ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Basic statements play a central role in Popper's "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", since they permit a distinction between empirical and non-empirical theories. A theory is empirical iff it consists of falsifiable statements, and statements (of any kind) are falsifiable iff they are inconsistent with at least one basic statement. Popper obviously presupposes that basic statements are themselves empirical and hence falsifiable; at any rate, he claims several times that they are (...) falsifiable. In this paper we prove that no basic statement is falsifiable, if the term 'basic statement' is to be understood according to Popper's definitions of that term. More precisely, we prove not only that no Popperian basic statement in the narrow sense of the word is falsifiable, but also that no Popperian basic statement in the broader sense, and even in the broadest possible sense, is falsifiable. This leads to the paradoxical result that, according to Popper's definitions of 'basic statement', the basis of the empirical sciences is not itself empirical. Furthermore, we point out a similar paradox as regards Popper's falsifiability scheme for theories. We close with a look at possibilities for overcoming these paradoxes. DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Basissätze spielen eine zentrale Rolle in Poppers Logik der Forschung, denn sie erlauben die Unterscheidung zwischen empirischen und nichtempirischen Theorien: Eine Theorie ist empirisch genau dann, wenn sie aus falsifizierbaren Aussagesätzen besteht, und Aussagesätze (beliebiger Art) sind falsifizierbar genau dann, wenn sie mindestens einem Basissatz widersprechen. Popper setzt offensichtlich voraus, dassŸ die Basissätze selbst empirisch und somit falsifizierbar sind. Jedenfalls behauptet er mehrmals ihre Falsifizierbarkeit. Wir beweisen in unserem Aufsatz, dassŸ die Basissätze nicht falsifizierbar sind, und wir beweisen dies nicht nur für Poppersche Basissätze im engeren Sinn, sondern auch für Poppersche Basissätze im weiteren Sinn und schlieߟlich für Poppersche Basissätze im weitesten, mit den Vorstellungen Poppers gerade noch verträglichen Sinn. Dies führt zu dem paradoxen Ergebnis, dass nach Poppers eigenen methodologischen Postulaten die Basis der empirischen Wissenschaften nicht selbst empirisch ist. Darüber hinaus entwickeln wir ein ähnliches Paradoxon bezüglich Poppers Falsifizierbarkeitsschema für Theorien. Zum AbschlussŸ unseres Aufsatzes betrachten wir einige Möglichkeiten, die von uns entdeckten Paradoxa zu überwinden. (shrink)

Of the later dialogues of Plato, the Sophists stand out. This article highlights the concept of sophist as propounded by Plato. A didactic approach runs through the text. Socrates harps on the relation between sophist, philosopher and a statesman. Are they three different or they are the same. The basic idea that Plato wants to convey is, both features highlight some of the key enigmas of the dialogue: What is the relation between the outer and middle parts? How seriously (...) are we to take the outer part? And is there a genuine, and successful, attempt to say what the sophist is? The article focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the middle part: the late-learners' problem, and the problem of false statement. The article also discusses communion of kinds and Plato's idea of the four quartets. (shrink)

Normality judgements are frequently used in everyday communication as well as in biological and social science. Moreover they became increasingly relevant to formal logic as part of defeasible reasoning. This paper distinguishes different kinds of normality statements. It is argued that normality laws like “Birds can normally fly” should be understood essentially in a statistical way. The argument has basically two parts: firstly, a statistical semantic core is mandatory for a descriptive reading of normality in order to explain the (...) logical features of normality laws. Secondly, a statistical justification of normality statements can be derived by game theoretic considerations if the normality law is understood as communication convention. (shrink)

Information of high evidentiary quality plays a crucial role in forensic investigations. Research shows that information provided by witnesses and victims often provide major leads to an inquiry. As such, statements should be obtained in the shortest possible time following an incident. However, this is not achieved in many incidents due to demands on resources. This intersectional study examined the effectiveness of a chatbot (the AICI), that uses artificial intelligence (AI) and a cognitive interview (CI) to help record (...) class='Hi'>statements following an incident. After viewing a sexual harassment video, the present study tested recall accuracy in participants using AICI compared to other tools (i.e., Free Recall, CI Questionnaire, and CI Basic Chatbot). Measuring correct items (including descriptive items) and incorrect items (errors and confabulations), it was found that the AI CI elicited more accurate information than the other tools. The implications on society include AI CI provides an alternative means of effectively and efficiently recording high-quality evidential statements from victims and witnesses. (shrink)

The most elaborate recent accounts of truthlikeness (verisimilitude) apply this notion primarily to generalizations in first-order languages with qualitative predicates. This paper outlines a new approach to the definition of truthlikeness for quantitative statements, including singular statements (point estimation), interval statements (interval estimation), and quantitative laws. In the case of laws, the basic issue is reduced to the topological problem of measuring the distance between two real-valued functions. The solution of this problem makes it possible to (...) define also the notion of approximate truth for quantitative laws. (shrink)

In W v M, a judge concluded that M's past statements should not be given weight in a best interests assessment. Several commentators in the ethics literature have argued this approach ignored M's autonomy. In this short article I demonstrate how the basic tenets of speech act theory can be used to challenge the inherent assumption that past statements represent an individual's beliefs, choices or decisions. I conclude that speech act theory, as a conceptual tool, has a (...) valuable contribution to make to this debate. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss conditionals as illocutionary speech acts whose interpretation depends upon the whole of the social context in which they are uttered and whose purpose is to affect the opinions and actions of others. I argue for a suppositional approach to conditional statements based in what philosophers call the Ramsey test and developing the psychological theory that conditionals elicit a process of hypothetical thinking in their listeners. By reference to the experimental psychological literature on conditionals, I (...) show that in general conditionals, even ones that are basic or abstract in nature, are not treated as truth-functional or material by ordinary people. Drawing upon the suppositional nature of conditionals and the influence of pragmatic implicature, I discuss uses of conditionals as advice, inducement, persuasions and dissuasion, arguing that speakers use conditionals to try to influence the beliefs and actions of their listeners by shaping their hypothetical thought about possibilities. (shrink)

This study aimed to examine the thoughts and expectations of patients receiving healthcare from their physicians and evaluate the ethical aspects of these thoughts and expectations. To determine the ethical aspects of the thoughts and expectations of patients, an open-ended question was asked on the web page of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) Health Care Command, which is accessible to the users of the TAF intranet system (the internet system used within TAF institutions). The participants were asked to express their (...) thoughts in their own words. A total of 804 participants answered the question by providing their input. The statements of the participants were classified separately by two public health specialists. The classification was made in accordance with the basic principles of patient rights, and they were collected under various headings including expectations about respect and care, good communication, informed consent, and fair and non-privileged distribution of healthcare services. The results show that patients tend to consider the physicians they see as solely responsible for all the negative issues that they encounter during their healthcare. This indicates that there is a need for extensive research on the underlying factors involved in the negative thoughts and feelings toward healthcare professionals in both TAF and Turkey in general. (shrink)

The distinction has occasioned a long controversy between Carnap and W.V. Quine. The latter distinguishes two sorts of analytic statements: the logical truths, characterized by their remaining true under all reinterpretations of the descriptive terms; and the statements, which reduce to logical truths with the help of definitions or by substitution of synonyms for synonyms. In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, he directs his criticism mainly against the latter arguing that the explications so far provided move in a circle, (...) since, in the end, the concept of synonymy is explained in terms of analyticity. He reaches the conclusion that the only form of synonymy not exhibiting this deficiency is that introduced by explicit conventions. But according to him, this procedure is of no avail, because the philosophically interesting content of the general term “analytic in L” cannot be grasped with its help. Carnap’s suggestion of defining a new basic concept “analytic in L0” does not solve the problem since we could just as well designate this with a neutral word, say “K”, thus avoiding the illusion of an explanation. The attempt to define synonymy with the help of semantic rules fails in a similar way: it accomplishes nothing more than to place certain statements under the rubric “Semantic rules” — a notion which is no clearer than the explicandum. Carnap replies that his definition of “analytically true” is given with regard to artificial or formalized languages for which we can determine syntactic and semantic rules in such a way that the concept of truth, in Tarski’s sense, can be applied to them. Analytic statements other than logical truths will thus be distinguished by means of so-called meaning postulates which serve to make the truth-value of such statements independent of empirical matters. I share Carnap’s astonishment that Quine finds the term “semantic rule” unintelligible while formulating no complaint against similar notions such as that of a syntactically well-formed formula, or that of an axiom etc. It appears that he cannot be satisfied with rules, because he expects a theory which would give us an empirical, i.e., a behavioristic, criterion of analyticity for natural languages. His chief dissatisfaction seems to come from the fact that no clear explicandum has been put forward — in contrast, e.g., with the notion of truth, where we have a sufficiently clear pre-theoretical concept. Thus, according to him, there is nothing that could be clarified by an explication. (shrink)

We have met in this conference to discuss “critical pluralism.” It will be a conference or discussion if the participants present different conceptions of critical pluralism based on different conceptions of criticism. Pluralism will enter the discussion in two ways: in the plurality of statements, which will be easy to recognize, and in the plurality or identity of what the statements are about, which will be problematic. There are three possible conclusions to which the discussion may lead. Some (...) of the participants may argue that only one of the opposed statements is about criticism and that the others may be about the work, but do not treat it as a literary work; these participants may so deny the possibility of critical pluralism. Some may present different modes of critical interpretation of a literary work and argue that they are different interpretations of the same work; these participants may recognize no need to differentiate different aspects in the work to which they interpretations are relevant. Finally, some may argue that the different modes of criticism apply to different aspects of the work which should be named differently and be treated by different methods, and which should be considered distinct objects of interpretation.The variety of critical methods and the variety of objects to which those methods can be applied are apparent when the reflexive relations between the pluralism of the interpretation of books and the pluralism of the circumstances and the matters that condition and constitute books are examined in a paradigm of possible forms and matters related to each other paradoxically. Many of the recurrent pairs of terms joined and differentiated in the literature of criticism are related paradoxically. Richard McKeon was the editor of The Basic Works of Aristotle, coeditor of Peter Abailard, Sic et Non: A Critical Edition, and author of Thought, Action, and Passion. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “Arts of Invention and Arts of Memory: Creation and Criticism” , “Canonic Books and Prohibited Books: Orthodoxy and Heresy in Religion and Culture” , and “Pride and Prejudice: Thought, Character, Argument, and Plot”. (shrink)

The author comments on the Consensus Statement from the point of view of an ethics consultant in Germany. Since many hospitals in Germany are under considerable competitive pressure, mission statements are becoming more and more important in order to draw a distinction between the different hospital types and to convey the meaning of the corporate identity both internally and externally. The Consensus Statement, which provides basic orientation without going into too much detail, can be a helpful initial document. (...) However, it does not deal with two specific problem areas which are examined more closely in the commentary: the application of risk-of-death algorithms in ICUs and the question of church membership of the caregivers to enable a proper preparation for death. The commentary also reveals certain differences in the discussions taking place in Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe. (shrink)

Knowledge of the ethical and legal basis of medicine is as essential to clinical practice as an understanding of basic medical sciences. In the UK, the General Medical Council requires that medical graduates behave according to ethical and legal principles and must know about and comply with the GMC’s ethical guidance and standards. We suggest that these standards can only be achieved when the teaching and learning of medical ethics, law and professionalism are fundamental to, and thoroughly integrated both (...) vertically and horizontally throughout, the curricula of all medical schools as a shared obligation of all teachers. The GMC also requires that each medical school provides adequate teaching time and resources to achieve the above. We reiterate that the adequate provision and coordination of teaching and learning of ethics and law requires at least one full-time senior academic in ethics and law with relevant professional and academic expertise. In this paper we set out an updated indicative core content of learning for medical ethics and law in UK medical schools and describe its origins and the consultative process by which it was achieved. (shrink)

In the article the basic procedures for finding of connective elements and resolving conflicts of references is analyzed. On the basis of this, a generalized algorithm is proposed that combines advantages of existing procedures for search for connective elements between phrases. The advantages of the selected procedures and their sequence are described, the formal description of input data and the results of the algorithm are presented. To optimize the procedure for scanning the text, the algorithm is performed as an (...) iterative reduction of the candidates for communication elements. This is achieved through the confirmation of non-conflict links and the gradual resolution of conflicts. (shrink)

The article is an attempt at establishing a theoretical basis for a dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy, with regard to the problem of internalism-externalism. It is argued, according to Roman Ingarden, that one has to first of all put forward an adequate question about the problem, to be able to understand it appropriately. Moreover, the analysis is limited to the two forms of the internalism-externalism debate, namely semantics and the philosophy of the mind. Within Husserl’s phenomenology one can easily (...) point to basic intuitions that justify thesis that this philosophy refers to the internalism-externalism problem. Ultimately, by using phenomenological terminology, the article arrives at questions about possible internalism-or-externalism within Husserl’s phenomenological project. The questions, however, suggest that phenomenology can be neither clearly nor completely classified either as internalism or as externalism. (shrink)

This article takes stock of the basic notions of Information Structure (IS). It first provides a general characterization of IS following Chafe (1976) within a communicative model of Common Ground (CG), which distinguishes between CG content and CG management. IS is concerned with those features of language that concern the local CG. It then defines and discusses the notions of Focus (as indicating alternatives) and its various uses, Givenness (as indicating that a denotation is already present in the CG), (...) and Topic (as specifying what an statement is about). It also proposes a new notion, Delimitation, which comprises contrastive topics and frame setters, and indicates that the current conversational move does not satisfy the local communicative needs totally. It also points out that the rhetorical structuring partly belongs to IS. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with a question in metaphysics. The question is: Is the world ultimately one, or is it many? It is neither a very profound nor a very complicated question. It is, on the contrary, very simple. But despite its simplicity, it expresses the most basic of all metaphysical problems.When two metaphysical problems, A and B, are so related that the statement of B assumes an answer to A, then we may fairly infer that A is more (...) basic than B, and B less basic than A. (shrink)

Managed care employs two business tools of managed practice that raise important ethical issues: paying physicians in ways that impose conflicts of interest on them; and regulating physicians' clinical judgment, decision making, and behavior. The literature on the clinical ethics of managed care has begun to develop rapidly in the past several years. Professional organizations of physicians have made important contributions to this literature. The statements on ethical issues in managed care of four such organizations are considered here, the (...) American Medical Association, the American College of Physicians, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Academy of Pediatrics. Three themes common to these statements are identified and critically assessed: the primacy of meeting the medical needs of each individual patient; disclosure of conflicts of interest in how physicians are paid; and opposition to gag orders. The paper concludes with an argument for a basic concept in the clinical ethics of managed care: physicians and institutions as economically disciplined moral co-fiduciaries of populations of patients. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BASIC GOODS AND THE HUMAN GOOD IN RECENT CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY }EAN PORTER University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana 0 NE OF THE MOST striking features of Catholic moral theology since Vatican II has been the reluctance of so many moral theologians, on all sides of the controversies which have characterized that discipline, to offer a substantive account of goodness and the human good as a basis (...) for understanding the moral life. There has been an extensive discussion of human goods (plural) and their relation to moral obligation, but no one, to my knowledge, has attempted to ground that discussion systematically in a substantive account of what it means to live a good human life which would precede and justify the identification of some goods as true or basic human goods. To the contrary, a number of the most influential moral theologians, led by Germain Grisez and John Finnis, insist that our knowledge of moral obligation cannot be based on any such general metaphysical or anthropological theory. Instead, they hold that morality is grounded in our recognition of certain basic goods, which are self-evident to us. My purpose in this essay is to examine the claim that some basic goods are self-evidently such to us. I will argue that Grisez and Finnis have not made a convincing case that there are selfevident basic goods. Moreover, I will argue that, to the extent that defenders of proportionalism do not challenge the GrisezFinnis account of basic goods, their alternative theories of morality are vitiated as well. I will conclude that the current debate in Catholic moral theology concerning the foundations of moral obligation might more fruitfully be cast as a debate over rival ac27 28 JEAN PORTER counts of the human good, than as a debate over the moral significance of particular goods. The Grisez/Finnis account of basic goods In order to understand the point of the account of self-evident basic goods developed by Grisez and Finnis, it will be necessary to see how this account functions in the context of their overall theory of morality.• This theory of morality begins with a general account of practical reason, which is then narrowed down into a theory of moral action, interpreted as action that is rational in the fullest possible sense. That is, this theory begins with the observation that all rational agents act in order to obtain or to preserve something that seems to be good, at least to that agent. But even the most rational agent can be mistaken as to whether this concrete desideratum is truly good, and in such a case the action is likely to be self-frustrating or even harmful to the agent (to say nothing of its consequences for others). Hence, the exigencies of practical reason itself, prior to the introduction of any properly moral consideration, force us to ask whether the seeming goods for which we act are true goods. And how are we to distinguish between true and seeming goods? Grisez and Finnis reply that the (true) good in its most general sense must be understood as that which is desirable, not only for this or that individual or in these special circumstances, but desirable per se, for every individual and in all situations. So far, this line of analysis will be familiar to anyone acquainted with scholastic philosophy. But at the next stage of the argu1 In my summary of the theory of morality put forth by Grisez and Finnis, I have relied primarily on the following works: John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Volume One: Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983); and Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 32 (1987), 99-151. The latter essay presents a summary of their theory including a detailed commentary on the earlier works through which it was developed, as well as responses to critics, and may be said to be the definitive statement of the Grisez/Finnis theory of morality up to now. BASIC GOODS AND THE HUMAN GOOD 29 ment, the originality... (shrink)

The phenomenon of fallacy is directly related to the nature of the person himself and the environment in which he lives. Knowing in which situations and how people are wrong will greatly prevent them from making Fallacies. For this reason, one of the most important aims of religions is to bring their followers to the happiness in this world and the hereafter, to determine the Fallacies that people may fall into beforehand and to reveal their reasons and solutions. The religions (...) of Judaism, Christianity and Islam are basically divinely based religions based on oneness (tawḥīd). However, Judaism and Christianity have been distorted for various reasons and have come out of the creed of oneness. One of the main reasons for their distancing from this primary source is that they make Fallacies on many issues, insist on this and do not take the necessary studies for a realistic solution. Because it is not possible to eliminate the fallacy without identifying the causes and finding solutions. The human being in communication and interaction with the beings around him establishes connections with them and makes decisions by reaching some conclusions. Disturbances in these connections, which are based on previous knowledge and experience, may cause fallacies in humans. Since the Tanakh and the Bible are sacred texts with distortion dimensions, the connections established with these sources may lead people to false beliefs on some issues instead of saving them from their Fallacies. The biggest mistake of the People of the Book, which is also the source of others, is that they see themselves not as servants of Allah but as their sons, adopted sons and especially friends. This situation led them to the distortions that they are exempt from certain orders and prohibitions and that they will be treated with privilege on the day of reckoning, or only they can enter the Paradise or they will stay in Hell for a limited number of days. Unfortunately, one of the reasons that lead them to think like this is the statements about themselves in the holy books they distorted. However, the Qurʾān has clearly revealed that their belief that they will be punished for a short time in Hell is a mistake and the truth is not as they claim. One of the most important issues of the Christian faith is the belief in the Trinity, which is the subject of constant debate both in the Christian world and in the Islamic world. Christians' excessive love for Jesus led them to the mistake of seeing Jesus as a divine being sent to save people from original sin, by not assuming him a human being. These thoughts of theirs were rejected in many verses of the Qurʾān and it is emphasized that Jesus is the servant and messenger of Allah. Another important mistake of the People of the Book is claiming that they were descended from Prophet Abraham and claiming the supremacy of lineage and therefore they did not accept the invitation of the Prophet Mohammed. In our study, we have discussed some basic distortions in the light of the Qurʾān, such as thinking that they are the beloved servants of Allah, ascribing deity to other than Allah, saying that Allah is not generous and that Paradise belongs to them what the people of the Book have fallen into while distorting their religion. From this point of view, first of all, we tried to determine the factors that affect Jews and Christians to fall into distortion that is to make wrong decisions that may result in disaster both worldly and otherworldly. Next, we examined how these factors, which we determined, affect the decision-making process and voluntary behaviors of people. Finally, we tried to determine the distortions that the Qurʾān deals with and the solutions it offers to eliminate these distortions in terms of the People of the Book. Although the Qurʾān and tafsīr (exegesis of the Qurʾān) sources constitute the main axis of our study, we also benefited from the sources of science such as psychology, sociology and morality. Unfortunately, it is seen that the People of the Book do not accept the distortion despite all the evidences, they still continue to feel superiority and choice both in terms of material and lineage, which leads them to distortions, and they act according to their old beliefs and behaviors. In addition, the fact that some Muslims in the past and today are led to these distortions is an indicator of how important the issue is. (shrink)

”It is often assumed that knowledge claims must be justified. But what kind of justification is required for knowledge ? . . . ” (*) -/- presupposition: the kind of epistemic justification depends on the type of the knowledge claim and its respective knowledge claim tradeoff ’vague vs. precise’. -/- procedere: in two - almost purely logical - case studies I account for this tradeoff and question in each case what (if any) were its general outcome wrt justification -/- first (...) for basic measurement statements of the form ′′ϕ(x) = r ∈ IR ± δ′′ (wrt ”measurement accuracy realism” debate) -/- and secondly predication statements of the form ′′x is ( a case of )P′′ (wrt ”epistemic vagueness” debate). (shrink)

A brief statement of the most basic principles of the discipline of Knowledge Management (KM).

BIEN’s definitive statement of a Basic Income (BI) and the commentaries on its five characteristics are examined in turn, to identify potential clarifications, revisions and omissions. The following amendments are proposed as a basis for further discussion: to shift the position of ‘unconditionally’ in the definitive statement so that it refers to the cash payment rather than to its delivery; some clarifications to characteristics 3 ‘individual’ and 4 ‘universal’; to introduce ‘uniform’, without which BIs could be used to endorse (...) flagrant discrimination against, or even zero amounts for, less favoured groups; to restore the comprehensive nature of ‘unconditionality’ (which is now characteristic 6), by substituting ‘behavioural requirement’ in place of ‘work requirement’; to give the characteristic ‘without means test’ its own commentary (no. 7). The introduction of ‘uniform’ and ‘behavioural’ into the definitive statement should help to prevent BIEN’s definition from being regarded as male orientated. (shrink)

This chapter first considers the most important of Kelsen's own express statements of a connection between his legal theory and the philosophy of Cohen. It then argues that Cohen's interpretations of Kant as well as his own ‘System of Philosophy’ actually differ profoundly from the historical Kant, thus showing the key theorem of Cohen's system to be not Kantian in origin but Platonic. Finally, the chapter considers the centrepiece of Kelsen's theory, the doctrine of the basic norm. It (...) shows that Kelsen's solution to the problem of establishing legal validity by appeal to the basic norm represents a direct application of the key theorem of Cohen's system, and that this theorem offers one plausible possibility — albeit not the only one — for the problem of validity on the basis of a concept of law that refers neither to natural law nor to any metajuridical source. (shrink)

The following definitions and explanations are decisions formulated arbitrarily in a sense. However, the underlying assumptions serving as a guide to their formulation are found in both pragmatism and logical positivism. Yet there has been some confusion of the difference between definitions, axioms, postulates, etc., and as a result there is a confusion of certain phases of formal and factual knowledge. For example, one notices in C. I. Lewis' works that all formal statements are thought of as “definitive.” A (...) more effective word, I believe, is “prescriptive.” Axioms are prescriptive, yet, as will be seen below, they are not definitions, and no one in practice conceives of them as such, as can be seen in mathematical works. Axioms prescribe the logical relationship between two or more concepts or words. If interpreted, the factual referents of the words, whose logical relations have been prescribed in axioms, are different. This is not the case with definitions. (shrink)

The view that the basic statements in some areas of language are never true or false absolutely, but only relative to an assessment-perspective, has been advanced by several philosophers in the last few years. This paper offers a critique of that position, understood first as a claim about our everyday concept of truth, and second as a claim about the key theoretical concept of an adequate empirical semantics. Central to this pair of critical discussions will be an argument (...) that the appeal of truth-relativism derives from a specific misconception: namely, that our ordinary concept of absolute truth is substantive — a form of metaphysical or epistemological determination. Building on this argument, the present paper aims to undercut relativism about truth both as a purely philosophical thesis and as an approach to the science of meaning. (shrink)

there are mathematical statements that cannot be proved or refuted using the usual axioms and rules of inference of mathematics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 311-315 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Fire and Water: Basic Issues in Asian Buddhism and Christianity Fire and Water: Basic Issues in Asian Buddhism and Christianity. By Aloysius Pieris, S. J. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1996. Aloysius Pieris, Jesuit priest and Buddhist scholar, is well known in theological and interreligious dialogue circles in Asia, and this is the third collection of essays of (...) his to be published in the Faith Meets Faith Series of Orbis Books. The eighteen essays which make up this book, all previously published elsewhere, are conveniently put together in three sections, under the following headings: 1) Women and Religion: Buddhist and Christian Appropriation of Feminist Criticism; 2) issues in Theology, Religion and Society; and 3) questions of Spirituality and Human Liberation. To merely summarize the content of the essays and offer a third-party critique would do injustice to the book, and could even mislead one who peruses such a summary into thinking one thereby "knows" what the book or Pieris is about. Such a hasty conclusion would deprive a would-be reader of the powerful experience that awaits in wrestling with Pieris through each essay of this volume. Judith Berling puts it well in her blurb at the back, pointing out that the author "uses poetry, evocative symbolism, and humor to offer a theological call to action in a voice that is liberationist, Asian, and feminist." Indeed, this volume invites one to a way of seeing that can also transform one's way of being in this world marked by increasing violence, poverty, and a systemic kind of oppression dehumanizing to both the perpetrators as well as the victims.The title of the present volume, Fire and Water, alludes to a dynamic dipolarity, masterfully sketched for the reader by Paul Knitter in his foreword, which underlies the author's vision of reality and vivifies much of his writing. The masculine and the feminine, the (Buddhist) gnostic and the (Christian) agapeic, the metacosmic (transcendent) [End Page 311] and the cosmic (immanent), the prophetic and the mystical, are different ways of naming this dipolarity. The way to ultimate liberation is in the effective embrace of both poles in complementarity and mutual interplay, whereas taking one pole in preference over the other results in a warped vision or mode of being, in imbalance, or even in abuse.In this review I would like to simply echo some key themes that will jump at one perusing the essays, reiterating that the very act of reading them can of itself be a transformative experience for an open-minded, open-hearted, and open-handed reader.The thrust of the six essays comprising the first section can perhaps be summed up in the thesis as formulated by the author himself: "Religion cannot survive in the future without appropriating the feminist critique, just as feminism cannot achieve its liberative goal without the aid of a religion so critiqued" (p. 62). Behind this statement is Pieris' emphatically critical stance, on the one hand, against all forms of patriarchal religion, whether Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, or other, which has justified, lent a hand in, or continued to perpetrate the physical, psychological, and especially religious abuse of women, and on the other hand, against secularist (or anti-religious) kinds of feminist theory that take off on what he enumerates as "five false starts" (pp. 50-51), which only result in unnecessary dichotomies that truncate the understanding of the goal of liberation, and consequently of the human as such.Pieris offers a vision of liberation centered on what he terms the humanum. This refers to the point of ultimate perfection to which the human, that is, "whatever pertains to men and women as self-conscious, other-oriented, and dreaming components of the cosmos," has the capacity to carry the cosmos. In this context, the human is no other than "this self-transcendent capacity immanent in the cosmos, this power to unfold within itself the Other, which is ever present from the first moment of evolution." To be human is inherently to be endowed... (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga’s account of proper basicality, which suggests a “broad foundationalism,” raises nagging questions. A first such question is how a disposition to accept certain beliefs as properly basic could contribute to their being so. A second is whether broadfoundationalists can really make headway in identifying the criteria of proper basicality by using, as Plantinga suggests, an inductive approach. A third is whether members of the set of statements that give criteria for proper basicality are (a) themselves properly (...) basic and (b) necessary or only contingent truths. I argue that each of these questions has a satisfactory answer, although at Ieast one inductive approach to detennining proper basicality fails. (shrink)

We present a unified approach for investigating rational reasoning about basic argument forms involving indicative conditionals, counterfactuals, and basic quantified statements within coherence-based probability logic. After introducing the rationality framework, we present an interactive view on the relation between normative and empirical work. Then, we report a new experiment which shows that people interpret indicative conditionals and counterfactuals by coherent conditional probability assertions and negate conditionals by negating their consequents. The data support the conditional probability interpretation of (...) conditionals and the narrow-scope reading of the negation of conditionals. Finally, we argue that coherent conditional probabilities are important for probabilistic analyses of conditionals, nonmonotonic reasoning, quantified statements, and paradoxes. (shrink)

One of the basic theorems in universal algebra is Birkhoff's variety theorem: the smallest equationally axiomatizable class containing a class K of algebras coincides with the class obtained by taking homomorphic images of subalgebras of direct products of elements of K. G. Gratzer asked whether the variety theorem is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice. In 1980, two of the present authors proved that Birkhoff's theorem can already be derived in ZF. Surprisingly, the Axiom of Foundation plays a crucial (...) role here: we show that Birkhoff's theorem cannot be derived in ZF + AC {Foundation}. even if we add Foundation for Finite Sets. We also prove that the variety theorem is equivalent to a purely set-theoretical statement, the Collection Principle. This principle is independent of $ZF \{\operatorname{Foundation}$ . The second part of the paper deals with further connections between axioms of ZF-set theory and theorems of universal algebra. (shrink)

An anthology of basic statements by the most influential social and political philosophers of Western civilization. Includes Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Mill, Marx and Engels, Hitler, Gandhi, and others.

The article presents the results of a more extensive work on soviet historiography of philosophy. the first thing to note is that there is a well-developed soviet historiography of philosophy. it has developed remarkably since 1947--including expansion of the history of the philosophy of the peoples of the soviet union. the article also discusses the principles that underlie soviet historiography of philosophy: partisanship, and the unity of historicism and internationalism. an examination of the discussions about the object of history of (...) philosophy as a science shows that the basic statement is that philosophy develops according to laws. (shrink)

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein argued that there are metaphysical truths. But these are ineffable, for metaphysical sentences try to say what can only be shown. Accordingly, they are pseudo-propositions because they are ill-formed. In the Investigations he no longer thought that metaphysical propositions are pseudo-propositions, but argued that they are either nonsense or norms of descriptions. Popper criticized Wittgenstein’s ideas and argued that metaphysical truths are effable. Yet it is by now clear that he misunderstood Wittgenstein’s arguments and misguidedly thought (...) that Wittgenstein used the principle of verification for distinguishing empirical propositions from metaphysical propositions. Because Popper developed his philosophy in part as a critique of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, this invites the question of whether these misunderstandings have consequences for his own philosophy. I discuss this question and argue that Popper’s attempt to distinguish metaphysics and science with the aid of a criterion of testability is from Wittgenstein’s perspective misguided. The main problem facing Popper’s philosophy is that alleged metaphysical propositions are not theoretical propositions but rules for descriptions. If Wittgenstein’s ideas are correct, then metaphysical problems are not scientific but grammatical problems which can only be resolved through conceptual investigations. (shrink)

Resumen: La aproximación que Durkheim esboza en Las Reglas es en la actualidad más bien criticada: sería una visión conservadora, que olvida la importancia de los agentes y una sociología de lo social que solo observa el orden establecido. Sin embargo, una lectura atenta de Las Reglas muestra que sus afirmaciones básicas -que es un hecho social, que debe ser visto como una cosa, y que debe buscarse su explicación a través de otros hechos sociales- son correctas y pueden integrar (...) los elementos válidos de las críticas realizadas. Detrás del rechazo a Durkheim aparece el rechazo a una afirmación radical de Las Reglas que nos resulta más bien intolerable: que la imposición es parte natural de la vida social.: The approach that Durkheim delineates in The Rules of Sociological Method is currently criticized: it is a conservative view that forgets the relevance of agents and it is a social sociology that only observes established order. However, an intensive reading of The Rules shows that their basic statements -about what is a social fact, that they should be treated as things, and that their explanation should be searched in other social facts- are correct one and they can integrate the correct elements argued by its critics. Behind the rejection to Durkheim there is the rejection to a radical statement in The Rules, one that is unbearable for us: that coercion is a natural part of social life. (shrink)

Commentary on the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, fl. 850-910, exegesis of Gautama's Nyayasutra, basic statement of the classic Hindu Nyaya philosophy; critical edition.

This Dorda's opus vitae was ready for publication in 1970 but it contains many cogent arguments and observations. Although in many instances new advancements have been made in physics and mathematics, Dorda's basic statements and observations on causality are still relevant and interesting today. Dorda's treatise comprises an Introduction and four parts.

Die Frage: sind empirische Theorien falsifizierbar? ist natürlich trivialerweise zu verneinen, falls man Theorien nicht als Mengen von Aussagen, sonden z. B., wie Sneed/Stegmüller, als mengentheoretische Strukturen plus intendierte Anwendungsbereiche auffaßt. Daß die Antwort, zumindest dann, wenn man die Fragestellung auf bestimmte physikalische Theorien einschränkt, auch bei Zugrundelegung der sogenannten Aussagen-Konzeption (statement view) nicht anders lautet, ist hingegen schon weniger trivial — obgleich seit langem bekannt, spätestens nämlich seit Duhems berühmter Argumentation gegen die Möglichkeit eines experimentum crucis. Andererseits beruht eine (...) der derzeit einflußreichsten methodologischen Theorien, die von Popper, gerade auf der gegenteiligen Behauptung. Erst jüngst noch hat Popper seine Falsifizierbarkeits-Annahme, vor allem gegen Kritiken von Lakatos und Putnam, zu verteidigen versucht; die gleiche Intention verfolgen auch zwei Aufsätze von Musgrave. Es erscheint mir daher angebracht, kurz auf das Problem der Falsifizierbarkeit von empirischen Theorien zurückzukommen.Vorweg noch zwei Bemerkungen zur Terminologie: 1) Ich verwende, ohne mich auf den Versuch einer genaueren Explikation einzulassen, den Begriff (physikalische) Theorie in dem für den statement view geläufigen Sinne, wonach eine (deterministische) Theorie aus einer Menge von allgemeinen (deterministischen Natur-)Gesetzen besteht. Es sei ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen, daß dies wenigstens partiell dem sonst üblichen Sprachgebrauch zuwider läuft: die Theorie des Planetensystems und die Mondtheorie, beispielsweise, sind keine Theorien im genannten Sinne, weil sie außer auf allgemeinen Naturgesetzen noch auf spezifischen nicht-gesetzesartigen Annahmen beruhen. Andrerseits dürfte diese Deutung des Begriffs Theorie zumindest mit derjenigen von Popper übereinstimmen. — 2) Daß eine Aussage bzw. Aussagenmenge T falsifizierbar ist, soll, wie bei Popper, bedeuten, daß Basissätze (wahre oder falsche) existieren, die zusammen mit T eine inkonsistente Satzmenge bilden; m.a.W.: falsifizierbar ist T in the simple logical sense of being logically incompatible with some basic statements. It has potential falsifiers. Basissätze sind dabei, grob gesagt, als Darstellungen von Beobachtungs-Befunden aufzufassen; Genaueres interessiert hier nur insoweit, als es sich umraum-zeitlich singuläre (Existenz-) Sätze handeln muß. Entsprechend soll schließlich T als falsifiziert gelten, wenn es wahre bzw. anerkannte oder akzeptierte Basissätze gibt, die T widersprechen. (Poppers Forderung, daß diese Basissätze ein reproduzierbares Phänomen beschreiben, also eine — allgemeine — falsifizierende Hypothese bewähren müssen, kann im vorliegenden Zusammenhang außer Betracht bleiben). (shrink)

The content-analysis of the Russian federal and regional basic legislation on the cultural policy has indicated a need in a deep revision of all existing regulatory legal acts, which support the state cultural policy implementation towards building a universal terminology and vesting the functions on the cultural policy implementation in the government as opposed to the statement of the departmental specific approach to the culture.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Augustinian Is Aquinas's Basic Account of Free Decision?Jamie Anne SpieringIntroductionQuestions about Augustine's influence on Thomas Aquinas are always interesting. In the previous century, leading Thomists such as Marie Dominic Chenu, Jean-Pierre Torrell, and Étienne Gilson wrote about the influence of one great master on the other. However, no one thinks the investigation is complete: the contributions of the new century have begun and are expected to continue.1 (...) In this article, I would like to consider how Augustine influenced Aquinas's account of something known to both authors as liberum arbitrium: free choice, or free decision.2 When we speak of grace and [End Page 435] human freedom, Aquinas's debt to Augustine and the extent of his fidelity to the master have been frequently explored.3 The same is true with regard to the fairly advanced question of the relation between human freedom and divine foreknowledge.4 But in this article I would like to consider Thomas's treatment of what we might call the basic questions surrounding man's ability to choose freely—questions about its essence and its existence. What is this liberum arbitrium, which Augustine repeatedly calls "a gift of nature"? How should we understand its activity? How should we understand its origin? Thomas Aquinas deals with liberum arbitrium as a power of the soul in question 83 of Summa theologiae [ST] I, in question 24 of De veritate, and in chapter 48 of Summa contra gentiles [SCG] II. These texts are not about the role of grace or the causality of God—though they prepare for the discussion—but simply about the powers of an intellectual nature. How Augustinian is Aquinas's account in these texts?5 [End Page 436] I will try to explore the question with reasonable thoroughness in this paper.6It will surprise no one to hear that my answer to "was Aquinas an Augustinian in his basic treatment of free decision?" is "in a way, no, and in a way, yes." It is both surprising and notable how significantly Aquinas departs from the Augustinian path. The first part of this paper will discuss three major ways in which Aquinas's account of liberum arbitrium breaks openly (by medieval standards) from the type of careful loyalty we see in earlier authors. In the second part of the paper, I will argue that Aquinas's account follows Augustine in distinctive ways: instead of prioritizing Augustine's context and preferred evidence for free decision, Aquinas does more to locate free decision within the quest for happiness which provided the ultimate pattern for Augustine's thought. He is an Augustinian, but of a very different kind.Aquinas's Treatment of Liberum Arbitrium Represents a Significant Break with the Augustinian TraditionIt simply was not Thomas's practice to write statements such as: "I am going to treat this topic in a way different from that of Augustine, and I plan to make significant improvements." How, then, can we understand whether, and to what extent, he made a break with Augustine's ideas? Direct comparison of the authors' works is the obvious strategy, but such comparison is complicated by our ignorance of whether Aquinas had actually seen the work in question or was only familiar with quotations from it. So I will employ an additional strategy to reveal Aquinas's breaks with Augustine: I will compare Thomas's work to that of Peter Lombard and Anselm of Canterbury. We know Aquinas had read Peter's work thoroughly, because [End Page 437] he wrote a commentary on it, and citations in De veritate reveal that Thomas knew at least the highlights of Anselm's work on free decision. Both Peter and Anselm are faithful to many aspects of Augustine's treatment: they follow him in the way they contextualize the topic, and they are careful to use Augustinian language in defining it. Aquinas does not. He radically shifts the context for the liberum arbitrium discussion and rejects definitions that use Augustine's formulations. He uses a boldly Aristotelian framework to replace a number of elements in Augustine's treatment. Finally, unlike Augustine, Peter, or Anselm, he asks about the... (shrink)

An analysis of the role of language in basic and applied science from the semantics of science and the theory of reference requires several steps. First, to specify the field of analysis in the light of several factors: the semantic problems of science; the reference in its triple dimension of relation between language and reality, of referent and of transmission in science; and the link between meaning and reference in science.Second, to consider the central approach to the semantics of (...) science, which forks into two main directions: the semantic line and the pragmatic path. De facto, they lead to different interpretations of the role of language in basic science and in applied science. The semantic line focuses on the content expressed through terms, statements and theories, which has been influential in important philosophical trends and still is prominent in some versions of scientific realism. Meanwhile, the pragmatic path emphasizes the meaning as use, which has influenced philosophers of science of diverse tendencies, such as S. Toulmin, Th. Kuhn, American pragmatists and supporters of the methodological pluralism.Third, to make explicit the leading conceptions regarding the theory of reference, both for the formal sciences and for the empirical sciences. There are a number of options, four of which are analyzed here. The view associated with the semantic role and the semantic value, which connects semantic, epistemological and ontological realms in basic science and in applied science. The causal theory of reference, which has shifted towards internal realism. Anti-realistic semantics, where truth is replaced by proof and the reference is the use made by someone of a term in a context. Kuhn’s approach in his linguistic period, where he rethinks the scientific revolutions taking into account the causal theory of reference.Fourth, to be aware of the consequences of these analyses for basic science and applied science in two ways: on the one hand, for the semantic differences between them, and, on the other, for the perspective of reference. (shrink)

Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the (...) Humean and Cartesian insights are both initially appealing, yet they appear to be in tension with one another. In this paper I attempt to satisfy both intuitions by developing a roughly descriptivist account of self-reference according to which our certainty in basic beliefs stems precisely from our needing to know so little in order to have them. (shrink)

In this collection, Reginald D. Archambault has assembled John Dewey's major writings on education. He has also included basic statements of Dewey's philosophic position that are relevant to understanding his educational views. These selections are useful not only for understanding Dewey's pedagogical principles, but for illustrating the important relation between his educational theory and the principles of his general philosophy.

Tr(A) iff ‡K(A) To remedy the error, Dummett’s proposes the following inductive characterization of truth: (i) Tr(A) iff ‡K(A), if A is a basic statement; (ii) Tr(A and B) iff Tr(A) & Tr(B); (iii) Tr(A or B) iff Tr(A) v Tr(B); (iv) Tr(if A, then B) iff (Tr(A) Æ Tr(B)); (v) Tr(it is not the case that A) iff ¬Tr(A), where the logical constant on the right-hand side of each biconditional clause is understood as subject to the laws of (...) intuitionistic logic.2 The only other principle in play in Dummett’s discussion is (+) A iff Tr(A), which, as he notes, the anti-realist is likely to accept. (shrink)

The central idea of Lakatos’ quasi-empiricism view of the philosophy of mathematics is that truth values are transmitted bottom-up, but only falsity can be transmitted from basic statements. As it is falsity but not truth that flows bottom-up, Lakatos emphasizes that observation and induction play no role in both conjecturing and proving phases in mathematics. In this paper, I argue that Lakatos’ view that one cannot obtain primitive conjectures by induction contradicts the history of mathematics, and therefore undermines (...) his quasi-empiricism theory. I argue that his misconception of induction causes this view of Lakatos. Finally, I propose that Wittgenstein’s view that “mathematics does have a grammatical nature, but it is also rooted in empirical regularities” suggests the possibility to improve Lakatos’ view by maintaining his quasi-empiricism while accepting the role induction plays in the conjecturing phase. (shrink)

Ḥanafī scholars resorted to various methods such as abrogation (naskh), specification (takhṣīṣ), preference, (tarjīh) interpretation (taʾwīl) in order to eliminate the incompatibility between the views of the founding authorities of the madhab (ashāb) and the nass (verses and hadiths). According to the famous narration attributed to Abu’l-Hasan al-Karkhī (d. 340/952), one of the Iraqī Ḥanafī scholars, it is thought that the nass contradicting the views of the madhhab scholars are abrogated, or that other evidence is preferred over them, but it (...) is more appropriate to reconcile and interpret them. However, this approach adopted by the Hanafīs has brought some criticism and accusations that the views of the madhab scholars are prioritized over the nass or that these were ignored in the face of their views. On the other hand, the discourse that the views of the madhab scholars should be preferred in case of incompatibility between the views of theirs and the nass, seems problematic and in need of explanation at first glance. Due to the reason mentioned, these statements, which reveal the general attitude of Ḥanafīs, need to be explained theoretically. In this study, firstly, the Hanafīs’ justifications for adopting this approach are discussed, and then it is seen that this does not mean “the nass is ignored or the views of the jurists are prioritized” as it is claimed. (shrink)