I argue that the "why be rational?" challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the “why be moral?” challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of rationality (...) instead in terms of the demand for a philosophical characterisation of rationality that can do something to explain why rational requirements are the kinds of things that are, by their very nature, normative. I consider several accounts that have recently been offered – the distinctive-object account, the proper functioning account, and the subjective reasons account – and argue that none succeeds in meeting this challenge. I then sketch a new account, the “first-personal authority account”, which holds that rational requirements are what I call “standpoint-relative demands” concerning the attitudes we ought to have and form; and that complying with rational requirements is a matter of honouring our first-personal authority as agents. I suggest that the first-personal authority account does a better job of meeting the challenge. (shrink)

In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. (...) Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational. (shrink)

This challenging and provocative book argues against much contemporary orthodoxy in philosophy and the social sciences by showing why objectivity in the domain of ethics is really no different from the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Many philosophers and social scientists have challenged the idea that we act for objectively authoritative reasons. Jean Hampton takes up the challenge by undermining two central assumptions of this contemporary orthodoxy: that one can understand instrumental reasons without appeal to objective authority, and that the (...) adoption of the scientific world view requires no such appeal. In the course of the book Jean Hampton examines moral realism, the general nature of reason and norms, internalism and externalism, instrumental reasoning, and the expected utility model of practical reasoning. The book is sure to prove to be a seminal work in the theory of rationality that will be read by a broad swathe of philosophers and social scientists. (shrink)

The call for papers for this conference claims that 'the founders of modern philosophy of science, including Sir Karl Popper… saw it as part of their role to explain the authority of science’. It continues by declaring that 'A key motive for Popper's "demarcation criterion" distinguishing science from "pseudo-science" was to restrict the authority of science to disciplines which used the scientific method.' However, a closer look at Popper’s writing shows that this widespread view is incorrect. In fact, (...) Popper declares in the postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery: [I]t is all guesswork, doxa rather than epistēmē… Science has no authority… It represents… our hope of emancipating ourselves from ignorance and narrow-mindedness, from fear and superstition. And this includes… the superstitious belief in the authority of science itself. After briefly defending my contention, with reference to the work of Bartley and some of Popper's statements elsewhere, I will argue that Popper is better understood as attempting to demarcate inquiry from non-inquiry. I also hope to show that this humbler goal is worthwhile, especially when it comes to resisting calls to teach so-called ‘creation science’ in schools. Unfortunately, Popper has become associated with the relatively simplistic view that falsifiability is a demarcation criterion. But Popper recognized, even in the first edition of Logic of Scientific Discovery, that falsifiability alone does not suffice. He was cognisant of the problem posed by Duhem's thesis, and therefore stated: A system such as classical mechanics may be ‘scientific’ to any degree you like; but those who uphold it dogmatically—believing, perhaps, that it is their business to defend such a successful system against criticism as long as it is not conclusively disproved—are adopting the very reverse of that critical attitude which in my view is the proper one for the scientist. This would appear to be why Popper wrote of 'the non-existence of scientific method' above and beyond 'the one method of all rational discussion, and therefore of the natural sciences as well as of philosophy… stating one's problem clearly and examining its various proposed solutions critically'. In short, the critical approach is a crucial part of the demarcation puzzle. In the remainder of the talk, I will develop this solution to the demarcation problem in response to several possible criticisms. Chief among these is that 'creation scientists' do inquire but only with narrow scope. To address this criticism, I will draw on some of my recent work on the roles of criticism and dogmatism in science ; and in particular, I will consider if looking at matters from the group level can help. (shrink)

The article touches upon the problem of concept “Indian tradition of rationality”. The author recalls a genetic link of the concept with Western philosophy. She notices the complexity of its application to Indian material, gives some examples in which the use of Western concepts of “reason”, “methods of cognition”, etc., leads to a distortion of the text’s meaning, and when an application of the criteria of Western logic to analysis of Indian philosophical discourse gives the readers an impression of (...) its absurdity. However, according to the author’s mind, the difficulties with the applying of Western concepts are not the sufficient grounds to abandon them. This conclusion follows from the presence of comparative studies by researchers belonging to both traditions (for example, B.K. Matilal, J. Mohanty, A. Chakrabarti, etc.), who compare successfully Western and Indian kinds of logico-epistemological type of rationality. The difficulties just bring up the questions about new instrumental concepts and methods of comparative studies more adequate to Indian culture. There are two possible directions for the studies of Indian tradition of rationality in connection with the revision of contents of the concepts in Western post- modern philosophy. In the first of them the concept of rationality can not to be used at all, then the phenomenology of practices of Indian discourse becomes the subject of research, i.e. the discourse images in different contexts (religious, philosophical, scientific), its explicit and implicit foundations and aims, which aren’t coincide with Western ones. In the second case Indian rationality can be analyzed in accordance with the criteria of transversal reason and transversal rationality. (shrink)

Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory is a valuable survey and critique of research in the rational choice tradition, but one that slights that tradition's past and potential contributions to the study of politics. The authors rightly note limitations of rational choice theory but understate what it has to offer political scientists, for they fail to focus clearly on its essentials; adopt too narrow a basis for evaluating scholarship; and wrongly identify rational choice theory with the shortcomings of some scholarship that (...) makes use of it. (shrink)

Before an aggregation of persons can be said to constitute a community there must exist a sharing of a body of norms or values, or asystem of beliefs or morals. In sociology this conception frequentlyappears in the term “consensus,” and in political science a similar conception goes by the phrase “social contract.” The two conceptions are not identical and an important point of difference will be touched on later, but according to this position knowledge of and adherence to the fundamental (...) rules is necessary to group unity or cohesion. (shrink)

This book draws the limits of our thoughts and consciousness between the mind and mind-independent reality by using mathematical logic with the support of neurology. The author combines the Analytical and Continental traditions with each other's virtues. If Kant were alive today, he would have had to write such a book. Diagnosing the limits between immanence and transcendence of the consciousness depends on defining some transcendental a priori categories in between as some basic axioms of the mind. Although this is (...) a paradoxical attempt every philosopher falls into, the author non-paradoxically identifies these non-intentional cognitive categories by using mathematical category theory. This basic model of the mind allows us to follow the logical possibilities in between that the mind can set up in its relationship with mind-independence. In this way, the author defines the intentional categories of consciousness by using mathematical set theory and obtains a self-representational higher-order theory of consciousness (SHOT). Finally, he combines the intentional and non-intentional categories with an algebraic topography and obtains a model of the mind. The architectural structure of the mind is the problematic skeleton of philosophy with all its sub-branches as a human aura that can be traced throughout the six Cartesian meditations. The philosophical anthropology depicted eventually emerged as a purely naturalistic, shamanic prototype metaphysics radically different from the monotheistic Western tradition that began with Plato. The reasoning had started from mathematics, but unexpectedly arrived at an archaic metaphysics. This philosophical theory is called "Anthropogonia", after Hesiod's Theogonia. After Anthropogonia, logically, truth-seekers in these ancient, imperial religions must retreat from their historically constructed Platonic realist theology to their shamanic roots. The naturalist architecture of the mind requires such a naturalized doctrine and art. (shrink)

Before an aggregation of persons can be said to constitute a community there must exist a sharing of a body of norms or values, or asystem of beliefs or morals. In sociology this conception frequentlyappears in the term “consensus,” and in political science a similar conception goes by the phrase “social contract.” The two conceptions are not identical and an important point of difference will be touched on later, but according to this position knowledge of and adherence to the fundamental (...) rules is necessary to group unity or cohesion. (shrink)

The paper gives an overview of Arthur Schopenhauer's theory of rationality. For Schopenhauer, rationality is a human faculty based on language, which, in addition to language, is primarily concerned with knowledge or philosophy of science and practical action. For Schopenhauer, language is the umbrella term under which he subsumes logic and eristics. This paper will first introduce Schopenhauer's logic and clarify its connection to the philosophy of language. This is followed by eristic dialectics, which reflects on how one (...) can protect oneself from people who argue irrationally in a goal-oriented way. Schopenhauer's philosophy of mathematics belongs to the field of philosophy of science. Unlike many other authors of his time, Schopenhauer does not advocate a rationalist but a representationalist approach, which, however, includes a theory of rationality. Therefore, Schopenhauer's representationalist approach will finally be discussed, emphasizing its relationship to his theory of rationality. (shrink)

Describes and evaluates a number of existing criticisms of the formal theory of rationality and subjective expected utility theory. The author argues that rationality is not a behavioural entity, but rather has to do with the relation between an agent's preferences and his or her behaviour.

Contractarian theories are meant to settle the issue of when political authority meets the conditions of rational legitimacy. The author addresses the same issue, but using different premises and a different conceptual frame. He takes as his point of departure the two basic problems which rational collective will‐formation refers to ‐ conflict‐resolution and goal attainment. He then introduces the codes of law and power, with which such will‐formation can be institutionalized. The legitimation gap that then still remains open can (...) be filled by a practical reason which is not limited simply to morality but also permeates the procedures of law application, policy‐formation and legislation. These preliminary considerations remain within the limits of a thought‐experiment. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the problem of artificial intelligence and the challenges of “smart technologies”, which threaten the autonomy of human mind and the existence of human itself. The author states the crisis situation of contemporary culture, the existential fatigue of humanity, which manifests itself in the intention to delegate one’s own subjectivity, will and rationality to external actors – namely the Internet, artificial intelligence, and robotics. The article discovers the alienation of the fundamental quality of a thinking (...) person – intelligence – and the threat of human enslavement in the world of the near future, governed by autonomous technologies. In addition to delegating rationality to machines, there is also a tendency to transfer goal-setting to “intelligent technology”, which is gradually endowed with the ability for self-learning and self-programming, and therefore may not align its tasks with human intentions. This problem is traced back to the origins of philosophical thinking and the earliest mentions of artificial beings in mythology, theology, fiction and scientific theory, that proves eternal human strife for creation and replication of human traces in natural environment. Humanization and rationalization of outer world thus is thought as an integral feature of human activity, but it also means constant and continuing alienation of human mind due to its openness and incompleteness, that puts mankind at risk – yet therefore defines humanity as a “risky” way of being. The author considers a scenario of the doubling of reality, in which digital algorithms, computer programmes and robotics may conquer, supplant or replace the world of nature and the human world, bypassing the latter as a less effective evolutionary step. In contrast to this, the author raises the question of what is mind, what is thinking and what is a human being – and whether consciousness, reduced to corporeality, sensuality or rationality, can serve as a model for reproduction. And whether a person is capable of creating a new life without love? (shrink)

Argues that rational belief is important in so far as we are interested in the truth, and that deference to authority does not provide an attractive alternative. Also argues that it cannot be made out that it would be good to have an irrational belief in God by appealing to the importance of trust or, as Pascal's wager does, to the good consequences of belief in God, if he exists. I go on to consider the value of belief in (...) God, when conceived in the way proposed. I conclude that, valuable as this may be, what is most valuable is the knowledge of God's will; because that is knowledge of what is good and what is bad. (shrink)

The Aristotelian dictum that desire is the starting point of practical reasoning that ends in action can of course be denied. Its denial is a commonplace of moral theory in the tradition of Kant. But in this essay I am concerned with that issue only indirectly. I shall not contend that rational action always or necessarily does involve desire as its starting point; nor shall I deny it. My question concerns instead the possibility of its ever beginning in desire. For (...) there is a question whether it is even possible for reasoning to begin in desire, a question arising from the nature of desire and its objects, which to my knowledge has not been articulated. If we can see how desire can provide the arche of action, then we can consider later, and from that vantage point, whether it is necessary that it should do so. It will, I think, be possible eventually to argue that if practical reasoning has the character it must have, if it can begin in desire, then its starting point can be nothing but desire. (shrink)

This book contributes to the developing dialogue between cognitive science and social sciences. It focuses on a central issue in both fields, i.e. the nature and the limitations of the rationality of beliefs and action. The development of cognitive science is one of the most important and fascinating intellectual advances of recent decades, and social scientists are paying increasing attention to the findings of this new branch of science that forces us to consider many classical issues related to epistemology (...) and philosophy of action in a new light. This book encourages scholars from different fields who are interested in the dialogue between cognitive science and social sciences, to develop and analyze new perspectives that allow us to elucidate the mystery of rationality. What is rationality? What are its limitations? What rationality assumptions must be used to study social and economic phenomena? The target audience primarily comprises researchers and experts in the field. Analysis of the concept of rationality is a leitmotiv in the history of the social sciences and has involved endless disputes. Since it is difficult to give a precise definition of this concept, and there is a lack of agreement about its meaning, it is possible to say that there is a ‘mystery of rationality’. What is it to be rational? Is rationality merely instrumental or does it also involve the endorsement of values, i.e. the choice of goals? Should we consider rationality to be a normative principle or a descriptive one? Can rationality be only Cartesian or can it also be argumentative? Is rationality a conscious skill or a partly tacit one? This book, which has been written by an outstanding collection of authors, including both philosophers and social scientists, tries to make a useful contribution to the debates on these problems and shed some light on the mystery of rationality. (shrink)

The article covers such issues as the relevance of the theory of perception as a multi-level information processing, the methodological role of the concept of representation and the relation of neurodynamic structures to subjective experience. The author critically reviews the philosophical presumptions underlying the various concepts of “local rationality,” the core of which is constituted by the belief that large ethnic cultures generate or are based on their own rationality and their own logic. Three statements are successively considered: (...) thinking is based on the inherent rules of rationality, logic is an extract of rationality, and types of rationality are geographically consistent with large ethnocultural communities. Empirical arguments are presented that demonstrate equivocality of the first two theses. In particular, firstly, it is shown that the genuine rationality of thinking lies not in following the rules that are immanent to it, but in the development of thinking and, more broadly, cognitive operations towards optimization of certain indicators of the cognitive or motor system that are important for survival and adaptation. In addition, this rationality is multivariate, and the choice between variants is often weakly determined or even random. Thus, the first statement turns out to be refuted. Secondly, by reference to the well-known experiments, it is shown that most people do not explicitly follow some declared logical rules in solving even logical or mathematical problems, and yet there is reason to consider their behavior rational. The third thesis, as shown with some limited empirical material, appears to be partially confirmed. Nevertheless, the demonstration of the doubtfulness of the first two theses makes the conclusion that different nations have different logics insufficiently substantiated. (shrink)

The article aims to assess Hobbes’ methodological legacy. After a brief review of different interpretations of Hobbes relevant to the subject, I center the discussion on the reading advanced by Norberto Bobbio and the notion of three “different forms and levels of rationality”: First, Hobbes’ dichotomy-based reasoning that radically contended the Aristotelian tradition, as well as biblical hermeneutics used by medieval theologians. Second, individualism as a method for collective decision making, one that led to socalled “game theory” and moral (...) individualism (quite significant in contemporary political philosophy). Finally, the rationality of political power that imposes on Sovereignty binding rules for gaining and maintaining power.After the discussion of the three different forms and levels of rationality, the article concludes that Thomas Hobbes, instead of being primarilyre- ferred to as an advocate of autocratic regimes, should be considered, at the very beginning of the long history of rule of law, as one of the key authors of modern constitutionalism and democracy.Resumen:Después de un rápido recorrido sobre las múltiples interpretaciones del pensamiento hobbesiano, el ensayo retoma y desarrolla la lectura que de Hobbes propuso Norberto Bobbio. Con base en esta lectura, se busca evaluar el legado metodológico de Hobbes, el cual se despliega a través de distintos niveles de racionalidad: en primer lugar, el razonamiento basado en dicotomías, el cual desafió de manera contundente la tradición aristotélica, la labor de los historiadores antiguos y la hermenéutica bíblica de los teólogos medievales. En segundo lugar, el individualismo como método para tomar decisiones colectivas, lo que abrió la puerta a la así llamada “teoría de juegos” y al individualismo moral tan notable en la filosofía política contemporánea. Y finalmente, la racionalidad del poder político, que lógicamente impone sobre la soberanía ciertas reglas vinculantes para obtener y mantener el poder.En conjunto, con el análisis de las distintas formas y niveles de racionalidad se pretende respaldar la idea de que Hobbes —antes de ser identificado como un defensor de regímenes autocráticos— puede ser considerado como un autor clave para la democracia y el constitucionalismo moderno, colocado en el justo inicio de la larga historia del Estado de derecho. (shrink)

The problem of rational theory-choice is the problem of whether choice of theory by a scientist may be objectively rational in the absence of an invariant scientific method. In this paper I offer a solution to the problem, but the solution I propose may come as something of a surprise. For I wish to argue that the work of the very authors who have put the rationality of such choice in question, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, contains all that (...) is needed to solve the problem. (shrink)

The problem of rationality is nowadays studied in an explicit fashion mostly by philosophers of science, the prevailing assumption being that science is rationality par excellence, so that an analysis of science will yield an understanding of rationality. It is therefore with great interest that one opens this book whose suggestive title gives the impression of approaching the problem in a more original way, namely from the point of view of logic. However, one finds the logic in (...) question to be conventional formal logic, and the problem touched upon only in those parts of the book dealing with the question of the role of formalization and formal methods in rationality, which parts constitute only a small portion of the work. The author advocates a view he calls metaformalism, which he describes obscurely as "the grammar of the connectivity and integration of viewpoints, the technical embodiment of magnanimity and love" ; sociologically as stemming from "the writings of Polanyi... Popper... Butterfield, Conant, Kuhn, Agassi, Feyerabend, Hanson, Sellars, Wartofsky and... Patrick Heelan" ; and insightfully as such that it "would bring a qualitative change to modern logic—a science which has been widening itself more than it has been deepening in roots. It would be the kind of technical development which would underwrite the view that logic cannot be fully understood without being seen in its relationship with rational competence and human subjectivity. A ’system logic’ would perhaps point to this relationship more strongly than propositional logic". (shrink)

I provide an account of the cognitive attitude of trust that explains the role trust plays in the planning of rational agents. Many authors have dismissed choosing to trust as either impossible or irrational; however, this fails to account for the role of trust in practical reasoning. A can have therapeutic, coping, or corrective reasons to trust B to ${\phi}$ , even in the absence of evidence that B will ${\phi}$ . One can choose to engage in therapeutic trust to (...) inspire trustworthiness, coping trust to simplify one’s planning, or corrective trust to avoid doing a testimonial injustice. To accommodate such types of trust, without accepting doxastic voluntarism, requires an account of the cognitive attitude of trust broader than belief alone. I argue that trust involves taking the proposition that someone will do something as a premise in one’s practical reasoning, which can be a matter of believing or accepting the proposition. I defend this account against objections that it (i) provides insufficient rational constraints on trust, (ii) conflates trust and pretense of trust, and (iii) cannot account for the rationality of back-up planning. (shrink)

Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views (...) on rationality, with each author also developing a unique and distinctive argument. (shrink)

When is it more rational to think for oneself or to defer to the relevant expert? Expertise is either closed-system oriented and lay-person oriented. The first sort is concerned primarily with controlling and manipulating a discipline's defining set of variables as a closed or relatively closed system. The second sort is simply in the business of "advising" clients. I argue that when expert claims are of the first sort, the layperson must defer to the experts; but when experts either extrapolate (...) from their closed-systems, or if they are of the second sort, then the layperson should think for herself. (shrink)

Despite their diversity, human languages share consistent properties and regularities. Wherefrom does this consistency arise? And does it tell us something about the problem that all languages need to solve? The authors provide an intriguing analyses which focuses on the “communicative function of ambiguity” whose resolution entailed an equally intriguing “speaker–listener cross‐entropy objective for measuring the efficiency of linguistic systems from first principles of efficient language use.”.

The introduction of the concept of the field of rationality and its correlates (the field of potentiality and the formal field) by Józef Życiński and Michał (Michael) Heller opened up space for the philosophical explanation of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in capturing regularities built into the physical reality. The presented study is a response to the clear incentive of these authors towards the development of the understanding and applicability of these concepts. It is argued that identifying symmetries within (...) the field of rationality not only helps to articulate the fundamental role of symmetries in physics but also provides a better grasp on the issue of potentialities for the emergence of complexity in the Universe. Additionally, some global properties of this field can be more deeply comprehended. By indicating the drawbacks and limitations of this approach, perspectives for further inquiry into the meaning and usefulness are suggested. (shrink)

The paper analyzes Max Weber’s concepts of rationality and rationalization as components of modernization processes in modern society. The author reconstructs Weber’s interpretation of “spiritual factors” of social development, which emerge in the ethos of Protestantism. The research demonstrates how Weber’s study of capitalism in terms of rationality corresponds with concepts of other classics of German sociology, such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Werner Sombart, Georg Simmel and others. The article emphasizes the relevance of Weber’s sociology for XX— XXI centuries (...) and how its basic concepts and methodological approaches have been further developed by scholars, including Ukrainian ones. Weber’s concept of rationality is applicable not only to the mental-epistemological sphere, it also acquires a social meaning. This approach has gained recognition in phenomenological sociology, theory of social systems, communicative theory and more. In addition to the formal rationality of the economy, modern social sciences use such concepts as social, aesthetic, ethical, environmental, and practical rationality. Weber’s “diagnosis of the age” is still a component of the “diagnosis” of modern society. The gap between values and interests remains an integral feature of the “risks and threats society” in the XXI century. This situation is especially evident in international relations, when “real politics” (Realpolitik), based on interests, becomes insensitive to “value postulates”. The author also discovers ways of value (moral and ethical) reclamation of modern society, particularly in the concepts of “ethical economy”, universalist ethics of discourse, global ethos and more. Keywords: purposive rationality, rationality (formal, material, communicative, systemic), value, ethos. (shrink)

While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the ‘hold’ that an intention has on an agent—a hold that is palpable from her first-person perspective? I argue that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, I maintain that the subjective authority of intention can be explained in terms of (...) the inner structure of intention. In adopting an intention the agent comes to see herself as criticizable depending on whether she executes the intention. This allows us to explain in first-personal terms why the agent becomes disposed to act and deliberate in ways that are characteristic of intention. As intention-formation involves profound changes to reflexive evaluative attitudes, this is the ‘Self-Evaluation’ view of the subjective authority of intention. (shrink)

The author shows that the search for new, non-classical forms of rationality is a symptom of the crisis of systematicity in human existence. Rationalism is a worldview correspondence to systemic human existence, and the limits of rationalism coincide with the limits of systematicity. Referring to postmodern philosophy, the author proves that human existence is not limited to systematicity. The scientific scope of the general, the ratio, is inferior to other horizons – aesthetic, moral, mystical, etc. culture-building existence has now (...) declared itself as the only truly human, supersystemic being-in-freedom, whose logic is not limited to rationality. The crisis of rationality has led to an understanding of man as not needing any guidance, and the highest manifestation of his unlimited freedom is his own uncaused self-restraint. (shrink)

In a two-tiered, or Dual Oughts, moral theory, the objective account of right and wrong is supplemented by decision guides designed to enable an agent, uncertain about the circumstances or consequences of her possible actions, to indirectly apply the objective theory by using an appropriate decision guide. But are the decision guides counsels of morality or counsels of rationality? Peter Graham argues they are counsels of pragmatic rationality. This paper shows Graham’s view is unsuccessful, and argues, based on (...) the approach recently developed in [Author] that decision guides must be seen as moral principles. An explanation is provided for why we may be tempted to interpret decision guides as principles of rationality. (shrink)

The article proposes to consider the phenomena of life and death within the framework of philosophical and scientific discourse. The author does not aim to explain the origin of life, he seeks to conceive of life and death on the basis of the methodology developed by him and the research conducted. The main way of understanding these phenomena is the hypothesis about the nature of the mechanism of life, as well as cultural–historical and semiotic analysis of the evolution of life. (...) In evolution, the author distinguishes three main stages: the formation of life, biological evolution and the evolution of social life. An important role in the latter is assigned, on the one hand, to the use of signs denoting not observable realities, but necessary for the management of the "primary team", on the other hand, technology. The technique performed two main functions: it expanded the capabilities of hominids in terms of creating the right environment and confirmed the use of signs, since it created a reality corresponding to their meanings. In social life, as well as in biological, two spheres need to be distinguished in the vital organization: one belongs to individuals, and the other, actually social, encompassing, without which the first cannot exist and function. Having asked the provisions indicated here, the author characterizes what death is and considers the cognitive dissonance that occurs when we try to rationally think about these phenomena. (shrink)

Warner here puts forward a much broader discussion of rationality than that which underlies today's polarization between analytic and continental philosophy. Through a series of case-studies the author explores ancient conceptions of dialectic and rhetoric in relation to the positive role given to sentiment or "the heart" by Pascal, Hume, and Nietzsche. These studies point to an understanding of philosophy which undercuts fashionable disputes and which helps to reaffirm a range of ideas long marginalized by the dominance of the (...) geometric model of philosophical argument. (shrink)

The paper first summarizes the author's decision-theoretical model of moral behavior, in order to compare the moral implications of the act-utilitarian and of the rule-utilitarian versions of utilitarian theory. This model is then applied to three voting examples. It is argued that the moral behavior of act-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a noncooperative game, played in the extensive mode, and involving action-by-action maximization of social utility by each player. In contrast, the moral behavior of rule-utilitarian individuals will have (...) the nature of a cooperative game, played in the normal mode, and involving a firm commitment by each player to a specific moral strategy (viz. to the strategy selected by the rule-utilitarian choice criterion) — even if some individual actions prescribed by this strategy, when considered in isolation, should fail to maximize social utility. The most important advantage that rule utilitarianism as an ethical theory has over act utilitarianism lies in its ability to give full recognition to the moral and social importance of individual rights and personal obligations. It is easy to verify that action-by-action maximization of social utility, as required by act utilitarianism, would destroy these rights and obligations. In contrast, rule utilitarianism can fully recognize the moral validity of these rights and obligations precisely because of its commitment to an overall moral strategy, independent of action-by-action social-utility maximization. The paper ends with a discussion of the voter's paradox problem. The conventional theory of rational behavior cannot avoid the paradoxical conclusion that, in any large electorate, voting is always an irrational activity because one's own individual vote is extremely unlikely to make any difference to the outcome of any election. But it can be shown that, by using the principles of rule-utilitarian theory, this paradox can easily be resolved and that, in actual fact, voting, even in large electorates, may be perfectly rational action. More generally, the example of rule utilitarianism shows what an important role the concept of a rational commitment can play in the analysis of rational behavior. (shrink)

This book provides a systematic treatment of Locke's theory of probable assent. It shows how the theory applies to Locke's philosophy of science, moral epistemology, and religious epistemology. There is a powerful case to be made that the most important dimension of Locke's philosophy is his theory of rational probable assent, rather than his theory of knowledge. According to Locke, we largely live our lives in the "twilight of probability" rather than in "the sunshine of certain knowledge". Locke's theory of (...) probable assent is towering insofar as it contains a wealth of novel, independently interesting, and prescient elements that precede the modern field of formal epistemology. In this book, the author argues for the central role of probable assent in Locke's philosophy. Locke's theory of probable assent is based on an epistemic modesty that claims, roughly, that our cognitive abilities are quite limited and that we ought to carry ourselves in believing with due caution. This modesty motivates the author's discussion of other aspects of Locke's epistemology, notably his principle of proportionality, his doxastic involuntarism, his epistemological pragmatism, and his theory of testimony. The book concludes by connecting the theory of probable assent with Locke's views on the limits of science, moral epistemology, and the rationality of faith. Locke's Twilight of Probability will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on Locke and the history of early modern philosophy. (shrink)

Brian Skyrms constructs a theory of "dynamic deliberation" and uses it to investigate rational decision-making in cases of strategic interaction. This illuminating book will be of great interest to all those in many disciplines who use decision theory and game theory to study human behavior and thought. Skyrms begins by discussing the Bayesian theory of individual rational decision and the classical theory of games, which at first glance seem antithetical in the criteria used for determining action. In his effort to (...) show how methods for dealing with information feedback can be productively combined, the author skillfully leads us through the mazes of equilibrium selection, the Nash equilibria for normal and extensive forms, structural stability, causal decision theory, dynamic probability, the revision of beliefs, and, finally, good habits for decision. The author provides many clarifying illustrations and a handy appendix called "Deliberational Dynamics on Your Personal Computer." His powerful model has important implications for understanding the rational origins of convention and the social contract, the logic of nuclear deterrence, the theory of good habits, and the varied strategies of political and economic behavior. (shrink)

Proponents of natural normativity maintain that the moral evaluation of human beings shares a certain common conceptual pattern with the evaluation of other living things. The adequacy of this analogy has been challenged, with opponents arguing that because humans are rational, there is a gap between what is natural and what is normative for humans. Rational creatures, the argument goes, are importantly different from non-rational living things in that reason includes the ability to step back from what is natural and (...) ask whether it is good that our nature is constituted as it is. Micah Lott has attempted a response to this challenge. After evaluating his proposal, I offer a reply that attempts to resolve an important dilemma, namely, that the naturalist either lacks a satisfying response to the authority-of-nature challenge or is forced to abandon naturalism. (shrink)

Arendt’s explorations of the dynamics of politics, facts, and truth in the public sphere contain important insights into the authority of science and science denial. This article reviews and contextualizes Arendt’s views on modern science and technology, discusses her views on authority, and identifies some insights that her writings provide on the dynamics of science denial. Arendt’s writings point to another possible source of authority besides Weber’s three categories (traditional, legal-rational, charismatic), based on a relationship between ruler (...) and ruled that precedes the issuance of commands. Her writings help clarify what makes scientific findings vulnerable to denial, expose some of the specific tactics of science denial, and include some clues for what it would take to keep the public space open, and to nourish the compelling element that would have to underlie scientific authority. (shrink)

This book concentrates upon how economic rationalities have been embedded into particular historical practices, cultures, and moral systems. Through multiple case-studies, situated in different historical contexts of the modern West, the book shows that the development of economic rationalities takes place in the meeting with other regimes of thought, values, and moral discourses. The book offers new and refreshing insights, ranging from the development of early economic thinking to economic aspects and concepts in the works of classical thinkers such as (...) Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Karl Marx, to the role of economic reasoning in contemporary policies of art and health care. With economic rationalities as the read thread, the reader is offered a unique chance of historical self-awareness and recollection of how economic rationality became the powerful ideological and moral force that it is today. (shrink)

A comparative analysis of the different notions of ‘ways of thinking’ introduced by philosophers. A guiding thread running through historical epistemology in an attempt to unify the researches of its authors. A comprehensive study of Ian Hacking’s ‘project of styles of reasoning’ and its implications for the relativism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Salonnières and the Philosophes in Old Regime France: The Authority of Aesthetic Judgment*Jolanta T. PekaczDuring the eighteenth century a significant shift occurred in the perception of the authority of aesthetic judgment in France, from a group usually referred to as “polite society” and widely considered the exclusive source of taste (goût) to various competing groups arrogating to themselves the right to judge artistic matters. 1 In (...) the present article I discuss the changing recognition of the genders as arbiters of taste, exemplified by Parisian salonnières on the one hand, and the philosophes on the other, during two eighteenth-century quarrels over the French and Italian operas: the Querelle des Bouffons in the 1750s and the controversy between Gluckistes and Piccinistes in the 1770s. I argue that by the end of the 1770s, as a result of the collapse of the old paradigm of “polite society” of which salons were a part, Parisian salon women lost the position (however illusory it might have been) which they enjoyed in the seventeenth century as arbiters of taste. While the philosophes attended feminine salons, [End Page 277] they rejected the idea of consulting salonnières on the matters of taste (and on other matters), as was previously the case, and relegated them to formal, if not merely decorative, roles of guardians of good manners and propriety, the roles accepted by salonnières.The ousting of the salonnière from aesthetic arbitration exemplified by the two operatic quarrels may be viewed as a continuation of the process of exclusion of salon women from discursive development that began in the seventeenth century, as discussed by Erica Harth in Cartesian Women: Versions and Subversions of Rational Discourse in the Old Regime (1992) and, most recently, by Joan DeJean in Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle (1997). In the seventeenth century the norms of feminine bienséance (decorum, propriety) allowed a woman to establish a salon but made it impossible for a salonnière to create a space intellectually comparable to that of the French Academy. After having lost a gendered competition for intellectual space with the Academy by the 1680s, the salon, as Erica Harth put it, “proved a discursive dead end for women.”In this essay I carry through this argument into the eighteenth century and demonstrate that salon women lost a competition with the philosophes not only in the intellectual but also in the aesthetic sphere. Salonnières did not choose not to make aesthetic judgments out of respect for the exclusive right of the philosophes to make such judgments 2 but rather were silenced by the philosophes and complied in order not to violate the limits of feminine bienséance in the public sphere, that is, to survive as salonnières. The seventeenth-century ideals of feminine bienséance taken over by eighteenth-century salonnières were no longer perceived as sufficient (or legitimate) to recognize women as arbiters of taste. In fact these ideals proved to be as detrimental as a source of authority for salon women in the siècle des lumières as they were ambiguous in the grand siècle.Ironically, not only were the eighteenth-century Parisian salonnières ousted from aesthetic arbitration, but neither did they succeed in their roles as guardians of propriety and good manners for the philosophes, that is, in keeping the Enlightenment discourse civil. In both operatic quarrels the dominant genre of discourse was a pamphlet, a libelle, not a salon conversation. While during the Querelle des Bouffons the philosophes were unanimously pro-Italian, the Gluck-Piccini quarrel caused a deep split among them, followed by fratricidal fighting, which seriously undermined their authority in public matters.I. The negative connotation associated with the epithets pedant, savant, and their derivatives in seventeenth-century French treatises on honnêteté indicates [End Page 278] that the authority of judgment of “persons of quality” in matters of taste resulted from the code of bienséances in social relations. Blaise Pascal probably best summarized arguments for the superiority of an honnête person (as opposed to a professional) in the realm of aesthetics; being an... (shrink)

What follows is an attempt to interpret Hegel’s Introduction to thePhilosophy of Rightin a way that explores the thesis of reason’s social character in light of the recent debate on Hegel’s theory of practical normativity. The discussion aims to highlight Hegel’s commitment to a ‘reconstructive’ version of the ‘immanent transcendence’ motive of Critical Theory and, more generally, to a programmatic critique of ‘deficient’ rationality and its effects on practice.

The Sovereignty of Reason is a survey of the rule of faith controversy in seventeenth-century England. It examines the arguments by which reason eventually became the sovereign standard of truth in religion and politics, and how it triumphed over its rivals: Scripture, inspiration, and apostolic tradition. Frederick Beiser argues that the main threat to the authority of reason in seventeenth-century England came not only from dissident groups but chiefly from the Protestant theology of the Church of England. The triumph (...) of reason was the result of a new theology rather than the development of natural philosophy, which upheld the orthodox Protestant dualism between the heavenly and earthly. Rationalism arose from a break with the traditional Protestant answers to problems of salvation, ecclesiastical polity, and the true faith. Although the early English rationalists were not able to defend all their claims on behalf of reason, they developed a moral and pragmatic defense of reason that is still of interest today. Beiser's book is a detailed examination of some neglected figures of early modern philosophy, who were crucial in the development of modern rationalism. There are chapters devoted to Richard Hooker, the Great Tew Circle, the Cambridge Platonists, the early ethical rationalists, and the free-thinkers John Toland and Anthony Collins. (shrink)

Communities of respect are communities of people sharing common practices or a (partial) way of life; they include families, clubs, religious groups, and political parties. This book develops a detailed account of such communities in terms of the rational structure of their members' reactive attitudes, arguing that they are fundamental in three interrelated ways to understanding what it is to be a person. First, it is only by being a member of a community of respect that one can be a (...) responsible agent having dignity; such an agent therefore has certain rights as well as the authority to demand that fellow members recognize her dignity and follow the norms of the community, norms compliance with which they likewise have the authority to demand from her. Second, by prescribing or proscribing both actions and values, communities of respect can shape the identities of its members in ways that others have the authority to enforce, thereby revealing an important interpersonal dimension of the identities of persons. Finally, all of this is grounded in a distinctively interpersonal form of practical rationality in virtue of which we jointly have reasons to recognize the dignity and authority of fellow members and so to comply with their authoritative demands, as well as to respect (and so comply with) the norms of the community. Hence we persons are essentially social creatures. (shrink)

The author explains Michael Oakeshott's distinctive theory of law through an explanation of its notion of authority. He explains the view that modern states are ambiguous, consisting partly of civil associations and partly of enterprise associations. Authority is not a function of people's attitudes to those in power, but exists when a government's action is itself accepted as sufficient reason for unconditional obedience. Authority in this sense cannot exist in enterprise association, commitment to which must be contingent (...) on the fulfillment of purposes common to all participants. But modern states are compulsory associations, different from each. Furthermore, authority could never be justified on a rational choice model, which must always be teleological in character. Because this means there can be no solution to the problem of political obligation, all philosophy can do is describe abstractly the Rule of Law state which does reconcile authority and liberty. (shrink)

After describing the three main kinds of probability theories, the author presents a new logical theory of probability. Probability, for him, is a logical relation between bodies of evidence and statements. The theory is an advance over Carnap's logical theory of probability in that it is not based on a formal language with strong completeness properties. The theory is formalized in Quine's protosyntax, which has two disadvantages: first, long formulas couched in terms of a large number of defined symbols disfigure (...) the book and obscure the exposition; and secondly, it is desirable to keep our theories of inductive logic and deductive logic independent. There seems to be no reason to burden one sort of theory with the other. There is no index.--J. R. W. (shrink)