The declared goal of this paper is to fill this gap: “... cognitive systems research needs questions or challenges that define progress. The challenges are not (yet more) predictions of the future, but a guideline to what are the aims and what would constitute progress.” – the quotation being from the project description of EUCogII, the project for the European Network for Cognitive Systems within which this formulation of the ‘challenges’ was originally developed (http://www.eucognition.org). So, we stick out our neck (...) and formulate the challenges for artificial cognitive systems. These challenges are articulated in terms of a definition of what a cognitive system is: a system that learns from experience and uses its acquired knowledge (both declarative and practical) in a flexible manner to achieve its own goals. (shrink)

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...) psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to develop a paradigm in problem solving where the notion of virtuality plays a central role. Following a brief discussion on virtual simulation, the paper attempts to identify a notion of virtuality based on the identification of the self (man or computer) with the problem solver. It is shown that such an identification/distinction possibly violates some general principle of the problem environment.To deal with this violation, a new problem is generated and a new virtualization act (...) is required, in order to attain a correspondence between virtuality and reality. A better understanding of this approach requires a combination of analog and digital reasoning: the analog being related to the environment in which the problem solving is required, and the digital to the problem solver's “mental” activities.We will briefly analyze the recursive approach to problem solving and suggest a possible problem solving methodology based on virtuality. The paper concludes with comments on the relation between etnology and virtual reality. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty decía que nuestra relación con el mundo se sitúa en el orden del «misterio insoluble». Es la invisibilidad de los dioses lo que garantiza la visibilidad del mundo. Este verso invisible –«le Dieu caché», «Dieu insondable», «Être muet», «arrière-silence», «membrure cachée», en términos merleau-pontianos– es la textura misma del recto visible. En el cine extremo o visionario este lenguaje aparentemente antitético no está menos presente para expresar eso que excede a toda visibilidad. Voyance (Merleau-Ponty) que emerge de los légamos (...) de lo invisible pero que no es lo contrario de la vista: «vision [est] ek-stase...», una visión en la que el mudo Ser revela su propio sentido. Así pues, lo invisible no es lo opuesto absoluto de lo visible sino más bien, como dice Merleau-Ponty, su «contrapartida secreta» sin la cual no podría existir la visibilidad. Asimismo, según Derrida, la imagen cinematográfica tiene una estructura fantasmática, está suspendida entre la presencia y la ausencia, pues la invisibilidad determina la lógica de las imágenes. El cine es un ojo, pero sólo ve bien cuando también se relaciona con ese ojo interior que es el de la «visión» de los visionarios. Igualmente, para Jean-Luc Godard, uno de los cineastas más relevantes del cine contemporáneo, la imagen real es la que no vemos. Lo que se ve en el filme tiene menos importancia que lo invisible. Violencia del mirar, desvelamiento de otra luz, que restituye la imagen de lo sagrado. (shrink)

We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.

In this paper we prove that the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is the variety generated by the class of finite simple bounded BCK-algebras. To obtain these results we prove that every simple algebra in the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is also a relatively simple bounded BCK-algebra. Moreover, we show that every simple bounded BCK-algebra can be embedded into a simple integral commutative bounded residuated lattice. We extend our main results to some richer subreducts of the class (...) of integral commutative bounded residuated lattices and to the involutive case. (shrink)

This book is a unique exploration of the idea of the "second person" in human interaction, the idea that face-to-face interactions involve a distinctive form of reciprocal mental state attributions that mediates their dynamical unfolding. Challenging the view of mental attribution as a sort of "theory of mind", Pérez and Gomila argue that the second person perspective of mental understanding is the conceptually, ontogenetically, and phylogenetically basic way of understanding mentality. Second person interaction provides the opportunity for the acquisition of (...) concepts of mental states of increasing complexity. The book reviews the growing interest in a variety of second person phenomena, both in development and in adulthood, presenting research that shows how participants in human interaction attribute psychological states of a referentially transparent kind to each other. This review documents the spontaneous preference for face-to-face interaction, from eye contact to joint attention, from forms of vitality to communicative intentions, from interaction detection to joint action, and from synchrony to interpersonal coordination. Also looking at the implications and applications of the second person perspective within fields as diverse as art and morality, this book is fascinating reading for students and academics in social and cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I try to establish the relevance of Peirce's Semeiotics to the conceptual foundations of Cognitive Science. Given Cognitive Science's commitment to the Representational Theory of Mind, I try to clarify the nature of mental representation from the standpoint of Peirce's general theory of signs. As it turns out, mental representations, because of their special role as interpretants of non-mental signs, present especial problems for their interpretation, whose solution Peirce anticipated in a way very close to that developed (...) in Cognitive Science. (shrink)

A partir de la definición de la globalización neoliberal como un localismo occidental globalizado, expresión de un nuevo tipo de imperialismo cultural, el objetivo principal de este artículo es el de llevar a cabo una exposición analítica de la propuesta de traducción intercultural e interpolítica d..

In a classical paper [15] V. Glivenko showed that a proposition is classically demonstrable if and only if its double negation is intuitionistically demonstrable. This result has an algebraic formulation: the double negation is a homomorphism from each Heyting algebra onto the Boolean algebra of its regular elements. Versions of both the logical and algebraic formulations of Glivenko’s theorem, adapted to other systems of logics and to algebras not necessarily related to logic can be found in the literature (see [2, (...) 9, 8, 14] and [13, 7, 14]). The aim of this paper is to offer a general frame for studying both logical and algebraic generalizations of Glivenko’s theorem. We give abstract formulations for quasivarieties of algebras and for equivalential and algebraizable deductive systems and both formulations are compared when the quasivariety and the deductive system are related. We also analyse Glivenko’s theorem for compatible expansions of both cases. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss Prinz’s Kantian arguments in “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?”. They purport to show that empathy is not necessary for morality because it is not part of the capacities required for moral competence and it can bias moral judgment. First, we show that even conceding Prinz his notions of empathy and moral competence, empathy still plays a role in moral competence. Second, we argue that moral competence is not limited to moral judgment. Third, we reject Prinz’s (...) notion of empathy because it is too restrictive, in requiring emotional matching. We conclude that once morality and empathy are properly understood, empathy’s role in morality is vindicated. Morality is not reduced to a form of rational judgment, but it necessarily presupposes pro-social preferences and motivation and sensitivity to inter-subjective demands. (shrink)

En este escrito se analiza la significación y el uso filosófico que Wittgenstein dio en su pensamiento maduro al concepto de forma de vida. Así, aunque se señala que Wittgenstein sólo hizo uso de dicho concepto en el contexto de la justificación de la praxis lingüística como límite epistemológico, se enfatiza no obstante que en ese uso ya es posible vislumbrar una cierta concepción antropológica sobre los seres humanos como animales de conducta expresiva, intencional, simbólica, lingüística generadora de reglas y (...) amante de regularidades. El artículo acaba con un análisis del problema de la forma de vida de los animales y su relación con la forma de vida humana: en concreto se destaca el carácter lingüístico y cultural de la forma de vida humana, y se muestran los límites en la atribución a los animales no-humanos de los predicados mentales humanos. (shrink)

Lattice BCK logic is the expansion of the well known Meredith implicational logic BCK expanded with lattice conjunction and disjunction. Although its natural axiomatization has three rules named modus ponens, ∨‐rule and ∧‐rule, we show that we can give an equivalent presentation with just modus ponens and ∧‐rule, however it is impossible to obtain an equivalent presentation with modus ponens as unique rule. In this paper we study and characterize all axiomatic extensions of lattice BCK logic with modus ponens as (...) unique rule. We obtain an infinite chain of proper axiomatic extensions with this property. Moreover, we prove that there is no weakest axiomatic extension of Lattice BCK‐logic admitting modus ponens as unique rule. (shrink)

We argue that Anderson's (MRH) needs further development in several directions. First, a thoroughgoing criticism of the several alternatives is required. Second, the course between the Scylla of full holism and the Charybdis of structural-functional modularism must be plotted more distinctly. Third, methodologies better suited to reveal brain circuits must be brought in. Finally, the constraints that naturalistic settings provide should be considered.

The anonimous scholiumOn all forms of syllogism was copied in 1884 from the Paris Codex 2064 by E. Richter. In 1899 M. Wallies published it in the preface to Ammonius' commentary on the Prior Analytics of Aristotle. There appear in that scholium, apart from the complex figure of Galenos, other characteristic forms of inference.Among these forms I found five so-called non-demonstrable stoic syllogisms, three modifications of the law of transposition of which the third is not mentioned by the authors of (...) Princ pia Mathematica, and a modification of the form of inference known as Euclid's law. This form of inference was applied by Euclid in mathematics and by Saccherius in syllogistics; it is mentioned for the first time by Cardan in a treatise of 1570 and later by Clavius in his commentary of 1574 on the Elements of Euclid and in the commentary on Theodosius'Sphaerica of the year 1586.In 1658 Erhard Weigel made the first attempt at refuting the logical law of Euclid as formulated by Cardan and Clavius and in 1686 James Bernoulli tried to prove it. (shrink)

We give a presentation of Post algebras of ordern+1 (n1) asn+1 bounded Wajsberg algebras with an additional constant, and we show that a Wajsberg algebra admits a P-algebra reduct if and only if it isn+1 bounded.

We discuss the discovery of technologies involving knotted netting, such as textiles, basketry, and cordage, in the Upper Paleolithic. This evidence, in our view, suggests a new way of connecting toolmaking and syntactic structure in human evolution, because these technologies already exhibit an which we take to constitute the key transition to human cognition.

Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we present (...) the second-person standpoint of morality, first as Darwall conceives of it, and then as we reinterpret it from a naturalistic approach. Then we synthesize Tomasello’s evolutionary account of morality, and Darwall’s objections to it. To reply to those objections, building on Tomasello’s proposal, we argue that the motivation to be impartial, and the feeling of obligation to comply with normative requirements, appeared when humans anticipated and, critically, internalized others’ sanctions to the violation of social norms. Consequently, we posit that social norms and sanctions appeared first at the community level, and only after that were they internalized in the form of self-directed reactive attitudes. Finally, we derive some corollaries that follow from our proposal. (shrink)