This book offers a comprehensive virtue ethics that breaks from the tradition of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. In developing a pluralistic view, it shows how different ’modes of moral response’ such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity are all central to the virtuous response and thereby to ethics. It offers virtue ethical accounts of the good life, objectivity, rightness, demandingness, and moral epistemology.

Christine Swanton presents a new target centred virtue ethics, which is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. She rejects the 'natural goodness' metaphysics of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in favour of a 'hermeneutic ontology' of ethics, and she offers a new target centred framework for assessing rightness of acts.

This ground-breaking and lucid contribution to the vibrant field of virtue ethics focuses on the influential work of Hume and Nietzsche, providing fresh perspectives on their philosophies and a compelling account of their impact on the development of virtue ethics. A ground-breaking text that moves the field of virtue ethics beyond ancient moral theorists and examines the highly influential ethical work of Hume and Nietzsche from a virtue ethics perspective Contributes both to virtue ethics and a refreshed understanding of Hume’s (...) and Nietzsche’s ethics Skilfully bridges the gap between continental and analytical philosophy Lucidly written and clearly organized, allowing students to focus on either Hume or Nietzsche Written by one of the most important figures contributing to virtue ethics today. (shrink)

This book explores the nitty-gritty details of particular virtues. Most of the virtues discussed--ambition, cheerfulness, creativity, magnificence, pride, wit, wonder--have been almost wholly neglected by contemporary ethicists.

It is not unusual now for Hume to be read as part of a virtue ethical tradition. However there are a number of obstacles in the way of such a reading: subjectivist, irrationalist, hedonistic, and consequentialist interpretations of Hume. In this paper I support a virtue ethical reading by arguing against all these interpretations. In the course of these arguments I show how Hume should be understood as part of a virtue ethical tradition which is sentimentalist in a response-dependent sense, (...) as opposed to Aristotelian. (shrink)

... View (i) The Thesis of Essential Contestedness The view that freedom and other ideals such as justice are essentially contested is important, ...

Environmental ethics is apparently caught in a dilemma. We believe in human species partiality as a way of making sense of many of our practices. However as part of our commitment to impartialism in ethics, we arguably should extend the principle of impartiality to other species, in a version of biocentric egalitarianism of the kind advocated by Paul Taylor. According to this view, not only do all entities that possess a good have inherent worth, but they have equal inherent worth, (...) and in particular no species is superior to any other. In this paper, I elaborate a Heideggerian environmental virtue ethics that slips between the horns of the dilemma. Central to this ethics is the relation of “dwelling” and the many virtues of dwelling, according to which the world is seen as “holy” in a variety of ways. This ethics is importantly local in respect of time and place, but also has universalistic aspects. To understand such an ethics, it is necessary to grasp Heidegger’s notion of truth as “aleithia” or opening, which enables us to escape the metaphysical dilemmas besetting ethics in the analytic tradition, including standard virtue ethics. Elaborating this notion occupies a large part of the paper. (shrink)

Many forms of virtue ethics, like certain forms of utilitarianism, suffer from the problem of indirection. In those forms, the criterion for status of a trait as a virtue is not the same as the criterion for the status of an act as right. Furthermore, if the virtues for example are meant to promote the nourishing of the agent, the virtuous agent is not standardly supposed to be motivated by concern for her own flourishing in her activity. In this paper, (...) I propose a virtue ethics which does not suffer from the problem. Traits are not virtues because their cultivation and manifestation promote a value such as agent flourishing. They are virtues in so far as they are habits of appropriate response to various relevant values. This means that there is a direct connection between the rationale of a virtue and what makes an action virtuous or right. (shrink)

According to many critics of virtue ethics the dominant virtue ethical paradigm of practical reasoning and right action both encourages a dismissive attitude to moral disagreement and offers a bad model for dealing with it. The charge of dismissiveness raises two issues. First, what is it to take moral disagreement seriously? Second, can virtue ethics respond to the charge?In answer to the first question I show that on virtue ethical account of ethics a great deal of pervasive deep disagreement can (...) be explained by the existence of vagueness and cognitive shortcomings. Taking moral disagreement seriously is to appreciate that much disagreement is deep, reasonable, and intractable; and that moral points of view (including those of virtuous agents) are subject to limited perspectives, the narrative particularities of one’s life, and cultural and historical location. The alleged problem with virtue ethics is that it fails to appreciate the perspectival, theory ladenness, and intractability of dispute, for it is commonly assumed that in virtue ethics a virtuous agent is both the determinant of right action and the repository of sound reasoning about which actions are right.In answer to the second question I show that virtue ethics need not be committed to this feature. I assume a dialogical version of virtue ethics where right action is understood in terms of meeting the targets of relevant virtues, many of which pertain to excellence in dialogue. Relative to this account I focus on two areas of disagreement.(1) The status of actions falling within areas where the application of ‘right’ is vague.(2) Disagreement caused by cognitive shortcomings on the part of some or all of the disagreeing parties. (shrink)

: On the Aristotelian picture of virtue, moral virtue has at its core intellectual virtue. An interesting challenge for this orthodoxy is provided by the case of universal love and its associated virtues, such as the dispositions to exhibit grace, or to forgive, where appropriate. It is difficult to find a property in the object of such love, in virtue of which grace, for example, ought to be bestowed. Perhaps, then, love in general, including universal love, is not necessarily exhibited (...) for reasons. This is the view that, with the help of Heidegger's notion of a fundamental emotional attunement, I defend. The problem is to show how universal love, and its manifestation in the virtues of universal love, can then be seen as rational. Showing this is the task of the essay. (shrink)

In this astonishingly rich volume, experts in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, political theory, aesthetics, history, critical theory, and hermeneutics bring to light the best philosophical scholarship on what is arguably Nietzsche's most rewarding but most challenging text. Including essays that were commissioned specifically for the volume as well as essays revised and edited by their authors, this collection showcases definitive works that have shaped Nietzsche studies alongside new works of interest to students and experts alike. A lengthy introduction, annotated (...) bibliography, and index make this an extremely useful guide for the classroom and advanced research. (shrink)

Although our moral lives would be unrecognisable without them, roles have received little attention from analytic moral philosophers. Roles are central to our lives and to our engagement with one another, and should be analysed in connection with our core notions of ethics such as virtue, reason, and obligation. This volume aims to redress the neglect of role ethics by confronting the tensions between conceptions of impartial morality and role obligations in the history of analytic philosophy and the Confucian tradition. (...) Different perspectives on the ethical significance of roles can be found by looking to debates within professional and applied ethics, by challenging existing accounts of how roles generate reasons, by questioning the hegemony of ethical reasons, and by exploring the relation between expertise and virtue. The essays tackle several core questions related to these debates: What are roles and what is their normative import? To what extent are roles and the ethics of roles central to ethics as opposed to virtue in general, and obligation in general? Are role obligations characteristically incompatible with ordinary morality in professions such as business, law, and medicine? How does practical reason function in relation to roles? Perspectives in Role Ethics is an examination of a largely neglected topic in ethics. It will appeal to a broad range of scholars in normative ethics, virtue ethics, non-Western ethics, and applied ethics interested in the importance of roles in our moral life. (shrink)

In this paper, I am concerned to show that a wide and interesting range of phenomena commonly described as ‘weakness of will’ should be understood as manifesting a defect of what I shall call ‘executive cowardice’ rather than a strong kind of irrationality. More specifically, I claim that such cases should not be understood as an irrational bypassing of an all-things-considered judgment about the thing to do—a view succinctly described by Peacocke thus: The akrates is irrational because although he intentionally (...) does something for which he has some reason, there is a wider set of reasons he has relative to which he does not judge what he does to be rational. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that virtue ethics should be understood as a form of ethics which integrates various domains of the practical in relation to which virtues are excellences. To argue this it is necessary to distinguish two senses of the “moral”: the broad sense which integrates the domains of the practical and a narrow classificatory sense. Virtue ethics, understood as above, believes that all genuine virtue should be understood as what I call virtues proper. To possess a virtue (...) proper (such as an excellent disposition of open-mindedness, an epistemic virtue) is to possess a disposition of overall excellence in relation to the sphere or field of the virtue (being open to the opinions of others). Overall excellence in turn involves excellence in integrating to a sufficient degree, standards of excellence in all relevant practical domains. Epistemic virtues, sporting virtues, moral virtues, and so on are all virtues proper. In particular it is impossible for an epistemic virtue to be a moral (narrow sense) vice. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the differences between Nietzsche and Aristotle are easily exaggerated. It discusses Nietzsche's “perspectivism.” The chapter focuses on three central basic universal virtues which the author argues Nietzsche both endorses and describes: forgetfulness, justice, and wisdom. In order for a genuine virtue of justice to be strong and tempered by grace, a strong “forgetfulness” is necessary. Virtues are described as “overflowing,” have extreme enthusiasm and passion at their core, and practical wisdom is nowhere or hardly to be (...) seen. The chapter describes the universal virtues as basic virtues and also discusses the issue of their differentiation. Two more forms of differentiation apparently create problems for understanding Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist: his idea that virtues are “individual” and his idea that there are virtues of the “convalescent” by contrast with virtues of the strong. (shrink)

This chapter shows that rather than simply focusing on empathy and benevolence, Hume's notion of love may inspire a virtue ethics of love. It outlines the bare bones of a Humean virtue ethics of love, including a Humean account of general or agapeic love. A modern development of sentimentalist virtue ethics has been undertaken by Michael Slote. The chapter shows how such a development would differ from Slote's morality of universal benevolence. Making sense of general love as a virtue or (...) core of virtue in Humean terms requires one then to do two things: explain how general love is possible, and explain how it is fitting. The chapter concerns with the first of these tasks. To show that general love is possible through bonds of proximate identification based on sympathy through resemblance, one need to say more about what kind of love is general love. (shrink)

This chapter provides a response dependence interpretation of it, and shows that it is compatible with a virtue ethical interpretation of Hume's moral philosophy. It aims to do justice to Hume's convictions both that sentiment lies at the foundations of ethics, and that ethics is a form of reliable, objective interaction with the world, permitting critical purchase on both people's behavior and emotions through objectively and socially accessible notions of virtue and vice. The distinction between a scientific constitution of properties (...) and an ethical or aesthetic one is nicely illustrated with Hume's discussion of the beauty of a circle. The chapter discusses the analysis of Hume's notion of the moral sense itself. The moral sense, as an appreciation of virtue, involves sensitivities due to the excitement of “sympathy” but a sympathy driven by or operating within the background of desires for the good of others. (shrink)

In this paper we have two related aims. First, we aim to present an account of what it is to treat women as sex-objects.1 Like other philosophical writers in the field, we hold that the central idea in an account of such treatment is the failure to treat women with proper respect in sexual behavior. This idea has been cashed out in terms of using,2 and in terms of dehumanization or failure to accord equal rights to freedom and welfare.3 However, (...) we believe that there is a central deficiency in most such philosophical accounts of treating women as sex-objects, namely, a failure to outline in any detail a theory of interpersonal norms so that one can grasp in more concrete terms what it is to avoid treating a woman as a sex-object. We aim to rectify this deficiency by presenting a model of interpersonal norms based on the work of the social psychologist Chris Argyris. (shrink)

This paper argues against two major features of consequentialist conceptions of virtue: Value-centredness and the Hegemony of Promotion as a mode of moral acknowledgement or responsiveness. In relation to the first feature, I argue against two ideas: Value should be understood entirely independently of virtue; and The only right-making respects which serve to make an action better than another is degree of value. I argue that what I call the bases of moral response are several, including also status, the good (...) for, and bonds. Against the Hegemony of Promotion thesis I argue for several modes of moral responsiveness constitutive of virtue. (shrink)

A correct understanding of Hume's sentimentalism cleared away the alleged difficulties of his sentimentalism; this chapter shows how a correct understanding of Nietzsche's attacks on “morality” and altruism removes the difficulties of his egoism. The chapter investigates what it is to affirm one's own life, and what is involved in self‐sacrificing altruism. It also shows how affirming one's own life can be compatible with “working for one's fellow men”. One has seen that virtuous egoism is consistent with “overflowing” “gift‐giving” but (...) the overflowing nature of giving is not sufficient for virtuous egoism. Full virtue requires the social feeling of the “collective‐individual.” Finally, one should recall that consequentialism for Nietzsche is the most shallow and “immature” of all the major types of moral theory, simply because it assesses states and actions solely in terms of their consequences, rather than in terms of the depth psychological states of individuals. (shrink)

IntroductionIntelligent Virtue is a great book on virtue: an eminently sensible book, and I agree with virtually all of it. For me describing a philosophy book as sensible and indeed commonsensical is real praise, for much philosophy exemplifies a vice to which Martha Nussbaum has drawn our attention in ‘Saving Aristotle’s Appearances.’See Language and Logos Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy, ed. Malcolm Schofield and Nussbaum , pp. 267–293, 277. This is the intellectual vice of philosophers who got ‘fascinated with the (...) internal progress of their argument, even though it ended in a place incredibly remote from and at odds with, human belief.’ Annas’s work is well grounded in the endoxa .I could list all the important theses with which I agree, ranging from the central claim that virtue is analogous to a practical skill, to the very important claim that happiness is not reached by attaining “stuff” such as money, power, prope .. (shrink)