It is well known that environmental burdens are more pronounced in socioeconomically disadvantaged communities, a phenomenon known as environmental injustice. Yet, there have been few studies that have addressed whether the degree of environmental injustice has changed over time. We analyze toxic releases in the United States over the first 26 years of the toxics release inventory and examine whether the decreases in toxic releases differ according to characteristics of the communities in which the emitters reside. We find that decreases (...) over these years are universal but far more substantial in high-income areas. Our results speak to both the nascent literature on information disclosure and that on environmental justice. (shrink)

Knowledge, certainty, and understanding are all plausible candidates for constituting aims and setting the norms for genuine inquiry. However, a mere pluralist account of aims and norms of inquiry that lacks a more fundamental theoretical motivation might strike us as ad hoc. The aim of this paper is to provide further motivation for a pluralist approach. The key to the solution is to regard finding sufficient reasons to believe as a more general, indeed unifying, aim of theoretical inquiry.

The literature on listening and daily discourse often describes an overly romanticized conception of listening, meaning what it should be in its ideal form. However, at most, this ideal is realized through the ‘masks’ that listeners ‘carry’ during their performance of listening. The ideal version that is being projected through the performance of listening is not cognruent with what actually happens behind the mask and performance. Individuals do not have the cognitive capacities to realize this unrealistic and unattainable ideal, but (...) they have the capacity to act as if they do. Using Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical account this paper reveals the psychological and social world that hides behind the mask and performance of listening in order to ground the theorizing of listening in a more realistic perspective. This account gives rise to novel and indispensable listening concepts: the definition of the situation, the sincere and cynical listener, undercurrent listening, and misrepresentations of listening. These concepts demonstrate that the study of interpersonal listening cannot be isolated from the dramaturgy of listening as (expressed) manners of listening are intricately and inherently embedded in social structure. This account also strongly contests the psychocentric and simplistic definition of listening as proposed by Kluger, A. N., & Mizrahi, M. (2023). Defining Listening: Can We Get Rid of the Adjectives? Current Opinion in Psychology, 101639.). (shrink)

According to a widely held view epistemic justification is a normative notion. According to another widely held assumption, epistemic justification comes in degrees. Given that gradability requires a context-sensitivity that normativity seems to lack, these two assumptions stand in tension. Giving up the assumption of gradability of justification represents a lesser theoretical cost.

We start by introducing the idea of echo chambers. Echo chambers are social and epistemic structures in which opinions, leanings, or beliefs about certain topics are amplified and reinforced due to repeated interactions within a closed system; that is, within a system that has a rather homogeneous sample of sources or people, which all share the same attitudes towards the topics in question. Echo chambers are a particularly dangerous phenomena because they prevent the critical assessment of sources and contents, thus (...) leading the people living within them to deliberately ignore or exclude opposing views. In the second part of this paper, we argue that the reason for the appearance of echo chambers lies in the adoption of what we call ‘epistemic vices’. We examine which vices might be responsible for their emergence, and in doing so, we focus on a specific one; ‘epistemic violence’. In assessing and evaluating the role of this epistemic vice, we note that it can be triggered by epistemic contexts characterized by high stakes that may turn ordinary intellectual virtues (such as skepticism) into vices (such as denialism). In the third part of this contribution, we suggest a way to deal with echo chambers. The solution focuses on advocating a responsibilist pedagogy of virtues and vices that -we claim- might be capable of preventing their emergence. (shrink)

Herman Cappelen w książce Fixing language (2018) zaproponował projekt w ramach inżynierii pojęciowej, w myśl którego to, co rewidujemy w pojęciach, to ich intensja i ekstensja. Podjął on polemikę z koncepcjami w inżynierii pojęciowej, zgodnie z którymi przy rewizji odwołujemy się do funkcji i celów. W pierwszej części artykułu opisuję wspomnianą dyskusję. W realizacji tego zamiaru korzystam z odwołań do artykułu Amie Thomasson „A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work” (2020). Następnie podejmuję próbę obrony stanowisk odwołujących się przy rewizji pojęciowej (...) do funkcji i celów. W tym celu odnoszę się do artykułu Michaela Prinzinga „The Revisionist’s Rubic: Conceptual Engineering and Discontinuity Objection” (2018). W drugiej części artykułu opisuję metodę eksplikacji jako jedną z metod, za której pomocą dokonuje się rewizji pojęciowej. Zwracam uwagę na eksplikacje stosowaną przez Quine’a, który proponuje skupić się przy eksplikacji na funkcjach, jakie pełnią pojęcia. (shrink)

Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be right (...) that his counterexamples undermine probabilistic relevance views of what it is for e to be evidence that h, there is still room for a defence of a related probabilistic view about an increase in being supported, according to which, if p > p, then h is more supported given e than it is without e. My argument relies crucially on an insight from recent work on the linguistics of gradable adjectives. (shrink)

This paper elaborates a new solution to the lottery paradox, according to which the paradox arises only when we lump together two distinct states of being confident that p under one general label of ‘belief that p’. The two-state conjecture is defended on the basis of some recent work on gradable adjectives. The conjecture is supported by independent considerations from the impossibility of constructing the lottery paradox both for risk-tolerating states such as being afraid, hoping or hypothesizing, and for risk-averse, (...) certainty-like states. The new proposal is compared to views within the increasingly popular debate opposing dualists to reductionists with respect to the relation between belief and degrees of belief. (shrink)

Author: Szutta Artur Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S CONCEPT OF THE ‘THIRD STATES’ (Stany trzecie w ujęciu Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 617-627 Keywords: “THIRD STATES”, LEISURE, PHILOSOPHY, THEORY, INTELLECT, SENSE OF LIFE, WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, JOSEPH PIEPER Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article treats on the concept of “third states” (as opposed to the other two kinds of states: those of work and entertainment) introduced by Władysław (...) Tatarkiewicz in his treatise On Happiness. A thorough analysis of the passage on “third states” as well as of the very concept allows to see its relevance to the considerations on such important philosophical questions as those of the nature of doing philosophy, the meaning of life, intellectual intuition, theoria or contemplation. The paper consists of five parts. The first part is focused on Tatarkiewicz’s understanding of “third states” as well as on a phenomenological analysis of the concept itself. The second part is a kind of extension of the analysis enriched by Josef Pieper’s interpretation of the idea of leisure which I find very close to what Tatarkiewicz means by “third states”. In the light of the analysis the concept of the ‘third states’ turns out to be very inspiring and useful in dealing with a number of philosophical questions, which is shown in the fourth part of the paper. The final step consists of questioning the above conclusion by short outlining a possible naturalistic interpretation of the ‘third states’ in the light of which the picture of philosophy, human life or human cognition, based on the concept of the ‘third states’ might turn out to be a mere illusion. I do not give a final answer to this question but treat the conclusion of the paper as an invitation to a deeper consideration of the matter. (shrink)

A aliança entre a Filologia e a História do Livro é indiscutível, do ponto de vista metodológico, e valiosíssima para a compreensão mesológica de qualquer edição, sendo certo que nenhum livro se publica sem estar inscrito numa dada moldura ecológica da cultura. Por isso mesmo, ultrapassando os limites próprios da actividade bibliográfica, o historiador do livro não pode prescindir da leitura dos textos que se escondem sob a opacidade do objecto livro.

Den Prozeß der Phänomenalisierung des Seins, des Weltwerdens der Welt kann nur angemessen verstehen, wer dessen struktureller Selbigkeit mit dem Geborenwerden/Geborensein des Daseins gewahr wird und ihr philosophisch Rechnung trägt. Diese an Hannah Arendt und Hans Saner einerseits sowie an Jacques Derrida und Jean-Luc Nancy andererseits anschließende These versucht der Beitrag im zweifachen Wege eines Aufweises entsprechender Überlegungen bei Husserl und einer Kritik an Heideggers bereits von Günther Anders notierten Tilgungsbemühungen der einschlägigen Implikationen seines Denkens zu plausibilisieren. Als thematischer Leitfaden (...) dient dabei die je unterschiedliche Konzeption der Räumlichkeit des Daseins im Verhältnis zu seiner Zeitlichkeit, von dessen Gewichtung das Gepräge eines Denkens als entweder natologisch-eröffnend oder thanatologisch-schließend mit abhängt. (shrink)

Archaeology and Intentionality explores perhaps one of the most overlooked topics in archaeology, that of intentionality. In archaeology, most explanations of human behaviour rely on intentionality and this book fills a surprising gap in the literature. By identifying the historical trajectory of the notion of intentionality, this book reframes our understanding of what it means to act intentionally and how archaeologists provide explanations concerning past (and present) societies. In general, this book presents a strong framework for archaeological research, one that (...) fits to current archaeological practices and research around the world. This framework considers that past actors were not unconditional free agents, who could act however they wished, nor were they absolute prisoners of the economic, biological, and environmental circumstances in which they lived. From the standpoint of intentionality, it becomes clear that human agency is not about what you can or cannot do, but about what you should, that is to say, actions are above all ethical. In a world wealth inequality runs rampant, where humans have damaged the environment beyond recognition, and where technology advances at an alarming rate - it is important that we recognize our intentions and the ethical responsibility that accompanies those intentions. The book highlights how archaeology is the perfect discipline to understand how and from where those intentions come from. Addressing several problems in archaeological theory and connecting archaeology, philosophy and social theory, this book. (shrink)

The text, starting from the classic picture taken from Polish literature on the barbaric destruction of higher culture, first shows the contemporary manifestations of an attack on one of the basic...

Neste texto perseguimos a polêmica presença do pensador francês Jean-Baptiste Roustaing no cenário espírita brasileiro, compondo-se com a obra de codificação de Allan Kardec. Tomamos, como ponto de referência, o papel de coordenador e representativo da Federação Espírita Brasileira (FEB) no processo, tanto de afirmação da presença de Roustaing ao lado de Kardec, quanto de posterior retirada da obra roustainguista, como leitura reconhecida e recomendada por aquela instituição. Concluímos pelo reconhecimento da importância da permanência da obra de Roustaing como bibliografia (...) avalizada pela FEB, o que, sem dúvida, indica para jogos de poder e de identidade no interior do movimento espírita brasileiro. (shrink)

By all accounts, virtue epistemology is making a value turn in contemporary analytic epistemology. In this article, this twist is explicated through the transformation of the understanding of epistemic values and the value of the epistemic. In the first sense, we are talking about how the view has changed on what determines the epistemic value of such categories as truth, knowledge, understanding, etc. In the second sense, we are talking about the value of our epistemic concepts (the value of the (...) epistemic): what is true belief, knowledge, etc. for? It is shown how the causal link between our beliefs and intellectual virtues allows us to explain the nature and value of knowledge as a central category of epistemology. The author reveals the difference between the main types of virtue epistemology through the prism of two different approaches to the justification of values: value internalism and value externalism. Value externalism assumes that a state/motive/action gains value from something outside of a person's consciousness. In contrast, value internalism holds that the conditions that determine value are internal to consciousness. For reliabilism, the value of cognitive success lies in its causal connection with the reliable competences of the subject, for responsibilism – with virtuous motives of cognitive activity. Common to reliabilism and responsibilism is that they shift the focus from the value of an effect (truth) to its relationship with the value of a cause – an ability or excellent trait of intellectual character. The main approaches to substantiating the fundamental value of knowledge in virtue epistemology are analyzed. If for reliabilism the highest epistemic value is truth as cognitive achievement, then for responsibilism the value of epistemic categories is primarily in their moral significance – the achievement of a good life and happiness (eudaimonia). In conclusion, the problematic aspects of virtue epistemology are formulated and promising directions for its further development are shown. (shrink)

Studies presenting memory-facilitating effect of emotions typically focused on affective dimensions of arousal and valence. Little is known, however, about the extent to which stimulus-driven basic emotions could have distinct effects on memory. In the present paper we sought to examine the modulatory effect of disgust, fear and sadness on intentional remembering and forgetting using widely used item-method directed forgetting paradigm. Eighteen women underwent fMRI scanning during encoding phase in which they were asked either to remember (R) or to forget (...) (F) pictures. In the test phase all previously used stimuli were re-presented together with the same number of new pictures and participants had to categorize them as old or new, irrespective of the F/R instruction. On the behavioral level we found a typical directed forgetting effect, i.e. higher recognition rates for to-be-remembered (TBR) items than to-be-forgotten (TBF) ones for both neutral and emotional categories. Emotional stimuli had higher recognition rate than neutral ones, while among emotional those eliciting disgust produced highest recognition, but at the same time induced more false alarms. Therefore when false alarm corrected recognition was examined the directed forgetting effect was equally strong irrespective of emotion. Additionally, even though subjects rated disgusting pictures as more arousing and negative than other picture categories, logistic regression on the item level showed that the effect of disgust on recognition memory was stronger than the effect of arousal or valence. On the neural level, ROI analyses (with valence and arousal covariates) revealed that correctly recognized disgusting stimuli evoked the highest activity in the left amygdala compared to all other categories. This structure was also more activated for remembered vs. forgotten stimuli, but only in case of disgust or fear eliciting pictures. Our findings, despite several limitations, suggest that disgust have a special salience in memory relative to other negative emotions, which cannot be put down to differences in arousal or valence. The current results thereby support the suggestion that a purely dimensional model of emotional influences on cognition might not be adequate to account for observed effects. (shrink)

Humans are often extraordinary at performing practical reasoning. There are cases where the human computer, slow as it is, is faster than any artificial intelligence system. Are we faster because of the way we perceive knowledge as opposed to the way we represent it? -/- The authors address this question by presenting neural network models that integrate the two most fundamental phenomena of cognition: our ability to learn from experience, and our ability to reason from what has been learned. This (...) book is the first to offer a self-contained presentation of neural network models for a number of computer science logics, including modal, temporal, and epistemic logics. By using a graphical presentation, it explains neural networks through a sound neural-symbolic integration methodology, and it focuses on the benefits of integrating effective robust learning with expressive reasoning capabilities. -/- The book will be invaluable reading for academic researchers, graduate students, and senior undergraduates in computer science, artificial intelligence, machine learning, cognitive science and engineering. It will also be of interest to computational logicians, and professional specialists on applications of cognitive, hybrid and artificial intelligence systems. (shrink)

Author: Dobosz Artur Title: METAMORPHOSIS – METAPHOR – ANTROPOMORPHISATION – Deantropomorphisation (Metamorfoza – metafora – antropomorfizacja – deantropomorfizacja) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.10, number: 2010/1, pages: 25-36 Keywords: ANTROPOMORPHISATION, DEANTROPOMORPHISATION Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The author proposes a theory of a metaphor according to which the metaphor is a manifestation sign of a magical thinking in contemporaneous culture. The proposed theory enables the classification of metaphors.

It is stated both by Tischner and his scholars that he follows the footsteps of Hegel. Yet thus far no one – including Tischner himself – was talking about exactly this aspect of Tischner’s thought that is antiHegelian. The best way to do that is to address the issue of truth. Tischner’s theory of truth is antiHegelian because Tischner puts emphasize on the word “feeling”, while at the same time describing his distrust for ontology, which leads him to two things: (...) he thinks about truth first and foremost as a kind of value which is not privileged among other values, and he thinks too little about society. So it is anti-Hegelian because it denies the requirement of Hegel’s science as being the true knowledge of spirit about spirit. In order to understand more from Tischner’s philosophy independently of the issue of Hegel’s philosophy, one should take into consideration Tischner’s theory of evil. (shrink)

In this paper we interpret and examine critically John Locke’s ideas on cognitive (intellectual) virtues and values presented in his The Conduct of the Understanding (1697). We believe that the cognitive subject’s virtues discussed by Locke are universal. We believe that knowledge and understanding must and can be guided by the pursuit of truth. But this concerns only the motivation component of knowledge, and not its success which is ultimately determined by the epistemic environment.