In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.2 (2003) 119-134 [Access article in PDF] The Constitution of Rhetoric's Tradition Maurice Charland Rhetoric is not a discipline. That is to say, as a domain of theoretical and practical knowledge, rhetoric is weakly institutionalized, lacking a centralized arbiter and standardized set of procedures for establishing truth claims. It also lacks the basic characteristics that Michel Foucault defines as disciplinary, for while we can identify "groups (...) of objects, methods, their corpus of properties considered to be true, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools," these are neither universally admitted, nor do they "constitute a sort of anonymous system, freely available to whoever wishes, or whoever is able to make use of them, without their being any question of their meaning" (1972, 222). On the contrary, despite the fact that rhetoric is usually figured as offering practical and, indeed, positive knowledge, the meaning of its terms is always being questioned and at stake. While we might, by considering terms loosely, seek to identify rhetoric in terms of objects such as "persuasion," or "discourse," these are not exclusively its province. Furthermore, the ends of rhetoric are themselves unclear. Is rhetoric really the art of discovering the available means of persuasion? Or is it an art of citizenship? Or a method of enquiry? It has at times been defined as each. Consequently, none of these methods can fix its identity. At most, we can say that "rhetoric," as a domain of knowledge, signals a commitment to the idea of agency in discourse.Rhetoric, while not disciplinary, nevertheless "hangs together" as a domain of knowledge even though it does not cohere conceptually. It is, or comes close to being, a "discursive formation." That is to say, we can identify a field that produces statements concerning discourse and its operations, which is characterized by certain regularities that articulate with the term rhetoric itself. The first such regularity is the gesture of negation. Rhetoric refuses philosophy (or acts out having been refused by philosophy). [End Page 119] Rhetoric further is defined against other intellectual genres: rhetoric is not poetics, is not political science, is not ethics, though it may "speak" to them. Ultimately, though, this tells us very little about the nature of rhetoric's difference, for while refusal is effective in positing the existence of a boundary between rhetoric and other domains, the location of that boundary and what it contains remains unspecified. Rhetoric must also be attributed an at least provisional sense. This is accomplished by rhetoric's second gesture, which initially appears more substantial. Rhetoric is framed in terms of the positivity of a foundational "tradition." Indeed, the gesture toward tradition is ubiquitous. Consider, for example, both the title and principles of organization of Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg's (1990) anthology, George Kennedy's (1998) recursion to the idea of "tradition" even as he attempts to present rhetoric as a natural and cross-cultural phenomenon, recent feminist works that explicitly address "the tradition," 1 the routine citation of Classical authorities and examples, the recurrence of "new" rhetorics, including Burke's dramatism, Perelman's theory of argumentation, as well as Barthes' semiotics, which are offered as supplements to tradition's lacks, and, finally, the energy devoted to the study of the history of rhetoric. The rhetorical tradition, as something bequeathed or put in play by ancient teachers, appears to offer rhetoric a substance, a literature, and a set of problems, particularly through variants of two other principles of discursive formation identified by Foucault, commentary and the author-function. Even so, the gesture toward tradition does not imply the existence of a historically rooted and fixed corpus or model: "Tradition" is a vague term, there is no unproblematic canon of texts to be commented upon, and tradition itself, rather than Aristotle, Plato, or Cicero, stands as "author." What we debate is the meaning of the "tradition," the uneasy relationship between Socrates and Sophists, Plato and Aristotle, but as positions rather than personae. Furthermore, in the name of rhetoric, ancient and modern texts are often read against the grain, and what is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.2 (2003) 103-108 [Access article in PDF] Defining, Using, and Challenging the Rhetorical Tradition Alisse Theodore Portnoy "What counts as 'the tradition'?" was the question that provoked this series of essays. Several of us attended a retreat sponsored by the Rhetoric Society of America, and we had dutifully split into smaller groups in an attempt to define or mark rhetoric as a discipline. Patricia Bizzell and (...) Bruce Herzberg had recently published the second edition of their The Rhetorical Tradition, and Michael Leff wanted to know what criteria Bizzell and Herzberg used as they revised the tradition. Bizzell was part of the group and responded. Jacqueline Jones Royster also responded to the opening question as the terrain shifted from defining to using and—quite naturally for everyone in the room—challenging the tradition. Maurice Charland soon entered into this Burkean parlor, despite his refusal to call rhetoric a discipline.One product of this ongoing conversation was a panel at the 2002 RSA biennial conference, from which the essays in this special issue of Philosophy & Rhetoric emerged. In their essays, Bizzell (English), Charland (Communication Studies), Leff (Communication Studies), and Royster (English) agree on several key points, the most basic of which are not only the existence but also the dynamic nature of a rhetorical tradition. The essayists agree that contemporary users of the tradition have agency in its constitution, and that texts by "performers" as well as by rhetorical theorists have a place in the tradition. But all of the essays have different starting points and offer us myriad ways to think about the rhetorical tradition.Patricia Bizzell writes with a unique perspective, having, as she says, edited the tradition—twice. In "Editing the Rhetorical Tradition," Bizzell takes stock and quickly accounts for us her sense of the "traditional tradition," or the tradition's blue chip stocks, and then offers tips on high risk and growth stocks. Playing with the stock market metaphor, Bizzell imagines [End Page 103] as high-risk stocks the texts or authors who have been marginal players, figures for whom presence is assured but reputation is not. Their reputations fluctuate depending on the ways "they can be made to serve the cultural preferences of those in power." Also contributing to what Bizzell calls "new traditions" are "thinkers who were practically unknown to traditional historians of rhetoric, sometimes because we did not have the methodological and pedagogical approaches necessary to construe their texts as rhetoric and sometimes because their work itself was hidden from scholarly view, fragmented, or lost." Bizzell outlines three ways these "growth stocks" enter into the tradition as she acknowledges the "whole new set of [scholarly] priorities" these texts often require.But just the novelty of these texts can pose challenges. Bizzell uses an exchange that occurred during the question period of the RSA session to suggest that texts might appear more abstract and philosophical, and therefore (mistakenly) more complex and valuable, simply "because we have the benefit of generations of scholarship and pedagogy assisting us to read these texts as rhetorical theory." Bizzell also argues that a metacritical awareness of the constraints upon language use makes a text theoretical even as it seems primarily "performative." In other words, more than a few "new tradition" texts count as contributing to rhetorical theory because they advocate non-traditional rhetorical practices or non-traditional access to conventional rhetorical spaces in the performance of the text.Bizzell reports the increased inclusion of these "growth stocks," the "thinkers who were practically unknown," even as she admits that reviewers for the second edition of The Rhetorical Tradition asked for more, not less, of the traditional tradition. And so as she concludes Bizzell refuses to see the composition of the tradition as a matter of contention or animosity. Rather, according to Bizzell, the tradition shifts "as our needs and interests change," based on choices "aris[ing] out of complex cultural factors relating to gender, race, social class, national identity, and more."Since anthologies like The Rhetorical Tradition play such a large part in the evolution of the rhetorical tradition, Bizzell claims some... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.2 (2003) 109-118 [Access article in PDF] Editing the Rhetorical Tradition Patricia Bizzell The rhetorical tradition is always being edited. I know because I have edited it myself—that's a sort of pun, in which the words "the rhetorical tradition" refer both to a book and to the cultural phenomenon the book represents. Bruce Herzberg and I (2001) have co-edited an anthology entitled The Rhetorical (...) Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. That project also involved editing the tradition itself, because, at least since the days of Isidore of Seville, it is through inclusions and exclusions in anthologies such as ours that the rhetorical tradition is established, grows, and changes. Anthologies seem always to have played a large role in the definition of the rhetorical tradition because the accessibility of texts has so often been an issue in the study of rhetoric, whether transmission problems have been caused by the dissipation of classical learning at the end of the Roman period or are caused by the vagaries of print publication today. Then and now, the changing shape of the tradition may be discerned from the tables of contents of anthologies, a circumstance that has become especially evident to me now that we have had the opportunity to edit our volume twice. The tables of contents of the first edition, appearing in 1990, and the second, in 2001, show both some enduring similarities and some interesting differences.It is important to remember that what we inherit as the "rhetorical tradition," for blessing or curse, comprises at least three modalities: texts deemed worthy of rhetorical study, methods of analyzing those texts, and methods of teaching rhetoric according to precepts and principles derived from those texts. Such a description of our cultural legacy would seem to put texts at the center of the tradition, and indeed, anthologies focus our attention on the rhetorical tradition as a set of texts. Tables of contents organized chronologically suggest a neat progression of supposedly major works marching through the centuries, but why those particular works? In [End Page 109] the study of rhetoric as in the study of imaginative literature, scholars now realize that these supposedly inevitable textual monuments to an unbroken and progressively more sophisticated discipline are in fact quarried from among the masses of material each era produces by traditions, that is, methodological and pedagogical traditions, in how to study rhetoric. Although the tradition appears to be text-based, how we wish to analyze verbal productions and how we prefer to teach the art of producing them govern our choices of rhetorical texts to preserve, elevate, or delete. And modern histories of rhetoric have shown that the preferences governing these choices arise out of complex cultural factors relating to gender, race, social class, national identity, and more.Once upon a time, these choices were dominated by the preferences of socially privileged men who saw Western culture as the best in the world, and that culture itself as springing primarily from Greek and Roman roots. As Walter Ong (1981) has explained in Fighting for Life, these men believed that education in rhetoric must be for men only and that boys must be introduced to it via agonistic competition. From these assumptions sprang buttresses for what we might call the "traditional tradition" in the study of rhetoric, a progression of texts written by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Augustine, Erasmus, Bacon, Blair, and so on. This kind of study of rhetoric required extensive education, first, in Latin and Greek, often inculcated with the aid of corporal punishment, as Ong describes, and it persisted well into the twentieth century (though, one trusts, with much less flogging—that went out with co-education, as Ong explains). For example, until 1936, Greek was a graduation requirement at the Jesuit college where I teach, the College of the Holy Cross, and Latin was not dropped as a graduation requirement there until 1959 (the college was still all male, but the rationale for dropping the requirement appears to have centered upon the need to make room in the curriculum for pre-professional studies). Here... (shrink)

Center for Humans and Nature, 109 West 77th Street, Suite 2, New York, NY 10024, USA. Tel.: 212 362 7170; Fax: 212 362 9592; Email: brucejennings{at}humansandnature.org ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> . Abstract A fundamental question for the ethical foundations of public health concerns the moral justification for limiting or overriding individual liberty. What might justify overriding the individual moral claim to non-interference or to self-realization? This paper argues that the libertarian justification for limiting individual (...) liberty known as the ‘harm principle’ or the ‘Millian paradigm’ is inadequate as a basis of public health ethics and policy. But simply pitting some collectivist value or utilitarian criterion over against individual liberty is not theoretically satisfactory, either. John Stuart Mill himself was not a Millian, in this sense, and his utilitarianism does not pit itself against individual liberty as a situation of balancing conflicting values. A reconsideration of Mill, particularly in light of the later work of Berlin on liberty, points toward a conception of relational liberty that is crucial for public health ethics because it contains within itself the basis for its own moral limitation. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

How important is the concept of solidarity in our society's calculus of consent as regards the legitimacy and ethical and political support for public health, health policy, and health services? By the term “calculus of consent,” we refer to the answer that people give to rationalize and justify their obedience to laws, rules, and policies that benefit others. The calculus of consent answers questions such as, Why should I care? Why should I help? Why should I contribute to the public (...) provision of others? Consent here does not have to be a deliberate, explicit act of informed agreement. And a calculus does not have to be a quantifiable, quasimathematical operation; more often, such a calculus takes narrative form in stories that a society tells about itself and that individuals tell about their place in it. One vital function of bioethics is to inform and shape those stories. Bioethics has the potential to offer society a keener insight into and perception of what is ethically at stake in controversies concerning health, science, and society. This insight is what we shall refer to as a “moral imagination,” by which we do not mean make-believe or fantasy but, rather, the capacity to take a critical distance from the given, to think reality otherwise. The moral imagination enables one to see connections between factors at work in history, in large social and communal structures, and in the shape of one's own life, thoughts, and feelings. Here we are especially concerned with the contribution that the concept of solidarity can make to the moral imagination of bioethics. We contend that solidarity must become more widely active and explicit in bioethics analysis and argumentation as it endeavors to shape reasons for obeying norms and rules of common benefit in an open, diverse society. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Toxic Chemicals in the Arctic Stratospheric Ozone Loss and Global Warming References and Further Reading.

I reply to criticisms of the divine command theory with an eye to noting the relation of ethics to an ontological ground. The criticisms include: the theory makes the standard of right and wrong arbitrary, it traps the defender of the theory in a vicious circle, it violates moral autonomy, it is a relic of our early deontological state of moral development. I then suggest how Henry Veatch's view of good as an ontological feature of the world provides a context (...) in which the divine command theory can be reasonably justified. (shrink)

It is commonly held that professors in university communities should not profess but should uphold the ideals of presuppositionless investigation, unbiased presentation of materials, and open dialogue. In particular it is believed that professors professing in the classroom is inconsistent with being a truly Socratic professor. I argue that this is a misreading of Socrates' claim not to know (be barren), but rather is a result of three myths: the myths of neutrality, of expressionism, and of denigration, and that when (...) these are properly debunked, professing in the classroom which seeks to engage, challenge, and empower students is proper for a truly Socratic professor. Our goal is not to make disciples of our students, but to enable students to advance reflectively beyond us. (shrink)

In tyhis book chapterI provides concise overviews of Richard Swinburne's views on topics in natural theology and also in distinctively Christian philosophical theology; changes in his views are identified. I explain Swinburne's positive, cumulative case for the existence of God, and his discussion of objections to God based on evil, and then move on to outline his views on A tonement, Revelation, the Trinity, and the Incarnation. I then sketch his case for the truth of Christianity, and and his views (...) on faith and its relationship with reason. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 2, Page 364-367, June 2011.

These days, creativity is a hot commodity, the magic ingredient that separates excellence from competence in every field of human endeavor. Yet there is little agreement on what it is, especially in education, where Jean Piaget’s critique of imagination remains influential. I outline the basis for a naturalized conception of creativity rooted in evolutionary processes that are enhanced by and in turn amplify individual and group creativity, and propose that replacing Piaget’s polarization of imagination and realistic thinking with Lev Vygotsky’s (...) integration of those mental processes is necessary to meet the aim of educating for creativity. The role of imagination in counterfactual thinking is explored and improvisation posited as a paradigmatic manifestation of both creative process and product. (shrink)

People of the western world now have unprecedented freedom to choose their religion. In this book, the world's leading sociologist of religion argues that the liberty and freedom to choose religion corrodes faith and that religion remains most vital when it is part of ethnic and national identity.

It has gone largely unnoticed that when Deleuze opposes the “private thinker” to the “public professor,” he is invoking the existential thought of Lev Shestov. The public professor defends established values and preaches submission to the demands of reason and the State; the private thinker opposes thought to reason, “idiocy” to common sense, a people to come to what exists. Private thinkers are solitary, singular and untimely, forced to think against consensus and “the crowd.” Deleuze takes from Shestov and Kierkegaard (...) the idea that genuine thinking manifests itself in a thinking which rebels against rational necessity, a theme central to Shestov’s leading French interpreter, Benjamin Fondane. Although Deleuze at first expresses doubts as to whether Shestov’s critique of reason can overcome the legislative reason of Kant, or whether it is entirely free of ressentiment, I argue that Shestov and Fondane’s anti-rationalism is more radical than Deleuze sometimes admits, and show how Deleuze’s attitude toward Shestov became more unreservedly positive over the years. On the other hand, against Shestov and Fondane, I agree with Deleuze that the private thinker is in solidarity with the “strange powers” which can remake the world, and thus with “the people to come.” Nonetheless, I argue that Deleuze’s philosophy cannot form the basis of a politics of egalitarian consensus, but that “the people to come” can only be a “broken chain” of untimely and singular exceptions. (shrink)

_Does the existence of evil call into doubt the existence of God? Show me the argument._ Philosophy starts with questions, but attempts at answers are just as important, and these answers require reasoned argument. Cutting through dense philosophical prose, 100 famous and influential arguments are presented in their essence, with premises, conclusions and logical form plainly identified. Key quotations provide a sense of style and approach. _Just the Arguments_ is an invaluable one-stop argument shop. A concise, formally structured summation of (...) 100 of the most important arguments in Western philosophy The first book of its kind to present the most important and influential philosophical arguments in a clear premise/conclusion format, the language that philosophers use and students are expected to know Offers succinct expositions of key philosophical arguments without bogging them down in commentary Translates difficult texts to core arguments Designed to provides a quick and compact reference to everything from Aquinas’ “Five Ways” to prove the existence of God, to the metaphysical possibilities of a zombie world. (shrink)

Demoscene is a computer subculture that proliferated throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This article examines one aspect of the Demoscene culture, the production of the ‘Demo’, a computer animation generated and performed in real-time visualization through digital code. I analyse the Demo as a technological and aesthetic form, speculating on its possibilities for theorizing a unique mode of digital image experience.

The ancient tradition is strong that the execution of M. Marius Gratidianus during the Sullan proscriptions was carried out by L. Sergius Catilina. The earliest evidence comes from several passages in Cicero's speech in toga candida, delivered just before the consular elections in 64 and designed to rake up as much prejudice as possible against his two main rival candidates, Catilina and C. Antonius . While in none of the passages does Cicero specifically mention the executioner or the victim, it (...) is Asconius commenting on the passages who reveals that Catilina was the executioner and Marius Gratidianus the victim. We do not have a great deal of the speech in toga candida left ; if we did have the whole speech, it is clear that we would have been given the name by Cicero himself. The Ciceronian version is that the head of Gratidianus was cut off by Catilina, carried in his hands through the city from the Janiculum to the temple of Apollo, and delivered to Sulla still full of life and breath. This version is followed by Plutarch . A variation can be found, as early as Sallust . There is a fragment of the historiae which says that Gratidianus died after his arms and legs had been broken and his eyes gouged out, so that he expired as it were through each and every limb. There is nothing about his head being cut off and carried about, nor is there any mention of Catilina as the executioner. While the details of the torture and mutilation become progressively more gory, this version is followed by Livy , Valerius Maximus , Lucan , and Florus. (shrink)

I ARGUE THAT THE NOTION OF THE BEST POSSIBLE WORLD IS MEANINGLESS AND THEREFORE A CHIMERA, BECAUSE FOR ANY WORLD WHICH MIGHT BE SO DESIGNATED, THERE COULD ALWAYS BE ANOTHER WHICH WAS BETTER, EITHER IN BEING POPULATED BY BEINGS WITH BETTER OR A GREATER QUANTITY OF GOOD CHARACTERISTICS, OR ELSE BY BEING MORE OPTIMIFIC.

We ask God to involve himself providentially in our lives, yet we cherish our freedom to choose and act. Employing both theological reflection and philosophical analysis, the author explores how to resolve the interesting and provocative puzzles arising from these seemingly conflicting desires. He inquires what sovereignty means and how sovereigns balance their power and prerogatives with the free responses of their subjects. Since we are physically embodied in a physical world, we also need to ask how this is compatible (...) with our being free agents. Providence raises questions about God's fundamental attributes. The author considers what it means to affirm God's goodness as logically contingent, how being almighty interfaces with God's self-limitation, and the persistent problems that arise from claiming that God foreknows the future. Discussion of these divine properties spills over into the related issues of why God allows, or even causes, pain and suffering; why, if God is all-knowing, we need to petition God repeatedly and encounter so many unanswered prayers; and how miracles, as ways God acts in the world, are possible and knowable. Throughout, the author looks at Scripture and attends to how providence deepens our understanding of God and enriches our lives. (shrink)

Performing reason: Mendelssohn on Judaism and enlightenment -- Jacobi and Mendelssohn: the tragedy of a messianic friendship -- In the year of the Lord 1800: Rosenzweig and the Spinoza quarrel -- Reinhold and Kant: the quest for a new religion of reason -- Beautiful life: Mendelssohn, Hegel, and Rosenzweig -- Mendelssohn, Rosenzweig, and political theology: beyond sovereign violence -- Beyond 1800: an immigrant Rosenzweig.

I argue that "obligation" is a referential notion, flowing from actual or potential relationships. Applied to future persons, our relationship with them is established by virtue of the significant effects that our acts will have on them, and this in turn provides the basis of our obligation to them. Referential problems arise particularly in the types of cases where alternative acts bring different people into existence, for here there is no clear referent of the obligation. In such cases a theistic (...) model has an advantage by delineating lines of obligation through God. (shrink)

First I employ Bayes's Theorem to give some precision to the atheologian's thesis that it is improbable that God exists given the amount of evil in the world (E). Two arguments result from this: (1) E disconfirms God's existence, and (2) E tends to disconfirm God's existence. Secondly, I evaluate these inductive arguments, suggesting against (1) that the atheologian has abstracted from and hence failed to consider the total evidence, and against (2) that the atheologian's evidence adduced to support his (...) thesis regarding the relevant probabilities is inadequate. (shrink)

I consider four recently suggested difference between killing and letting die as they apply to active and passive euthanasia : taking vs. taking no action; intending vs. not intending the death of the person; the certainty of the result vs. leaving the situation open to other possible alternative events; and dying from unnatural vs. natural causes. The first three fail to constitute clear differences between killing and letting die, and "ex posteriori" cannot constitute morally significant differences. The last constitutes a (...) difference but is not morally significant. (shrink)

Two main questions are addressed: (1) What standard defines the nonmoral good for humans, the prudentially rational life? (2) How is this standard applied in guiding and in assessing lives? The standard presented is “The Worthwhileness Principle,” which asserts that if one’s life situation is sufficiently fortunate, the aim is to maximize worthwhileness, the net balance of benefits over costs; but if one’s life situation is chronically, and substantially unfortunate, the aim is to minimize nonworthwhileness, the net balance of costs (...) over benefits. The principle is based on a two-sided, positivity and negativity, or cost-and-benefit-centered viewpoint, rather than a one-sided, good-centered viewpoint. Specifically, it includes negative ends, harms to be avoided, negative means, resource costs to be minimized, and negative luck, misfortune, unfortunate lives.Regarding the second question, the standard is applied prospectively in guiding lives and activities by means of prudential deliberation, prudential habits, and prudential spontaneity. It is applied retrospectively in assessing whole or partial lives using the Worthwhileness Scale. (shrink)

A questão sobre como e por que os jovens vêm a se radicalizar é ​​um dos temas que permeiam de modo central todos os principais escritos de Dostoiévski. Pode-se argumentar que Os Demônios oferece a expressão definitiva acerca de quais são as consequências da radicalização, uma vez que ela venha a ocorrer, mas para o caso de se procurar compreender como e por que a radicalização acontece na mente e no espírito de um jovem, é necessário voltar-se para a obra (...) seguinte de Dostoiévski, o romance O Adolescente. Neste romance, a busca de Arkadi por seu pai é, em última análise, uma busca por uma ordem que reflita uma “bela aparência”. (shrink)

Uses real-life examples and five basic moral principles to encourage teens to make the right choices in various situations related to friends, family, school, and relationships.

Virtually all Americans are part of the health care system. They may be patients, health professionals, employers providing benefits, insurers, medical manufacturers, regulators, innovators, or investors. Each has a stake in this burgeoning sector of the United States economy, and each may be critically affected, in multiple and diverse ways, by changes to the system under health reform. As health care expenditures continue to rise, it is increasingly important to understand where these expenditures go and the factors that drive these (...) cost increases. This article examines health care expenditure patterns, considering both the “usual suspects” that frequently are cited as spending drivers, as well as certain significant dynamics that may be the main contributors to rising costs. We conclude that in order to successfully contain costs, health reform will need to address these underlying factors. (shrink)

The development of atomic bombs under the auspices of the U. S. Army's Manhattan Project during World War II is considered to be the outstanding news story of the twentieth century. In this book, a physicist and expert on the history of the Project presents a comprehensive overview of this momentous achievement. The first three chapters cover the history of nuclear physics from the discovery of radioactivity to the discovery of fission, and would be ideal for instructors of a sophomore-level (...) "Modern Physics" course. Student-level exercises at the ends of the chapters are accompanied by answers. Chapter 7 covers the physics of first-generation fission weapons at a similar level, again accompanied by exercises and answers. For the interested layman and for non-science students and instructors, the book includes extensive qualitative material on the history, organization, implementation, and results of the Manhattan Project and the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing missions. The reader also learns about the legacy of the Project as reflected in the current world stockpiles of nuclear weapons.. (shrink)