In recent years, several formalisms for program construction have appeared. One such formalism is the type theory developed by Per Martin-L f. Well suited as a theory for program construction, it makes possible the expression of both specifications and programs within the same formalism. Furthermore, the proof rules can be used to derive a correct program from a specification as well as to verify that a given program has a certain property. This book contains a thorough introduction to type theory, (...) with information on polymorphic sets, subsets, monomorphic sets, and a full set of helpful examples. (shrink)

Se trata de un articulo que me lo he bajado de la página de Mplus. En realidad es un DRAFT en lugar de un artículo (no lo puedo citar). Explica cómo realizar análisis Bayesianos y cuándo es conveniente utilizarlos. Es una técnica que se emplea al par del Bootstrapping (aunque su base sea diferente). Pero es interesante porque está disponible en análisis multinivel y puede ser útil cuando los parámetros no son normales y o la muestra es pequeña (el ejemplo (...) multinivel que muestra tiene sólamente 10 clusters a nivel between). (shrink)

Harm-reduction approaches are used to reduce the burden of risky human behaviour without necessarily aiming to stop the behaviour. We discuss what an introduction of harm reduction for doping in sports would mean in parallel with a relaxation of the antidoping rule. We analyse what is ethically at stake in the following five levels: (1) What would it mean for the athlete (the self)? (2) How would it impact other athletes (the other)? (3) How would it affect the phenomenon of (...) sport as a game and its fair play basis (the play)? (4) What would be the consequences for the spectator and the role of sports in society (the display)? and (5) What would it mean for what some consider as essential to being human (humanity)? For each level, we present arguments for and against doping and then discuss what a harm-reduction approach, within a dynamic regime of a partially relaxed antidoping rule, could imply. We find that a harm-reduction approach is morally defensible and potentially provides a viable escape out of the impasse resulting from the impossibility of attaining the eradication of doping. The following question remains to be answered: Would a more relaxed position, when combined with harm-reduction measures, indeed have less negative consequences for society than today9s all-out antidoping efforts that aim for abstinence? We provide an outline of an alternative policy, allowing a cautious step-wise change to answer this question and then discuss the ethical aspects of such a policy change. (shrink)

Ockham’s razor is the idea that simpler hypotheses are to be preferred over more complex ones. In the context of medical diagnosis, this is taken to mean that when a patient has multiple symptoms, a single diagnosis should be sought that accounts for all the clinical features, rather than attributing a different diagnosis to each. This paper examines whether diagnostic parsimony can be justified by reference to probability theory. I argue that while attempts to offer universal justifications of diagnostic parsimony (...) fail, a more constrained use of this diagnostic principle can be supported. (shrink)

Is science in the midst of a crisis of replicability and false discoveries? In a recent article, Alexander Bird offers an explanation for the apparent lack of replicability in the biomedical sciences. Bird argues that the surprise at the failure to replicate biomedical research is a result of the fallacy of neglecting the base rate. The base-rate fallacy arises in situations in which one ignores the base rate—or prior probability—of an event when assessing the probability of this event in the (...) light of some observed evidence. By extension, the replication crisis would result from ignoring the low prior probability of biomedical hypotheses. In this paper, my response to Bird’s claim is twofold. First, I show that the argument according to which the replication crisis is due to the low prior of biomedical hypotheses is incomplete. Second, I claim that a simple base-rate fallacy model does not account for some important methodological insights that have emerged in discussions of the replication crisis. (shrink)

. My main claim is that explanations are fundamentally about relations between concepts and not, for example, essentially requiring laws, causes, or particular initial conditions. Nor is their linguistic form essential. I begin by showing that this approach solves some well-known old problems and then proceeds to argue my case using heuristic analogies with mathematical proofs. I find that an explanation is something that connects explanandum and explanans by apprehensible steps that penetrate into more fundamental levels than that of explanandum. (...) This leads to a deeper discussion of what it means to be more fundamental. Although I am not able to give a general definition, I argue that linguistic entities and empirical concepts are usually not fundamental, much relying on the distinction between complete and depleted ideas or experiences. (shrink)

The basic theory of preference relations contains a trivial part reflected by axioms A1 and A2, which say that preference relations are preorders. The next step is to find other axims which carry the theory beyond the level of the trivial. This paper is to a great part a critical survey of such suggested axioms. The results are much in the negative — many proposed axioms imply too strange theorems to be acceptable as axioms in a general theory of preference. (...) This does not exclude, of course, that they may well be reasonable axioms for special calculi of preference. I believe that many axioms which are rejected here may be plausible if their range of application is restricted by conditions which are possible to formulate only in a language richer than that of the propositional calculus, e.g. in one containing modal operators or probabilistic concepts. (shrink)

Locke has been accused of endorsing a theory of kinds that is inconsistent with his theory of individuation. This purported inconsistency comes to the fore in Locke’s treatment of cases involving organisms and the masses of matter that constitute them, for example, the case of a mass constituting an oak tree. In this essay, I argue that this purported problem, known as ‘The Kinds Problem’, can be solved. The Kinds Problem depends on the faulty assumption that nominal essences include only (...) features observable at a time t. Once this assumption is rejected, new candidates open up for the relevant difference in the world that is included in the nominal essence of e.g. mass but not oak tree. And I argue that there is at least one good candidate for the extrinsic feature observable only over time in which the mass differs from the oak it constitutes, namely its persistence conditions. The Kinds Problem can be solved. (shrink)

All definitions of mental disorder are backed up by arguments that rely on general criteria (e.g., that a definition should be consistent with ordinary language). These desiderata are rarely explicitly stated, and there has been no systematic discussion of how different definitions should be assessed. To arrive at a well-founded list of desiderata, we need to know the purpose of a definition. I argue that this purpose must be practical; it should, for example, help us determine who is entitled to (...) publicly funded health care. I then propose eight conditions of adequacy that can be used to assess competing definitions (e.g., the ordinary language condition, the coherence condition, and the condition of normative adequacy). These conditions pull in different directions, however, and we must decide which are most important. I also suggest that there is no single definition that can help us deal with all the relevant practical issues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Art and Science, Facts and KnowledgeBengt Brülde (bio)Keywordsart, definitions, epistemology, facts and values, mental disorder, metaphysical realism, nominalism, physical disorder, social constructivismThe main purpose of my original article was to find out how the evaluative content of the concept of mental disorder, i.e. its "value component," should be characterized. Both Tyreman and Ross are focusing on other things, however. Tyreman seems to agree with my analysis, and his primary (...) objective is to find out whether my general analytical approach can be extended to other areas, e.g. whether it can be used to analyze the concept of physical disorder or the concept of art. It is hard to tell whether Ross agrees with my view, since her entire commentary is focused on a few assumptions I made in the beginning of the paper, mainly in passing, to make my evaluative investigation more manageable. In short, the main content of my original paper is never really challenged, and I do not think I have to revise my view on the evaluative content of the concept of mental disorder. Both commentaries give rise to questions that are interesting in their own right, however, e.g. questions about art and science, and about facts and knowledge. This gives me the opportunity to develop my views on a number of topics that I never touched upon in the original article, e.g. the purpose of defining "mental disorder," the factual component of the concept, the connection between ontological and epistemological issues, and the value-neutrality of science. I am very grateful to the editors for allowing me to give such an extensive reply.My Reply to TyremanTyreman wants to know whether the same kind of analysis given in my original paper can be applied just as usefully to other areas of health care. That is, the question is whether the same type of analytical approach can be extended to other areas where evaluative considerations seem to play a crucial part. In his commentary, Tyreman has mainly four areas in mind, namely physical disorder, art, good art, and good (competent) clinical practice. Or more specifically, the question is whether the kind of evaluative analysis I used in my original paper can help us answer the following four questions: (a) How should we define the concept of physical disorder, i.e. according to what criteria should we draw the line between physical disorders and other physical conditions? (b) How should we define the concept of art, i.e. according to what criteria should we draw the line between art and other artifacts and performances? (c) What is good art, i.e. according to what criteria should we evaluate those artifacts (etc.) that we have decided to categorize as works of art? (d) What makes a clinical performance or practice good or competent, according to what criteria should we evaluate such practices?The first two questions are conceptual, i.e. the question is how certain concepts should be [End Page 111] defined, and in what way or ways values enter the picture. The last two questions are straightforwardly evaluative, however, and it goes without saying that we have to rely on value judgments to answer these questions. This difference suggests that the conceptual analyses needed in the first two cases are somewhat different from the evaluative analyses needed in the last two cases. It is also far more likely that my analysis of mental disorder can be extended to the first two cases. After all, my approach is designed to capture the evaluative content of concepts that are not purely evaluative. (We will return to this below.)To see whether my analysis can be of any help in any of Tyreman's four cases, we need to recapitulate what it is all about. The analysis in question is specifically concerned with how the evaluative content of the concept of mental disorder should be characterized, i.e. how and to what extent we have to rely on value judgments to distinguish mental disorders from other conditions. The first part of the analysis consists in the formulation of four questions that any reasonably complete account needs to answer. These questions are: (0... (shrink)

One vexed philosophical question that once enjoyed great esteem is this: in the Beatific Vision that the saints enjoy in heaven, does happiness (beatitudo) consist in the vision of God, in delight in God, or in a combination of the vision and the delight? The answer that one gives to this question apparently commits one to a view about what happiness is ultimately about. It has long been thought that Aquinas holds that happiness consists in the vision of God alone. (...) In this essay, I argue that, on this important issue, Aquinas actually maintains that happiness consists both in the vision of God and delight in God, but that—unlike some of his contemporaries—Aquinas unequivocally affirms that the vision is more important in happiness than the delight. After arguing for this interpretation, I consider the quite compelling account of perfect and imperfect happiness that seems to follow from it. (shrink)

Is God happy? In the tradition of classical theism, the answer has long been “Yes.” And, just as God is not merely powerful, but all-powerful, so too God is not merely happy, but all-happy or infinitely happy. Far from being empty praise, God’s happiness does important work, in particular, in explaining both human existence and human destiny. This essay is an attempt to give divine happiness the serious philosophical treatment it deserves. It turns out that, as with many divine traits, (...) ascribing all-happiness to God is not without potential problems. I raise and attempt to address what I take to be the most serious problem, which I call “The Subjective Problem of Evil.”. (shrink)

Four studies examined 15- to 16-month-olds’ imitation of a model’s novel action with a familiar or an unfamiliar object. The infants observed a reliable or an unreliable model demonstrating a novel action with the object in a solitary observational or in an interactive context. The model’s reliability was manipulated by having the model acting competently or incompetently with different familiar objects. In two out of four studies infants imitated the model’s behavior when the model had previously shown to be reliable (...) than when the model had been unreliable. The infants’ motivation to imitate was related to whether the reliable model interacted with the infants during object demonstration. More infants imitated the reliable model, who demonstrated the objects while interacting with the infants, than the reliable model who behaved in a disinterested manner during object demonstration. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Takacs and Bourrat (Biol Philos 37:12, 2022) examine the use of geometric mean reproductive output as a measure of biological fitness. We welcome Takacs and Bourrat’s scrutiny of a fitness definition that some philosophers have adopted uncritically. We also welcome Takacs and Bourrat’s attempt to marry the philosophical literature on fitness with the biological literature on mathematical measures of fitness. However, some of the main claims made by Takacs and Bourrat are not correct, while others are (...) correct but not for the reasons they give. (shrink)

(1996). Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Ziauddin Sardar on Islam and science: Marginalization or modernization of a religious tradition. Social Epistemology: Vol. 10, Islamic Social Epistemology, pp. 273-287.

The relationship between decision theory and the theory of natural selection in evolutionary biology offers a fertile ground for philosophical inquiry. A topic that has recently been addressed in the philosophical literature is the connection between decision-theoretic and biological discussions of risk. The paper adds to this literature by drawing attention to a distinction between two different notions of risk originating in the economic literature and by exploring their relationship in a biological context. More specifically, the paper shows that the (...) two notions of risk can part ways in models of risk-sensitive foraging theory. The paper also draws attention to an important difference in contemporary explanations of the apparent lack of empirical success of rational choice theory and risk-sensitive foraging theory. (shrink)

A so called “weak value” of an observable in quantum mechanics (QM) may be obtained in a weak measurement + post-selection procedure on the QM system under study. Applied to number operators, it has been invoked in revisiting some QM paradoxes (e.g., the so called Three-Box Paradox and Hardy’s Paradox). This requires the weak value to be interpreted as a bona fide property of the system considered, a par with entities like operator mean values and eigenvalues. I question such an (...) interpretation; it has no support in the basic axioms of quantum mechanics and it leads to unreasonable results in concrete situations. (shrink)

The main question is whether chemically induced mood enhancement is likely to make us happier, or whether it may rather have detrimental effects on our long-term happiness. This question is divided into three: What effects are mood -enhancing drugs likely to have on the long-term happiness of the person who takes these drugs? How would these drugs affect the happiness of the immediate environment of the people who take them, e.g. children or spouses? What effects would a wide-spread use of (...) mood -enhancing drugs have on society as a whole, and how would this affect the long-term happiness of its citizens? My answers to these questions are very tentative, partly because we know too little about what non-hedonic effects these drugs can be expected to have. It is possible that these drugs would have detrimental effects on some determinants of happiness, however, e.g. marriage and friendship, social and physical activity, rational problem-solving and mental effectiveness, political participation and interpersonal trust. But on the other hand, there are also a number of determinants of happiness that might be positively affected by a wide-spread and frequent use of mood -enhancing drugs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 13.2 (2006) 133-141MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Dysfunctions, Disabilities, and Disordered MindsBengt BrüldeFilip RadovicRichard Gipps' and Jerome Wakefield's commentaries on our article are so different from each other that we have decided to deal with them separately. Gipps suggests that we adopt a different framework altogether. In his view, our main question—"What makes a mental disorder mental?"—is somehow defective, and it ought to be replaced by (...) an alternative question, namely, "What makes a mind disordered?" He thinks he can answer this question by providing an alternative account of the mental in terms of intentionality and suigeneris psychological understanding. He also suggests that mental disorders are "alterations within the intentional order." Wakefield, on the other hand, shares most of our "framework assumptions"; for example, he accepts the way we formulate our central question and how we present the different possible answers. The only part of our general project to which he objects is the attempt to find a principled account of what makes a mental function (dysfunction, mechanism, ability, or the like) mental. His main purpose is to defend and develop his own version of the internal cause view, namely, the idea that mental disorders are (harmful) mental dysfunctions. Because Gipps' comments are of a far more general nature than Wakefield's, we respond to Gipps first. This gives us an opportunity to make our "framework assumptions" more explicit.Gipps' Criticism of the Notion of Mental DisorderLet us first note that Gipps' suggestions are often vague. As Gipps himself puts it, his account is "clearly in need of much further clarification and elaboration" (121). This means that we sometimes have to reconstruct what he says to attribute sufficiently clear views to him.Gipps questions our assumption that there is such a thing as a general category of disorder, of which mental and somatic disorders can be regarded as subcategories. Or more precisely, he rejects the view that "disorder" is a proper category (or "semantic category," as he puts it), and he also seems to deny that "mental disorder" is a category. This is supposed to imply that our central question is somehow wrongly formulated, and to pave the way for his reformulation of this question (from now on, "the move").To determine whether Gipps' objection is valid or not, we need to know what he means by the term "category." However, all we are told is that a noun designates a (semantic) category if and only if it has a "unitary sense." Unfortunately, he does not specify what this "unitary sense" consists in. For example, does he implicitly assume that a noun designates a category if and only if there are necessary conditions for membership that are jointly sufficient? The example he offers (see [End Page 133] p. 118) suggests another possible interpretation, however. Here, he claims that the relation between the terms "mental disorder" and "physical disorder" are analogous to the relation between the terms "chemical reaction" and "emotional reaction." This suggests that the term "disorder" as it occurs in the phrase "physical disorder" and the term "disorder" as it occurs in the phrase "mental disorder" have different senses. This is an interesting suggestion that may well be correct, but Gipps does not offer any arguments for the assumption that "disorder" behaves like "reaction." Neither does he offer any examples of proper (semantic) categories.The Move from "Mental Disorders" to "Disordered Minds"In Gipps' view, mental disorders are best conceived of as disorders of the mind, and physical disorders as disorders of the body, and he therefore suggests that we ask what makes a disordered mind disordered rather than what makes a mental disorder mental. But why does Gipps believe that this move from "mental disorder" to "disordered minds" constitutes an improvement? The first reason has already been given, namely that the term "disorder" might not designate a proper category. But this is not a good reason for making the move Gipps suggests unless we assume that "mind" and "body" are proper categories. At this... (shrink)

During recent years, there has been a growing awareness that a better understanding of human activities and the behavioural components of environmental problems is needed. This volume brings together psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, historians of technology and economics, and management experts to identify and examine the rules and motives that govern the environmental behaviour of individuals, households, organizations and society as a whole. Illustrated with case studies from Scandinavia, it shows how behaviours with negative or positive environmental effects are often performed (...) without such consequences in mind. The book discusses how change towards positive environmental behaviour often conflicts with deep-rooted habits as well as exploring the importance for environmental practice of different everyday contexts. By presenting this multi-disciplinary analysis, the volume provides a comprehensive understanding of how behavioural change in relation to the environment can come about and how this can be integrated in the political framework. (shrink)

From good intentions to real life: introducing crisis resolution teams in Norway In Norway, as in most western countries, the adult services for people experiencing mental health problems have gone through major changes over the last decades. A report submitted to the Norwegian Parliament in 1997 summarized several areas of improvement in the provision of mental health‐care to its population, and led to the introduction of a national mental health programme in 1998 for its implementation to be completed by 2008. (...) The most significant recent development in Norway is ‘Crisis Resolution/Home Treatment’ (CRHT) teams that provide an alternative to acute hospital care services. The major aim of this study is to explore an emerging form of community mental health‐care, and present a framework for establishment and examination of CRHT teams applying the user perspectives. An illustration of user experiences in an already established CRHT team provides a background for understanding implications of this form of service in relation to service users’ needs in acute crises. (shrink)

This longitudinal study (1994-1996) used the Gordon Personality Inventory to measure nursing students’ self-image (Gordon A), self-values (Gordon B) and interpersonal values (Gordon C). It was performed with students from three colleges of health in the south of Sweden: Jönköping ( n = 54), Växjö ( n = 24) and Kristianstad ( n = 38). The null hypothesis of the study was that the new academic three-year programme did not have the power to change significantly the students’ self-image and professional (...) values. The hypothesis was tested by paired sample Student’s t-test. The result was that, at Jönköping, self-image changed and increased significantly in the dimensions of ‘cautiousness’ and ‘personal relations’, and decreased in ‘sociability’, and increased in the self-value ‘order’. At Växjö the self-image dimensions of ‘original thinking’ and ‘personal relations’ increased, and, at Kristianstad, the students increased their self-image scores in ‘responsibility’. (shrink)

The current study examined whether infants use previous encounters for maintaining expectations for adults’ contingent responding. An unfamiliar adult responded contingently or non-contingently to infant signaling during an initial play situation and 10 min later presented an ambiguous toy while providing positive information (Experiment 1; forty-two 12-month-olds). The infants in the contingent group looked more at the adult during toy presentation and played more with the toy during the concluding free-play situation than the infants in the non-contingent group. When the (...) parent had responded contingently or non-contingently to infant bids (Experiment 2; forty 12-month-olds), the infants in the contingent group tended to look more at the parent and tended to play more with the toy than did the infants in the non-contingent group. The results indicate that from just a brief exposure, infants form expectations about adults’ responsiveness and maintain these expectations of contingent/non-contingent responding from one situation to another. (shrink)

As part of the conference commemorating Theoria's 75th anniversary, a round table discussion on philosophy publishing was held in Bergendal, Sollentuna, Sweden, on 1 October 2010. Bengt Hansson was the chair, and the other participants were eight editors‐in‐chief of philosophy journals: Hans van Ditmarsch (Journal of Philosophical Logic), Pascal Engel (Dialectica), Sven Ove Hansson (Theoria), Vincent Hendricks (Synthese), Søren Holm (Journal of Medical Ethics), Pauline Jacobson (Linguistics and Philosophy), Anthonie Meijers (Philosophical Explorations), Henry S. Richardson (Ethics) and Hans Rott (...) (Erkenntnis). (shrink)

The present study examined 17-month-olds’ imitation in a third-party context. In four experiments, the infants watched while a reliable or an unreliable model demonstrated a novel action with an unfamiliar (Experiments 1 and 3) or a familiar (Experiments 2 and 4) object to another adult. In Experiments 3 and 4, the second adult imitated the model’s novel action. Neither the familiarity of the object or whether or not the second adult copied the model’s behavior influenced the likelihood of infant imitation. (...) Findings showed that the infants in the reliable model condition were more willing to imitate the model’s action with the unfamiliar object. The results suggest that infants take into account the reliability of a model even when the model has not directly demonstrated her reliability to the infant. (shrink)