Results for 'C.M. Korsgaard'

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  1.  19
    Ignatieff, M. 107.V. Jabri, I. Kant, J. Keane, M. Keck, C. Korsgaard, C. Lopez-Guerra, M. Loughlin & T. McCarthy - 2012 - In Eva Erman & Ludvig Beckman, Territories of Citizenship. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 170.
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  2. 10. Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays (pp. 176-181).Christine M. Korsgaard, R. Jay Wallace, Gary Watson, Stephen Darwall & David Shoemaker - 2006 - In Laurie Dimauro, Ethics. Greenhaven Press.
     
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  3.  50
    Rawlsian Objectivity.C. M. Melenovsky - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4):545-564.
    In a 1981 letter to H.L. A. Hart, John Rawls sketches a view of moral objectivity that substantially differs from that of contemporary constructivists. The view he describes does not rely on constitutive features of agency as Korsgaard's does, and it does not bottom out in a form of realism as Scanlon's moral theory does. Instead, Rawls's view grounds objectivity on the fundamental conceptions that could be shared in wide reflective equilibrium. Constructivism grounds objectivity in a kind of intersubjectivity, (...)
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  4.  40
    Self-appropriation vs. self-constitution: Social philosophical reflections on the self-relation.Kurt C. M. Mertel - 2017 - Human Affairs 27 (4):416-432.
    It is widely held that reflexivity is the defining feature of selfhood: the ability of the self to stand in a certain relation to itself. The question of how exactly to theorize this self-relation, however, has been the source of ongoing debate. In recent years, Kantian and post-Kantian approaches such as Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivism and Richard Moran’s commitment view, have attempted to establish the priority of the agential over the epistemic self-relation, thereby re-orientating the debate away from metaphysics and (...)
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  5.  30
    Trouble in the Kingdom of Ends (Rev.: C. M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 252 pp.). [REVIEW]Besedin A. P. - 2020 - Kantian Journal 39 (2):99-108.
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  6.  32
    Christine M. Korsgaard, Tiere wie wir. Warum wir moralische Pflichten gegenüber Tieren haben. Eine Ethik, aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Stefan Lorenzer, München: C.H. Beck, 346 S., ISBN 978-3-406-76545-2. [REVIEW]Dagmar Fenner - 2022 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 129 (1):165-168.
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  7.  89
    Kant, Korsgaard und die Tiere.Sven Ellmers - 2023 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 6:27–57.
    Christine M. Korsgaard ist eine der einflussreichsten Stimmen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. In ihren Arbeiten zur Moralphilosophie Kants verteidigt sie diese gegen zwei Einwände: erstens, dass der kategorische Imperativ auf externe Werte angewiesen ist, mithin als formales Testverfahren scheitere, und, zweitens, dass Kant empfindungsfähige Wesen, die kein Vernunftvermögen besitzen, aus seiner Ethik ausgeschlossen habe und ausschließen musste. Den ersten Einwand glaubt Korsgaard durch eine spezifische Interpretation des kantischen Widerspruchsverständnisses zumindest partiell zurückweisen zu können. Wie ich zeigen werde, unterschätzt Korsgaard (...)
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  8. The constitution of agency: essays on practical reason and moral psychology.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today's leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology ...
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  9. Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Christine Korsgaard has become one of the leading interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy. She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant's moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems. She rejects the traditional picture of Kant's ethics as a cold vision of the moral life which emphasises duty at the expense of love and value. Rather, Kant's work is (...)
  10. Fellow creatures: Kantian ethics and our duties to animals.Christine M. Korsgaard - unknown
    Christine M. Korsgaard is Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. She was educated at the University of Illinois and received a Ph.D. from Harvard. She has held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, and visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. She is a member of the American Philosophical Association and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has published extensively on Kant, and about (...)
     
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  11. Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity (...)
  12.  33
    Practical Identity, Contingency and Humanity.Damiano Ranzenigo - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (3-4):303-322.
    Aim of this paper is to support the view that all human practical identities are contingent by arguing against the view that there is at least one necessary practical identity shared by all human beings, namely Humanity. The view that Humanity is a necessary practical identity is explicitly defended by Christine M. Korsgaard (Korsgaard, C. M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity, edited by O. O’Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. (...)
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  13. Interview with Korsgaard: Internalism and the Sources of Normativity (Corrected version).Christine M. Korsgaard - manuscript
    This is the version of the interview with Professor Korsgaard that was supposed to have appeared in Constructions of Practical Reason: Interviews on Moral and Political Philosophy, edited by Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). Due to an unfortunate accident, the first edition of that volume contains an unedited transcript of that interview rather than the corrected version below.
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  14. (2 other versions)Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
  15. Skepticism about practical reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
    Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is (...)
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  16. The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut, Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This paper criticizes two accounts of the normativity of practical principles: the empiricist account and the rationalist or realist account. It argues against the empiricist view, focusing on the Humean texts that are usually taken to be its locus classicus. It then argues both against the dogmatic rationalist view, and for the Kantian view, through a discussion of Kant's own remarks about instrumental rationality in the second section of the Groundwork. It further argues that the instrumental principle cannot stand alone. (...)
     
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  17. Fellow Creatures. Our Obligations to the Other Animals.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):165-168.
  18. (1 other version)The right to lie: Kant on dealing with evil.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (4):325-349.
    One of the great difficulties with Kant’s moral philosophy is that it seems to imply that our moral obligations leave us powerless in the face of evil. Kant’s theory sets a high ideal of conduct and tells us to live up to that ideal regardless of what other persons are doing. The results may be very bad. But Kant says that the law "remains in full force, because it commands categorically" (G, 438-39/57).* The most weI1—known example of...
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  19. Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (9999):99-122.
    In this paper I trace the development of one of the central debates of late twentieth-century moral philosophy—the debate between realism and what Rawls called “constructivism.” Realism, I argue, is a reactive position that arises in response to almost every attempt to give a substantive explanation of morality. It results from the realist’s belief that such explanations inevitably reduce moral phenomena to natural phenomena. I trace this belief, and the essence of realism, to a view about the nature of concepts—that (...)
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  20. Kant's Formula of Universal Law.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1985 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1-2):24-47.
  21. The Activity of Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 83 (2):23 - 43.
    Then you have a look around, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening to us—I mean the people who think that nothing exists but what they can grasp with both hands; people who refuse to admit that actions and processes and the invisible world in general have any place in reality.
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  22. The reasons we can share: an attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):24-51.
    To later generations, much of the moral philosophy of the twentieth century will look like a struggle to escape from utilitarianism. We seem to succeed in disproving one utilitarian doctrine, only to find ourselves caught in the grip of another. I believe that this is because a basic feature of the consequentialist outlook still pervades and distorts our thinking: the view that the business of morality is to bring something about . Too often, the rest of us have pitched our (...)
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  23. Self-constitution in the ethics of Plato and Kant.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (1):1-29.
    Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an action, is (...)
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  24. From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - In Stephen Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting, Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Cambridge University Press.
    Aristotle believes that an agent lacks virtue unless she enjoys the performance of virtuous actions, while Kant claims that the person who does her duty despite contrary inclinations exhibits a moral worth that the person who acts from inclination lacks. Despite these differences, this chapter argues that Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view of the object of human choice and locus of moral value: that what we choose, and what has moral value, are not mere acts, but actions: acts (...)
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  25. Constitutivism and the virtues.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):98-116.
    In Self-Constitution, I argue that the principles governing action are “constitutive standards” of agency, standards that arise from the nature of agency itself. To be an agent is to be autonomousl...
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  26. Creating the kingdom of ends: Reciprocity and responsibility in personal relations.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:305-332.
  27. Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall’s The Second‐Person Standpoint.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):8-23.
  28. The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (1):19-51.
    This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively speaking—against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why the (...)
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  29. Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2013 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (4):629-648.
    Legal systems divide the world into persons and property, treating animals as property. Some animal rights advocates have proposed treating animals as persons. Another option is to introduce a third normative category. This raises questions about how normative categories are established. In this article I argue that Kant established normative categories by determining what the presuppositions of rational practice are. According to Kant, rational choice presupposes that rational beings are ends in themselves and the rational use of the earth’s resources (...)
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  30. Aristotle and Kant on the source of value.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Ethics 96 (3):486-505.
    Kant holds that the good will is a source of value, In the sense that other things acquire their values from standing in an appropriate relation to it. I argue that aristotle holds a similar view about contemplation, And that this explains his preference for the contemplative life. They differ about what the source of value is because they differ about which kind of activity, ethical or contemplative, discovers meaning and purpose in the world.
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  31. Acting for a Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2005 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 40 (1):11-35.
    The use of the English word “reason” in all of these contexts, and the way we translate equivalent terms from other languages, suggests a connection, but what exactly is it? Aristotle and Kant’s conception of what practical reasons are, I believe, can help us to answer this question, by bringing out what is distinctive, and distinctively active, about acting for a reason. That, at least, is what I am going to argue.
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  32. The Relational Nature of the Good.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:1.
  33.  32
    Ethics at the intersection of Kant and Aristotle.Christine M. Korsgaard & Ana Marta González - 2003 - Anuario Filosófico 36 (3):775-794.
    In this interview Christine M. Korsgaard answers several questions on her particular interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. More specifically, she dwells on the role of the noumenal/phenomenal distinction for a better understanding of Kant's idea of practical reason, as well as on the compatibility between Aristotelian and Kantian practical reason. In addition, she answers a couple of more general questions on the perspectives and challenges of contemporary ethical theory.
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  34. Personhood, animals, and the law.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2013 - Think 12 (34):25-32.
    ExtractThe idea that all the entities in the world may be, for legal and moral purposes, divided into the two categories of ‘persons’ and ‘things’ comes down to us from the tradition of Roman law. In the law, a ‘person’ is essentially the subject of rights and obligations, while a thing may be owned as property. In ethics, a person is an object of respect, to be valued for her own sake, and never to be used as a mere means (...)
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  35. On Having a Good.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (3):405-429.
    You are the kind of entity for whom things can be good or bad. This is one of the most important facts about you. It provides you with the grounds for taking a passionate interest in your own life, for you are deeply concerned that things should go well for you. Presumably, you also want to do well, but that may be in part because you think that doing well is good for you, and that your life would be impoverished (...)
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  36. Facing the Animal you See in the Mirror.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1):4-9.
    A contribution to a panel on ethics and animals forthcoming in The Harvard Review of Philosophy.
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  37. Aristotle on Function and Virtue.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (3):259 - 279.
  38. The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's Ethics.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1-2):3-42.
    Hume thinks moral judgments are based on sentiments of approval and disapproval we feel when we contemplate someone from a "general point of view." We view her through the eyes of her "narrow circle" and judge her in accordance with general rules. Why do we take up the general point of view? Hume also argues that approval is a calm form of love, love of character, which sets a normative standard for other forms of love. In this paper I explain (...)
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  39.  64
    Valuing animals, nature, and our own animal nature: A reply to Maclean, Schapiro, and Wallace.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):242-257.
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  40. Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals.Christine Marion Korsgaard - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of our moral relationships to the other animals. She offers challenging answers to such questions as: Are people superior to animals, and does it matter morally if we are? Is it all right for us to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets?
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  41.  49
    Species-Being and the Badness of Extinction and Death.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 1 (1):143-162.
    This paper offers an account of the property Feuerbach and Marx called “species-being,” the human being’s distinctive tendency to identify herself as a member of her species, and to think of the species as a “we.” It links the notion to Kant’s theory of rights, arguing that every claim of right commits the maker of that claim to something like world government, and therefore to the conception of humanity as a collective agent. It also links species-being to the concept of (...)
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  42.  20
    Evoluční etika Franse de Waala a její filozofické reflexe.Filip Jaroš & Adéla Šrůtková - 2017 - Filosofie Dnes 9 (1):52-70.
    Článek představuje teorii původu lidské morálky od Franse de Waala a zhodnocuje přínos filozofických komentářů od Christine M. Korsgaardové a Mary Midgleyové z hlediska oboru evoluční etiky. Základní struktura de Waalova přístupu je v souladu se sentimentalistickou teorií morálky, která určuje soucítění jako bazální morální cit. V interpretaci vlivné neodarwinistické genocentrické školy dále hraje zásadní roli altruismus. Stoupenci tohoto směru (R. Dawkins, G. C. Williams) nicméně obhajují rozdělení krutého světa přírody a etického světa lidské kultury; distinkce byla Fransem de Waalem (...)
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  43. (1 other version)Reflections on the Evolution of Morality.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2010 - The Amehurst Lecture in Philosophy 5:1–29.
  44. Kant’s Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Foundations I.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1989 - The Monist 72 (3):311-340.
    One of the debates of recent moral philosophy concerns the question whether moral judgments express “internal” or “external” reasons. According to internalists, if someone knows or accepts a moral judgment then she must have a motive for acting on it. The motive is part of the content of the judgment: the reason why the action is right is a reason for doing it. According to externalists, this is not necessarily so: there could be a case in which I understand both (...)
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  45. Natural goodness, rightness, and the intersubjectivity of reason: Reply to Arroyo, Cummiskey, Moland, and Bird-pollan.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (4):381-394.
    Abstract: In response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of “natural goodness” and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural (...)
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  46. The dependence of value on humanity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2003 - In Jay Wallace, The Practice of Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 63--85.
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  47.  21
    Business ethics and values.C. M. Fisher - 2003 - New York: FT Prentice Hall. Edited by Alan Lovell.
    Features include a comprehensive review of existing material, combined with new perspectives to equip students for the challenges in the work environment; chapter overviews and student learning objectives offer a solid and useful framework in which to organise study; diagrams and charts present overviews and contexts for the subject to act as useful revision aids; effective pedagogy including a review of the arguments considered, a menu of seminar topics, and questions in every chapter, serving as an ideal basis for seminar (...)
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  48. Philosophy in Medicine: Conceptual and Ethical Issues in Medicine and Psychiatry.C. M. Culver & B. Gert - 1982 - Mind 93 (372):624-627.
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  49. Conscience.Christine M. Korsgaard - unknown
    Conscience is the psychological faculty by which we aware of and respond to the moral character of our own actions. It is most commonly thought of as the source of pains we suffer as a result of doing what we believe is wrong --- the pains of guilt, or “pangs of conscience.” It may also be seen, more controversially, as the source of our knowledge of what is right and wrong, or as a motive for moral conduct. Thus a person (...)
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  50. I—Prospects for a Naturalistic Explanation of the Good.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):111-131.
    In this paper I explore the possibility of explaining why there is such a thing as the good in naturalistic terms. More specifically, I seek an explanation of the fact that some things are good-for human beings and the other animals in the final sense of good: worth aiming at. I trace the existence of the final good to the existence of conscious agents. I propose that the final good for an animal is her own well-functioning as the kind of (...)
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