How do individuals respond when they perceive that their family business has been built upon unethical business conduct? Drawing on an expanded version of Hirschman’s typology of generic responses to declining situations (Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1970), which includes responses of Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect, we offer a model that predicts probability of intended response behavior as a function of normative obligation (i.e., what one perceives ought (...) to be done), managerial discretion (i.e., what one perceives can be done), and successor commitment to the firm. The model is tested on 124 business school students exposed to a scenario depicting an inherited ethical dilemma occurring in a family business from Arthur Miller’s play All My Sons, and shows support for elements of the proposed framework. Most notable is a significant negative relationship between normative firm-directed commitment and the response of Neglect. (shrink)

Atlas, S. On the relation between subject and object.--Bamberger, B. Religion and the arts.--Bemporad, J. Man, God, and history.--Braude, W. C. The two lives of Hillel's sandwich.--Chapman, C. B. The health guilds, the public interest and the malpractice dilemma.--Feuer, L. Influence of Abba Hillel Silver on the evolution of Reform Judaism.--Hackerman, N. Ignorance, the motivation for understanding.--Hartshorne, C. Whitehead's metaphysical system.--Ogden, S. M. Prolegomena to a Christian theology of nature.--Sandmel, S. The rationalist denial of Jewish tradition in Philo.--Shakow, D. Educating (...) the mental health researcher for potential development in man.--Turner, D. An Ashendene dozen from the Levi A. Olan collection of fine books.--Olan, L. A. A preliminary summing up. (shrink)

_Ideology and Utopia_ argues that ideologies are mental fictions whose function is to veil the true nature of a given society. They originate unconsciously in the minds of those who seek to stabilise a social order. Utopias are wish dreams that inspire the collective action of opposition groups which aim at the entire transformation of society. Mannheim shows these two opposing elements to dominate not only our social thought but even unexpectedly to penetrate into the most scientific theories in philosophy, (...) history and the social sciences. This new edition contains a new preface by Bryan S. Turner which describes Mannheim's work and critically assesses its relevance to modern sociology. The book is published with a comprehensive bibliography of Mannheim's major works. (shrink)

Derek Turner believes that a proper interpretation of Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude can help to reveal the nature of the difference between «historical» (geology, archeology, forensics) and «empirical» (physics, chemistry) sciences. From his point of view, the apparent asymmetry between these sciences is a consequence of different understanding of the possibilities to «manipulate» the objects of study and the role played by background theories. In our opinion, Turner’s concept is a good example of how profound and (...) inviting the instrumentalistic concept of science could be. First, it is «reflexive» in the sense that it constrained other instrumentalist theories (B. Fraassen’s constructive empiricism deeply flawed). And secondly, it is «constructive» – the emphasis that «the strength of arguments for or against scientific real- ism can vary depending on the scientific context» quite unexpectedly leads to the fact that «ideographic / nomothetic division is not very helpful», and to the fact that «epistemic disadvantage, but the same epis- temic status». Reflections on the book: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge University Press, 2007. (shrink)

I review the book “Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate” by Derek Turner. Turner suggests that philosophers should take seriously the historical sciences such as geology when considering philosophy of science issues. To that end, he explores the scientific realism debate with the historical sciences in mind. His conclusion is a view allied to that of Arthur Fine: a view Turner calls the natural historical attitude. While I find Turner’s motivations good, I (...) find his characterisation of the historical sciences unconvincing. I say why in a section at the end of the review. The result is that I am unpersuaded by his thesis. (shrink)

A recent study by Olivieri et al, published in PLOS ONE, reports that between 2009 and 2015 a third of patients with thalassaemia in Canada’s largest hospital were switched from first-line licensed drugs to regimens of deferiprone, an unlicensed drug of unproven safety and efficacy. Based on retrospective data from patient records, the PLOS Study reports that patients treated with deferiprone, either as monotherapy or in combination with first-line drugs, suffered serious adverse effects. The data reported by Olivieri et al (...) give rise to a number of ethical issues. These ethical issues are identified, placed in historical context and analysed. For purposes of this analysis, reliance is placed on two core principles of research ethics, harm minimisation and informed consent, and also on the hospital’s mission statement. Then a mystery is explored: How and why did it happen that Toronto’s University Health Network treated large numbers of patients with an unlicensed drug over a period of many years? ‘Institutional conflict of interest’ is considered as a possible explanatory hypothesis. (shrink)

In recent decades it has become increasingly clear that a substantial amount of cognitive work goes on independent of consciousness. The research has been carried out largely under two rubrics, implicit learning and implicit memory. The former has been concerned primarily with the acquisition of knowledge independent of awareness and the latter with the manner in which memories not readily available to conscious recall or recognition play a role in behavior; collectively these operations comprise the essential functions of the cognitive (...) unconscious. This paper reviews the recent history of work on these issues, identifies some of the problems confronting researchers, and introduces a theoretical framework based on principles of evolutionary biology within which to view them. The argument is that the cognitive unconscious, despite its apparent sophistication, is of considerable evolutionary antiquity and antedates conscious cognitive systems by a considerable amount of time. Various entailments of this evolutionary perspective are explored including such issues as phylogeny and ontogeny of implicit processes, the robustness of the implicit functions as displayed by the capacity to resist disruptions from psychological and neurological disorders, the relationship between implicit cognition and intelligence, and individual differences in implicit cognitive abilities. (shrink)

Modeling his position on Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude, Derek Turner proposed the Natural Historical Attitude. Although these positions share a family resemblance, Turner’s position differs from Fine’s in two important ways. First, Fine’s contextualism is more fine-grained. Second, Turner’s argument for metaphysical agnosticism seems to lead to the implausible conclusion that we should be agnostic about the mind-independence of ordinary objects – a position in tension with Fine’s “core position.” While this paper presents a textual (...) analysis of Fine’s and Turner’s arguments, the conclusions reached here cohere well with some of the best empirically-informed assessments of the historical sciences. Given the diversity of the historical sciences, the fact that many claims in the historical sciences have enough support to be regarded as true, and the implausibility of Turner’s agnosticism, philosophers studying historical science would be better served by embracing a stance closer to Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude. (shrink)

In this paper we elaborate a conception of what we call integrational creativity, which aims both to capture the richest kinds of human creativity and to bring together certain existing conceptions of creativity in a way that we hope will resonate with what people have had in mind in talking of creativity. These conceptions are those offered by Arthur Koestler, Margaret Boden, and two conceptual blending theorists, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner; and we show how these conceptions and (...) the criticisms that have been made of them can be accommodated within our integrational account. We also argue, drawing on the work of Immanuel Kant and Hartmut Rosa, that the integrating character of creativity is complemented by the resonating character of its appreciation. On our view, the heart of creativity lies in its integrating–resonating structure, and in the final part we note some of the implications for recent debates about creativity. (shrink)

We use a creature construction to show that consistently $$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak d=\aleph _1= {{\mathrm{cov}}}< {{\mathrm{non}}}< {{\mathrm{non}}}< {{\mathrm{cof}}} < 2^{\aleph _0}. \end{aligned}$$The same method shows the consistency of $$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak d=\aleph _1= {{\mathrm{cov}}}< {{\mathrm{non}}}< {{\mathrm{non}}}< {{\mathrm{cof}}} < 2^{\aleph _0}. \end{aligned}$$.

Taken at face value, a programming language is defined by a formal grammar. But, clearly, there is more to it. By themselves, the naked strings of the language do not determine when a program is correct relative to some specification. For this, the constructs of the language must be given some semantic content. Moreover, to be employed to generate physical computations, a programming language must have a physical implementation. How are we to conceptualize this complex package? Ontologically, what kind of (...) thing is it? In this paper, we shall argue that an appropriate conceptualization is furnished by the notion of a technical artifact. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have tried to develop a version of truthmaker theory which ties the truthmaking relation closely to the notion of fundamentality. In fact, some of these truthmaker-fundamentalists, as I call them, assume that the notion of fundamentality is intelligible in part by citing, as central examples of fundamentals, truthmakers, which they understand necessarily as constituents of fundamental reality. The aim of this paper is first to bring some order and clarity to this discussion, sketching how far TF is compatible (...) with orthodox truthmaking, and then critically to evaluate the limits of TF. It will be argued that truthmaker theory cannot directly help with articulating the nature of fundamental reality and that T-REL does not necessarily relate truths with anything more fundamental, unless what is fundamental is what the truthbearers in question are about. I shall argue that TF faces a rather thorny dilemma and some general problems. I shall present two exhaustive types of fundamentalism on which a version of TF can be based: deflationary and inflationary. It will be argued that each version of TF runs into significant troubles accounting for all truth, specifically ordinary truths and metaphysical truths about the relations between ordinary facts and fundamental facts. I shall not attempt to solve these problems, but rather, at the end, diagnose the issues with TF as lying in the difficulties with reconciling the manifest image with the scientific and metaphysical images of reality. (shrink)

C endorses the doctrine of Composition as Identity, which holds that a composite object is identical to its many parts, and entails that one object can be identical to several others. In this dialogue, N argues that many‐one identity, and thus composition as identity, is conceptually confused. In particular, N claims it violates two conceptual truths: that existence facts fix identity facts, and that identity is no addition to being. In response to pressure from C, N considers several candidate interpretations (...) of the first slogan. Each interpretation imagines God issuing a divine existential decree that counts as ‘fixing the existence facts’, and then considers what questions about identity are left open by it. N eventually hits on an appealing interpretation of the slogan that C can neither undermine nor accommodate, and uses it to interpret the second slogan as well. (shrink)

Bioethicists disagree over methods, theories, decision-making guides, case analyses and public policies. Thirty years ago, the thinking of many scholars coalesced around a principlist approach to bioethics. That mid-level mode of moral reasoning is now one of many approaches to moral deliberation. Significant variation in contemporary approaches to the study of ethical issues related to medicine, biotechnology and health care raises the question of whether bioethics exists as widely shared method, theory, normative framework or mode of moral reasoning.

In the contemporary discussion of hidden variable interpretations of quantum mechanics, much attention has been paid to the “no hidden variable” proof contained in an important paper of Kochen and Specker. It is a little noticed fact that Bell published a proof of the same result the preceding year, in his well-known 1966 article, where it is modestly described as a corollary to Gleason's theorem. We want to bring out the great simplicity of Bell's formulation of this result and to (...) show how it can be extended in certain respects. (shrink)

Companies often benefit from others’ attributions of moral conviction for prosocial behavior, for example, attributions that a company has a sincere moral desire to improve the environment when behaving sustainably. Across four studies, we explored how organizations’ changing resource positions influenced people’s attributions for the motivations underlying prosocial organizational behaviors. Observers attributed less moral conviction following prosocial behavior when they believed an organization was losing economic resources. This effect was primarily a “penalty” assessed against organizations that were losing resources, as (...) opposed to a “reward” given to organizations gaining resources. Finally, we found that this effect occurred because people perceive organizations that are losing resources as more situationally constrained, leading them to attribute less dispositional moral conviction. We discuss theoretical and practical implications stemming from how changes in resource access can lead people to be more skeptical of organizations’ motivations following prosocial behavior. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to assess the impact of Big Data technologies for insurance ratemaking, with a special focus on motor products.The first part shows how statistics and insurance mechanisms adopted the same aggregate viewpoint. It made visible regularities that were invisible at the individual level, further supporting the classificatory approach of insurance and the assumption that all members of a class are identical risks. The second part focuses on the reversal of perspective currently occurring in data analysis (...) with predictive analytics, and how this conceptually contradicts the collective basis of insurance. The tremendous volume of data and the personalization promise through accurate individual prediction indeed deeply shakes the homogeneity hypothesis behind pooling. The third part attempts to assess the extent of this shift in motor insurance. Onboard devices that collect continuous driving behavioural data could import this new paradigm into these products. An examination of the current state of research on models with telematics data shows however that the epistemological leap, for now, has not happened. (shrink)

Le présent article revient sur la polémique qui anime les sphères politiques européenne et française depuis les années 1990 autour de la suppression du mot « race » des textes normatifs. Au-delà des enjeux idéologiques que ce débat cristallise, il propose d’élargir la perspective d’analyse à un phénomène plus englobant : la confrontation d’ordres juridiques hétérogènes engagés dans des processus intégratifs : « le droit français et le droit communautaire diffèrent dans leur démarche en matière de lutte contre les discriminations (...) ». Si le droit français « dit » la race, il lui nie une existence normative. A l’inverse, le droit de l’Union en fait un critère distinctif susceptible d’activer des dispositions juridiques liées au principe de non-discrimination. Ce changement de paradigme conduit le juge interne à modifier son approche traditionnelle des droits de l’Homme fondée sur le principe d’égalité. Les décisions du juge et du rapporteur public portent les traces d’aménagements dénominatifs lorsqu’il raisonne dans le cadre d’une approche plus relativiste, légitimant la différence de traitement. (shrink)

A collection of stories by bioethicists writing about their own illnesses displays the importance of microethics. From this perspective, ethics happens not in the application of principles to specific decisions, but rather in the moment-to-moment flow of clinical interaction, as healthcare workers and patients make decisions, especially in their use of language. Microethical issues that are common to multiple stories are described as dense junctures of ethical concern. Three junctures are discussed in detail: conflicts between medical and patient rationalities, issues (...) of how clinicians represent patients, and practices of truth telling. These junctures are illustrated with examples from the bioethicists’ personal stories of treatment. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper argues that Einstein subscribed to three distinct kinds of interpretations of the quantum theory: subjective, instrumental, and hidden variables interpretations. We explore the context and ihe content of Einstein's thinking over these interpretations, emphasizing Einstein's conception of his role not only as a critic of the new quantum theory but also as a guide pointing the way to better physics.

L. J. Henderson was a central figure in Harvard discussions of the nature of science in the interwar period and served as a bridge between the sciences and the social sciences. Two key ideas were promoted by Henderson: systems and conceptual schemes, both of which spread quickly at Harvard and then beyond. In this article the focus will be on conceptual schemes, a term which had a distinctive origin in Henderson that accounts for some of the ambiguities in its adaptations. (...) Henderson spoke as a scientist speaking to philosophers rather than doing philosophy and sharply distinguished his aims from those that followed from Immanuel Kant. Henderson’s model was the scheme of ancient Greek medicine, which had persisted for millennia and was replaced by modern medicine. This was differentiated from earlier neo-Kantian and later Kuhnian variations. Henderson’s account was distinctive in placing the origins of conceptual schemes in intuitions about patterns formed in practice by people operating on concrete phenomena. The resulting schemes, he thought, had to be accepted on faith by students, but were, as he put it, walking sticks to enable communication and understanding rather than exclusive dogmas. Henderson was an enthusiast for Vilfredo Pareto, who was vilified at Harvard during the war by Carl J. Friedrich, which led not to the disuse of his ideas but to the erasure of their origins. (shrink)

... or political office or scientific research tends to think everything small which does not visibly contribute to money-getting, or political influence, ...

A strong case can be made that the cognitive system is designed for guiding action, not, for example, symbol manipulation. I review empirical work demonstrating the link between action and cognition with special attention to the processes of language comprehension. Next, I sketch an embodied cognition framework for integrating work on language understanding with a more general approach to cognition and action. This general approach considers contributions to action of bodily states, emotions, social and cultural processes, and learning within a (...) framework that generates a dynamic system. This framework is used to consider the notion of distributed cognition and the prospects that technology might induce substantial changes in cognition. My assessment is that such changes are unlikely. (shrink)

When clinician‐patient relationships go wrong, the problem may not be merely that one person is knowingly mistreating the other. More likely, they are caught up in different stories, and animated by different moral visions. The task is for each to see the point of the other's story.

In 1924, Bohr, Kramers and Slater tried to introduce into microphysics conservation principles that hold only on the average. This attempt was abandoned in the light of the Compton-Simon experiment. Since that time, except for a moment of doubt in 1936, it has been thought that the classical conservation laws hold in quantum theory for each individual interaction, in a way that yields the classical exchange-and-balance of momentum familiar from the laws of elastic collisions. It has been thought, that is, (...) that in each individual “collision” what one part of the total system loses in linear momentum another part gains, so as to maintain the same total amount afterwards as before. To those familiar with discussions of the interpretation of quantum theory, however, it will be apparent that the very concepts needed to express this idea of an elastic collision are generally not admitted in the theory. For one needs the idea that both before and after collision the total system has a well-defined value for the conserved quantity and, moreover, that the various component parts of the system have well-defined values for those quantities out of which the conserved one is composed. But in the case of spin, for example, it is customary to say that although total spin may be conserved in certain interactions one cannot attribute values to the separate components of spin because the associated operators do not commute. Moreover, one does not generally refer to the values of quantities except in eigenstates. Hence, in general, one would not refer to the value of the conserved quantity before and after interaction, except for interactions initiated in eigenstates. (shrink)

We explore Woodin's Universality Theorem and consider to what extent large cardinal properties are transferred into HOD (and other inner models). We also separate the concepts of supercompactness, supercompactness in HOD and being HOD-supercompact. For example, we produce a model where a proper class of supercompact cardinals are not HOD-supercompact but are supercompact in HOD. Additionally we introduce a way to measure the degree of HOD-supercompactness of a supercompact cardinal, and we develop methods to control these degrees simultaneously for a (...) proper class of supercompact cardinals. Finally, we also produce a model in which the unique supercompact cardinal is also the only strongly compact cardinal, no cardinal is supercompact up to an inaccessible cardinal, level by level inequivalence holds and the unique supercompact cardinal is not HOD-supercompact. (shrink)

_National Jewish Book Award winner __ An internationally recognized scholar and theologian shares a Jewish mysticism for our times in this " humane, accessible " book (_Publishers Weekly_, Starred Review)__ “Green challenges traditional notions of God, Israel, and Torah, offering a radically new understanding and stimulating the reader to join him in a journey of discovery.”—Daniel Matt, Graduate Theological Union_ Judaism, one of the world’s great spiritual traditions, is not addressed to Jews alone. In this masterful book, winner of the (...) 2020 National Jewish Book Award in the Con­tem­po­rary Jew­ish Life and Practice category, Arthur Green calls out to seekers of all sorts, offering a universal response to the eternal human questions of who we are, why we exist, where we are going, and how to live. Drawing on over half a century as a Jewish seeker and teacher, he shows us a Judaism that cultivates the life of the spirit, that inspires an inward journey leading precisely toward self-transcendence, to an awareness of the universal Self in whose presence we exist. As a neo-hasidic seeker, he is both devotional and boldly questioning in his understanding of God and tradition. Engaging with the mystical sources, he translates the insights of the Hasidic masters into a new religious language accessible to all those eager to build an inner life and a human society that treasures the divine spark in each person and throughout Creation. (shrink)