. Far from becoming antinomial, the absolute position of the I composes itself into a necessary process which, above tragedy, exalts the “spiritual automatism” of the relation between subject and substance. The aesthetic dimension of this synthesis consists in ceaselessly and tirelessly bringing back power and substance, the productive element and the form of production, to perfection. Romanticism, according to Hegel, is characterized by a capacity to overcome the pure objectivity of the ideal and the natural as a true idea of beauty and truth, initially to destroy the union of the idea and its reality, and to locate the latter in the difference, so as then to bring to manifestation the inner world of absolute subjectivity and reconstruct its objectivity where the overcoming of sensibility is appeased in the absolute character of the result. The filiation of this process is still Lessingian, but the new dialectic expresses and articulates its motivations, while insisting on the propaedeutic of the beautiful along the path leading to the absolute. Spinoza, a certain Spinoza, becomes the central figure in this process. (shrink)

Conceptual analysis is one of the notions undergoing dramatic changes during Wittgenstein's intermediate period. There's an aspect of such changes which might prove characteristic of the new directions taken by Wittgenstein's thought after 1929: it is the notion of complete analysis. We believe that Wittgenstein's treatment of this notion is also an interesting indication of new concerns generated by the "new method" itself, in terms of its radical openness to dialogism and its anti-dogmatism. Our aim here will be (...) to explore a couple of hints as to why this can be so. (shrink)

Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, mentions Niccolò Machiavelli by name in his extant works just a handful of times. That, however, he read him carefully and thoroughly time and again there can be no doubt, and it is also clear that he couches his argument both in his Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline and in his Spirit of Laws as an appropriation and critique of the work of (...) the predecessor whom he termed ‘this great man’. In this paper I explore the manner in which the Frenchman redeployed the arguments advanced by the Florentine for the purpose of refuting the latter's conclusions. ☆ In citing Machiavelli, I employ N. Machiavelli, Tutte le opere, ed. M. Martelli (Florence, 1971), and I refer to the divisions within each work provided by the author. To make my references to Machiavelli's Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio more precise, I sometimes also employ the paragraph enumeration added by the editors of N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, tr. H. C. Mansfield and N. Tarcov (Chicago, 1996). In citing Montesquieu, wherever possible, I have employed the splendid new critical edition being produced by the Société Montesquieu: Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu, ed. J. Ehrard, C. Volpilhac-Auger, et al., 22 vols. (Oxford, 1998-), which I cite as VF. I cite Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence (1734), ed. F. Weil and C. Courtney, as CR by chapter and, where appropriate, line from VF, ii, 89–285. I cite Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des lois (1757), as EL by part, book, chapter, and, where appropriate, page from Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu, ed. R. Caillois, 2 vols. (Paris, 1949–51), ii, 225–995, and Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, Mes pensées as MP by number from Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu, ed. A. Masson, 3 vols. (Paris, 1950–5), ii, 1–677. (shrink)

In Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa argues for a triple-S structure of complete competences that includes, besides the innermost seat competence of the agent, her overall intrinsic condition and the right situational factors for the manifestation of cognitive success to occur. Complete competences are context-sensitive. The question is raised whether epistemic competences are extrinsic or intrinsic dispositional properties, as well as whether knowledge is the manifestation of powers of the actual world or whether it is a matter of (...) what happens in modally close worlds. An ontological background for the context-sensitivity of epistemic competences that is compatible with their intrinsic character is set in the context of a general account of dispositions. An actualist conception of knowledge is also provided. On this view, the modal force of knowledge, far from being captured by non-localized possibilities, is rooted in the directedness of powers. This article, thus, aims at making explicit the ontological underpinnings of knowledge in a way that it is consistent with Sosa’s fully dispositional virtue epistemology. To this end, the constitution of complete competences is placed in a proper perspective. (shrink)

Background: Nurses and midwives have a professional obligation to promote health and prevent disease, and therefore they have an essential role to play in vaccination. Despite this, some nurses and midwives have been found to take an anti-vaccination stance and promulgate misinformation about vaccines, often using Facebook as a platform to do so. Research question: This article reports on one component and dataset from a larger study – ‘the positives, perils and pitfalls of Facebook for nurses’. It explores the (...) specific issue of nurses and midwives who take an anti-vaccination stance, deemed to be unprofessional by crossing professional boundaries and by providing medical information on Facebook that is not within their scope of practice. Participants: Data were collected via an online worldwide survey from nurse and midwife participants, distributed and ‘snowballed’ through relevant nursing and midwifery groups on Facebook. In total, 1644 Registered Nurses and Midwives, and Enrolled Nurses worldwide attempted the online survey. There were 1100 (66.9%) completed surveys and 54 partially (33.1%) completed surveys. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted online using Skype® with 17 participants in Australia. Ethical considerations: Ethical processes and procedures have been adhered to relating to privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of the participants. Findings/results: A mixed-methods approach was used, including descriptive and content analysis of the quantitative survey data and thematic analysis of the qualitative interview data. The main theme ‘blurred boundaries’ was generated, which comprised three sub-themes: ‘follow the science, ‘abuse of power and erosion of trust’ and ‘the moral and ethical responsibility to safeguard public health’. The results offer an important and unique understanding of how nurses and midwives interpret the conduct of fellow health professionals as unprofessional and crossing the professional boundary if they used Facebook to promulgate anti-vaccination messages and/or give medical advice online. Conclusion: There are many positives and negatives for nurses and midwives associated with using Facebook for personal and professional communication, which is in keeping with the results of the larger study from which this article is taken. Professional behaviour is a key theme in the larger research as is the ethical construct of ‘every act has a consequence’; however, in this article, the theme ‘blurred boundaries’ offers an overall understanding of how nurses and midwives interpret the behaviour of their colleagues who espouse anti-vaccination sentiment and/or give medical advice online that is outside their scope of practice and education. (shrink)