We argue that an epistemology of martial arts is at least as complex as advanced epistemological positions available to the philosophy of science. Part of the complexity is a product of the epistemic relation between the knower and known, or the scientist and the object of inquiry. In science, we measure things without changing them and, sometimes, complex systems can change as we measure them; but, in the epistemology of sport that we are interested in, each measurer is also an (...) object of inquiry. As such, each martial arts practitioner has to use various epistemic tools to measure a responsive system. We proceed in three steps. First, we discuss three epistemological frameworks in the philosophy of science—perspectivism, productivism, and distributed cognition. Second, we develop an epistemology of martial arts that features components from each of those epistemic frameworks. Third, we close the paper with a brief discussion about the unique complexity available to the martial artist, focusing on the responsive measurements that occur between two systems. (shrink)

Hypocrisy is widely thought to be morally objectionable in a way that undermines the hypocrite’s moral standing to blame others. To wit, we seem to intuitively accept the “Nonhypocrisy Condition:” R has the standing to blame S for some violation of a moral norm N only if R’s blaming S is not hypocritical. This claim has been the subject of intensifying philosophical investigation in recent years. However, we can only understand why hypocrisy is morally objectionable and has an effect on (...) standing to blame if we can correctly characterize hypocrisy itself. Unfortunately, some recent discussions fail to do this, which fatally undermines subsequent arguments concerning the effect of hypocrisy on the standing to blame. This paper’s central aim is to develop and defend a better account of hypocrisy. The hope is that with such an account in hand, we can explain and perhaps justify our moral aversion to hypocrisy in general as well as the Nonhypocrisy Condition in particular. (shrink)

Reductive representationalist theories of consciousness are yet to produce a satisfying account of pain’s affective component, the part that makes it painful. The paramount problem here is that that there seems to be no suitable candidate for what affective experience represents. This article suggests that affective experience represents the Darwinian fitness effects of events. I argue that, because of affective experience’s close association with motivation, natural selection will work to bring affect into covariance with the average fitness effects of types (...) of event, and that this covariance makes fitness effects a promising candidate for what affect represents. I also argue that this account is to be preferred to Cutter and Tye’s recent proposal that affect represents harmfulness, and answer an objection that Aydede and Fulkerson recently offered against representational accounts of affect. (shrink)

Benjamin Barber is one of America's preeminent political theorists. He has been a significant voice in the continuing debate about the nature and role of democracy in the contemporary world. A Passion for Democracy collects twenty of his most important writings on American democracy. Together they refine his distinctive position in democratic theory. Barber's conception of "strong democracy" contrasts with traditional concepts of "liberal democracy," especially in its emphasis on citizen participation in central issues of public debate. These essays (...) critique the "thin representation" of liberal democracy and buttress the arguments presented in Barber's twelve books, most recently in his well-received Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Re-shaping the World. In these pieces, Barber argues for participatory democracy without dependence on abstract metaphysical foundations, and he stresses the relationship among democracy and civil society, civic education, and culture. A Passion for Democracy is divided into four sections. In the first, "American Theory: Democracy, Liberalism, and Rights," Barber addresses issues of ongoing relevance to today's debates about the roots of participatory democracy, including individualism vs. community, the importance of consent, and the irrelevance of Marxism. Essays in the second section, "American Practice: Leadership, Citizenship, and Censorship" provide a "strong democracy" critique of American democratic practice. "Education for Democracy: Civic Education, Service, and Citizenship" applies Barber's theories to three related topics and includes his much-discussed essay "America Skips School." The final section, "Democracy and Technology: Endless Frontier or End of Democracy?" provides glimpses into a future that technology alone cannot secure for democracy. In his preface, Barber writes: "In these essays... I have been hard on my country. Like most ardent democrats, I want more for it than it has achieved, despite the fact that it has achieved more than most people have dared to want." This wide-ranging collection displays not only his passion for democracy, but also his unique perspective on issues of abiding importance for the democratic process. (shrink)

The literature contains a popular argument in favor of the position that conditional attitudes are not simple attitudes with conditional contents but, rather, have a more complex structure. In this paper I show that an analogous argument applies to what we might call quantificational attitudes—like an intention to follow every bit of good advice I receive or a desire to get rabies shots for each bite I incur from an infected bat. The conditions under which these attitudes are satisfied and (...) thwarted are not captured by claiming that they are simple attitudes with quantificational contents. So, the argument supports a novel position—that quantificational attitudes have a more complex structure. After sketching the form of this extra structure, I show how similar considerations count in favor of the existence of genuinely quantificational speech acts. (shrink)

The Anemodoulion, a Constantinopolitan tetrapylon decorated with numerous figural reliefs and crowned by a weathervane, has traditionally been seen as an entirely late antique construction. A re-evaluation of the medieval sources shows that, while the tetrapylon itself was constructed in late antiquity, its figural decoration and conversion into a weathervane likely date to the reign of Leo III (717–741). Viewed in connection with other monuments of Leo's reign, in particular the gate of the Kontoskalion Harbor, and historical accounts of the (...) end of the Arab siege of 717/18, the Anemodoulion may be interpreted as a triumphal monument celebrating the dispersal of the Arab fleet via a powerful storm. It thus provides new insight into the earliest efforts of the Isaurian emperors to rebuild Constantinople as a fitting capital for a medieval empire. (shrink)

Taking the question of phenomenality as its guiding thread, this paper attempts to shed light on the relationship between Heidegger's turn and Derrida's 1964/65 seminar on Heidegger. I argue that deconstruction can be understood as a performative attempt to take into account Heidegger's thinking of originary semblance or errancy, which already announces itself in Sein und Zeit and is a central figure of what the later Heidegger calls ‘the turn’. Instead of trying to grasp this errancy or this différance phenomenologically, (...) Derrida takes up the necessity to read and repeat what is already given, what already appears, and thereby undermines, through his reading of Heidegger's Crossing Out of the Word ‘Sein’, the phenomeno-fundamental ontological approach of Sein und Zeit, or rather: shows that it is always already undermined. (shrink)

This article offers an account of online experimentation and innovation that has taken place in the English department of the University of Wolverhampton from 2003 to 2005. Focusing on an introductory first-year module and two third-year modules, it explores how and to what extent a virtual learning environment can enhance the teaching of English literary studies in higher education. Using a ‘blended learning’ model of English teaching, in which face-to-face and online teaching are integrated, the study examines how VLEs can (...) be incorporated into a coordinated assessment regime within individual modules, and considers the strategies for implementing VLE assessment in a staged progression across an English programme. The authors argue that online activities need to be both integrated into English courses and assessed.When balanced properly, VLE work offers no ‘easy option’ for students but effectively complements more traditional forms of assessment in English, such as essays and exams. (shrink)

Witold Gombrowicz, novelist, essayist, and playwright, was one of the most important Polish writers of the twentieth century. A candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1968, he was described by Milan Kundera as “one of the great novelists of our century” and by John Updike as “one of the profoundest of the late moderns.” Gombrowicz’s works were considered scandalous and subversive by the ruling powers in Poland and were banned for nearly forty years. He spent his last years (...) in France teaching philosophy; this book is a series of reflections based on his lectures. Gombrowicz discusses Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger in six “one-hour” essays and addresses Marxism in a shorter “fifteen-minute” piece. The text—a small literary gem full of sardonic wit, brilliant insights, and provocative criticism—constructs the philosophical lineage of his work. (shrink)

Caring for hospitalized patients with COVID-19 raises ethical dilemmas in which clinicians must weigh the unknown value of an intervention against the unknown risk of viral transmission. Current guidelines for delivering high-value care in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic do not directly address ethical dilemmas that arise from the unique concerns of individual patients. We propose an “ethical pause” in which clinicians address ethical dilemmas by taking time to ask three questions that invoke the major bioethical principles of beneficence, (...) nonmaleficence, and distributive justice: will this intervention help my patient? Could this intervention harm my patient? Could this intervention harm or help others? Using two exemplar cases, we demonstrate how the process of deliberately asking and answering structured ethical questions is a mindful problem-solving strategy that facilitates delivery of high-value care. (shrink)

Discussion of the need for moral guidelines in business; suggestions for communication in the workplace.

One of the central aims of Susanne Mantel’s book "Determined by Reasons" (2018) is to reject the idea that normative and motivating reasons can be identical. In her own words, Mantel denies the “Identity Thesis”, according to which “when an agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a motivating reason M of that agent such that M is identical with N” (Mantel 2018, 93). In this comment, I offer a simple argument for the Identity Thesis: (1) When an (...) agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a reason M for which that agent acts such that M is identical with N. (2) A reason for which someone acts is a motivating reason. (3) Therefore, when an agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a motivating reason M of that agent such that M is identical with N. Premise (1) is trivial, and premise (2) is true by a common definition of the term ‘motivating reason’, according to which a motivating reason is just a reason that is acted upon. I call this the operative notion of a motivating reason. Mantel does not address this operative notion, even though it is widely used in the literature, especially among proponents of the Identity Thesis. I argue that Mantel does not succeed in rejecting the Identity Thesis as long as she does not show that the operative notion of a motivating reason is flawed. (shrink)

Many friends of the category of particularised qualities subscribe to the view that particularised qualities have a unique bearer in which they inhere; no such quality then can inhere in two different entities. But it seems that this idea is flawed, for there are apparent counterexamples. An apple’s redness is identical with the redness of its skin, though the apple is distinct from its skin. So it seems that a principle of beareruniqueness has to be modified, maybe by excluding certain (...) unwanted cases. (shrink)

The possibility of cooperation and the stability of political order are long-standing problems. Polybius, well known for his Histories analysing the expansion of Rome and his description of the Roman constitution, also offers an intriguing social and political theory that covers ground from psycho-anthropological micro-foundations to institution-based political order, providing a genealogy of morals and political order that is best understood in game-theoretical terms. In this paper I try to give such an interpretation. Polybius’ naturalistic, proto-game theoretical views show similarities (...) with Hume, Smith and especially Hobbes’ doctrine of sovereignty by acquisition. However, Polybius is original in crucial regards, giving a motivationally plausible account of institutional and especially constitutional solutions to moral and political problems. Constitutional order, for Polybius, embodies and makes possible in the first place a kind of political reason that cannot be had individually. Polybian political theory thus offers interesting solutions to problems concerning moral motivation, collective action, and the conditions for political order, as well as the explanation and character of institutions. (shrink)

© 2020, Edizioni ETS. All rights reserved. This lecture outlines elements central to the project of rethinking the concerns of political theology. The lecture seeks to integrate that thinking into the development of a philosophy of life; life defined by an already given relation to the law. Maintaining the law, which is the stance against nihilism, whilst complicating the way law is understood, involves a shift in how sovereignty would itself then be conceived.

In this proof-of-concept study, we assessed the potential for immersive virtual reality to measure transfer following strategic memory training, and whether efficacy and transfer are increased when training is complemented by practice in an immersive virtual environment. Forty older adults with subjective memory complaints were trained with the method of loci. They were randomized to either a condition where they practiced the strategy in VR or a control condition where they were familiarized with VR using a non-memory task. Training efficacy (...) was measured with word recall, and transfer of the training benefit was measured with a recall task completed in two VR tasks as well as a self-report memory questionnaire. Testing was administered before, midway, and after training. Participants improved their scores on word recall. Regarding transfer measures, participants improved their performance in the two VR recall tasks but not on the self-report memory questionnaire. No significant group effect was observed. Improvement was found when comparing PRE to POST 3 with no further improvement at POST 6. Thus, strategic memory training improved the memory of seniors with memory complaints on word recall and a transfer task relying on a VR scenario that resembles real-life. However, no evidence supporting an increase in transfer effects was found when enriching training with VR memory exercises. (shrink)

This contribution argues for the retention of the MS reading ἀλλήλοισι at Ar. Thes. 471, arguing that the grammatical ‘mistake’ is deliberate and comically effective in the context of the play and against the background of Aristophanic gender linguistics.

The Department of Fisheries and Wildlife Sciences (FWS) graduate program at Virginia Tech held a student-led, discussion-based, 9-week seminar in the philosophy of science during the fall 1999 semester. This seminar presented the sociologist of science with the opportunity to investigate questions such as, How does a contemporary scientific discipline use the philosophy of science? What do scientists hope to gain from an understanding of demarcation issues? And how do they perceive themselves as a science? Issues of demarcation between science (...) and pseudo-science are prevalent in FWS. The role of public funding is at the forefront of the department’s concerns, as governmental agencies are responsible, to a dominant degree, for funding research that the public assumes will benefit them. Thus, the concerns of the department are of utility, or the perception thereof. An investigation of the sort proposed here is practical yet restrictive. The topics are preselected and noncomprehensive because the seminar organizers in FWS chose select readings pertinent to their discipline. Discussions revolved around such topics as the definition of science, methodology, credibility, specialization within FWS, the value (or lack thereof) of theory in FWS, the manager-scientist distinction, and the use of models. The intent of this article is to provide a brief ethnographic view of the seminar. It will review some of the seminar topics and relate them to the broader issue of scientific self-definition and the concept of science as a social mechanism. It is not an evaluative article about FWS but a descriptive article about how a scientific discipline regards itself. (shrink)

According to a popular view, shared by the great atheists of the nineteenth century and by students in introductory courses on the philosophy of religion, religious belief is, at best, an edifying fiction. Given that it has apparently lost the ability to edify large sections of the population , it has also lost its only real claim to credibility. Following Hegel’s famous account of the “unhappy consciousness” in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Feuerbach and his successors diagnose religion as a symptom (...) of “alienation.” Human beings have a tendency to compensate for their own shortcomings, and those of the harsh environment they inhabit, by projecting an image of human perfection and endowing this projected image with a life of its own, thereby impeding our ability to make up for these shortcomings by our own efforts. But, so the story goes, modern intellectuals have pierced through the veil erected by human psychology, economics, and religious institutions and have seen the ideas of God, heaven, and the like for what they really are—illusions that, at best, edify the weak-minded, and, at worst, perpetuate intellectual and material bondage. Call this view atheistic fictionalism. According to the received wisdom, J. G. Fichte should occupy a prominent place in any account of the pedigree of atheistic fictionalism. On the received view, Fichte is a sort of extreme subjectivist or solipsist. So one is not surprised to learn that this Fichte was accused of atheism in 1798, and forced to relinquish his chair at Jena the following year, entering the pantheon of persecuted freethinkers alongside Giordano Bruno, Galileo, and Spinoza. (shrink)

The technique of imaging was first introduced by Lewis, in order to provide a novel account of the probability of conditional propositions. In the intervening years, imaging has been the object of significant interest in both AI and philosophy, and has come to be seen as a philosophically important approach to probabilistic updating and belief revision. In this paper, we consider the possibility of generalising imaging to deal with uncertain evidence and partial belief revision. In particular, we introduce a new (...) logical criterion that any update rule should satisfy, and use it to evaluate a range of different approaches to generalising imaging to situations involving uncertain evidence. We show that none of the currently prevalent approaches to imaging allow for such a generalisation, although a lesser known version of imaging, introduced by Joyce, can be generalised in a way that mitigates these problems. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In their recent article, Brummett and Muaygil reject Bishop et al.’s framing of the debate over standardization in clinical ethics consultation (CEC) “as one between pro-credentialing procedural and anti-credentialing phenomenological,” claiming that this framing “amounts to a false dichotomy between two extreme approaches to CEC.” Instead of accepting proceduralism and phenomenology as a binary, Brummett and Muaygil propose that these two views should be seen as the extreme ends of a spectrum upon which CEC should be done. However, as evidenced (...) by several inconsistencies within their article, they have failed to fully appreciate the concern animating Bishop et al.’s proposal. Additionally, because of this failure, they do not seem to realize that credentialing ethicists for CEC will only create different problems in Saudi Arabia even as it possibly solves some of the current problems they identify. In this commentary, we highlight and clarify Brummet and Muaygil’s five misunderstandings of Bishop et al. This leads us to conclude that while they claim to be advocating a middle way between proceduralism and phenomenology, in fact they would like for us to standardize another proceduralism, albeit one that incorporates some of the “qualitative” values of American bioethics. (shrink)

In deductive theorizing using mathematics as our theorizing tool, nature is known to routinely help us discover new empirical truths about itself, whether we want the help or not (“generative phenomenon”). Why? That’s because, I argue, some of our deductive inference rules are themselves of empirical origin, thereby providing nature with a seemingly-trivial but crucial link to our mind’s reason.