The Database, Logic, and Suffering _Memento_ and Random-Access Information Aesthetic.

Lying to one’s patients is wrong. So obvious as to border on a platitude, this truism is one that bioethicists have heartily endorsed for several decades. Deception, the standard line holds, underc...

Why think that conscious experience of reality is any more epistemically valuable than testimony about it? I argue that conscious experience of reality is epistemically valuable because it provides cognitive contact with reality. Cognitive contact with reality is a goal of experiential inquiry which does not reduce to the goal of getting true beliefs or propositional knowledge. Such inquiry has awareness of the truth-makers of one’s true beliefs as its proper goal. As such, one reason why conscious experience of reality (...) is more epistemically valuable than testimony about reality is that it gives us more epistemic goods than only true belief or propositional knowledge. I defend this view from two rival accounts. First, that while conscious experience of reality has greater value than testimony, its value is only eudaimonic. Second, that while it has greater epistemic value than testimony, this value is not distinctive: for it only promotes truth better than testimony. (shrink)

Contemporary architecture is increasingly grounded in science and mathematics. Architectural discourse has shifted radically from the sometimes disorienting Derridean deconstruction, to engaging scientific terms such as fractals, chaos, complexity, nonlinearity, and evolving systems. That's where the architectural action is -- at least for cutting-edge architects and thinkers -- and every practicing architect and student needs to become conversant with these terms and know what they mean. Unfortunately, the vast majority of architecture faculty are unprepared to explain them to students, not (...) having had a scientific education themselves. Here is an architecture book by an architect/scientist, just in time to help architects in the new millennium. Alexander discusses many of the scientific terms arising in cutting-edge architecture, and explains them to those who don't have scientific training or advanced mathematical knowledge. We find discussions of the evolution of forms; the importance of process in design; iteration; genetic algorithms; sequences of transformations; different levels of scale (i.e. fractals); etc. They are explained here by an architect who is also a scientist, because he wants to change the way architects think and build. Alexander is not merely popularizing other scientists' results and making them accessible to architects: he is in fact presenting new and original scientific work that ties many of these concepts together in a way that will be useful to architects. (shrink)

'Correlations without correlata' is an influential way of thinking of quantum entanglement as a form primitive correlation which nonetheless maintains locality of quantum theory. A number of arguments have sought to suggest that such a view leads either to internal inconsistency or to conflict with the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Here wew explicate and provide a partial defence of the notion, arguing that these objections import unwarranted conceptions of correlation properties as hidden variables. A more plausible account sees the (...) properties in terms of Everettian relative states. The ontological robustness of entanglement is also defended from recent objections. (shrink)

Recent technological and methodological changes in farming have led to an emerging set of claims about the role of digital technology in food production. Known as precision agriculture, the integration of digital management and surveillance technologies in farming is normatively presented as a revolutionary transformation. Proponents contend that machine learning, Big Data, and automation will create more accurate, efficient, transparent, and environmentally friendly food production, staving off both food insecurity and ecological ruin. This article contributes a critique of these rhetorical (...) and discursive claims to a growing body of critical literature on precision agriculture. It argues precision agriculture is less a revolution than an evolution, an effort to shore up and intensify the conventional farming system responsible for generating many of the social and environmental problems precision agriculture is presented as solving. While precision agriculture advocates portray it as a radical, even democratic epistemological break with the past, this paper locates truth claims surrounding datafication and algorithmic control in farming within deeper historical contexts of the capitalist rationalization of production and efforts to quantify and automate physical and mental labor. Abjuring the growing cultural tendency to treat algorithmic systems as revolutionary in favor of social and historical dimensions of precision agriculture, can help re-frame the discussion about its design and use around real, socially and ecologically oriented change in farming, and so ensure that the possibilities and benefits of precision agriculture are as evenly and effectively shared as possible. (shrink)

Rational explanation of action out of emotion faces a number of challenges. The Wrong Explanation Challenge says that explaining action out of emotion by reference to a purpose rather than an emotion gets it wrong. The Redundancy Challenge says that if explanation of an action by reference to emotion is sufficient then rational explanation is redundant. And the No Further Justification Challenge says that there is no more to say, at the level of rational explanation, about why people act as (...) they do out of a particular emotion. Furthermore, even if these challenges can be addressed, there is a Problem of Expressive Action, since many actions out of emotion seem unpromising candidates for being guided by normative practical reasons of the prudential, instrumental, deontic or consequentialist sort. In response, I argue that many actions out of emotions should be understood as expressive actions guided by the agent's conception of normative practical reasons: specifically, their conception of expressive reasons. (shrink)

I will entertain and reject three arguments which putatively establish that the individuals produced through de-extinction ought to be the same species as the extinct population. Forms of these arguments have appeared previously in restoration ecology. The first is the weakest, the conceptual argument, that de-extinction will not be de-extinction if it does not re-create an extinct species. This is misguided as de-extinction technology is not unified by its aim to re-create extinct species but in its use of the remnants (...) of extinct populations as a resource. The second is the argument from authenticity; the populations produced by de-extinction technologies will be inauthentic if they are not of the extinct species and, therefore, will not be valuable. I argue authenticity is not required in conservation as the value of authenticity varies between people and cultures, and the novelty of de-extinct species will be equally desirable in many cases. The third argument is from retributive justice; we need the de-extinct population to have the same species identity as we owe a moral debt to the extinct population. I find the case for retributive justice unconvincing and argue that acting as if we have a duty to resurrect extinct species will result in a world with less species. Ultimately all the arguments that connect de-extinction technology to species identity fail, leaving us to consider a more complex calculus for the justification of de-extinction in conservation. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that when ‘might’ expresses certain kinds of relative modality, the sentence ‘p and it might not be the case that p’ is in some sense inconsistent. It has proven difficult to define a formal semantics that explicates this inconsistency while meeting certain other desiderata, in particular, that p does not imply ‘Must p’. This paper presents such a semantics. The key idea is that background contexts have to have multiple levels, including an inner set consisting of (...) worlds that represent what might be true and an outer set of worlds such that a sentence must be true only if it is true in all of them. This is an open access publication. (shrink)

This essay argues that Montaigne draws on elements of both the Academic and Pyrrhonian skeptical traditions, but that the fundamental desire for self-knowledge that initially led him to appreciate the insights of the ancient skeptics ultimately leads him beyond them. What lies at the heart of Montaigne’s skepticism is neither an epistemological position nor the experience of doubt, but rather the determination to philosophize self-consciously.

_Career-spanning selections from the writings of William Desmond._.

We study the problem of existence and generic existence of ultrafilters on ω. We prove a conjecture of $J\ddot{o}rg$ Brendle's showing that there is an ultrafilter that is countably closed but is not an ordinal ultrafilter under CH. We also show that Canjar's previous partial characterization of the generic existence of Q-points is the best that can be done. More simply put, there is no normal cardinal invariant equality that fully characterizes the generic existence of Q-points. We then sharpen results (...) on generic existence with the introduction of $\sigma-compact$ ultrafilters. We show that the generic existence of said ultrafilters is equivalent to $\delta = c$ . This result taken along with our result that there exists a $K_{\sigma}$ non-countably closed ultrafilter under CH, expands the size of the class of ultrafilters that were known to fit this description before. From the core of the proof, we get a new result on the cardinal invariants of the continuum, i.e., the cofinality of the sets with $\sigma-compact$ closure is δ. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 113-126, Spring 2022.

This book examines the issue of rational cooperation, especially cooperation between people with conflicting moral commitments. The first part considers how the two main aspects of cooperation - the choice by a group of a particular cooperative scheme and the decision by each member to contribute to that scheme - can be understood as guided by reason. The second part explores how the activity of reasoning itself can take a cooperative form. The book is distinctive in offering an account of (...) what people can accomplish by reasoning together, of the role of deliberation in democratic decision making, and of the negotiation of the proper use of concepts. Presenting for the first time a detailed analysis of the general problem of cooperation and collective reasoning between people with different moral commitments, this book will be of particular interest to philosophers of the social sciences and to students in political science, sociology and economics. (shrink)

We present a new modeling framework for recognition memory and repetition priming based on signal detection theory. We use this framework to specify and test the predictions of 4 models: (a) a single-system (SS) model, in which one continuous memory signal drives recognition and priming; (b) a multiple-systems-1 (MS1) model, in which completely independent memory signals (such as explicit and implicit memory) drive recognition and priming; (c) a multiple-systems-2 (MS2) model, in which there are also 2 memory signals, but some (...) degree of dependence is allowed between these 2 signals (and this model subsumes the SS and MS1 models as special cases); and (d) a dual-process signal detection (DPSD1) model, 1 possible extension of a dual-process theory of recognition (Yonelinas, 1994) to priming, in which a signal detection model is augmented by an independent recollection process. The predictions of the models are tested in a continuous-identification-with-recognition paradigm in both normal adults (Experiments 1–3) and amnesic individuals (using data from Conroy, Hopkins, & Squire,2005). The SS model predicted numerous results in advance. These were not predicted by the MS1 model, though could be accommodated by the more flexible MS2 model. Importantly, measures of overall model fit favored the SS model over the others. These results illustrate a new, formal approach to testing theories of explicit and implicit memory. (shrink)

This review essay critically examines Catherine Mills’s Biopolitics and Camisha Russell’s The Assisted Reproduction of Race. Although distinct works, the centrality of race and reproduction provides a point of connection and an opening into reframing contemporary debates within bioethics and biopolitics. In reviewing these books together I hope to show how biopolitical theory and critical philosophy of race can be useful in looking at bioethical problems from a new perspective that open up different kinds of analyses, especially around historically embedded (...) problems like institutional racism and the legacies of colonialism in healthcare. (shrink)

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. (...) This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief. (shrink)

Reports of anomalous experiences are to be found in all known societies, both historically and geographically. If these reports were accurate, they would constitute powerful evidence for the existence of paranormal forces. However, research into the fallibility of human memory suggests that we should be cautious in accepting such reports at face value. Experimental research has shown that eyewitness testimony is unreliable, including eyewitness testimony for anomalous events. The present paper also reviews recent research into susceptibility to false memories and (...) considers the relevance of such work for assessing reports of anomalous events. It is noted that a number of psychological variables that have been shown to correlate with susceptibility to false memories also correlate with the tendency to report paranormal and related anomalous experiences. Although attempts to show a direct link between tendency to report anomalous experiences and susceptibility to false memories have had only limited success to date, this may reflect the use of inappropriate measures. (shrink)

Hugely influential, Michel Foucault's work has not only impacted a diverse range of disciplines—from history and sociology to fine arts, feminism, and gay and lesbian studies—but has also profoundly shaped Western culture at a street level. -/- Yet until now there has been no overarching systematic approach to his work from a Reformed perspective—let alone one that is as fair and accessible as Watkin's. After walking us through key elements of Foucault's thought, Watkin both critiques and answers Foucault through the (...) Bible's teaching on history, power, and identity. His insights are necessary reading for anyone who wants to engage thoughtfully with the ideas of our culture. (shrink)

In What is Marriage? One Man and One Woman: A Defense, Sherif Girgis, Ryan Anderson and Robert George defend the ‘conjugal marriage’ while claiming to make no moral judgments about homosexuality. My contention in this article is that the argument of What is Marriage is not sufficiently different from the arguments of classical new natural law theorists, and, therefore, What is Marriage does not remain neutral on the question of whether homosexuality is moral. First, I give an overview of some (...) classical NNLT arguments on the nature of marriage and their sexual ethic. Next, I present What is Marriage's account of conjugal marriage as a comprehensive union of two people, focusing on what makes a genuinely bodily union. I then move to the central contention of this article. By drawing on its understanding of genuinely bodily union and its account of the harm of same-sex marriage, I argue that What is Marriage is committed to the view that same-sex sexual unions cannot be good, since on its account of things there can be no shared sexual goods in a same-sex sexual ‘union’. (shrink)

Summary: This essay rejects the widespread thesis that conceptually creative metaphors are unpara‐phrasable on grounds that it misconceives the nature and function of paraphrase. Encouraged by a deceptively parallel rejection of the positivist reducibility thesis by philosophers of science, defenders of the unparaphrasability thesis mistakenly equated paraphrase with literal translation and in so doing failed to appreciate paraphrase's critical role in the systematic exploitation of metaphor's creative potential. This essay attempts to recast the terms of the paraphrasability debate by separating (...) paraphrase from literal translation and defending paraphrase's essential epistemic role in theory development. Three arguments for the paraphrasability of creative metaphor are presented followed by a critique of the major arguments for their unparaphrasability as formulated by Black, Cohen and Ricoeur. Résumé: Cet essai rejette, parce qu'elle repose sur une incomprehension de la nature et de la fonction de la paraphrase, la thése répandue selon laquelle des métaphores conceptuellement créatives ne peuvent pas être paraphraseées. Encouragés par un rejet faussement paralléle, par les philosophes des sciences, de la réductibilité positiviste, les défenseurs de la non‐paraphrasabilité ont confondu paraphrase et traduction littérale et, ce faisant, n'ont pas tenu compte du rôle critique de la paraphrase dans l'exploitation systématique du potentiel créatif de la métaphore. Cet essai tente de reformuler les termes du débat sur la paraphrasabilité en distinguant la paraphrase de la traduction littérale et en défendant le rôle épistémologique essentiel de la paraphrase dans le développe‐ment des théories. Trois arguments sont présentés pour la paraphrasabilité de la métaphore créative; suit une critique des principaux arguments contre la paraphrasabilité tels qu'ils ont été formulés par Black, Cohen et Ricoeur. Zusammenfassung: Es wird die weitverbreitete Auffassung widerlegt, wonach begrifflich kreative Metaphern nicht paraphrasierbar sind, weil sie Natur und Funktion der Paraphrase missversteht. Durch den scheinbar parallelen Fall der Verwerfung der Reduktionsthese durch Wissenschaftstheoretiker getäuscht setzten die Vertreter der These der Unparaphrasierbarkeit die Paraphrase mit der wört‐lichen Übersetzung gleich und sind deshalb nicht in der Lage, die kritische Funktion der Paraphrase bei der systematischen Verwertung des schöpferischen Potentials der Metapher zu erfas‐sen. Es wird versucht, das Problem der Paraphrasierbarkeit neu zu formulieren, indem die Paraphrase von der wörtlichen Übersetzung unterschieden wird und indem die erkenntnistheorelisch wesentliche Rolle der Paraphrase bei der Entwicklung von Theorien hervorgehoben wird. Es wer‐den drei Argumente zugunsten der Paraphrasierbarkeit von schopferischen Metaphern vorgelegt und die wichtigsten Argumente von Black, Cohen und Ricoeur gegen die Paraphrasierbarkeit kri‐tisiert. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Where Can I Find Answers? Is Life Sacred? Is It Bad to Die? Which Deaths Are Worse? Might I Live On? Should I Take the Elixir of Life? Who's Who? Is It All Meaningless? Should There Be More, and Better, People? Does Reality Matter?

The prelims comprise: Half Title Title Copyright Contents Preface.

In <em>Phys. Rev. A</em> <strong>63</strong> 022113 (2001), Brukner and Zeilinger claim that the Shannon information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum mechanics, adducing arguments that seek to show that it is inextricably tied to classical notions of measurement. It is shown here that these arguments do not succeed: the Shannon information does not have problematic ties to classical concepts. In a further argument, Brukner and Zeilinger compare the Shannon information unfavourably to their preferred information measure, (...) I(p), with regard to the definition of a notion of `total information content'. This argument is found unconvincing and the relationship betwen measures of information and notions of `total information content' investigated. (shrink)

The first major commentary on the text of 2 Clement since J.B. Lightfoot's magisterial work in the 19th century. Provides a new edition of the Greek text, together with an English translation; in addition there is a full Introduction and a detailed commentary on the Greek text.