Diese Ausgabe der Kategorienlehre Eduard von Hartmanns vereint alle drei Bande, die 1923 von Fritz Kern unter Beachtung der Verfasserhandschrift herausgegeben wurden. Im Mittelpunkt seiner Lehre steht fur Hartmann der Begriff der Kategorie, mit dem er eine unbewusste Intellektualfunktion von bestimmter Art und Weise oder eine unbewusste logische Determination, die eine bestimmte Beziehung setzt, bezeichnet. In den Kategorien der Sinnlichkeit" (erster Band), den Kategorien des reflektierenden Denkens" (zweiter Band) und den Kategorien des spekulativen Denkens" (dritter Band) werden die (...) Kategorien sodann erstens in der subjektiv idealen, zweitens in der objektiv realen und drittens in der metaphysischen Sphare behandelt. Demgemass bietet Hartmanns Werk mit dem ersten Band eine Erkenntnistheorie am Leitfaden der Kategorien, mit dem zweiten Band eine kategoriale Grundlegung der Naturphilosophie und mit dem dritten Band schliesslich eine Metaphysik. Unverandertes Reprint der Ausgabe von 1923.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 95 direction, it opens a field of pure philosophy, unencumbered by surds such as finite man. Only if the Phenomenology is taken as a monographic work on man can there be difficulty. Let us hasten to add that, on the very premises of his book, Loewenberg's criticism of Hegel is tentative rather than apodictic; its harshness is relieved through the dialogue form. And perhaps, the interlocutors will, (...) as one of them suggests, "resume (their) conversations with fresh minds at a later date" (p. 371). They might find that they have to go beyond the limits of exoteric discussion. Or, conversely, they might find that exoteric treatment can yield no more than an anthropological reading and is, in fact, bound up with it. If Loewenberg 's extant commentary did no more than demonstrate this negative point, however implicitly,it would be of great merit. But there is of course much more: there is the substance of Loewenberg's commentary, largely unaffected by the above counter-representations. Theoretical problems aside, the supreme value of the book lies in its clarity and perceptiveness, in the "sense" it makes of the Phenomenology. Of a kind all its own, it will henceforth serve as the preferred entrance to Hegel. KLAUS HARTMANN Bonn, W. Germany Arthur Hfibscher, editor. XXXVIlI. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch ]~r das Jahr 1957. (Frankfurt/ Main: Waldemar Kramer, 1967.Pp. v + 244.) Schopenhauer: Philosophe de l'Absurde. By Clement Brosset. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.Pp. ix [i] -b 107.Paper, F. 7.--) Manches in dem Jahrbuch ist rein anekdotisch; manches bio- oder bibliographisch. Einiges h~ngt nur sehr lose mit Schopenhauer zusammen; so der liingste Beitrag (K. Engisch, "Todesstrafe--ja oder nein?,") mit nfitzlicher historischer und systematiseher Ubersieht, die zum Ergebnis kommt, dass die Argumente gegen die Todesstrafe iiberwiegen. Von gesetzgeberischen Interessen getragen ist such G. Zoebe, "Sind die Tiere rechtlos?" Der zweitliingste Beitrag (H. Voigt, 'r0ber Schopenhauers Erkenntnistheorie,') enth~ilt eine Art von Variationen sum Thema des Zusammenhanges zwischen Charakter und Schicksah Man freut sich, dass ein Inder (Kanti Chandra Pandey) sich fiber Schopenhauers Kenntnis des Hinduismus und Buddismus eehr anerkennendausspricht. Das Bild der Sehopenhauerschen Philosophie, wie es uns im Jahrbuch begeguet ist das uns vertraute: Pessimismus, ErlSsung durch Kunst, Mitleid, Verneinung des Willens. Aber nach Brosset erfassen diese Kategorien nur die sekund~ren Charaktere der Schopenhauerschen Philosophie. In ihrem wirklich wertvollen Kern sei diese Philosophie erstens Vorl~uferin der yon Brosset so genannten genealogischen Philosophie eines Marx, Nietzsche und Freud; allerdings letzten Endes ein Versager, da sie auf das eigentliche Anliegen der genealogischen Philosophie, n~mlich die Ableitung konkreter und spezifischer Ideen (bei Schopenhauer: der Intelligenz) aus der Umformung unbewusster Tatbestiinde (bei Schopenhauer: des Willens), nicht eingehe, sondern sich mit der Feststellung begniigt, dass die Wurzel der (bewussten) InteUigenz der (unbewusste) Wille ist. Zweitens sei Schopenhauer der erste, der seine Philosophie auf der Urerfahrung der Grundlosigkeit (Brosset zieht den Ausdruck Absurdit~t vor), daher Unausdenkbarkeit oder Unergrfindlichkeit des Seins im ganzen, aufbaut. Auf diese Erfahrung (die Frage, 'Warum nicht Nichts?' ist unbeantwortbar) reagiere der Menseh mit Angst. Die Notwendigkeit und die Zweckm~issigkeit, die die Welt im ganzen charskterisieren, seien selbst kontingent und zwecklos. Manchmal scheint mir Brosset die Originalitiit seiner Interpretationen zu iiberseh~tzen; insbesondere seine Erkl~rung der Blindheit des Willens (S. 26f.) rennt wohl offene Tfiren ein. PHILIP MERLAN ~cripps College, Claremont, California... (shrink)

We study a class of two-player normal-form games with cyclical payoff structures. A game is called circulant if both players’ payoff matrices fulfill a rotational symmetry condition. The class of circulant games contains well-known examples such as Matching Pennies, Rock-Paper-Scissors, as well as subclasses of coordination and common interest games. The best response correspondences in circulant games induce a partition on each player’s set of pure strategies into equivalence classes. In any Nash Equilibrium, all strategies within one class are either (...) played with strictly positive or with zero probability. We further show that, strikingly, a single parameter fully determines the exact number and the structure of all Nash equilibria in these games. The parameter itself only depends on the position of the largest payoff in the first row of one of the player’s payoff matrix. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Previous studies have found that narrative input conveyed through different media influences the structure and content of children’s narrative retellings. Visual, televised narratives appear to elicit richer and more detailed narratives than traditional, orally transmitted storybook media. To extend this prior work and drawing from research on narrative elaboration, the current study’s main goal was to identify the core plot component differences (the who, what, where, when, why, and how of a story) between children’s retellings of televised versus traditional storybook (...) narratives. However, because children also differ individually in their IQ, we further incorporated this variable into our analysis of children’s narrative retellings. For our purpose, a novel coding schema was developed, following and extending the existing narrative elaboration approaches. Participants were 46 typically developing children aged 4–5 years from Germany. The current study incorporated two narrative input conditions to which children were randomly assigned: in the video condition, children watched a non-verbal, visually conveyed, televised story from a DVD; and in the book condition, children read the story with an adult and experienced an orally conveyed version in the form of a book with minimal accompanying pictures. In both conditions, the same story was conveyed. After including IQ as a covariate in our analyses, results show that the children from the video condition gave significantly more elaborated retellings, particularly across the who, what, and where (sub-)components. Differences between the conditions in the component when, how and why did not reach statistical significance. Our findings indicate that different media types entail differential cognitive processing demands of a story, resulting in type-specific memories and narratives. The effect of different medial conditions was significant and persisted when individual differences in cognitive development were considered. Consequences for children’s development, education, and interaction with and within today’s digital world are discussed. (shrink)

Computational modeling should play a central role in philosophy. In this introduction to our topical collection, we propose a small topology of computational modeling in philosophy in general, and show how the various contributions to our topical collection fit into this overall picture. On this basis, we describe some of the ways in which computational models from other disciplines have found their way into philosophy, and how the principles one found here still underlie current trends in the field. Moreover, we (...) argue that philosophers contribute to computational modeling not only by building their own models, but also by thinking about the various applications of the method in philosophy and the sciences. In this context, we note that models in philosophy are usually simple, while models in the sciences are often more complex and empirically grounded. Bridging certain methodological gaps that arise from this discrepancy may prove to be challenging and fruitful for the further development of computational modeling in philosophy and beyond. (shrink)

As knowledge creation quickly gains importance for globally active corporations, we attempt to combine the advantages of the Stakeholder View with those of the SECI model by Nonaka and Takeuchi. In order to support the mental processes of the stakeholders, we use so-called topic maps to transform implicit into explicit knowledge and to visualize it. The preliminary propositions are illustrated by the case study of Swiss Re.

Bonjour (1985: 101 and 1999: 124) and other coherence theorists of justification before him (e.g. Ewing, 1934: 246) have complained that we do not have a satisfactory analysis of the notion of coherence. The problem with existing accounts of coherence is that they try to bring precision to our intuitive notion of coherence independently of the particular role that it is meant to play within the coherence theory of justification (e.g Lewis, 1946: 338). This is a mistake: it does not (...) make any sense to ask what precisely makes for a more coherent information set independently of the particular role that coherence is supposed to play within the context in question. What is this context and what is this role? The coherence theory of justification rides on a particular common sense intuition: when we gather information from less than fully reliable sources, then the more coherent the story that materializes is, the more confident we may be, ceteris paribus. Within the context of information gathering from certain types of sources, coherence is a property of stories which plays a confidence boosting role. But what features should the information sources have, so that the coherence of the information set is indeed a determinant of our degree of confidence in question? And what goes into the ceteris paribus clause? In other words, what other factors affect our confidence in the information set in question? (shrink)

We give a probabilistic justification of the shape of one of the probability weighting functions used in Prospect Theory. To do so, we use an idea recently introduced by Herzog and Hertwig. Along the way we also suggest a new method for the aggregation of probabilities using statistical distances.

physical realist heavily bverlaid with the interpretation afforded by linguistic analysis, so he changed, too. But at the time, which was approximately during the second decade of the twentieth century, they were no doubt very close in their views. Russell acknowledged the influence of Wittgenstein in several places in the 1918 lectures on logical atomism. Wittgenstein might not have written the Tractatus had Russell not given the lectures on logical atomism, or at least had he not maintained the views there (...) expressed. Certainly it is true in a very large sense that the Tractatus may be interpreted as a commentary on the 1918 lectures of Russell. Wittgenstein certainly did not hear them but, as Russell said, the topics were discussed together; and the debt of the Tractatus to the views of the contents of the lectures is obvious. Since Wittgenstein was the pupil and Russell the teacher, we may assume, despite the mutual influence, that the greater effect was Russell's. There is no space in which to go into a thorough analysis of the predecessors of Wittgenstein and of the influences upon him. In addition, there is not sufficient data. One clue, however, we are given. One of his friends has informed us that Wittgenstein "did read and enjoy Plato" and "recognized congenial features" in his philosophical method 1, although, to be sure, Wittgenstein is not said to have been a great reader of philosophy. (shrink)

There remains only the obligation to thank those who have helped me with specific suggestions and the editors who have kindly granted permission to reprint material which first appeared in the pages of their journals. To the former group belong Alan B. Brinkley and Max O. Hocutt Portion of chap ters I and VI were published in Philosophy of Science; of chapters IV and V in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine; of chapter VIII in Dialectica; of chapter IX in The (...) British lournal for the Philosophy of Science; and of chapter XIII in Synthese. J.K.F. New Orleans, 1971 PREFACE In this book I have tried to describe the scientific method, understood as the hypothetico-experimental technique of investigation which has been prac ticed so successfully in the physical sciences. It is the first volume of a three-volume work on the philosophy of science, each of which, however, is complete and independent. A second volume will contain an account of the domain in which the method operates and a history of empiricism. A third volume will be devoted to the philosophy of science proper: the metaphysics and epistemology presupposed by the method, its logical structure, and the ethical implications of its results. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar as conexões entre o pensamento político de Nietzsche e sua crítica da cultura, tal como desenvolvidos nas notas e ensaios do primeiro período de sua obra, especialmente no ensaio Cinco prefácios a cinco livros não escritos. Trata-se de mostrar como o filósofo procura, a partir de uma singular análise do Estado e da sociedade na Grécia antiga, restituir à experiência política uma dimensão reflexiva em declínio na modernidade.