Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa se propõe a ser uma forma de análise da práxis cristã, tendo como ponto de partida a experiência místico-religiosa. A resposta de Friedrich Schleiermacher ao Iluminismo tem muito a nos beneficiar, principalmente se levarmos em consideração as críticas de Rudolf Otto. A compreensão do “sentimento de dependência” em Schleiermacher, que se torna em Otto “sentimento de criatura”, e a realidade da experiência de Deus que se conecta à práxis, nos fornecem um excelente ponto de partida para compreensão daquilo (...) que move as pessoas a uma vida de renúncia, servidão e comprometimento com valores e princípios do Evangelho de Jesus Cristo. Com base em uma pesquisa de campo, foi possível perceber que existe uma conexão entre a práxis cristã e a experiência religiosa. Quando há experiência religiosa, há ações cristãs executadas com naturalidade, com maior incidência do que quando não existe tal experiência. Podemos ter muito a perder se acaso deixarmos de considerar o aspecto experiencial da fé cristã com o sagrado. Em primeiro lugar, em nossas formulações teológicas, as quais podem, em maior ou menor grau, enfatizar em demasia aspectos antropocêntricos, deixando de lado o aspecto numinoso. Em segundo lugar, perderemos a oportunidade de influenciar a igreja a vivenciar uma prática espiritual real, que considere, com toda a relevância devida, a experiência de fé e não somente aspectos catequéticos. Por fim, perderemos a possibilidade de analisar a vida de fé, tendo como ponto de partida a experiência de Deus, que pode ter sido agente influenciador número um para uma vida de exemplo de práxis cristã genuína. (shrink)

Sait-on que le seul débat philosophique d'envergure sur l'oeuvre de Marx a eu l'Italie pour théâtre? Sait-on que ce débat, qui fit époque, est à l'origine de la philosophie italienne contemporaine? Autour des années 1897-1900 une partie décisive se joue entre Antonio Labriola, Benedetto Croce et Giovanni Gentile. Les Essais sur la conception matérialiste de l'histoire du premier affirment en effet l'autonomie théorique et pratique de la philosophie de la praxis. Ami et éditeur de Cabriola, B Croce nie cependant la (...) consistance de cette philosophie, analyse les faiblesses de la critique de l'économie politique et réduit le matérialisme historique à une méthodologie du facteur économique. Mais Gentile le contredit, affirme la réalité de "la philosophie de Marx", dont il dénonce toutefois l'énoncé matérialiste. Si le chemin de l'Italie semble ainsi barré pour Marx, c'est pourtant dans et par les philosophies idéalistes de Croce et de Gentile (dominantes sur la scène italienne jusqu'à la seconde guerre mondiale) qu'il va investir la péninsule. Enfin, par un nouveau renversement, dans les prisons de Mussolini un ancien gentilien utilise Croce pour relancer la philosophie de praxis à la hauteur des défis que l'époque lance au libéralisme aussi bien qu'au marxisme soviétique : les Cahiers de Prison d'Antonio Gramsci font la synthèse du débat fondateur et donnent un sens cosmopolitique à la traduction de la philosophie en politique et en histoire. Cette synthèse est-elle réussie, ou appartient-elle à un passé et à une culture qui sont épuisés? Tel est l'enjeu du débat majeur de la pensée italienne contemporaine : la philosophie de la praxis, qui fut comme la carte d'identité de cette culture, est-elle finie? (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the relationship between the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and that of John McDowell, the latter of whom is widely considered to be one of the most influential living analytic philosophers. It serves as a point of entry in McDowell’s and Hegel’s philosophy, and a substantial contribution to ongoing debates on perceptual experience and perceptual justification, naturalism, human freedom and action. The chapters gathered in this volume, as well as McDowell’s responses, make (...) it clear that McDowell’s work paves the way for an original reading of Hegel’s texts. His conceptual framework allows for new interpretive possibilities in Hegel’s philosophy which, until now, have remained largely unexplored. Moreover, these interpretations shed light on various aspects of continuity and discontinuity between the philosophies of these two authors, thus defining more clearly their positions on specific issues. In addition, they allow us to see Hegel’s thought as containing a number of conceptual tools that might be useful for advancing McDowell’s own philosophy and contemporary philosophy in general. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

The survival of some masterpieces of literature across the ages is still an unexplained mystery. Deeply rooted in their time, they reflect the preoccupations of a given historical period and have an impact, by means of their testimony, on future generations. They bring into play images, drives and phantoms which have remained unchanged from prehistoric time to our day. The perfection of their form has remained unequaled; their examples incite us to meditation and creativity.

BackgroundCurrently, we are facing a demographic shift to an older population and its consequences worldwide: in the years to come, several older people will need nursing home care. The work culture is important for care quality in NHs. Some Norwegian municipalities have implemented the Joy of Life Nursing Home strategy, representing a resource-oriented health-promoting approach. Knowledge about how implementation of the JoLNH approach impacts the work culture is scarce.AimssWe hypothesized that the JoLNH strategy impacts positively on the work culture: when (...) comparing measurements at two time points and when comparing two municipalities, among which one has implemented the JoLNH and the other has not.MethodWith a 1-year interval, healthcare personnel in 43 NHs located in two large Norwegian municipalities responded to a survey in two waves. In total, 558 healthcare personnel participated at T1 and 515 at T2. Work culture was assessed by the Systematizing Person–Group Relations Instrument.FindingsThe municipality implementing the JOLNH strategy experienced significant increases in SPGR dimensions, representing positive orientations towards a better work culture, whereas those working in the non-JoLNH municipality reported an increase in SPGR dimensions, signifying a worsened work culture.DiscussionThe data indicate that the implemented JoLNH strategy has endorsed positive effects in the work culture. The JoLNH strategy emphasizes on the quality of patient care, which is what healthcare personnel, in general, are much concerned about. Furthermore, attention to task orientation and independent work seem to encourage a better work culture in NHs.ConclusionThis study suggests that the JoLNH strategy impacts positively on the work culture in Norwegian NHs. (shrink)

Philosophical critiques are prone to relapse into a sort of entrenchment in which the basic elements of a philosophy are kept from exposure, so that instead of advancing, philosophy easily becomes compartmentalized into specific trends. This article thus seeks the conditions of a non-entrenched, open-field philosophical critique in general and, in particular, of an open-field critique of Harman’s OOO (object-oriented ontology). For that purpose, the idea of precariousness is introduced, which is then confronted with some ideas concerning philosophical critique and (...) practice, in particular those of François Laruelle. Since we can find in Harman’s OOO an outline of what we call here an open-field critique, the field of combat against Harman will be the one concerning the idea of an open field itself. (shrink)

Through fourteen original essays, the book seeks to understand the viability of the notion of sovereignty in a globalized world, thus taking into account the inclusion of a language of rights, limitation and legitimacy. It examines sovereignty using a normative approach.

Burge famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions—such as “Peter has the concept of (...) arthritis”—according to which these ascriptions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is. (shrink)

Burns proposes an intriguing hypothesis by suggesting that the “schizophrenia genes” might not be regulatory genes themselves, but rather closely associated with regulatory genes directly involved in the proper growth of the social brain. We point out that this account would benefit from incorporating the effects of localized lesions and aberrant hemispheric asymmetry on cortical connectivity underlying the social brain. In addition, we argue that the evolutionary framework is superfluous.

We argue that the pivotal role assigned by Northoff to the principle of top-down modulation in catatonia might successfully be applied to other symptoms of schizophrenia, for example, hallucinations. Second, we propose that Northoff's account would benefit from a more comprehensive analysis of the cognitive level of explanation. Finally, contrary to Northoff, we hypothesize that “top-down modulation” might play as important a role as “horizontal modulation” in affective-behavioral alterations.

Historically, phenomenology started to face the phenomenon of intersubjectivity as an objection to its own transcendental aspiration to constitute apodicticity. In fact, since Husserl’s very influential Fifth Cartesian Meditation, the risk of solipsism threatened the possibilities of a genuine phenomenology of the other. This problem ‘s discussion was continued by all of the most significant phenomenologists, such as Max Scheler, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Marc Richir, Ricœur, Lévinas, and others, all having made explicit reference to that starting reflection by Husserl in The (...) Cartesian Meditations. In this paper, I will approach the problem of intersubjectivity, not by attending to the already mentioned traditional phenomenological motive, but, instead, by trying to bring to light the variety of ways of how relationships to others are faced phenornenologically, and its implications for a debate about the psychotherapeutic relationship. Under the assumption that there is no psychotherapy without a psychotherapist/client relationship, it is particularly relevant the contribution of phenornenologies of intersubjectivity to the effort of answering the question «What do our relational experiences with others mean?». (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar como o conceito de antinatalismo – isto é, uma visão filosófica que defende a ideia de que é melhor que os humanos parem de trazer novas vidas ao mundo, ou que teria sido melhor não termos sido trazidos à existência – e, mais especificamente, o antinatalismo de David Benatar, se alinham à vertente metafísica do pessimismo schopenhaueriano, presente no Tomo I de O Mundo como Vontade e Representação e também nos Suplementos. Ao fazer (...) isto, não será intenção deste trabalho a pressuposição de que as vertentes do pessimismo de Schopenhauer sejam, necessariamente, antinatalistas. Antes, tem-se como motivação demonstrar o que há do pessimismo metafísico schopenhaueriano no antinatalismo de Benatar que, por ser diferente de outras visões antinatalistas, é aqui adjetivado como “benatariano”, e, por conseguinte, o que há na posição do filósofo sul-africano que pode ser justificado pela metafísica de Schopenhauer. (shrink)

A proposta do presente artigo é contextualizar, no pensamento de Schopenhauer, traços fundamentais de sua reflexão estética sobre a alegoria. Para tanto, o artigo foi desenvolvido segundo três linhas de argumentação: interpretação da alegoria no âmbito de uma reflexão simbólica da teoria da representação; a relação entre poesia e alegoria no pensamento de Schopenhauer, com destaque para uma confrontação de sua posição tanto com o primeiro romantismo quanto com o idealismo alemão; compreensão da alegoria como elemento estético de uma retórica (...) poética do engano. (shrink)