This paper seeks to answer the question: Can contemporary forms of artificial intelligence be creative? To answer this question, I consider three conditions that are commonly taken to be necessary for creativity. These are novelty, value, and agency. I argue that while contemporary AI models may have a claim to novelty and value, they cannot satisfy the kind of agency condition required for creativity. From this discussion, a new condition for creativity emerges. Creativity requires curiosity, a motivation to pursue epistemic (...) goods. I argue that contemporary AI models do not satisfy this new condition. Because they lack both agency and curiosity, it is a mistake to attribute the same sort of creativity to AI that we prize in humans. Finally, I consider the question of whether these AI models stand to make human creativity in the arts and sciences obsolete, despite not being creative themselves. I argue, optimistically, that this is unlikely. (shrink)

I argue for an account of creativity that unifies creative achievements in the arts, sciences, and other domains and identifies its characteristic value. This account draws upon case studies of creative work in both the arts and sciences to identify creativity as a kind of successful exploration. I argue that if creativity is properly understood in this way, then it is fundamentally a property of processes, something only agents can achieve, something that comes in degrees, subjectively novel, and non-formulaic. As (...) I develop the account, I show how it avoids challenges faced by other accounts of creativity, especially concerning creativity’s value. Hills and Bird (2018, 2019) have together argued that creativity is not necessarily valuable. My account challenges this view. If I am right that creativity is a kind of successful exploration, then creativity does have a characteristic value, specifically epistemic value. (shrink)

"This reviewer had to be restrained from stopping people in the street to urge them to read it: They would learn something of the way science is done,...

There is an underappreciated respect in which the widespread availability of generative artificial intelligence (AI) models poses a threat to human connection. My central contention is that human creativity is especially capable of helping us connect to others in a valuable way, but the widespread availability of generative AI models reduces our incentives to engage in various sorts of creative work in the arts and sciences. I argue that creative endeavors must be motivated by curiosity, and so they must disclose (...) the creative agent’s inquisitive self. It is through self-disclosure, including the disclosure of the inquisitive self, that we put ourselves in a position to be seen by and connect with others through our creative pursuits. Because relying on AI for certain generative tasks is less self-disclosive than the creative work such technologies supplant, this reliance threatens to weaken our connections to one another. (shrink)

Presenting the first step-by-step commentary on Husserl’s Ideas I, Marcus Brainard’s Belief and Its Neutralization provides an introduction not only to this central work, but also to the whole of transcendental phenomenology. Brainard offers a clear and lively account of each key element in Ideas I, along with a novel reading of Husserl, one which may well cause scholars to reconsider many long-standing views on his thought, especially on the role of belief, the effect and scope of the (...) epoché, and the significance of the universal neutrality modification. (shrink)

Explaining how something is possible is a familiar and epistemically important achievement in both science and ordinary life. But a satisfactory general account of how-possibly explanation has not yet been given. A crucial desideratum for a successful account is that it must differentiate a demonstration that something is possible from an explanation of how it is possible. In this paper, I offer an account of how-possibly explanation that fully captures this distinction. I motivate my account using two cases, one from (...) ordinary life and one from ornithology. On my account, a how-possibly explanation is a greater achievement than a mere description of how a state of affairs might possibly obtain. In addition to being a potential explanation of why some state of affairs actually obtains, a how-possibly explanation must involve the relief of an imaginative frustration on the part of its recipient. When a recipient’s imaginative frustration is relieved, she does not just know that the state of affairs in question is possible, but is also able to imagine how it could possibly obtain. (shrink)

Marketing and web analytic companies have implemented sophisticated algorithms to observe, analyze, and identify users through large surveillance networks online. These computer algorithms have the capacity to infer categories of identity upon users based largely on their web-surfing habits. In this article I will first discuss the conceptual and theoretical work around code, outlining its use in an analysis of online categorization practices. The article will then approach the function of code at the level of the category, arguing that an (...) analysis of coded computer algorithms enables a supplement to Foucauldian thinking around biopolitics and biopower, of what I call soft biopower and soft biopolitics. These new conceptual devices allow us to better understand the workings of biopower at the level of the category, of using computer code, statistics and surveillance to construct categories within populations according to users’ surveilled internet history. Finally, the article will think through the nuanced ways that algorithmic inference works as a mode of control, of processes of identification that structure and regulate our lives online within the context of online marketing and algorithmic categorization. (shrink)

Recent developments in ethics and postmodemist epistemology have set the stage for a reconceptualization of environmental ethics. In this paper, I sketch a path for postmodemism which makes use of certain notions current in contemporary environmentalism. At the center of my thought is the idea of place: (1) place as the context of our lives and the setting in which ethical deliberation takes place; and (2)the epistemological function of place in the construction of our understandings of self, community, and world. (...) Central to these themes, in tum, are the related notions of myth, narrative, storied residence, and ethical vernacular. (shrink)

l examine the degree to which the so-called “deep ecology” movement embodies a feminist sensibility. In part one I take a brief look at the ambivalent attitude of “eco-feminism” toward deep ecology. In part two I show that this ambivalence sterns largely from the fact that deep ecology assimilates feminist insights to a basically masculine ethical orientation. In part three I discuss some of the ways in which deepecology theory might change if it adopted a fundamentally feminist ethical orientation.

This article deals with “epoch” and “epoché”, each of which plays a central role in Heribert Boeder’s thought. Because it understands itself as the building of rational wholes, or logoi, his thought - but also that which it builds - is termed the “logotectonic”. The first part of the article situates the logotectonic epoché in the phenomenological tradition, particularly with respect to its key manifestations in Husserl and Heidegger, while also setting it off from that tradition. It is shown to (...) be not a method of access to consciousness, to say nothing of a withholding of Being, but rather a fundamental reticence on the part of the inquirer with respect to what has been thought. It is an exclusion of one’s idiosyncrasies in order to approach what has been thought in and on its own terms. It is this new epoché, and it atone, that gives access to the epoch in Boeder’s sense. Each of three epochs of philosophy is governed by a unique principle, which is given voice in the wisdom proper to that epoch atone and to which philosophy responds (either negatively or positively). The character of this response is the basis of Boeder’s claim that the history of philosophy is the “crisis of principles.” The principle of a given epoch determines the tasks to be accomplished by the philosophy of that epoch. Once the full range of tasks is completed, the epoch is concluded, making way for a new principle and thus a new epoch. The succession of epochs comes to an end, however - in Hegel. In view of this end, the article then takes up the subsequent “periods” of thought: modernity and submodernity; it seeks to show briefly how neither constitutes an epoch, but also how the end of submodernity coincides with the opening up of the possibility of rescuing wisdom from its oblivion and granting it a present that makes dwelling possible once again. This is precisely task that moves the logotect and, by extension, the logotectonic. (shrink)

"Reality and Mystical Experience" proposes and demonstrates the use of a new hermeneutical tool for the study of philosophical and religious foundations. The tool, which I call "publicity-presence-awareness terminology," offers a way to examine, understand, and classify different conceptions about the nature of reality in terms of their different approaches to certain shared metaphysical problems. Such an analysis helps, in turn, to clarify the basis for and significance of mystical experience within these traditions. ;The schema proposed here is especially useful (...) for philosophical studies across differing worldviews because it accommodates both inter- and intracultural realities and truths. This project defines "reality" and "truth" in terms of "publicity" and "presence." The publicity-presence distinction proposed here provides, in turn, a formal, much more culturally neutral and thus useful version of the traditional "universal-particular" and "attribute-particular" distinctions. ;The project has two parts. Part One defines the terms that make up the schema; Part Two looks at what publicity-presence-awareness terminology might reveal about the metaphysical presuppositions of three different religious traditions: Madhyamaka Buddhism, Advaita-Vedanta Hinduism, and patristic Christianity. In each case, the analysis demonstrates how each religion offers a fundamentally different yet equally valid approach to metaphysical mystery. Taken together, the three studies show that insight into metaphysical ultimacy does not express itself within just one metaphysical paradigm but rather in a natural typology of metaphysical views--different species that express a common mystery in a variety of ways. Moreover, just as biological organisms must be well-formed in order to live, the three species of metaphysics examined here suggest certain parameters for well-formed, viable metaphysics. ;Part Two also shows how the metaphysical presuppositions of each view govern certain features of the mystical traditions. The three studies look at how mystical awareness is distinguished from conventional awareness within each context, and how mystical traditions might offer context-specific remedies for the metaphysical limitations of their parent religions. (shrink)

Explores complex questions about the nature of reality, philosophy, and religion, and how we reconcile our often-conflicting beliefs about these questions"--Provided by publisher.

This is the first book-length work by Heribert Boeder to appear in English. The essays brought together here, several of which are to be found only in this volume, bear witness to a new perspective on metaphysics, modernity, and so-called postmodernity. The "seditiousness" of Boeder's undertaking lies in his twofold intention: to explicate what has been thought in metaphysics, modernity, and postmodernity as self-contained, rational totalities--as history, world, and speech, respectively--and by means of those explications to recover dwelling as it (...) has been made visible in the "configurations of wisdom". He approaches each of these totalities by way of Heidegger's thought, which marks the limit of modernity and as such is pivotal to Boeder's enterprise. (shrink)

This book is the culmination of Heinrich Meier's acclaimed analyses of the controversial thought of Carl Schmitt. Meier identifies the core of Schmitt's thought as political theology—that is, political theorizing that claims to have its ultimate ground in the revelation of a mysterious or supra-rational God. This radical, but half-hidden, theological foundation unifies the whole of Schmitt's often difficult and complex oeuvre, cutting through the intentional deceptions and unintentional obfuscations that have eluded previous commentators. Relating this religious dimension to Schmitt's (...) support for National Socialism and his continuing anti-Semitism, Meier compels the reader to come to terms with the irreconcilable differences between political theology and political philosophy. His book will give pause to those who have tended to gloss over the troubling aspects of some of Schmitt's ideas. With editions in German, French, Italian, and now English, Meier's two books on Schmitt have dramatically reoriented the international debate about Carl Schmitt and his significance for twentieth-century political thought. "Standing far above the rest... is Heinrich Meier's new study, _Die Lehre Carl Schmitts_, which covers all of Schmitt's writings.... Meier's work has forced everyone to take a second look at the assumptions underlying Schmitt's better-known writings and reconsider some that have been ignored."—Mark Lilla, reviewing the German edition in _The New York Review of Books_. (shrink)

Heinrich Meier’s work on Carl Schmitt has dramatically reoriented the international debate about Schmitt and his significance for twentieth-century political thought. In _The Lesson of Carl Schmitt_, Meier identifies the core of Schmitt’s thought as political theology—that is, political theorizing that claims to have its ultimate ground in the revelation of a mysterious or suprarational God. This radical, but half-hidden, theological foundation underlies the whole of Schmitt’s often difficult and complex oeuvre, rich in historical turns and political convolutions, intentional deceptions (...) and unintentional obfuscations. In four chapters on morality, politics, revelation, and history, Meier clarifies the difference between political philosophy and Schmitt’s political theology and relates the religious dimension of his thought to his support for National Socialism and his continuing anti-Semitism. New to this edition are two essays that address the recently published correspondences of Schmitt—particularly with Hans Blumberg—and the light it sheds on his conception of political theology. (shrink)

Ideas are important in shaping the policy choices of governments. But many ideas that have not been successful in the past continue to be used by policymakers, and some good ideas tend not to be adopted. This Element will focus on why governments make these poor policy choices. We will discuss a number of examples of 'zombie ideas' that refuse to die, and then discuss the factors that are associated with their survival. Those factors occur at the elite, the organizational (...) and the societal level. We will also examine some 'ghost' ideas that may well be successful but have a difficult time being adopted, and the factors that are associated with the exclusion of these ideas from the policy process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 10.2 (2005) 101-135 [Access article in PDF] Truth, Knowledge and the Wild World Jim Cheney One ought not to put too much stock in the word 'philosophy'.... [T]here are alternative ways of intelligently engaging the world. To construe one's thinking in terms of belief is characteristic of a particular kind of world view and it remains to be seen whether those who share an (...) indigenous world view conceive of experience in such an overtly intellectualized manner. Leroy N. Meyer and Tony Ramirez (1996, 104)1 Wilderness treats me like a human being. Tom Birch2As Holmes Rolston III has said, "A principal characteristic of human life is that it develops into biography. In that sense, humans do not want their values in nature, any more than they want other goods in life, to come seriatim, like beads on a string.... Humans want a storied residence in nature where the passage of time integrates past, present, and future in a meaningful career" (Rolston 1988, 351). This is what I had hoped for: a narrative of storied residence in Midwest prairie, lake, and river country, and in the mountains and deserts of Idaho, with the history of the development of an environmental ethic (or ethos) left largely implicit within that larger narrative, leaving readers to reflect as they may on the philosophical dimensions of the journey. To leave traditional philosophical [End Page 101] modes of expression completely behind proved impossible (for now), but it has been for me a worthwhile exercise to locate my reflections on "truth, knowledge, and the wild world" in something of a narrative form. It is the lakes and rivers, prairies, mountains, and deserts that have remained implicit. They have cast their spell, however, on any attempt to impose cultural order on the relationship between truth, knowledge, and the wild world. I Looking back on it, it seems that my entire philosophical career has been implicated—in one way or another, directly and indirectly—in these two questions: "How important is truth to knowledge and epistemology?" and "What is the role of natural environments in the production of knowledge?" Furthest back, at the very origin of my philosophical life, reflections on philosophical knowledge were inevitably posed and thought about in natural environments, particularly in my meditations as I drifted in the early morning mist on the St. Croix River and several Minnesota lakes, especially Cedar Lake. Even now, when I am trying to make my way to a new understanding of some philosophical issue, I walk along the shores of Lake Michigan and the Milwaukee River, or sit by rivers and lakes in Idaho, a place that became my second home after meeting my partner, Fran. Northern White Cedars stand in our yard, front and back; Western Red Cedar holds our house in its embrace.There is no question in my mind that natural environments are the deepest sources of whatever philosophical understandings I may have come to. In terms of formal studies, however, the question of the role of natural environments in the production of knowledge did not emerge for me until, well into my teaching career, I discovered the newly-emerging field of environmental ethics. It was at that point that the deepest wellspring of my philosophy and my life came together with my professional philosophical interests—in an uneasy balance. Until that time, as I think of it now, my philosophical track through the curious environment of the academy, however well it prepared me to think about central issues in environmental ethics, was mostly marked by a fascination with glittering baubles and gemstones and did not truly touch the soil, water, and atmosphere of my life.Questions of truth, knowledge, and epistemology took center stage from the beginning of my formal philosophical studies. As an undergraduate [End Page 102] at Berkeley, Thompson Clarke introduced me (in three courses) to the skeptical implications of Ordinary Language Philosophy that had escaped the attention of J. L. Austin and others. This baptism into the rigors of skeptical philosophy left me pretty much convinced, as my partner and... (shrink)

Deep ecologists have criticized reform environmentalists for not being sufficiently radical in their attempts to curb human exploitation of the nonhuman world. Ecofeminists, however, maintain that deep ecologists, too, are not sufficiently radical, for they have neglected the cmcial role played by patriarchalism in shaping the cultural categories responsible for Western humanity’s domination of Nature. According to eco-feminists, only by replacing those categories-including atomism, hierarchalism, dualism, and androcentrism - can humanity learn to dweIl in harmony with nonhuman beings. After reviewing (...) the eco-feminist critique both of reform environmentalism and of deep ecology, I sketch a critical dialogue between eco-feminism and deep ecology. (shrink)

The ideas of C. D. Broad have affected the work of moral philosophers throughout the twentieth century to the present day. First published in 1971, this edited volume contains Broad’s best essays on the philosophical problems of Ethics, mostly written and published between 1914 and 1964. Among the essays are Broad’s important critiques of G. E. Moore’s ethical theory, his lecture entitled ‘Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism’, and other pieces discussing topics as broad as Conscience, Egoism and Free Will. This reissue (...) serves as an important companion to Broad’s other works, a number of which have also been reissued within the Routledge Library Editions series, and will be invaluable to students interested in Broad’s theories and twentieth-century philosophical thought. (shrink)

An ethics-based epistemology is necessary for environmental philosophy—a sharply different approach from the epistemology-based ethics that the field has inherited, mostly implicitly, from mainstream ethics. In this paper, we try to uncover this inherited epistemology and point toward an alternative. In section two, we outline a general contrast between an ethics-based epistemology and an epistemology-based ethics. In section three, we examine the relationship between ethics and epistemology in an ethics-based epistemology, drawing extensively on examples from indigenous cultures. We briefly explore (...) several striking implications of an ethics-based epistemology in sections four and five. (shrink)

Feminist analysis has eonvineed me that certain tendencies within that form of radical environmentalism known as deep ecology-with its supposed rejection of the Western ethical tradition and its adoption of what looks to be a feminist attitude toward the environment and our relationship to nature-constitute one more chapter in the story of Western alienation from nature. In this paper I deepen my critique of these tendencies toward alienation within deep ecology by historicizing my critique in the light of a development (...) in the ancient world that is disquietingly similar to the rise of deep ceology in recent times-namely, the rise of Stoicism in the wake of the breakup of the ancient polis. (shrink)

I offer an epistemologically grounded revisioning of Tom Birch’s ethical principle of universal consideration, suggesting that epistemologies have ethical dimensions and hence that universal moral consideration is intrinsic to the epistemological enterprise. I contrast epistemologies of domination with epistemologies in part constituted by the generosity of spirit that is the hallmark of Birch’s notion of universal consideration.

In his campaign against moral pluralism, J. Baird Callicott has attempted to bring “theoretical unity and closure” to environmental ethics by providing a “metaphysics of morals” encompassing environmental, interpersonal, and social concems, as weIl as concems for domesticated animals. The central notion in this metaphysics is the community concept. I discuss two quite different, and separable, aspects of Callicott’s project. First, I argue that his metaphysics of morals does not provide ethical unity and closure. Second, and less specifically focused on (...) Callicott, I discuss the thesis that we can derive ethical obligations from descriptions of the structures of the various communities to which we belong. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that in Husserlian phenomenology there is no opposition between theory and praxis. On the contrary, he understands the former to serve the latter, so as to usher in a new world. The means for doing is the phenomenological reduction or epoché. It gives the phenomenologist access to the starting point, the “first things,” and orients his/her striving towards reason and the renewal of humanity. Careful attention to the significance of the epoché also sheds light (...) on Husserl’s understanding of the relationship of phenomenology not only to philosophy but also to the other sciences. Though an exposition of the “phenomenology of the philosophical vocation” which Husserl sketched in the 1920s, e.g., in his Kaizo articles and lectures on first philosophy, the author seeks to shore up his thesis. (shrink)

I place my analysis and naturalization of the problem of evil in relation to (1) Holmes Rolston’s views on disvalues in nature and (2) the challenge posed to theology by environmental philosophy in the work of Frederick Ferré. In the analysis of the problem of evil that follows my discussion of Rolston and Ferré, I first discuss the transformative power for the religious believer of reflection on the problem of evil, using the biblical Job as a case study. I point (...) out difficulties with Job’s particular resolution of the problem of evil and suggest that these difficulties can be satisfactorily addressed by naturalizing spirituality. (shrink)

(Re)framing ethics at work -- Starting conversations about professional ethics -- Working for a good life -- Being a professional : problems and promises -- Reconsidering organizations as cultures of integrity -- Seeking something more in the market -- Finding new ways to talk about everyday ethics.

Nominal logic is a variant of first-order logic in which abstract syntax with names and binding is formalized in terms of two basic operations: name-swapping and freshness. It relies on two important principles: equivariance (validity is preserved by name-swapping), and fresh name generation ("new" or fresh names can always be chosen). It is inspired by a particular class of models for abstract syntax trees involving names and binding, drawing on ideas from Fraenkel-Mostowski set theory: finite-support models in which each value (...) can depend on only finitely many names. Although nominal logic is sound with respect to such models, it is not complete. In this paper we review nominal logic and show why finite-support models are insufficient both in theory and practice. We then identify (up to isomorphism) the class of models with respect to which nominal logic is complete: ideal-supported models in which the supports of values are elements of a proper ideal on the set of names. We also investigate an appropriate generalization of Herbrand models to nominal logic. After adjusting the syntax of nominal logic to include constants denoting names, we generalize universal theories to nominal-universal theories and prove that each such theory has an Herbrand model. (shrink)

It is widely held that all hope for a satisfactory environmental ethic rests on the question whether intrinsic value can be discovered in non-human nature, for it is also widely held that intrinsic value is what, if anything, grounds human obligations to non-human nature. The work of J. Baird Callicott on intrinsic value has been central to the contemporary discussion of environmental ethics and the present paper leads off with an overview of some aspects of his work in this area.