Introduction of O2 to Earth's early biosphere stimulated remarkable evolutionary adaptations, and a wide range of electron acceptors allowed diverse, energy-yielding metabolic pathways. Enzymatic reduction of O2 yielded a several-fold increase in energy production, enabling evolution of multi-cellular animal life. However, utilization of O2 also presented major challenges as O2 and many of its derived reactive oxygen species are highly toxic, possibly impeding multicellular evolution after the Great Oxidation Event. Remarkably, ROS, and especially hydrogen peroxide, seem to play a major (...) part in early diversification and further development of cellular respiration and other oxygenic pathways, thus becoming an intricate part of evolution of complex life. Hence, although harnessing of chemical and thermo-dynamic properties of O2 for aerobic metabolism is generally considered to be an evolutionary milestone, the ability to use ROS for cell signaling and regulation may have been the first true breakthrough in development of complex life. The importance of Earth's oxygen cycle and reactive oxygen species produced on the evolution of complex life. The ability to detoxify oxygen species is not a trait that emerged as a response to increased O2 levels but rather crucial adaptation to the early Earth's weakly oxic microenvironments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Broken Bodies and Healing Communities: The Challenge of HIV and AIDS in the South African ContextEmily Reimer-BarryBroken Bodies and Healing Communities: The Challenge of HIV and AIDS in the South African Context Edited by Neville Richardson Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: Cluster Publications, 2009. 209 pp. $12.00.The township of Mpophomeni, like many communities in South Africa, has been tragically devastated by HIV/AIDS. Christian churches in the region have responded to (...) this ongoing crisis in a variety of ways. In this collection of essays, edited by Neville Richardson, a team of international scholars from various subfields has combined ethnography and qualitative research with theology, with the goal of understanding how Christian churches have responded to the needs of the people of Mpophomeni. This book is the result of a two-year collaborative research project. The title of the book alerts the reader to two major themes of the unfolding narrative: the reality of brokenness, suffering, and sin (individual, interpersonal, social, and ecclesial) and the goal of healing (again, individual, interpersonal, social, and ecclesial). The ten chapters, individually authored, are divided thematically into three sections: Part 1, “Healing and Community: Perspectives from Zulu Culture and Religion”; Part 2, “Caring, Healing and Faith Communities”; and Part 3, “Caring and Community: Training in a Hospital Setting.” As perhaps expected, the authors’ conclusions remain ambivalent. James R. Cochrane explains: “Religion per se is not innocent of breaking bodies, which should always stand as a warning to us. But religion per se is also the source of healing; indeed, in some ways it is all about healing or wholeness, in relation to the sacred” (115). Churches in Mpophomeni have been “protective spaces” (11), “bridging communities” (91), and “broken bodies” that remember and re-member “the broken body of Jesus” (145–51). But communities are also in flux (101) and are sources of discourse that stigmatizes and shames (172).The book presents clearly argued and compelling essays that work independently and could be read or adopted for class as individual essays. The authors approach some of the same difficult questions from different vantage points, methodological foundations, and subdisciplines. For example, in the first two chapters Sidsel Roalkvam and Jone Salomonsen describe the many social problems in Mpophomeni, including poverty, unemployment, gender inequalities, sexual violence, drug and alcohol addiction, and criminal violence. But their [End Page 225] ethnographic research uncovers some of the rituals of healing that help the community to cope, including the practice of communal “strong prayer” (11–15), and uMemulo rite of passage for girls (23–37).However, I wish there were more coherent conversation between the authors of each individual essay. While Richardson explains that the research was collaborative “not only in terms of interaction between the researchers and the community but also among the researchers themselves” (ix), this collaboration between the researchers is not obvious to the reader in the final format of the book. Perhaps another book format would have more fruitfully conveyed this collaborative stance (for example, the inclusion of responses to each chapter or the addition of a roundtable discussion chapter or coauthored chapters).The ethnographic data presented in the third section is particularly rich and challenging for theology, but the authors could have spent more time unpacking, contextualizing, and analyzing the included quotations from patient–chaplain conversations. If, for example, the story of a thirty-three-year-old HIV+ man who allegedly raped a fifteen-year-old girl to give her “a good lesson for her life” so that she will not dress provocatively is “very characteristic of the material” in the study (203–5), much more needs to be said to explain how pastoral care interventions can address the stated “gender inequalities and the drastically different roles of men and women resulting in the vulnerable position of women” (206).The book is a must-read for scholars working on HIV/AIDS and Christian ethics. It could also provide supplemental readings for an undergraduate or graduate course in this area. [End Page 226]Emily Reimer-BarryUniversity of San DiegoCopyright © 2012 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The paper proposes a formal account of Aristotle's trichotomy of verbs, in terms of properties of their continuous tensings, into S(state)-verbs, K(kinesis)-verbs, and E-(energeia)-verbs. Within a Fregean tense framework in which predicates are relativized to times, an account of the continuous tenses is presented and a preliminary account of the trichotomy devised, which permits an illuminating analogy to be drawn between the temporal properties of E- and K-verbs and the spatial properties of stuffs and substances. This analogy is drawn upon (...) in constructing a sophisticated version of the preliminary theory accommodating more of the linguistic data. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to identify and to suggest reasons to reject those assumptions about the nature and scope of perceptual knowledge that appear to make an unacceptable scepticism the only strictly defensible answer to the philosophical problem of knowledge of the world in general. The suggestion is that our knowing things about the world around us by perception can be satisfactorily explained only if we can be understood to sometimes perceive that such-and-such is so, where what we (...) perceive to be so is the very state of the world that we thereby know to be so. This is not proposed as a better answer to the philosophical problem, but as a way of seeing how that problem as traditionally understood could not really present a threat to anyone who can think about the world at all. (shrink)

This review focuses on the Ogdoas scholastica by Jacob Lorhard, published in 1606. The importance of this document turns on the fact that it contains what is almost certainly the first published occurrence of the term “ontology.” The body of the work consists in a series of diagrams called “diagraphs.” Relevant features of this compendium of diagraphs are: 1. that it does not in fact contain the word “ontology,” and 2. that Lorhard himself was not responsible for its content.

“A Pluralistic Universe” began as James’s Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College, 1908. He repeated the lectures at Harvard and they were published the following year. Writing from Cambridge, and alluding to his last experiment with public lectures, recently published as Pragmatism (1907), he told his friend that the new commission “doom[s] me to relapse into the ‘popular lecture’ form just as I thought I had done with it forever. . . . I find that my free and easy personal way (...) of writing, especially in ‘Pragmatism,’ has made me an object of loathing to many respectable academic minds, and I am rather tired of awakening that feeling, which more popular lecturing on my part will probably destine me to increase.” . (shrink)

In this book, Christian Barry and Sanjay G. Reddy propose ways in which the international trading system can support poor countries in promoting the well-being of their peoples.

Knowledge and Civilization advances detailed criticism of philosophy's usual approach to knowledge and describes a redirection, away from textbook problems of epistemology, toward an ecological philosophy of technology and civilization. Rejecting theories that confine knowledge to language or discourse, Allen situates knowledge in the greater field of artifacts, technical performance, and human evolution. His wide ranging considerations draw on ideas from evolutionary biology, archaeology, anthropology, and the history of cities, art, and technology.

ABSTRACT We have previously argued that there are forms of greenhouse gas offsetting for which, when one emits and offsets, one imposes no risk. Orri Stefansson objects that our argument fails to distinguish properly between the people who stand to be harmed by one’s emissions and the people who stand to be benefited by one’s offsetting. We reply by emphasizing the difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to the distribution of harm and acting in a way (...) that worsen’s someone’s prospect. (shrink)

This essay is a response to Luis M. Augusto’s intriguing paper on the rift between mainstream and formal ontology. I will show that there are in fact two questions at issue here: 1. concerning the links between mainstream and formal approaches within philosophy, and 2. concerning the application of philosophy (and especially philosophical ontology) in support of information-driven research for example in the life sciences.

There is more rationality in our lives than there is in our philosophy. There is more morality in our lives than there is in our philosophy. Those claims undoubtedly are startling, perhaps even incomprehensible, given that the Western philosophical tradition from Plato on is devoted to rationality, in morality and everywhere else. The narrowly circumscribed account of rationality in that philosophical tradition—formal reason—is, however, the source of both claims. The formal reason of philosophy is rule-governed reasoning, the kind of inferential (...) reasoning used in logic and mathematics. This view percolates through ordinary understandings of rationality as well, exemplified by the familiar use of the expression .. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on the importance of auditory object processing for producing and comprehending human language, the relative lack of development of this capability in nonhuman primates, and the consequent need for hominid neurobiological evolution to enhance this capability in making the transition from protosign to protospeech to language.

Dr. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross is credited as one of the first clinicians to formalize recommendations for working with patients with advanced medical illnesses. In her seminal book, On Death and Dying,...

A remarkable feature of contemporary political discourse is the dominance of morality. One legacy of logical positivism and analytical philosophy was the reluctance of political theorists during the twentieth century to engage in substantive argument about appropriate social ends or individual rights and values. Philosophers were content to describe the linguistic framework within which related political proposals were discussed without offering any proposals themselves. It was felt that the philosopher was not especially qualified to give political advice or make any (...) recommendations. The technical political theorist was properly confined to the second level of inquiry, that is, explanation of the meaning of concepts, not the first level, which was concerned with questions of how we ought to live, or issues of public policy. Economists and sociologists might have the technical skills appropriate for inquiries into public policy, but as to the big questions—such as the ends and purposes of man and society—almost anybody could make pronouncements. The important point was that reason was incapable of adjudicating between rival versions of the good life. (shrink)

The parceling of land into real estate is more than a simple geometrical affair. Real estate is a historical product of interaction between human beings, political, legal and economic institutions, and the physical environment. And while many authors, from Jeremy Bentham to Hernando de Soto, have drawn attention to the ontological (metaphysical) aspect of property in general, no comprehensive analysis of landed property has been attempted. The paper presents such an analysis and shows how landed property differs from other types (...) of property in a way which implies a special role for political and economic philosophy of property rights in land. This is the Chinese translation of "The Metaphysics of Real Estate", Topoi, 20: 2 (September 2001), 161–172. (shrink)

This article confronts Richard Rorty's idea of cultural politics with Bruno Latour's argument for extending democracy to nonhuman things. Why does Latour make this argument? How many of his assumptions might Rorty share? Quite a few, it turns out. Additionally, ethical integration with nonhumans promises to advance the cosmopolitan politics we require for an effective response to ecological crisis.

See revised version in Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy, chapter 4; available online at: http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/.

The forms and specific situations of the government of men by one another in a given society are multiple; they are superimposed, they cross, impose their own limits, sometimes cancel one another out, sometimes reinforce one another. According to a commonplace in the critical discussion of Foucault's later work, he is supposed to have decided to take up Nietzsche's interpretation of power as Wille zur Macht, ‘will to power.’ For instance, Habermas believes he has criticized Foucault when he says, ‘Nietzsche’s (...) authority, from which this [Foucault’s] utterly unsociological concept of power is borrowed, is not enough to justify its systematic usage.’ Charles Taylor finds in Nietzsche ‘a doctrine which Foucault seems to have made his own,’ viz., that ‘there is no order of human life, or way we are, or human nature, that one can appeal to in order to judge or evaluate between ways of life. (shrink)

EVERY speaker of a language knows a bewildering variety of linguistic facts, and will come to know many more. It is knowledge that connects sound and meaning. Questions about the nature of this knowledge cannot be separated from fundamental questions about the nature of language. The conception of language we should adopt depends on the part it plays in explaining our knowledge of language. This chapter explores options in accounting for language, and our knowledge of language, and defends the view (...) that individuals’ languages are constituted by the standing knowledge they carry from one speech situation to another. (shrink)

What do we seek in metaphysical reflection on the world we live in? Kant thought the urge is “something more than a mere thirst for knowledge.” Here I introduce the question whether we could ever gain sufficient “distance” from our knowing the things we know about the world to arrive at satisfyingly independent verdicts about the metaphysical status of what appear to be indispensable ingredients of our conception of the world and of ourselves as agents within it. Could we consistently (...) explain the necessity with which certain truths are true, or the causal connections we believe to hold between certain events, or the values we ascribe to certain objects or actions, as not really part of the way things are independently of our speaking and thinking and acting in the ways we do? The question is whether and how we could consistently accept such apparently negative metaphysical conclusions while continuing to understand ourselves and the world in the ways we do. (shrink)

When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities (...) enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle. (shrink)