Spinoza ' s understanding and understanding Spinoza -- Spinoza ' s understanding -- Understanding Spinoza -- The metaphysics of substance -- Descartes and substance -- Spinoza contra Descartes on substance -- Modes -- Necessitarianism -- The purpose of it all -- The human mind -- Parallelism and representation -- Essence and representation -- Parallelism and mind - body identity -- The idea of the human body -- The pancreas problem, the pan problem, and panpsychism -- Nothing but representation -- Representation, (...) will, and belief -- Skepticism -- Psychology : striving and self - preservation -- Conatus -- Desire, joy, and sadness -- Love, hate, and all that -- The ethics of the ethics -- The good notion of the good -- The right notion of the right -- Knowledge and morality -- Freedom and morality -- Helping others -- Lies and degrees of freedom -- The state, religion, and scripture -- Rights and power -- Religion and the state -- Scripture -- Prophecy and the truth of the Bible -- From PSR to eternity -- The aftermath of Spinoza -- Leibniz -- Bayle and Hume -- The pantheism controversy -- Hegel -- Nietzsche -- Prospects of spinozistic rationalism. (shrink)

This first extensive study of Spinoza's philosophy of mind concentrates on two problems crucial to the philosopher's thoughts on the matter: the requirements for having a thought about a particular object, and the problem of the mind's relation to the body. Della Rocca contends that Spinoza's positions are systematically connected with each other and with a principle at the heart of his metaphysical system: his denial of causal or explanatory relations between the mental and the physical. In this way, (...) Della Rocca's exploration of these two problems provides a new and illuminating perspective on Spinoza's philosophy as a system. (shrink)

Symbolic arithmetic is fundamental to science, technology and economics, but its acquisition by children typically requires years of effort, instruction and drill1,2. When adults perform mental arithmetic, they activate nonsymbolic, approximate number representations3,4, and their performance suffers if this nonsymbolic system is impaired5. Nonsymbolic number representations also allow adults, children, and even infants to add or subtract pairs of dot arrays and to compare the resulting sum or difference to a third array, provided that only approximate accuracy is required6–10. Here (...) we report that young children, who have mastered verbal counting and are on the threshold of arithmetic instruction, can build on their nonsymbolic number system to perform symbolic addition and subtraction11–15. Children across a broad socio-economic spectrum solved symbolic problems involving approximate addition or subtraction of large numbers, both in a laboratory test and in a school setting. Aspects of symbolic arithmetic therefore lie within the reach of children who have learned no algorithms for manipulating numerical symbols. Our findings help to delimit the sources of children’s difficulties learning symbolic arithmetic, and they suggest ways to enhance children’s engagement with formal mathematics. We presented children with approximate symbolic arithmetic problems in a format that parallels previous tests of non-symbolic arithmetic in preschool children8,9. In the first experiment, five- to six-year-old children were given problems such as ‘‘If you had twenty-four stickers and I gave you twenty-seven more, would you have more or less than thirty-five stickers?’’. Children performed well above chance (65.0%, t1952.77, P 5 0.012) without resorting to guessing or comparison strategies that could serve as alternatives to arithmetic. Children who have been taught no symbolic arithmetic therefore have some ability to perform symbolic addition problems. The children’s performance nevertheless fell short of performance on non-symbolic arithmetic tasks using equivalent addition problems with numbers presented as arrays of dots and with the addition operation conveyed by successive motions of the dots into a box (71.3% correct, F1,345 4.26, P 5 0.047)8.. (shrink)

The Parmenidean Ascent is a full-throated and wide-ranging defense of an extreme form of monism or the denial of all distinctions, a form of monism rarely seen since the time of the pre-Socratic philosopher, Parmenides. At once historically sensitive and deeply engaged with trends in recent and contemporary metaphysics, philosophy of action, epistemology, and philosophy of language, The Parmenidean Ascent aims, on rationalist grounds and in a skeptical spirit, to challenge the content of-and to overturn the methods of much of (...) contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This paper presents an argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the PSR, the principle according to which each thing that exists has an explanation. I begin with several widespread and extremely plausible arguments that I call explicability arguments in which a certain situation is rejected precisely because it would be arbitrary. Building on these plausible cases, I construct a series of explicability arguments that culminates in an explicability argument concerning existence itself. This argument amounts to the claim that the (...) PSR is true. The plausibility of the initial cases in the series provides the basis of an argument for the PSR, an argument that can be rebutted only by drawing a line between the plausible early cases in the series and the apparently unacceptable later cases. I argue that no principled reason for drawing this line has been found and that one cannot draw an unprincipled or arbitrary line without begging the question. The paper concludes that, therefore, this defense of the PSR remains unrebutted and that we have a powerful, new reason to embrace the PSR. (shrink)

Several hundred thousand intellectually talented 12-to 13-year-olds have been tested nationwide over the past 16 years with the mathematics and verbal sections of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). Although no sex differences in verbal ability have been found, there have been consistent sex differences favoring males in mathematical reasoning ability, as measured by the mathematics section of the SAT (SAT-M). These differences are most pronounced at the highest levels of mathematical reasoning, they are stable over time, and they are observed (...) in other countries as well. The sex difference in mathematical reasoning ability can predict subsequent sex differences in achievement in mathematics and science and is therefore of practical importance. To date a primarily environmental explanation for the difference in ability has not received support from the numerous studies conducted over many years by the staff of Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth (SMPY) and others. We have studied some of the classical environmental hypotheses: attitudes toward mathematics, perceived usefulness of mathematics, confidence, expectations/ encouragement from parents and others, sex-typing, and differential course-taking. In addition, several physiological correlates of extremely high mathematical reasoning ability have been identified (left-handedness, allergies, myopia, and perhaps bilateral representation of cognitive functions and prenatal hormonal exposure). It is therefore proposed that the sex difference in SAT-M scores among intellectually talented students, which may be related to greater male variability, results from both environmental and biological factors. (shrink)

Gregory Rocca's nuanced discussion prevents Aquinas's thought from being capsulized in familiar slogans and is an antidote to unilateralist or monochrome views about God-talk.

This study aims to analyze what drives and prevents the purchasing of eco-friendly products across different consumer groups and develops a conceptual model embracing the positive altruistic, positive ego-centric, and negative ego-centric antecedents of eco-friendly product purchase intention and behavior. We empirically validate the conceptual model for green and non-green consumers. Data are analyzed using structural equation modeling and multi-group analysis of the two groups. The results confirm the relevance of the determining factors in the model and show significant differences (...) in eco-friendly product purchasing patterns between green and non-green consumers. Altruistic motives are more important for green than for non-green consumers. Negative ego-centric motives affect the purchase intentions of non-green consumers more than the intentions of green consumers, whereas the impact of negative motives on behavior is stronger for green than for non-green consumers. The first contribution of this paper is the development and testing of a parsimonious model of eco-friendly products purchasing that embraces both positive and negative antecedents, which have been theoretically suggested in the past but have rarely been empirically tested together. The second contribution of this study is that it develops insight into the specific antecedents of eco-friendly products purchasing for green and non-green consumers to assess potential similarities and differences in eco-friendly products purchasing process, the hypothesized antecedents, their impact on eco-friendly products purchase intention and behavior, and the intention–behavior relation. (shrink)

This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly. However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian Circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes (...) on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret Wilson and others by showing how Descartes' doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. This doctrine and other analogous positions in Descartes can also reveal that Descartes, again surprisingly, takes important steps toward doing epistemology without direct appeal to God and God's veracity. (shrink)

Background and purpose Educators’ ethical competence is of crucial importance for developing students’ ethical thinking. Previous studies describe educators’ ethical codes and principles. This article aims to widen the understanding of health- and social care educators’ ethical competence in relation to core values and ethos. Theoretical background and key concepts The study is based on the didactics of caring science and theoretically links the concepts ethos and competence. Methods Data material was collected from nine educational units for healthcare and social (...) service in Finland. In total 16 semi-structured focus group interviews with 48 participants were conducted. The interviews were analysed with a thematic analysis according to Braun and Clarke. Ethical considerations The study is approved by the Declaration of Helsinki, the legislation regarding personal data and the General Data Protection Regulation. The study received ethical permission from the University of Jyväskylä. Informed consent was obtained from all the educational units and participants in the study. Findings The findings are presented based on three general patterns, an ethical basic motive, an ethical bearing and ethical actions. Subthemes are Humane view of students as unique individuals with individual learning, Bearing of tactfulness and firmness, Bearing of perceptiveness and accessibility, Bearing of satisfaction and joy over student learning, Valuing bearing towards each oneself and colleagues, Ability to interact and flexibility, Collegiality and a supportive work community and Educators as role models and inspirators. Conclusion Educators’ personal and professional ethos is crucial to student learning, personal growth and ethical reasoning. Therefore, it is important to further develop educators’ training regarding ethical competence. (shrink)

This paper critically examines a prominent and perennial strategy—found in thinkers as diverse as Kant and Shamik Dasgupta—of simultaneously embracing the Principle of Sufficient Reason and also limiting it so as to avoid certain apparently negative consequences of an unrestricted PSR. I will argue that this strategy of taming the PSR faces significant challenges and may even be incoherent. And for my purposes, I will enlist a generally derided argument by Leibniz for the PSR which will help us to see (...) the connections between the PSR and a radical form of monism. (shrink)

This paper offers a defense of a much-maligned Leibnizian argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the principle according to which whatever is has a sufficient reason or explanation. While Leibniz’s argument is widely thought to rely on a question-begging premise, the paper offers a wholly original and non-question-begging defense of that premise, a defense that Leibniz did not anticipate. The paper does not present this defense of Leibniz's argument as an interpretation of Leibniz; rather, the paper—more modestly in one (...) way, less modestly in another—simply claims that this argument succeeds. (shrink)

I argue that the standard counterexamples to the identity of indiscernibles fail because they involve a commitment to a certain kind of primitive or brute identity that has certain very unpalatable consequences involving the possibility of objects of the same kind completely overlapping and sharing all the same proper parts. The only way to avoid these consequences is to reject brute identity and thus to accept the identity of indiscernibles. I also show how the rejection of the identity of indiscernibles (...) derives some of its support from its affinity with a Kripkean account of trans-world identity and theories of direct reference. (shrink)

in his characteristically generous and searching discussion of my book, Spinoza, Daniel Garber rightly points out that I structure my interpretation of Spinoza’s system around the principle of sufficient reason. This is the principle that, as I and others sometimes put it, each fact has an explanation and is thus not brute, or the principle that each thing has an explanation. The ‘or’ will soon be important. Indeed, it might seem that I am too focused on the PSR—certainly I seem (...) that way to Garber1—for I seek to use the PSR to unlock any number of problems that interpreters of Spinoza have faced over the last three centuries. Garber does a great job of conveying the range of uses to which I put the PSR.. (shrink)

In order to articulate an account of erotic love that does not attempt to transcend its personal features, Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum lean on the speeches by Aristophanes and Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium. This leads them to downplay the sense in which love is not only for another person, but also for the good. Drawing on a distinction between relative and absolute senses of speaking about the good, I mediate between two features of love that at first may seem (...) irreconcilable. The first is the sense in which love is deeply personal in character. The second is the sense in which we in love come to articulate ethical demands. With the help of the Diotimian ascent of love that Socrates presents in his speech, I submit that these two can come together in the realization that our personally conditioned responses in love are transformed to accommodate demands that carry an unconditional meaning. (shrink)

Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory they cannot, even if there is a uniquely best way of doing so. To solve this problem we propose an argument in favor of ‘belief-less reasoning’, a mode of inference that leads to converge on the optimal solution ignoring the beliefs of the other players. We argue that belief-less reasoning is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy. We show (...) that this principle can be used to justify (some versions of) team reasoning, as well as other schemes of practical reasoning that do not involve sophisticated meta-representation. (shrink)

Writing to Henry Oldenburg in 1665, Spinoza says that he regards the human body as a part of nature. “But,” he adds significantly, “as far as the human mind is concerned, I think it is a part of nature too.” Genevieve Lloyd’s elegantly written book aims to investigate the meaning, implications and attractions of these characteristic Spinozistic claims.

In learning mathematics, children must master fundamental logical relationships, including the inverse relationship between addition and subtraction. At the start of elementary school, children lack generalized understanding of this relationship in the context of exact arithmetic problems: they fail to judge, for example, that 12 + 9 - 9 yields 12. Here, we investigate whether preschool children’s approximate number knowledge nevertheless supports understanding of this relationship. Five-year-old children were more accurate on approximate large-number arithmetic problems that involved an inverse transformation (...) than those that did not, when problems were presented in either non-symbolic or symbolic form. In contrast they showed no advantage for problems involving an inverse transformation when exact arithmetic was involved. Prior to formal schooling, children therefore show generalized understanding of at least one logical principle of arithmetic. The teaching of mathematics may be enhanced by building on this understanding. (shrink)

Previous studies have found that narrative input conveyed through different media influences the structure and content of children’s narrative retellings. Visual, televised narratives appear to elicit richer and more detailed narratives than traditional, orally transmitted storybook media. To extend this prior work and drawing from research on narrative elaboration, the current study’s main goal was to identify the core plot component differences (the who, what, where, when, why, and how of a story) between children’s retellings of televised versus traditional storybook (...) narratives. However, because children also differ individually in their IQ, we further incorporated this variable into our analysis of children’s narrative retellings. For our purpose, a novel coding schema was developed, following and extending the existing narrative elaboration approaches. Participants were 46 typically developing children aged 4–5 years from Germany. The current study incorporated two narrative input conditions to which children were randomly assigned: in the video condition, children watched a non-verbal, visually conveyed, televised story from a DVD; and in the book condition, children read the story with an adult and experienced an orally conveyed version in the form of a book with minimal accompanying pictures. In both conditions, the same story was conveyed. After including IQ as a covariate in our analyses, results show that the children from the video condition gave significantly more elaborated retellings, particularly across the who, what, and where (sub-)components. Differences between the conditions in the component when, how and why did not reach statistical significance. Our findings indicate that different media types entail differential cognitive processing demands of a story, resulting in type-specific memories and narratives. The effect of different medial conditions was significant and persisted when individual differences in cognitive development were considered. Consequences for children’s development, education, and interaction with and within today’s digital world are discussed. (shrink)

Spinoza's response to a certain radical form of scepticism has deep and surprising roots in his rationalist metaphysics. I argue that Spinoza's commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason leads to his naturalistic rejection of certain sharp, inexplicable bifurcations in reality such as the bifurcations that a Cartesian system posits between mind and body and between will and intellect. I show how Spinoza identies and rejects a similar bifurcation between the representational character of ideas or mental states and the epistemic (...) status of these ideas, a bifurcation to which Spinoza sees the radical sceptic committed. Spinoza's rejection of this bifurcation helps to explain some of his most cryptic statements concerning scepticism and also reveals a promising and highly metaphysical strategy for understanding and responding to scepticism. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 565-577, June 2022.

This essay supports a so-called identification-oriented interpretation of the argument for substance monism. It emphasizes the conceptual barrier between different attributes and the conceptual-independence condition in the definition of substance. It argues that certain features of Spinoza’s notion of attributes enable him to defend his argument for substance monism from a number of challenges: the fact that, for Spinoza, each attribute of a substance, independently of the modes of the substance and independently of other attributes, is sufficient for conceiving of (...) the substance; and the fact that, for Spinoza, because of the conceptual independence of the attributes, no attribute of a substance can prevent that substance from having any other attribute. (shrink)

When it comes to the relationship between art and nature, research on Adorno’s aesthetics usually centres on his discussion of Kant and Hegel. While this reflects Adorno’s own position – his comprehension of this relationship is to a large extent developed through a critical re-reading of both the Kantian and the Hegelian position – I argue that we are able to gain important insights into Adorno’s aesthetics and the central art–nature relation by reading his ideas in the light of Schelling’s (...) conception of this relationship. The article focuses on the similarities between Schelling’s notion of nature’s productivity and Adorno’s understanding of natural beauty. It concludes with a discussion on Adorno’s re-evaluation of the reconciliatory power of the exemplary unity of the artwork in conjunction with Schelling’s comparison between artwork and organism, as well as his concept of the construction of nature. (shrink)

Abstract What sense are we to make of the promise of love against the contingency of human life? I discuss two replies to this question: (1) the suggestion that marriage, based on the probable success of this kind of relationship, is a more or less worthwhile endeavour (cf. Moller and Landau), and (2) Martha Nussbaum's Aristotelian proposal that we only live life fully if we embrace aspects of life, such as loving relationships, that are vulnerable to fortune. I show that (...) both responses, in different ways, depend on the presupposition that the sense of our promises to love is dependent on our ability to make predictions. The philosophers I discuss assume an epistemological standpoint from which we may attempt to judge whether it is in our general interest to love. I argue that embracing such a perspective by itself leads our attention away from the kind of personal and moral engagement in other people of which our promises to love are expressive. From the perspective of love, the attempt to calculate the risks and gains of loving itself appears as a moral failure to be present to the reality of other people. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RES SIGNIFICATA AND MODUS SIGNIFICANDI IN AQIDNAS'S THEOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY GREGORY RoccA, O.P. Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology Berkeley, California ST. THOMAS AQUINAS often refers to the distinction between res significata and modus significandi. He asserls that, whie the :absolute and analogical predicates of positive theology may be pveditcated of God with regard to their RS,1 they mrust,be denied of God with regard to their (...) MS.2 The distinotion, then, is an imporlant element in his 1 For brevity's sake I will refer to res significata, by RS and to modus significand.i by MS; I will also speak of the res/modus distinction. The following abbreviations for Aquinas's works will be used: BDH=Flropositio in librum Boethii De hebdomadibus (Marietti ed., 1954); DA=the disputed question De anima (ed. J. H. Robb [Toronto: PIMS, 1968]) ; DDN=Flropositi super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus (Marietti ed., 1950); DP=De potentia (Marietti ed., 1949); DSS=De substantiis separatis (Leonine Commission, vol. 40, 1969); DV=De veritate (Leonine Co=ission, vol. 22, 197276 ); Herm.=Sententia libri Peri hermeneias (Marietti ed., 1955); John= Leotura super Johannem (Marietti ed., 1952); Meta.=Sententia libri Metaphysioorum (Marietti ed., 1950); Phys.=Sententia libri Physioorum (Marietti ed., 1965) ; Quod. = Quaestiones quodlibetales (Marietti ed., 1956) ; BOG= Summa contra gentiles (Marietti ed., vols. 2-3, 1961) ; SDO=Eropositio super librum De causis (Marietti ed., 1955) ; SS=Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (Paris: Lethielleuro, 1929, 1933, 1947); ST=Summa theologiae (Alba/ Rome: Editiones Paulinae, 1962). The English translations are my own. For Thomas's positive theology of the divine names, see Gregory Rocca, "Analogy as Judgment and Faith in God's Incomprehensibility: A Study in the Theological Epistemology of Thomas Aquinas" (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1989) 540-615. 2 A characteristic text: "In every name predicated by us [of God], imperfection is found with respect to the name's mode of signifying [MS], 173 174 GREGORY ROCCA, O.P. theological epistemology and onomatofogy.3 For some, however, the distinction wou1d ultimately lead us back to the univocist camp of Duns Scotus,4 for they see it as hiding within itself 1 a latent core of univocity. One writes that the predication involved in 1anafogy of attribution is both univocal and equivocail: " It is univocal, insofar as it ai1ways denotes the siame proprietas rei; it is equivoca,J since, through a differrent modus significandi, it •connotes ' a different existentiail mode of the denoted proprieta.'J." 5 Another writes, in simil.ar fashion, that "the :same property is signifi·ed, hut the way in which the property inheres in the subject is different." a Another contends tha;t the idis:tinJCtion between RS and MS is a" bogus distinction between what words realily mean and what they mean to us." 7 If the res/niodus distinction is an imwhich does not belong to God, though the thing signified [RS'] is suitable to God in some eminent manner " (SOG l.30.277) ; the same sentiment is found in many other texts such as SS L35.LL ad2 and ST l.13.3. Thomas often explains the saying of Pseudo-Dionysius, that negations about God are true while affirmations are vague, by claiming that affirmations are true as regards their RS but not as regards their MS (SS l.22.l.2. adl; l.4.2.l. ad2; SOG l.30.277; DP 7.5 ad2; ST l.13.12. adl; SDO 6.161). a Hampus Lyttkens, however, thinks the distinction plays no essential role in Thomas's theory of the divine names (" Die Bedeutung der Gottesprltdikate bei Thomas von Aquin," N eue Zeitschrift fur systematisahe Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 6 [1964] 277-80). Klaus Muller claims the application of the res/modus distinction to the divine names " says really nothing at all" (Thomas van Aquins Theorie und Praxis der Analogie. Der Streit um das rechte Vorurteil und die Ana,lyse einer aufsohlussreichen Diskrepanz in der "Summa theologiae ", Regensburger Studien zur Theologie 29 [Frankfurt am Main/Bern/NY: Peter Lang, 1983] 100). 4 See Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon, HJ77) 78-80. s Jan Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter: liJin uberblick, Afterword by... (shrink)

Spinoza's response to a certain radical form of scepticism has deep and surprising roots in his rationalist metaphysics. I argue that Spinoza's commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason leads to his naturalistic rejection of certain sharp, inexplicable bifurcations in reality such as the bifurcations that a Cartesian system posits between mind and body and between will and intellect. I show how Spinoza identies and rejects a similar bifurcation between the representational character of ideas or mental states and the epistemic (...) status of these ideas, a bifurcation to which Spinoza sees the radical sceptic committed. Spinoza's rejection of this bifurcation helps to explain some of his most cryptic statements concerning scepticism and also reveals a promising and highly metaphysical strategy for understanding and responding to scepticism. (shrink)

Are there reasons for loving? How can I promise to love someone? Is there such a thing as unconditional love? Am I responsible for loving or for failing to love someone? Can there be love without idealization? -/- This work sets out to show that many of the questions we raise when philosophizing about love are expressive of confusions about what we talk about when we talk about love. Addressing questions pertaining to philosophical discussions about emotions, personal identity and the (...) meaning of language and morality, the author shows how these confusions can be dissolved by carefully attending to our different conversations about love. Her investigations show that many of the challenges we face when reflecting on love do not have the kind of scientific or strictly philosophical character that would allow us to settle them once and for all. They are moral in character and gain their significance from the questions they raise about the place love has in our own lives. The kind of reflection on the meaning of love suggested in this work does not depend on any new discoveries about the phenomena of love. It is available to anyone who is prepared to reflect on our ways of speaking and to question our preconceptions of love and of philosophy. Through such reflection our understanding of love may continually deepen. (shrink)

During evaluative conditioning, a neutral conditional stimulus becomes pleasant or unpleasant after pairings with a positive/negative unconditional stimulus. Measures of US expectancy are...