Apathy – a term of ancient philosophy, which was also used by representatives of patristics, medieval scholasticism and New Age philosophy. “Apathy”, de-pending on the understanding of affectability as the ability to undergo an impact, can mean the absence of any suffering (passion, affect), immunity to this or that influence or non-subjection to it. In the broadest sense, there are two types of nonafficiability: general nonafficiability as immunity to any influence (ontological connotation), and special (spiritual) nonafficiability as immunity (...) to passions or as freedom from passions (ethical connotation). The most common Latin equivalents of the Greek term ἀπάθειαare “impassibilitas”,“tranquillitas”. The article shows what shades of meaning were conveyed using these terms by ancient philosophers (pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Neoplatonists), numerous representatives of Greek and Latin patristics, representatives of medieval philosophy (Thomas Aquinas) and New Age philosophy (Spinoza, Kant). (shrink)

This essay turns to ancient sources in order to rethink the relationship between political apathy and democracy. If modern democratic theorists place political apathy entirely outside of democracy – either as a destructive limit upon the full realization of a democratic polity, or, more sanguinely, as a pragmatic necessity which tempers democracy so that it may function in a workable yet watered-down form – the ancients conceived of political apathy as a peculiarly democratic phenomenon that was likely (...) to flourish in tandem with the expansion of egalitarian institutional structures and moral ideas. Evidence for the ancient recognition of political apathy as a uniquely democratic kind of affliction centers on, but is not limited to, three main sources. In literature, the Homeric epic, and specifically the story of Achilles, present apathy for politics and commitment to human equality as synonymous forces. In philosophy, one of the main reasons Plato opposes the democratic regime is precisely that it engenders apathy among the citizenry. And in history, Herodotus’ account of the first debate on constitutions as well as the ancient democratic practice of election by lot reveal an ancient egalitarian interest in using democracy to quell, rather than encourage, political behavior. (shrink)

This paper explores the themes of apathy and activism by contrasting the conventionally negative concept of motivational desire-lack with Deleuze and Guattari's positive concept of ‘desiring-production’. I suggest that apathy and activism are both problematically tied to the same motivational force: the conventional negativity of desire, which results in a ‘split subject’ always already ‘undone’ by difference. The philosophy of positive desiring-production provides alternative concepts of motivation and selfhood, not characterised by generative lack or alienation. On the contrary, (...) this alternative ontology describes an identity that is not primarily ‘undone’ by difference, but ‘done’ or ‘made’ through the complex and piecemeal relations it forges with various aspects of the bodies it encounters. Understood as a complex multiplicity, the self or community accordingly has a primary, immediate and active interest in the quality of its multifaceted relations with others. Finally, I argue that some contemporary forms of activism can be read as practices aimed at creating and safeguarding the social conditions that foster the complex relational composition of selves and communities. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Apathy may be a Bad Thing, but it is not always bad in the cases and ways it is alleged to be. The charge that the apathetic are irrational often stems from an oversimplification of political decision‐making techniques. The apathetic need not, for example, simply deny the possibility of getting one's goals, or simply ignore the benefits of action. They may, instead, have learned from experience that an avidly desired and pursued goal is always more valued before than (...) after its attainment, and that setting a low initial value on a goal may actually increase its final value. If the values of various alternatives are adjusted in the light of such knowledge, apathy looks much more rational. But that is not the end of the story. The adjustments may be either (i) a conventional and involuntary discounting and surcharging of existing alternatives in the light of known preference patterns, or (ii) a ‘voluntary decision’to value or devalue a goal in order to obtain a certain result. The latter sort of adjustment requires the introduction of new alternatives into the decision problem, and revisions to our notion of when inaction is irrational. (shrink)

The study of social change has neglected the dynamics motivating individuals to join mass movements. Particularly obscure is how apathetic people are transformed into social activists. Considering this problem the author suggests three stages of development through which the individual progresses in attaining a higher level of personal and social maturity. The first stage - dreaming -emerges when the individual aspires to change while wishing to avoid the risks involved. The second - the illusion of power - occurs when the (...) hunger for power and the fear of it are mediated. The third - real power - is promoted by the yearning for self-respect and social acceptance and is manifested by competence in gaining supremacy and actual experience in struggle. As a consequence of this process the individual advances from a subjective self-image to perceiving himself as a social being; society is humanized by the greater participation of individuals. (shrink)

In his criticisms of the German youth movement and the emergence of fascism across Europe during the early 1920s, Max Scheler draws a distinction between the different senses of political apathy that give rise to mass political movements. Recent studies of mass apathy have tended to treat all forms of apathy as the same and as a consequence reduced the diverse expressions of mass violence to the same, stripping mass movements of any critical function. I show in (...) this paper that Scheler’s distinction provides the means by which to locate the various origins of mass violence and the practical means by which to address this violence that preserves the liberating potential of collective political movements. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Beyond Apathy: A Theology for Bystanders by Elisabeth T. Vasko, and: The Limits of Hospitality by Jessica WrobleskiKathryn Lilla CoxBeyond Apathy: A Theology for Bystanders Elisabeth T. Vasko Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015. 269pp. $29.00The Limits of Hospitality Jessica Wrobleski Collegevile, MN: Liturgical Press: A Michael Glazier Book, 2012. 168pp. $19.95At first glance it might seem as if these two books do not belong together since moving (...) beyond apathy requires engaged action, and accepting the limits of hospitality focuses attention on how we step back from particular actions. However, both Vasko and Wrobleski challenge their readers to reconsider how interaction with other people, coupled with honest reflection, stretches the contours of our comfort zones, ultimately leading to conversion, a richer embrace of each other’s humanity, and discipleship practices. Together the works require the reader to grapple with how our apathy not only is culpable as a sin of omission but also functions as another form of inhospitality. In recognizing our various sins, including apathy, how do we practice hospitality for the self while seeking forgiveness and reconciliation?Methodologically, both Vasko and Wrobleski use experience—theirs and others’—in a nuanced, engaging manner. They use narratives to illustrate theory or to prompt critical self-reflection in the context of faith. Their self-revelation is neither overdone nor naïve. Rather, both demonstrate how faith seeks understanding whereby the tradition can help make sense of lived experience, and how experiences at times require theological reconstruction of doctrine in order for the tradition to speak words of hope, salvation, and love in new contexts. Both Vasko and Wrobleski advocate, albeit with different styles, that discipleship requires an honest assessment of contemporary reality while looking toward the future, attending to evidence of an eschatological inbreaking of the kingdom. Together their works bridge the all-too-often divided arenas of theoretical study and religious practice by exploring theological claims and perspectives not their own, as well as prayer and other practices that help correct biases and ideologies.More specifically, Vasko wants to analyze why humans “repeatedly bypass opportunities for resisting violence” (9). Her decision to focus on the “category of bystander” helps her “disrupt the victim-perpetrator and oppressor-oppressed binaries and the hierarchical dualism often accompanying it” (14). This disruption of binary frameworks for considering violence and sin, both between two [End Page 215] individuals or two communities, provides a new consideration of how individuals and communities participate in structural sin, and a compelling assessment of why we are culpable for sins of omission. Vasko advances conversations about white privilege and complicity in structures of sin by considering the question of inaction when confronted with injustice. Why are we bystanders, and how can we move beyond bystander status toward solidarity in the pursuit of justice, especially as it relates to our participation in violence around bullying, racism, sexism, and LGBTQ discrimination? Her theological analysis of the bystander weaves together and demonstrates the interconnectedness of Christology, atonement theory, sin/grace, theological anthropology, and scripture. She demonstrates the importance of drawing on the social sciences for insight into structures and communal norms of behavior as well as strategies for fostering change. While grappling with a tough topic, Vasko ultimately provides a roadmap for acknowledging apathy and beginning the process of moving beyond it, even as some will disagree with the end goal of moving beyond apathy.Wrobleski, too, explores privilege, although in a more understated manner through the category of hospitality. She investigates the limits, along with “the virtues and conditions necessary to sustain the practice of hospitality over time and in diverse circumstance” (ix). It is in the exploration of providing hospitality where the question of privilege arises: Who can offer hospitality? Do we have the means to offer it? What is the risk of hospitality? What form does hospitality take and how does one extend welcome that honors and recognizes the inherent dignity of all people despite different life circumstances? These questions are considered in a richly complex and nuanced way in chapter 4, “The Limits of Security.”Wrobleski explores the communal dimensions of hospitality through narratives of various communities—her own, Catholic Worker houses, and... (shrink)

Epistemologies are overwhelmingly riddled with biases, influenced by ideologies and fixed ideas. Max Stirner and Louis Althusser argue at length regarding the negative impact of these on our way of thinking. This paper argues that the only escape from Stirner's fixed ideas or Althusser's ISAs (Ideological State Apparatuses) is through an apathetic disposition to the truth – something very unphilosophical in nature. In order to create parallactic shifts in thought, we must also develop a new epistemology, one rooted in (...) class='Hi'>apathy. Through this, we can become true philosophers and thinkers moving towards a truth not solely determined by our pre-held assumptions. (shrink)

This paper studies the attempts (and failure) of Russian revolutionaries to mobilize the peasantry in the decade leading to the Soviet revolution of 1917. Peasants, who had been emancipated from serfdom only four decades earlier, in 1861, were still largely propertyless and poor. This would, at first glance, make them a ripe target for revolutionary activity. But peasants were largely refractory. We explain this lack of revolutionary spirit through two models. First, despite their lack of education and political awareness, the (...) peasants were rational in their refusal to participate in revolutionary activity; they engaged in a cost–benefit calculus which pushed them away from revolt and political organization. Second, based on the Wildavsky–Thompson cultural types, Russian peasants were largely fatalist: they believed they had no influence on the world, so it was not worth attempting to change it. This paper sheds light on some aspects of the Russian revolution, but also encourages further research in history and economic sociology on the interaction between culture and incentives. (shrink)

The Marquis de Sade’s work can be considered as one of the inaugural instances of a technique that, within both the philosophical and literary realm, is typical of the nineteenth century: emotional restraint. His disapproval of the rhetoric of empathy and moral sentimentalism assumes particular relevance in that it is an “internal” critique. Availing himself of certain characteristic premises of the sentimentalist philosophy—which are primarily attributable to the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau—Sade completely changes their conclusions, to the point of reaching (...) a conscious form of immoralism. This immoralism can be interpreted as a systematic overturning of the morale larmoyante, exalted in late eighteenth-century... (shrink)

In order the combat the growing apathy, cynicism, and indifference observed among students, the author developed a course designed to make the study of philosophy relevant, applicable, and personal for students. This paper is a detailed exposition of the structure and content of this course. Build around the theme “Exploring Moral Character,” this course focuses on the role of moral character in ethical decision making and the nature of students’ own moral character. The course is divided into four units. (...) Designed as a voyage of personal discovery for students, each unit concludes with a non-traditional writing assignment (the moral reasoning unit, for example, concludes with students writing letters to the Admiralty as witnesses to the conviction and sentencing of Billy Budd). The author discusses why the course structure and paper assignments facilitate students’ ability to make explicit and to reflect on their own moral values. Appended to the article is a list of the course’s non-traditional paper assignments. (shrink)

Psychological questions within philosophical ethics, although very often deeply distrusted, are justified if we presume the ultimate unity of the ethical and psychosocial subject. Such questions are especially well-grounded when we deal with a philosophy that is as practical as Stoicism. Because of both their contents and origins, the theories of values and emotions proposed by this ancient school may attract the suspicious attention of psychologists. For there are good reasons to suggest that the ideas in question were neurotic – (...) that they arose from and caused neurosis. This hypothesis can be verified within the framework of Paul Tillich’s multidisciplinary conception of neurosis. After a somewhat more detailed analysis, it turns out that the Stoic conception is in principle neither the result nor the cause of neurotic disturbances. Furthermore, it seems that it is quite the contrary – it causes people to flourish psychologically and existentially. It must nevertheless be emphasized that Stoic philosophy, if misunderstood or led astray, still might become neurotic in character. (shrink)

As we all know, people often do not do what would be the rational thing to do. Both psychologists and philosophers have long been interested in explaining this aspect of the human condition. Also, the relation between everyday irrationality and pathological breakdowns of rationality is a familiar topic of discussion in psychiatry. It is not merely the failures themselves that present interesting questions; there is also the hope that, by understanding when and why we violate rational norms, we might get (...) a firmer grasp on what it means to meet such norms, and thus gain a deeper understanding of the rational capacities of human beings. The capacity we focus on herein is our capacity for practical rationality... (shrink)

The general argument of this book is easily stated: utopian thinking plays an essential role in all types of transformative politics. For a variety of reasons, however, utopian thinking has become virtually impossible in contemporary Western societies. Therefore, in these societies, transformative politics have almost completely disappeared and been replaced by a narrow form of interest group politics. Jacoby assumes that the disappearance of transformative politics represents a grave failure of modern society, but it is not clear why he believes (...) this is so. Moreover, throughout the book Jacoby assumes that the left has a monopoly on transformative politics, but this too is never argued. (shrink)

Boethius first identifies Philosophy in the 'Consolation' as his 'medica', his “healer” or “physician.” Over the course of the dialogue Philosophy exercises her medical art systematically. In the second book Philosophy first gives Boethius “gentler remedies” that are preparatory for the “sharper medicines” that she administers later. This article shows that, philosophically speaking, Philosophy’s “gentler remedies” amount to persuading Boethius toward Stoicism, which functions as an anesthetic for the more invasive philosophical surgery that she performs afterwards. Seeing this, however, requires (...) understanding how Philosophy draws out Boethius’s spiritedness in the first book and how in the second book she sublimates it into an intellectual and volitional apathy toward the things of fortune, i.e., into a Stoic attitude toward that which is other. Significantly, though, the Stoicism to which Philosophy leads Boethius is of a mitigated sort, inasmuch as friendship is not included among the things of fortune to which Boethius is anesthesized, an exception that opens up Boethius to genuine wonder and, consequently, to genuine philosophizing. (shrink)

G.W.F. Hegel is often vilified for his conservative reactionary philosophy, particularly with respect to the rights of women. Alternatively, tracing a path through G.W.F Hegel's political thought, MacDonald demonstrates that, in fact, the logic of Hegel's argument necessitates the recognition of equal political and civil rights for all human beings. Combining a thoughtful study of Hegel's political thought with close readings of two pivotal works of literature, MacDonald's book shows how the perennial tension between fulfilled, yet diverse, personal lives and (...) stable political communities has historically developed. While Sophocles' Antigone highlights the tension that exists in states that deny the particular interests of their citizens, MacDonald argues that an alternative image, one that admits the freedom of all humans as the grounds for an ethical family and state and one that is consistent with Hegel's thought in both the Phenomenology of Spirit and The Philosophy of Right, is offered in Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream. In an era of political cynicism and apathy, Finding Freedom seeks to recover the strengths of modern political life, arguing that Hegel's understanding of the true nature of human freedom, one that is based on our willing participation in rationally demonstrable goods, can be grounds for reinvigorating both the family and the political community. (shrink)

Two intellectual vices seem to always tempt us: arrogance and diffidence. Regarding the former, the world is permeated by dogmatism and table-thumping close-mindedness. From politics, to religion, to simple matters of taste, zealots and ideologues all too often define our disagreements, often making debate and dialogue completely intractable. But to the other extreme, given a world with so much pluralism and heated disagreement, intellectual apathy and a prevailing agnosticism can be simply all too alluring. So the need for intellectual (...) humility, open-mindedness, and a careful, humble commitment to the truth are apparent. In this book, Dr Church and Dr Samuelson explicate a robust and vibrant account of the philosophy and science of this most valuable virtue, and they highlight how it can be best applied and personally developed. (shrink)

The review of the collective monograph "Running and Philosophy", which has not been introduced into the sphere of domestic research of philosophical aspects of physical culture and sports, is presented. Marathon for the Mind" (published in English in 2007). The publication includes 19 essays prepared by American philosophers. The professional study of the socio-cultural determination and the existential significance of running practices by the authors of the monograph is effectively combined with the analysis of personal experience of participating in stayer (...) races, which provides a confessional and emotional presentation, as well as practical confirmation of the results obtained. It can be assumed that the content of the collection under consideration covers the main thematic repertoire and represents the research techniques of the philosophy of running that has been forming since the second half of the twentieth century. The reviewed monograph reveals the humanistic potential of running as a factor of anthropogenesis (Sh. Kay), a means of achieving "correct" apathy (R. Devitt) and the highest kind of friendship (M. V. Austin). R. A. Belliotti considers running as a way to gain superhuman standing, H. L. Reed and R. S. Reed find in it the embodiment of the values of existentialism. Within the framework of solving the problems of anthropological dualism, running activity is addressed by J. J. Wisniewski, M. Maze, C. Taliaferro and R. Trauber. K. Martin and M. S. Nussbaum consider running as a medium of aesthetic experience generation, R. J. van Arragon and K. Kinghorn reflect on the typology of runners. D. P. Fry and J. P. Moreland The connection between running and religious practices is investigated, G. Basham, K. Kelly, U. P. Kabasench and D. R. Hochstetler analyze the correlation of goals and means of running activity. Thus, the monograph substantiates the understanding of running as a publicly available and effective means of gaining physical, mental and social well-being, which expresses the humanistic essence of running practices and justifies the philosophical and anthropological significance of their research. (shrink)

Like Leo Strauss and Karl Popper, most readers take it that one cannot have a political reading of the Republic at all, except by interest in Plato’s attitude toward the proposals developed by Socrates and his interlocutors. But this is not true. I do not mean that it is a good idea to cultivate apathy concerning Plato’s attitudes to sexual equality, private property, food, war, and so on. I mean that there is this possibility mentioned by Stanley Rosen, that (...) “Plato speaks in the story he tells, not in the arguments he assigns to his dramatis personae.”1 That possibility, more usually deployed against Popper, might also worry Strauss. For it is not obvious that treating Socrates as Plato’s satirical voice is any.. (shrink)

The text consists of essays that revolve around the question of the nature and meaning of philosophy, even as it demonstrates philosophy's significance and relevance to some fundamental human problems and issues. The essays present diverse views of what philosophy might be and might aspire to be, with contributors being influenced by a wide range of philosophical approaches and traditions. The conversations also cut across disciplinary boundaries to interrogate and utilize ideas taken from ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, literary studies, cultural studies, (...) and the sociology of science. Traversing regional boundaries, the essays show philosophical analysis at work in exploring some issues pertinent to African, Caribbean, European, and American experiences, even while not ignoring Asian traditions. The collection presents interesting and intriguing views on how philosophical inquiry can illuminate various pressing problems: development, conflict, the discriminating preservation of worthwhile traditions, and the prevalence of apathy. It also reflects the vitality and multifaceted nature of philosophical discourse in grappling with live issues. The edited text is a comprehensive, balanced, and unique anthology of readings capturing the diversity of philosophical investigation. (shrink)

A physician and spokesman for the French Ideologues, Pierre-JeanGeorges Cabanis (1757-1808) stands at the crossroads of several influential developments in modern culture--Enlightenment optimism about human perfectibility, the clinical method in medicine, and the formation and adaptation of liberal social ideals in the French Revolution. This first major study of Cabanis in English traces the influences of these developments on his thought and career. Originally published in 1980. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously (...) out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

In capitalism human beings act as if they are mere animals. So we hear repeatedly in the history of modern philosophy. Indifference and Repetition examines how modern philosophy, largely coextensive with a particular boost in capitalism’s development, registers the reductive and regressive tendencies produced by capitalism’s effect on individuals and society. Ruda examines a problem that has invisibly been shaping the history of modern, especially rationalist philosophical thought, a problem of misunderstanding freedom. Thinkers like Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Marx claim (...) that there are conceptions and interpretations of freedom that lead the subjects of these interpretations to no longer act and think freely. They are often unwillingly led into unfreedom. It is thus possible that even “freedom” enslaves. Modern philosophical rationalism, whose conceptual genealogy the books traces and unfolds, assigns a name to this peculiar form of domination by means of freedom: indifference. Indifference is a name for the assumption that freedom is something that human beings have: a given, a natural possession. When we think freedom is natural or a possession we lose freedom. Modern philosophy, Ruda shows, takes its shape through repeated attacks on freedom as indifference; it is the owl that begins its flight, so that the days of unfreedom will turn to dusk. (shrink)

This article confronts the problems of establishing normative restrictive claims for delegitimizing conduct and attitudes of cultural appropriation. Using C. Thi Nguyen’s and Matthew Strhol’s intimacy account (IA) as a background, I offer an alternative of cultural adoption relying upon Alain Locke’s value theory and philosophical pluralism. The phenomenon of cultural adoption I propose develops some insights from Nguyen’s and Strohl’s IA, while critiquing their framework’s perceived limitations. By adding loyalty and intensity to the prerogatives of intimacy, the hope is (...) that a more nuanced approach to the ethical concerns of cultural adoption will be achieved. My contention is that Locke’s notions of a racial sense or kinship feeling provides stronger grounds for establishing an ethics of the passerby or what I will call non-intimate encounters. Next, I will argue that the interpersonal relations of groups cannot be interpreted as simple, but only as complex wholes. Instead of monoliths and exclusive binaries, we have to recognize variation within groups and learn to think in what Albert Murray calls “mulatto,” or a culture of novel hybrids. In the final section, I argue that Locke’s philosophy, broadly construed, operates as a contraceptive knowledge against the growing imperial apathy of populists and absolutists. We should work to abandon forms of political and epistemological violence by rejecting these forms of cultural abuse. It is my grand contention that human groups express in their differences a uniqueness that makes us distrust or admire and like each other. (shrink)

Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In (...) the Anthropology and the Doctrine of Virtue, apathy is taken in the sense of freedom from affects. In these texts, Kant maintains that we must strive toward a state in which affects are absent. (shrink)

This article seeks to re-evaluate the importance of the political in the thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The article first shows that Sartre’s description of Merleau-Ponty’s intellectual trajectory as one of increasing political apathy from the 1950s onwards is inaccurate. The article then demonstrates that throughout the post-war period, including in his project for a new ontology, Merleau-Ponty believed that a revised version of Marxism would provide the methodological framework within which philosophical work could address the political challenges of the (...) present. This revised Marxism was to be a direct alternative to the reifying uses of Marx’s thinking. It would rely upon the latter’s self-reflexive historicism, which meant its very failures showed how philosophy might transform itself in connection with its own time. Cet article tente souligner la place du politique dans la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. On contestera d’abord la description faite par Sartre de sa trajectoire intellectuelle, selon laquelle il aurait fait preuve d’une apathie croissante, à partir des années cinquante, vis-à-vis des questions politiques. On montrera ensuite que durant toute la période d’après-guerre, jusque dans les recherches ontologiques ultimes, Merleau-Ponty a pensé qu’un usage renouvelé du marxisme permettrait au travail philosophique de répondre aux défis politiques du présent. Une telle révision du marxisme représentait une alternative directe aux usages réifiant de la pensée de Marx. Cette révision serait rendue possible par la réflexivité historiciste de cette pensée, qui fait que, dans ses erreurs mêmes, celle-ci révèle la capacité de la philosophie à se transformer au contact de son temps. (shrink)

Existing philosophies of justice have failed to challenge and overcome the peculiar African crisis of development. The contract model of justice assumed that there would be justice when people acting as rational agents accepted basic practices of society that would assure their mutual advantage in the long run, this has not really worked in the development practice in many parts of the world, due to the nullifying effects of Kleptocracy, patrimonialism, institutional decay, antinomies and apathy, precipitation of primordial ethno-cultural (...) enclaves and other divisive factors. The utilitarian philosophy of justice, seen as a way of defining the greatest good or happiness of the greatest number of the society and the impartiality or respect model of justice, which suggests the recognition of the intrinsic worth of people as entities deserving of respect, whose interests should be maintained in the interest of the overall common good, have also failed due to the realities of cultural, historical and psychological inducements to truncate or restrictively appropriate the principles and institutions intended for the greater or common good; federalism, industrialization and social services. Taken together, these philosophies have not succeeded, due to obstructive cosmological templates that have re-institutionalized almost globally, a new wave of regressive authoritarianism, denial of economic and political rights, ossified anachronism deriving from both the primordial and colonial forms of ethno-religious prejudices, conflict driven mistrust and mutual hatred among groups. We therefore need to look in other directions. (shrink)

An examination of the meaning of meaninglessness: why it matters that nothing matters. When someone is labeled a nihilist, it's not usually meant as a compliment. Most of us associate nihilism with destructiveness and violence. Nihilism means, literally, “an ideology of nothing. “ Is nihilism, then, believing in nothing? Or is it the belief that life is nothing? Or the belief that the beliefs we have amount to nothing? If we can learn to recognize the many varieties of nihilism, Nolen (...) Gertz writes, then we can learn to distinguish what is meaningful from what is meaningless. In this addition to the MIT Press Essential Knowledge series, Gertz traces the history of nihilism in Western philosophy from Socrates through Hannah Arendt and Jean-Paul Sartre. Although the term “nihilism” was first used by Friedrich Jacobi to criticize the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Gertz shows that the concept can illuminate the thinking of Socrates, Descartes, and others. It is Nietzsche, however, who is most associated with nihilism, and Gertz focuses on Nietzsche's thought. Gertz goes on to consider what is not nihilism—pessimism, cynicism, and apathy—and why; he explores theories of nihilism, including those associated with Existentialism and Postmodernism; he considers nihilism as a way of understanding aspects of everyday life, calling on Adorno, Arendt, Marx, and prestige television, among other sources; and he reflects on the future of nihilism. We need to understand nihilism not only from an individual perspective, Gertz tells us, but also from a political one. (shrink)

This Element argues that Kant was a consistent proponent of the claim that the moral law is the causal law of a free will, and that the supposed ability of free will to choose indifferently between options is an empty concept.

I examine the significance of the Stoic theory of pathē for Kant’s moral psychology, arguing against the received view that systematic differences block the possibility of Kant’s drawing anything more than rhetoric from his Stoic sources. More particularly, I take on the chronically underexamined assumption that Kant is committed to a psychological dualism in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, positing distinct rational and nonrational elements of human mentality. By contrast, Stoics take the mentality of an adult human being to (...) be rational through and through, while recognising that this rationality is not normally in a state of health or excellence. I show how Kant’s account of affections—chiefly the “affects” and “passions” that he identifies as targets of a duty of apathy—draws substantive lessons from his Stoic sources, and how he accepts on his own terms the monistic principles of Stoic moral psychology. (shrink)

How do we challenge the structures of late capitalism if all possible media through which to do do is inescapably capitalist? This urgent political question is at the heart of Peter Trawny's major new work. With searing precision Trawny demonstrates how our world has become wholly determined by technology, capital, and the medium. In this world of the 'TCM', we universal subjects remain in a state of apathy that is temporarily punctuated, but also reinforced, by the phantasmatic dream of (...) difference offered us by the 'Hollywood machine.' Our sole motivation is to gain money and the power it brings. The only meaningful difference in the world of the TCM universal is the difference between wealth and poverty. Freedom here is then the freedom to dispose of things (particularly technological objects) and to gain pleasure. It makes our relation to our surroundings essentially 'touristic,' and our relation to the earth an essentially exploitative one. The notion of personal or societal freedom has never been more controversial or, seemingly, more far from our grasp. While exploring in details the difficulties we face in our attempts to be free, Trawny builds an almost Utopian vision of how to break out of the mediums in which we operate and experience a new kind of freedom – both one of intimacy, and one through philosophy. An ambitious and lively yet completely rigorous work, this book offers a fascinating vision of how to live and live well. (shrink)

Calvin's ethics is often misconstrued as legalistic, somber, and ascetic. However, such a treatment is simply not consistent with Calvin's deep and abiding concern for the development and display of proper emotional responses in the lives of Christian believers. This paper examines the nature and function of the emotions in Calvin's theological ethics. Pre-figuring modern cognitivist views, Calvin rejects the characterization of the emotions as blind, arational forces. In so doing he displays a generally Stoic vision of the nature of (...) the emotions. They are not simply nonrational forces that "overcome" us, but are integrally related to what we believe and value. Although Calvin largely agrees with the Stoics that the emotions are derivative of our beliefs and values, he explicitly rejects the "iron philosophy" of the Stoic doctrine of apathy. Calvin argues strenuously that the emotions are an integral part of the creation of human beings and not simply the result of the Fall. He grounds his arguments for the goodness of the emotions soteriologically, Christologically, and on the doctrine of God. Therefore, where the Stoics called for an elimination of the emotions, Calvin calls for their purification or "sanctification." To this end Calvin argues that believers can and should train their emotions by means of meditation upon the cross of Christ, meditation upon the future life and the spiritual discipline of prayer. (shrink)

When a term is used in science, we tend to integrate its origins, functions, and history to see if the term is a scientific one or comes from other fields. The term «empathy» is an example to such a case. This article challenges the widespread view that empathy is the capability of a person to understand emotions and thoughts of others. We will deconstruct the concept of empathy as an academic one by focusing on its limits. We will discuss the (...) possibility of empathy for humans in critically reconstructing the meaning of the word and its meanings from its ancient origins to contemporary research. Our question is centered on cognitive actions that enable empathy as an emotional way of understanding others. Based on our findings, we argue that the concept of empathy is a recently established academic term. As a concept, it matches with some alternative concepts such as apathy and sympathy. In rhetoric, it is the pathos of the speech that affects the speaker by emotions since no specific receptive ability of the speaker is needed. Similarly, when we use the term empathy, we should use it as a category of the sender, not that of the receiver. This concept of logical empathy opposes to the classical view of empathy studies emphasizing that empathy is a receptive category of the receiver. So, empathy is nothing else but the ability to send emotional or intellectual content suitable to a capable receiver. Also, the comparative study in the concept of empathy in Buddhism gives us evidence that empathy is a spiritual or mental concept whose applications are in the area of pre-linguistic states and esoteric contexts. In rhetorical terms we could define it as a persuasive mood of pathos-driven speech. (shrink)

What is the best model of emotion if we are to reach a good understanding of the role of emotion in religious life? I begin by setting out a simple model of emotion, based on a paradigm emotional experience of fear of an immediate threat in one’s environment. I argue that the simple model neglects many of the complexities of our emotional lives, including in particular the complexities that one finds with the intellectual emotions. I then discuss how our dispositions (...) to have these kinds of emotions, which are part of what it is to be a virtuous intellectual enquirer, are subject to vicissitudes, in particular brought about by depression, apathy and other damaging changes to our psychic economy. These changes can flatten affect, so that one’s intellectual life goes cold on one. Finally, I commend the idea of applying this model of intellectual emotion onto religious emotion. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas describes the Christian as homo viator: the "human wayfarer" or pilgrim journeying through this world to the heavenly city. This journey is vulnerable to "worldly sin" or "worldliness": an excessive attachment to wealth, status, honors, prestige, and power. A major cause of apathy to the poor and the underprivileged, worldliness treats our identity as purely this-worldly and therefore shuts the door to eschatological hope through subtle forms of presumption and despair. Drawing upon Aquinas and other sources in (...) the Western theological tradition, this essay argues that Christians should retrieve worldliness as a moral category to better understand threats to hope. As a remedy to worldliness, Elliot proposes hope's beatitude of poverty of spirit, suggesting that it both increases solidarity with the poor and helps one grow in the theological virtue of hope. (shrink)

Contemporary democratic theory, in its focus on the distinction between a private and a public sphere, tends to exclude emotions from political life. Arendt, Habermas, and Angus present critical theories of politi­cal action and deliberation that demand that emotions be left behind in favour of a narrower rationality. On the basis of a first step toward incorporating emotions into political life as accomplished by Martha Nussbaum – despite its limitations – and of a second step taken by Sara Ahmed, an (...) outline of a theory of emotions becomes possible, and brings into question the distinction between private and public life. Emotions act as motivations that accompany every instance of participation or for non-participation, be it because of apathy or of disengagement. (shrink)

Western democracy is now at a critical juncture. Some worry that power has been wrested from the people and placed in the hands of a small political elite. Others argue that the democratic system gives too much power to a populace that is largely ill-informed and easily swayed by demagogues. This classic study of democratic principles is thus now more relevant than ever. A renowned historian of antiquity and political philosophy, Sir M.I. Finley offers a comparative analysis of Greek and (...) modern conceptions of democracy. As he puts the ancient Greeks in dialogue with their contemporary counterparts, Finley tackles some of the most pressing issues of our day, including public apathy, partisanship, consensus politics, distrust of professional politicians, and the limits of free speech. Including three lectures that Finley delivered at Rutgers University, plus two additional essays that further illuminate his thinking, _Democracy Ancient and Modern _explores the dramatic differences between the close-knit civil society of the ancient Greeks and our own atomized mass societies. By mapping out democracy’s past and its present manifestations, this book helps us plot a course for democracy’s future. (shrink)

In 1797 Friedrich Schlegel wrote philosophy of art usually lacks one of two things: either the philosophy, or the art. This collection of essays contains both the philosophy and the art. It brings together an international team of leading philosophers to address diverse philosophical issues raised by recent works of art. Each essay engages with a specific artwork and explores the connection between the image and the philosophical content and how philosophy can aid interpretation of the artwork. The discussion ranges (...) over political, ethical and religious concepts, such as apathy and irony, to standard problems in the philosophy of art, such as expression, style and depiction, as well as major movements in art history, such as Dadaism. Many of the contributors are distinguished in areas of philosophy other than aesthetics and are writing about art for the first time. All show how productive the engagement can be between philosophy, more generally, and art. (shrink)