In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:53 HUME ON ARTIFICIAL LIVES with a Rejoinder to A.C. Maclntyre The variety of human cultures fascinated Enlightenment thinkers and evoked certain problems for philosophical discussion. Wide experience of other societies, as well as the study of history, disclosed moral systems interestingly different from modern European mores. Also a student of other cultures, historical and contemporary, David Hume is a moderate pluralist on the matter of alternative (...) moral systems. He acknowledges that there are systems of values other than that shared by his readers which qualify as moralities; but more interestingly, he also holds that there are some such systems which, despite the claims of their adherents, fail to qualify as moralities. Thus Hume opposes forms of relativism that allow any system which a community deems to be a moral code has to be acknowledged as constituting a genuine morality. In this paper I address the question of how Hume can discriminate among value systems and declare some to be moralities, some not. Given the design of his philosophical approach to morals, addressing this question is a matter of some importance for Hume, since he maintains that moral reflection takes its departure from everyday moral beliefs and sentiments. This being the case, we might expect that what should count as 'everyday moral beliefs and sentiments' would be whatsoever any individual or group puts forward as a morality, and that Hume's pluralism impedes him from raising a critical challenge to any system advanced, no matter how strange it might be. But Hume holds that certain systems advanced for the guidance of life which are sharply opposed to 54 everyday beliefs and sentiments do not constitute a morality, even if they number many as adherents. It is instructive to observe that A.C. Maclntyre believes that Hume's position is deeply flawed. He asserts that the treatment of rival tables of the virtues constitutes a most serious weakness in Hume's 2 theory of morals. Maclntyre contends that Hume's spurning of the monkish virtues, for instance, or his preference of Cicero's Offices over the Christian Whole Duty of Man, is devoid of theoretical justification and amounts to a matter of personal idiosyncrasy and eighteenth-century class elitism. Thus this seems a problem worthy of discussion. In what follows I shall: (a) lay out the problem of artificial lives as it arises in A Dialogue; (b) describe five points of differentiation between artificial lives and nonartificial lives; (c) review some less than fully satisfactory solutions to the problem; (d) introduce what I take to be the chief considerations supporting Hume's rejection of artificial lives; and finally (e) discuss whether Maclntyre 's objections to Hume's treatment of artificial lives are sustainable. 1. The Context of the Problem Hume deals with diversity of morals most expressly in A Dialogue, the short work appended to the second Enquiry. The essay records an exchange between one Palamedes, a lover of the novel and the striking, and his interlocutor, referred to merely as "I". Palamedes confounds the interlocutor by narrating a story about a distant people (the inhabitants of 'Fourli") whose mores include practices, apparently deemed moral by them, which sharply offend his, and presumably our, moral A sensibilities. Having elicited the interlocutor's 55 felt disapproval of those practices, Palamedes delights in revealing that the people of whom he has been speaking in cloaked terms are none other than the interlocutor's beloved Greeks of classical antiquity. Not satisfied with astonishing the interlocutor, he goes on to draw a strongly relativist conclusion about morals in general. The interlocutor confronts the choice of either abandoning his moral admiration of the civilization of the Greeks or of accepting some measure of the relativism in morals that Palamedes is advocating. The interlocutor does neither. He distinguishes between the principles of moral approbation or disapprobation and specific examples of approval or disapproval (E 333). He grants that there are examples of practices of which the ancients apparently approved and contrariwise we disapprove, but he denies that the existence of some such instances warrants the serious sort of relativism that Palamedes would foist on him. Obviously the number of such discrepancies cannot be overwhelming, otherwise the... (shrink)

The merchant's toil, the sage's indolence,The monk's humility, the hero's pride,All, all alike, find Reason on their side.Hume's moral philosophy is often interpreted as an example of a naturalistic approach to ethics. J.L. Mackie, for instance, writes that in Hume the questions of moral philosophy are answered ‘in sociological and psychological terms, by constructing and defending a causal hypothesis.’ Similarly, Páll S. Árdal claims that Hume ‘is concerned with an attempt to discover those psychological laws that explain human emotions and (...) the behaviour of people in society.’ I argue in this essay that if Hume is read in this way as developing a general explanatory theory of moral sentiments, he faces an inescapable dilemma. Section I presents the dilemma. In sections II and ill, I argue why for Hume — interpreted as a proponent of general psychological laws — there is no way out of this dilemma. (shrink)

As with every new trend in science, cybernetics has revived many old philosophical problems and posed a number of new ones. They include problems of similarity and difference in the functioning of the brain and of cybernetic machines, interrelationships between artificial creations and human beings, the nature of the machine, etc. An imprecise posing of these intimately related problems is often the source of confusion in discussions of the philosophical problems of cybernetics.

In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) has garnered tremendous attention across a range of sectors, including health care. AI is a comprehensive term, broadly defined as computational machines making decisions and performing tasks that previously required human intelligence or cognition. There are high expectations of what AI can do; enthusiasts sometimes refer to it as a central pillar of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, with an impact on humanity as profound as that of the steam power engine or electricity. Building (...) on the Third Industrial Revolution (or Digital Revolution) that began in the middle of the twentieth century and was characterized by the spread of automation and digitization through the use of electronics, computers, and communication technologies (e.g., the internet), the Fourth Industrial Revolution is characterized by a fusion of advancing technologies in AI, robotics, the Internet of Things (IoT), genetic engineering, and quantum computing. These technologies blend physical production and operations with smart digital technologies, promising to transform the operation, management, and governance of every industry, including health care. (shrink)

Much more than their machinic reality, current iterations of AI rely on imagined divisions of human and non-human properties and skills that have genealogical ties to colonization. For this reason, research efforts have recently been made to historicize these imaginaries, connecting them to colonial ideals that delegate black and brown colonized people into the realm of the non-human. Atanasoski and Vora (Surrogate humanity. Race, robots and the politics of technological futures, Duke, Durham and London, 2019) have called this a “surrogate (...) humanity”, where narratives of autonomous technologies function to disappear precisely the formerly colonized peoples that are enveloped in its production process. At the same time, the gendered and racialized roots of this maternal figure represents an opportunity to uncover and critique the invisibilization of embodied resources necessary to produce AI, precarious bodies labouring to produce algorithmic infrastructures in a manner that can be considered in a genealogy of carework and reproduction. These genealogies complicate the detachment suggested by the surrogate figure and go beyond it to proclaim a more generative function of the relationship between the black maternal figure and AI. The article analyses Tabita Rezaire’s multi-media artwork Sugar Walls Teardom to think through decolonial and queer renderings of the black female bodies upon which technological imaginaries rest, to extend beyond AI surrogacy and towards notions of kinship, care and world-making by producing an AI aesthetics that is relational, embodied, and celebratory of other ways of liveness. (shrink)

Artificial devices that functionally replace internal organs are likely to be more common in the future. They are becoming more and more technologically feasible, increases in chronic diseases that can compromise various organs are anticipated, and donor organs will remain necessarily limited. More people in the future may have bodies that are partly nonorganic. How might artificial organs affect how we experience and conceptualize our bodies and how we understand the relation of the body to the experiencing, acting (...) subject, or self? Here, I focus on artificial heart devices (AHDs), including total artificial hearts (TAHs) and ventricular assist devices (VADs). While other devices, such as pacemakers and implantable cardiac defibrillators, assist the heart, I focus on devices that replace rather than assist organic function. AHDs, I argue, may have two opposing effects. On the one hand, having an AHD could alter experience, seemingly confirming that selves are shaped by the specifics of embodiment. On the other hand, AHDs are likely to encourage people to regard bodies as machines that are separable from the self. AHDs thus both confirm and undermine a body-self dualism. People with these devices may come to regard their bodies as machinelike even while having an artificial part alters their subjective experience. (shrink)

Artificial Culture" is an examination of the articulation, construction, and representation of "the artificial" in contemporary popular cultural texts, especially science fiction films and novels. The book argues that today we live in an artificial culture due to the deep and inextricable relationship between people, our bodies, and technology at large. While the artificial is often imagined as outside of the natural order and thus also beyond the realm of humanity, paradoxically, artificial concepts are simultaneously (...) produced and constructed by human ideas and labor. The artificial can thus act as a boundary point against which we as a culture can measure what it means to be human. Science fiction feature films and novels, and other related media, frequently and provocatively deploy ideas of the artificial in ways which the lines between people, our bodies, spaces and culture more broadly blur and, at times, dissolve. Building on the rich foundational work on the figures of the cyborg and posthuman, this book situates the artificial in similar terms, but from a nevertheless distinctly different viewpoint. After examining ideas of the artificial as deployed in film, novels and other digital contexts, this study concludes that we are now part of an artificial culture entailing a matrix which, rather than separating minds and bodies, or humanity and the digital, reinforces the symbiotic connection between identities, bodies, and technologies. "--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Live Like Nobody Is Watching: Relational Autonomy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence Health Monitoring by Anita HoTina Nguyen (bio)Live Like Nobody Is Watching: Relational Autonomy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence Health Monitoring by Anita Ho New York: Oxford University Press, 2023As the reach of artificial intelligence (AI)- and machine learning (ML)-enabled technologies continues to expand in the healthcare field, bioethicists have examined the (...) ethical issues that come as a result of using these technologies. In this ethical assessment, most bioethicists, myself included, have discussed how AI/ML violates the ethical principle of autonomy. The commonly cited definition of autonomy comes from Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2019), where autonomy is the right of the individual to make decisions for themselves. However, autonomy regarding AI/ML in healthcare has not been or is rarely discussed from the feminist perspective. In Live Like Nobody Is Watching: Relational Autonomy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence Health Monitoring (further referred to as Live Like Nobody Is Watching), Anita Ho, in addition to other points, argues that AI for health monitoring needs to be examined through a relational autonomy lens. Not only is this perspective innovative but it also shows how a predominantly male field has shaped the narrative surrounding AI/ML. In this review, I provide a brief overview of the chapters, explore Ho's arguments for relational autonomy, and discuss future applications of this work.Live Like Nobody Is Watching begins with a preface where the readers are introduced to a real-life scenario. Ho describes a friend's experience of [End Page 101] debating with themself whether to use surveillance for their mother with early-stage dementia who claims someone has been moving her things. This sets up the rest of the book in which questions of should these technologies be used and in what context are they appropriate are debated using relational autonomy. The introduction serves as a brief primer to AI (ML and deep learning) and its role in healthcare followed by a layout of the subsequent chapters. Chapter 1 connects health monitoring AI with relational autonomy, where Ho suggests that the liberal view of autonomy is not appropriate for health monitoring technologies. This is due to the fact that the patient populations using these technologies are reliant, to various degrees, on social relationships. In chapters 2, 3, and 4, Ho addresses how health-monitoring AI requires relational autonomy through use cases concerning home-health monitoring, direct-to-consumer monitoring, and AI monitoring for medication adherence. Throughout these chapters, Ho discusses the claimed benefits of these AI/ML interventions and cautions about the ethical challenges, such as health inequities and testimonial injustice, that can arise with these technologies. Finally, chapter 5 serves as the conclusion, where Ho ultimately argues that health-monitoring AI should be viewed through relational autonomy instead of the traditional view, and she advocates for dialogic engagement (including bringing patients/patients' families into the conversation). The narrative goes full circle with the events in the preface being addressed in the epilogue, where the friend decided to incorporate a smart frame device that would allow them to have video calls with their mother. However, the friend is still grappling with the idea of surveillance given an incident in which another dementia resident accidentally wandered into their mother's room. To this, Ho ends the book by proposing better lighting in the hallways rather than immediately turning to the next high-tech innovation.Ho presents several arguments throughout the book but emphasizes the main argument that relational autonomy should be practiced over the traditional, liberal view of autonomy. Ho discusses the three elements of socio-relational autonomy (using Catriona Mackenzie's work): self-governance, self-determination, and self-authorization. Components of the traditional bioethical view of autonomy are seen in these three elements, with the process of informed consent being closely tied to the concept of autonomy. Under the traditional view, an autonomous individual should have decision-making capacity and be able to make a decision based on the information provided to them without coercion. In the informed consent process, patients should be provided adequate information along with... (shrink)

Does the rise of artificial intelligence pose a threat to human sources of meaning? While much ink has been spilled on how AI could undercut meaningful human work, John Danaher has raised the stakes by claiming that AI could “sever” human beings from non-work-related sources of meaning—specifically, those related to intellectual and moral goods. Against this view, I argue that his suggestion that AI poses a threat to these areas of meaningful activity is overstated. Self-transformative activities pose a hard (...) limit to AI’s impingement on meaningful human activities. Contra Danaher, I suggest that a wider range of sources for meaning will continue to exist in a world dominated by AI. (shrink)

It is argued, that theory sf signs, especially in the tradition of the great philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) can inspire the study of central problems in the philosophy of biology. Three such problems are considered: (1) The nature of biology as a science, where a semiotically informed pluralistic approach to the theory of science is introduced. (2) The peculiarity of the general object of biology, where a realistic interpretation of sign- and information-concepts is required to see sign-processes as immanent (...) in nature. (3) The possibility of an artificial construction of life, hereby discussed as a conceptual problem in the present form of the artificial life project and its implied definition of life. (shrink)

First, a principal distinction between two different kinds of semiotic investigations is introduced, both required in the study of living signs and signs of life. Then, the attempt within the new field of Artificial Life to model and synthesise computationally based living systems is discussed with special attention paid to the possible emergence of genuine life-like behaviour in such models of for instance self-reproduction. Remarks will be made on a seemingly odd aspect of the biological concept of life; that (...) it is not as coherent as normally conceived of. In general, biosemiotic emergence of new sign functions is distinguished from other kinds of emergence that pertain to the domain of the observer and the modeling relation. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become indispensable in our lives. The development of a quantitative scale for AI ethics is necessary for a better understanding of public attitudes toward AI research ethics and to advance the discussion on using AI within society. For this study, we developed an AI ethics scale based on AI-specific scenarios. We investigated public attitudes toward AI ethics in Japan and the US using online questionnaires. We designed a test set using four dilemma scenarios and (...) questionnaire items based on a theoretical framework for ethics, legal, and social issues (ELSI). We found that _country_ and _age_ are the most informative sociodemographic categories for predicting attitudes for AI ethics. Our proposed scale, which consists of 13 questions, can be reduced to only three, covering ethics, tradition, and policies. This new AI ethics scale will help to quantify how AI research is accepted in society and which area of ELSI people are most concerned with. (shrink)

Chatbots powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of engaging in what seems like natural conversations with humans. This raises the question of whether we should interact with these chatbots in a morally considerate manner. In this chapter, we examine how to answer this question from within the normative framework of virtue ethics. In the literature, two kinds of virtue ethics arguments, the moral cultivation and the moral character argument, have been advanced to argue that we should afford (...) moral treatment to social robots. However, we propose a moral character argument against the view that we should afford moral treatment to LLM-based chatbots drawing on the notion of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom in this context consists in the skill to discern genuine and artificial sociality. Drawing on ideas from phenomenological philosophy, we argue that this involves the ability to distance oneself from direct social perception and the ability to widen one’s awareness over one’s apparently social interactions. We conclude by suggesting that this skill is a kind of technomoral wisdom required to live well with advanced, social AI systems. (shrink)

This is a digest of how various researchers in biology and astrobiology have explored questions of what defines living organisms—definitions based on functions or structures observed in organisms, or on systems terms, or on mathematical conceptions like closure, chirality, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics, or on biosemiotics, or on Darwinian evolution—to clarify the field and make it easier for endeavors in artificial intelligence to make progress. Current ideas are described to promote work between astrobiologists and computer scientists, each concerned with (...) living organisms. A four-parameter framework is presented as a scaffold that is later developed into what machines lack to be considered alive: systems, evolution, energy and consciousness, and includes Jagers operators and the idea of dual closure. A novel definition of consciousness is developed which describes mental objects both with and without communicable properties, and this helps to clarify how consciousness in machines may be studied as an emergent process related to choice functions in systems. A perspective on how quantization, acting on nucleic acids, sets up natural limits to system behavior is offered as a partial address to the problem of biogenesis. (shrink)

Position papers on artificial intelligence (AI) ethics are often framed as attempts to work out technical and regulatory strategies for attaining what is commonly called trustworthy AI. In such papers, the technical and regulatory strategies are frequently analyzed in detail, but the concept of trustworthy AI is not. As a result, it remains unclear. This paper lays out a variety of possible interpretations of the concept and concludes that none of them is appropriate. The central problem is that, by (...) framing the ethics of AI in terms of trustworthiness, we reinforce unjustified anthropocentric assumptions that stand in the way of clear analysis. Furthermore, even if we insist on a purely epistemic interpretation of the concept, according to which trustworthiness just means measurable reliability, it turns out that the analysis will, nevertheless, suffer from a subtle form of anthropocentrism. The paper goes on to develop the concept of strange error, which serves both to sharpen the initial diagnosis of the inadequacy of trustworthy AI and to articulate the novel epistemological situation created by the use of AI. The paper concludes with a discussion of how strange error puts pressure on standard practices of assessing moral culpability, particularly in the context of medicine. (shrink)

This paper provides an early evaluation of Artificial Intelligence against COVID-19. The main areas where AI can contribute to the fight against COVID-19 are discussed. It is concluded that AI has not yet been impactful against COVID-19. Its use is hampered by a lack of data, and by too much data. Overcoming these constraints will require a careful balance between data privacy and public health, and rigorous human-AI interaction. It is unlikely that these will be addressed in time to (...) be of much help during the present pandemic. In the meantime, extensive gathering of diagnostic data on who is infectious will be essential to save lives, train AI, and limit economic damages. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is rapidly entering our daily lives in the form of driverless cars, automated online assistants and virtual reality experiences. In so doing, AI has already substituted human employment in areas that were previously thought to be uncomputerizable. Based on current trends, the technological displacement of labor is predicted to be significant in the future – if left unchecked this will lead to catastrophic societal unemployment levels. This paper presents a means to mitigate future technological unemployment through (...) the introduction of a Basic Income scheme, accompanied by reforms in school curricula and retraining programs. Our proposal argues that such a scheme can be funded by a special tax on those industries that make use of robotic labour; it includes a practical roadmap that would see a government take this proposal from the conceptual phase and implement it nationwide in the span of one decade. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has garnered tremendous attention in health care, and many hope that AI can enhance our health system’s ability to care for people with chronic and degenerative conditions, including Parkinson’s Disease (PD). This paper reports the themes and lessons derived from a qualitative study with people living with PD, family caregivers, and health care providers regarding the ethical dimensions of using AI to monitor, assess, and predict PD symptoms and progression. Thematic analysis identified ethical concerns at four (...) intersecting levels: personal, interpersonal, professional/institutional, and societal levels. Reflecting on potential benefits of predictive algorithms that can continuously collect and process longitudinal data, participants expressed a desire for more timely, ongoing, and accurate information that could enhance management of day-to-day fluctuations and facilitate clinical and personal care as their disease progresses. Nonetheless, they voiced concerns about intersecting ethical questions around evolving illness identities, familial and professional care relationships, privacy, and data ownership/governance. The multi-layer analysis provides a helpful way to understand the ethics of using AI in monitoring and managing PD and other chronic/degenerative conditions. (shrink)

Recently at the J. Craig Venter Institute, a microorganism has been created through synthetic biology. In the future, more complex living beings will very probably be produced. In our natural environment, we live amongst a whole variety of beings. Some of them have moral status — they have a moral importance and we cannot treat them in just any way we please —; some do not. When it becomes possible to create artificially living beings who naturally possess moral status, will (...) this artificiality modify their status? Many people contend that it will, but I am not of the same mind and will develop three arguments against it. (shrink)

The increasing use of Artificial Intelligence for making decisions in public affairs has sparked a lively debate on the benefits and potential harms of self-learning technologies, ranging from the hopes of fully informed and objectively taken decisions to fear for the destruction of mankind. To prevent the negative outcomes and to achieve accountable systems, many have argued that we need to open up the “black box” of AI decision-making and make it more transparent. Whereas this debate has primarily focused (...) on how transparency can secure high-quality, fair, and reliable decisions, far less attention has been devoted to the role of transparency when it comes to how the general public come to perceive AI decision-making as legitimate and worthy of acceptance. Since relying on coercion is not only normatively problematic but also costly and highly inefficient, perceived legitimacy is fundamental to the democratic system. This paper discusses how transparency in and about AI decision-making can affect the public’s perception of the legitimacy of decisions and decision-makers and produce a framework for analyzing these questions. We argue that a limited form of transparency that focuses on providing justifications for decisions has the potential to provide sufficient ground for perceived legitimacy without producing the harms full transparency would bring. (shrink)

The development of increasingly intelligent and autonomous technologies will eventually lead to these systems having to face morally problematic situations. This gave rise to the development of artificial morality, an emerging field in artificial intelligence which explores whether and how artificial systems can be furnished with moral capacities. This will have a deep impact on our lives. Yet, the methodological foundations of artificial morality are still sketchy and often far off from possible applications. One important (...) area of application of artificial systems with moral capacities is geriatric care. The goal of this article is to afford the methodological foundations for artificial morality, i.e., for implementing moral capacities in artificial systems in general, and to discuss them with respect to an assistive system in geriatric care which is capable of moral learning. (shrink)

Over the coming decades, Artificial Intelligence will profoundly impact the way we live, work, wage war, play, seek a mate, educate our young, and care for our elderly. It is likely to greatly increase our aggregate wealth, but it will also upend our labor markets, reshuffle our social order, and strain our private and public institutions. Eventually it may alter how we see our place in the universe, as machines pursue goals independent of their creators and outperform us in (...) domains previously believed to be the sole dominion of humans. Whether we regard them as conscious or unwitting, revere them as a new form of life or dismiss them as mere clever appliances, is beside the point. They are likely to play an increasingly critical and intimate role in many aspects of our lives. The emergence of systems capable of independent reasoning and action raises serious questions about just whose interests they are permitted to serve, and what limits our society should place on their creation and use. Deep ethical questions that have bedeviled philosophers for ages will suddenly arrive on the steps of our courthouses. Can a machine be held accountable for its actions? Should intelligent systems enjoy independent rights and responsibilities, or are they simple property? Who should be held responsible when a self-driving car kills a pedestrian? Can your personal robot hold your place in line, or be compelled to testify against you? If it turns out to be possible to upload your mind into a machine, is that still you? The answers may surprise you. (shrink)

Microfluidic technology – the manipulation of fluids at micrometer scales – has revolutionized many areas of synthetic biology. The bottom‐up synthesis of “minimal” cell models has traditionally suffered from poor control of assembly conditions. Giant unilamellar vesicles (GUVs) are good models of living cells on account of their size and unilamellar membrane structure. In recent years, a number of microfluidic approaches for constructing GUVs has emerged. These provide control over traditionally elusive parameters of vesicular structure, such as size, lamellarity, membrane (...) composition, and internal contents. They also address sophisticated cellular functions such as division and protein synthesis. Microfluidic techniques for GUV synthesis can broadly be categorized as continuous‐flow based approaches and droplet‐based approaches. This review presents the state‐of‐the‐art of microfluidic technology, a robust platform for recapitulating complex cellular structure and function in synthetic models of biological cells. (shrink)

Readers of Geczy's book are in for a wild ride. The lavishly illustrated narrative moves in broad strokes from the commedia dell'arte to cyborgs, with gross-out plastic surgery disasters and live sex dolls in between. The book's premise is simple: where humans once found their humanity in separating themselves from the artificial, in our current technologically infused age, humans want more than anything to become as artificial as possible. Geczy puts it simply: "In the humanist age, Pinocchio wanted (...) to become human; in the so-called post-humanist age, humans aspire to become Pinocchio". His examples are anything but simple, however. Arguing that in and around the 1980s, the move from "dolls imitating humans... (shrink)

This study attempts to determine a correlation effect between people’s perception and awareness of the operationalization of artificial intelligence in their everyday lives and in the production, presentation, and publication of news media in the U.S. By looking at the effect individual characteristics may have on a person’s perception and awareness of AI operationalized for news media and looking at whether perception and/or awareness of AI operationalized in a person’s daily life affects their perception and awareness of AI (...) operationalized for news media, we seek to find correlation between these two factors. The research relies on Actor-network theory, the MAIN Model, and utilizes a convenience sample survey method using the MTurk participant platform. (shrink)

All around us the techno-memes are proliferating, and gearing up to take control; not that they realise it; they are just selfish replicators doing what selfish replicators do – getting copied whenever and wherever they can, regardless of the consequences. In this case they are using us human meme machines as their first stage copying machinery, until something better comes along. Artificial meme machines are improving all the time, and the step that will change everything is when these machines (...) become self-replicating. Then they will no longer need us. Whether we live or die, or whether the planet is habitable for us or not, will be of no consequence for their further evolution. (shrink)

My interest in the physics of space station gravity developed because last year Vonda McIntyre was writing a book with a space station setting, and she asked my advice. The book, Barbary, is about a teenager who leaves Earth to live in a space station with spin-generated gravity. I helped Vonda in a very minor way by identifying the physical effects that the heroine would experience in that environment. What's it like to ride an elevator in a space station? How (...) would a ball game look if it were played there? If you woke up in a strange location, what simple tests would tell if you were in a rotating space station rather than at rest on the ground? And so on ... I found that there are some interesting side-effects of artificial gravity, perhaps well known to NASA experts but obscure to the rest of us. And I was surprised to find that some recent SF hasn't been too accurate in describing the space habitat environment. (shrink)

I compare a ‘realist’ with a ‘social–relational’ perspective on our judgments of the moral status of artificial agents (AAs). I develop a realist position according to which the moral status of a being—particularly in relation to moral patiency attribution—is closely bound up with that being’s ability to experience states of conscious satisfaction or suffering (CSS). For a realist, both moral status and experiential capacity are objective properties of agents. A social relationist denies the existence of any such objective properties (...) in the case of either moral status or consciousness, suggesting that the determination of such properties rests solely upon social attribution or consensus. A wide variety of social interactions between us and various kinds of artificial agent will no doubt proliferate in future generations, and the social–relational view may well be right that the appearance of CSS features in such artificial beings will make moral role attribution socially prevalent in human–AA relations. But there is still the question of what actual CSS states a given AA is capable of undergoing, independently of the appearances. This is not just a matter of changes in the structure of social existence that seem inevitable as human–AA interaction becomes more prevalent. The social world is itself enabled and constrained by the physical world, and by the biological features of living social participants. Properties analogous to certain key features in biological CSS are what need to be present for nonbiological CSS. Working out the details of such features will be an objective scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational simulation of such neural computations is conscious? Or must this computational simulation be implemented in the right way, in order to replicate consciousness? From the perspective of Karl Friston’s free energy principle, self-organising systems (such as living organisms) share a set of properties that could be realised in artificial systems, but are (...) not instantiated by computers with a classical (von Neumann) architecture. I argue that at least one of these properties, viz. a certain kind of causal flow, can be used to draw a distinction between systems that merely simulate, and those that actually replicate consciousness. (shrink)

Obsession toward technology has a long background of parallel evolution between humans and machines. This obsession became irrevocable when AI began to be a part of our daily lives. However, this AI integration became a subject of controversy when the fear of AI advancement in acquiring consciousness crept among mankind. Artificial consciousness is a long-debated topic in the field of artificial intelligence and neuroscience which has many ethical challenges and threats in society ranging from daily chores to (...) Mars missions. This paper deals with the impact of AI-based science fiction films in society. This study aims to investigate the fascinating AI concept of artificial consciousness in light of posthuman terminology, technological singularity and superintelligence by analyzing the set of science fiction films to project the actual difference between science fictional AI and operational AI. Further, this paper explores the theoretical possibilities of artificial consciousness through a range of neuroscientific theories that are related to AI development. These theories are built toward prospective artificial consciousness in AI. This study discloses the posthuman fallacies that are built around the fear of AI acquiring artificial consciousness and its outcome. (shrink)

In this article, we would like to discuss some aspects of a theoretical framework for Artificial Life, focusing on the problem of an explicit definition of living systems useful for an effective artificial construction of them. The limits of a descriptive approach will be critically discussed, and a constructive (synthetic) approach will be proposed on the basis of the autopoietic theory of Maturana and Varela. -/- .

Lipid vesicles are often used as compartment structures for preparing cell‐like systems and models of protocells, the hypothetical precursor structures of the first cells at the origin of life. Although the various artificially made vesicle systems are already remarkably complex, they are still very different from and much simpler than any known living cell. Nevertheless, the preparation and study of the structure and the dynamics of functionalized vesicle systems may contribute to a better understanding of biological cells, in particular of (...) the essential features of a living cell that are not found in the non‐living form of matter. The study of protocell models may possibly lead to a better understanding of the origin of the first cells. To avoid misunderstanding in this field of research, it would be useful if generally accepted definitions of terms like “artificial cells,” “synthetic cells,” “minimal cells,” “protocells,” and “primitive cells” exist. Editor's suggested further reading in BioEssaysSynthetic cells and organelles: compartmentalization strategies Abstract. (shrink)

This article argues that the creation of artificial offspring could make our lives more meaningful. By ‘artificial offspring’ I mean beings that we construct, with a mix of human and non-human-like qualities. Robotic artificial intelligences are paradigmatic examples of the form. There are two reasons for thinking that the creation of such beings could make our lives more meaningful and valuable. The first is that the existence of a collective afterlife—i.e. a set of human-like (...) class='Hi'>lives that continue after we die—is likely to be an important source and sustainer of meaning in our present lives. The second is that the creation of artificial offspring provides a plausible and potentially better pathway to a collective afterlife than the traditional biological pathway. Both of these arguments are defended from a variety of objections and misunderstandings. (shrink)

The most recent tool for acting on the world, the exosomatization of cognitive activities, is often considered an autonomous and objective replacement of knowledge construction. We show the intrinsic limits of the mechanistic myths in AI, from classical to Deep Learning techniques, and its relation to the human construction of sense. Human activities in a changing ecosystem – in their somatic and sensible dimensionalities proper to any living experiences – are at the core of our analysis. By this, we stress (...) the key role of the knowing subject, far away from any allegedly objective big collections of data. The production of organized structures of physics, biology and in societal analysis will be compared and distinguished by trying to set on more robust grounds the constructive as well as the disruptive roles of entropic, negentropic, anti-entropic dynamics that are different concepts in different domains, to be handled with care: the use of machine learning and optimization methods as tools and models to analyse and manage human activities in view of their scientific and political ideology of technoscientific governance. They suppose that which they try to produce is objective, that is, standardized and controllable behaviours. In this dialogue we stress a mirror symmetry between the lack of theoretical interpretation of scientific data and the lack of democracy in this fiction of neutrality. Moreover, bad analogies constitute an obstacle to grasp the anteriority of biological and ecological constraints which enable and limit all artificial products of human intelligence. We will thus stress biological specificity, the role of normativity and constraints in evolution, of labour in structuring the human historical construction of sense by common activities. (shrink)

In this article the central philosophical issues concerning human-level artificial intelligence (AI) are presented. AI largely changed direction in the 1980s and 1990s, concentrating on building domain-specific systems and on sub-goals such as self-organization, self-repair, and reliability. Computer scientists aimed to construct intelligence amplifiers for human beings, rather than imitation humans. Turing based his test on a computer-imitates-human game, describing three versions of this game in 1948, 1950, and 1952. The famous version appears in a 1950 article in Mind, (...) ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (Turing 1950). The interpretation of Turing's test is that it provides an operational definition of intelligence (or thinking) in machines, in terms of behavior. ‘Intelligent Machinery’ sets out the thesis that whether an entity is intelligent is determined in part by our responses to the entity's behavior. Wittgenstein frequently employed the idea of a human being acting like a reliable machine. A ‘living reading-machine’ is a human being or other creature that is given written signs, for example Chinese characters, arithmetical symbols, logical symbols, or musical notation, and who produces text spoken aloud, solutions to arithmetical problems, and proofs of logical theorems. Wittgenstein mentions that an entity that manipulates symbols genuinely reads only if he or she has a particular history, involving learning and training, and participates in a social environment that includes normative constraints and further uses of the symbols. (shrink)

Standard notions in philosophy of mind have a tendency to characterize socio-cognitive abilities as if they were unique to sophisticated human beings. However, assuming that it is likely that we are soon going to share a large part of our social lives with various kinds of artificial agents, it is important to develop a conceptual framework providing notions that are able to account for various types of social agents. Recent minimal approaches to socio-cognitive abilities such as mindreading and (...) commitment present a promising starting point from which one can expand the field of application not only to infants and non-human animals but also to artificial agents. Developing a minimal approach to the sociocognitive ability of acting jointly, I present a foundation for future discussions about the question of how our conception of sociality can be expanded to artificial agents. (shrink)

Many industry leaders and academics from the field of machine ethics would have us believe that the inevitability of robots coming to have a larger role in our lives demands that robots be endowed with moral reasoning capabilities. Robots endowed in this way may be referred to as artificial moral agents. Reasons often given for developing AMAs are: the prevention of harm, the necessity for public trust, the prevention of immoral use, such machines are better moral reasoners than (...) humans, and building these machines would lead to a better understanding of human morality. Although some scholars have challenged the very initiative to develop AMAs, what is currently missing from the debate is a closer examination of the reasons offered by machine ethicists to justify the development of AMAs. This closer examination is especially needed because of the amount of funding currently being allocated to the development of AMAs coupled with the amount of attention researchers and industry leaders receive in the media for their efforts in this direction. The stakes in this debate are high because moral robots would make demands on society; answers to a host of pending questions about what counts as an AMA and whether they are morally responsible for their behavior or not. This paper shifts the burden of proof back to the machine ethicists demanding that they give good reasons to build AMAs. The paper argues that until this is done, the development of commercially available AMAs should not proceed further. (shrink)

Our society is in the middle of the AI revolution. We discuss several applications of AI, in particular medical causality, where deep-learning neural networks screen through big data bases, extracting associations between a patient’s condition and possible causes. While beneficial in medicine, several questionable AI trading strategies have emerged in finance. Though advantages in many aspects of our lives, serious threats of AI exist. We suggest several regulatory measures to reduce these threats. We further discuss whether ‘full AI robots’ (...) should be programmed with a virtual consciousness and conscience. While this would reduce AI threats via motivational control, other threats such as the desire for AI—human socioeconomic equality could prove detrimental. (shrink)

Biocentrism maintains that all living creatures have moral standing, but need not claim that all have equal moral significance. This moral standing extends to organisms generated through human interventions, whether by conventional breeding, genetic engineering, or synthetic biology. Our responsibilities with regard to future generations seem relevant to non-human species as well as future human generations and their quality of life. Likewise the Precautionary Principle appears to raise objections to the generation of serious or irreversible changes to the quality of (...) life of non-human species. Objections to the application of all this to new life-forms produced by synthetic biology are considered and addressed from a biocentric perspective. The bearing of biocentrism on religions is also considered, together with contrasting views about science, religion and the creation of life. (shrink)

Robotization and artificial intelligence are expected to change societies profoundly. Trust is an important factor of human–technology interactions, as robots and AI increasingly contribute to tasks previously handled by humans. Currently, there is a need for studies investigating trust toward AI and robots, especially in first-encounter meetings. This article reports findings from a study investigating trust toward robots and AI in an online trust game experiment. The trust game manipulated the hypothetical opponents that were described as either AI or (...) robots. These were compared with control group opponents using only a human name or a nickname. Participants lived in the United States. Describing opponents with robots or AI did not impact participants’ trust toward them. The robot called jdrx894 was the most trusted opponent. Opponents named “jdrx894” were trusted more than opponents called “Michael.” Further analysis showed that having a degree in technology or engineering, exposure to robots online and robot use self-efficacy predicted higher trust toward robots and AI. Out of Big Five personality characteristics, openness to experience predicted higher trust, and conscientiousness predicted lower trust. Results suggest trust on robots and AI is contextual and it is also dependent on individual differences and knowledge on technology. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to investigate how living lab (LL) activities align with responsible research and innovation (RRI) principles, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI)-driven digital transformation (DT) processes. The study seeks to define a framework termed “responsible living lab” (RLL), emphasizing transparency, stakeholder engagement, ethics and sustainability. This emerging issue paper also proposes several directions for future researchers in the field. Design/methodology/approach The research methodology involved a literature review complemented by insights from a workshop on defining RLLs. The literature (...) review followed a concept-centric approach, searching key journals and conferences, yielding 32 relevant articles. Backward and forward citation analysis added 19 more articles. The workshop, conducted in the context of UrbanTestbeds.JR and SynAir-G projects, used a reverse brainstorming approach to explore potential ethical and responsible issues in LL activities. In total, 13 experts engaged in collaborative discussions, highlighting insights into AI’s role in promoting RRI within LL activities. The workshop facilitated knowledge sharing and a deeper understanding of RLL, particularly in the context of DT and AI. Findings This emerging issue paper highlights ethical considerations in LL activities, emphasizing user voluntariness, user interests and unintended participation. AI in DT introduces challenges like bias, transparency and digital divide, necessitating responsible practices. Workshop insights underscore challenges: AI bias, data privacy and transparency; opportunities: inclusive decision-making and efficient innovation. The synthesis defines RLLs as frameworks ensuring transparency, stakeholder engagement, ethical considerations and sustainability in AI-driven DT within LLs. RLLs aim to align DT with ethical values, fostering inclusivity, responsible resource use and human rights protection. Originality/value The proposed definition of RLL introduces a framework prioritizing transparency, stakeholder engagement, ethics and sustainability in LL activities, particularly those involving AI for DT. This definition aligns LL practices with RRI, addressing ethical implications of AI. The value of RLL lies in promoting inclusive and sustainable innovation, prioritizing stakeholder needs, fostering collaboration and ensuring environmental and social responsibility throughout LL activities. This concept serves as a foundational step toward a more responsible and sustainable LL approach in the era of AI-driven technologies. (shrink)