Abstract:Thoreau’s story of climbing Saddleback (Mt. Greylock) in A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (1849) preserves his memories associated with the place and establishes the cultural significance of the mountain. The interpolation is about Thoreau’s quest to find a place of meaning and permanence amid the rapid changes in his life and the development of rural New England from industrialization. Places are integrations of space and time created by stories with personal and cultural significance. Such places must be (...) preserved. The hike is a pilgrimage to a paradise where he has a transcendental vision of a new world. Thoreau is born again on the mountain. The Greylock story is one of the most studied places in A Week. Literary critics have discussed how Thoreau’s ascent and the sunrise at the summit are the climax of the Romantic hero’s journey through nature, space, and time. None have noticed the symbolism of Thomas Carlyle’s “untamable fly” appearing instead of God, and none have explored Greylock as a Thoreauvian place. Thoreau’s trip to Greylock and the Catskills was a search for inspiration, and he was inspired to write Walden (1854). He stayed in cabins that prefigured his house at Walden Pond, and he saw things that reminded him of Harvard, Boston, Staten Island, and other mountains he had climbed. At the summit he found water, nibbled supper with the mice, conceived of a book about nature, and watched the sunrise of his new life. The history of Greylock is the story of the environmental impact of unregulated lumbering and development and the resulting conservation efforts. The old growth forest is now protected state land, with rare birds and a ghost. The mountain is a literary place also associated with Hawthorne, Melville, and Rowling. Since 1994, Thoreau’s climb up Greylock has been commemorated by an annual hike retracing his footsteps. (shrink)

I begin, as I shall end, with fictions.In a well-known tale, The Sandman, Hoffmann has a student, Nathaniel, fall in love with a beautiful doll, Olympia, whom he has spied upon as she sits at a window across the street from his lodgings. We are meant to suppose that Nathaniel mistakes an automaton for a human being. The mistake is the result of an elaborate but obscure deception on the part of the doll's designer, Professor Spalanzani. Nathaniel is disabused quite (...) by accident when he over-hears a quarrel between Spalanzani, who made Olympia's clockwork, and the sinister Coppelius, who contributed the eyes. (shrink)

Can we understand what makes someone the same person without understanding what it is to be a person? Prereflectively we might not think so, but philosophers often accord these questions separate treatments, with personal-identity theorists claiming the first question and free-will theorists the second. Yet much of what is of interest to a person—the possibility of survival over time, compensation for past hardships, concern for future projects, or moral responsibility—is not obviously intelligible from the perspective of either question alone. Marya (...) Schechtman encourages us to adopt a more unified perspective. (shrink)

"Is higher education a right, or a privilege? This author argues that all citizens in a free and open society should have an unconditional right to higher education. Such an education should be costless for the individual and open to everyone regardless of talent. A readiness and willingness to learn should be the only qualification. It should offer opportunities that benefit citizens with different interests and goals in life. And it should aim, as its foundational moral purpose, to help citizens (...) from all walks of life live better, freer lives. Using concepts and ideas from liberal political philosophy the author argues that access to educational goods and services is something to which all citizens have a right over a full life. Such goods, it is argued, play a key role in helping citizens realize self-determined goals. Higher education should therefore be understood a basic social institution responsible for ensuring that all citizens can access such 'autonomy-supporting' goods. The book examines the implication of this justification of the right to higher education for questions of educational justice, political authority, distributive justice, civic education, and personal autonomy"--. (shrink)

Abstract Jeffrey Koperski claims in Zygon (2008) that critics of Intelligent Design engage in fallacious ad hominem attacks on ID proponents and that this is a “bad way” to engage them. I show that Koperski has made several errors in his evaluation of the ID critics. He does not distinguish legitimate, relevant ad hominem arguments from fallacious ad hominem attacks. He conflates (or equates) the logical use of valid with the colloquial use of valid. Moreover, Koperski doesn't take seriously the (...) legitimate concerns of the ID critics, and in doing so, commits the straw man fallacy. In the end, I show that no one disagrees with the criticism of improper use of fallacies as methods of evaluation. But what constitutes proper, relevant evaluation of the ID theorists and their motivation is a matter of dispute. And sometimes attacking a person as a method of evaluation is justified, and thus is not fallacious. The definition of ad hominem arguments as either a “good way” or a “bad way” rests on justification, which I argue ID opponents have. The basis for these good objections relies on the motivation many Christians have to share their faith with non-Christians, which they call the “great commission.”. (shrink)

How can a reflective scientist put forward an explanation using a model when they are aware that many of the assumptions used to specify that model are false? This paper addresses this challenge by making two substantial assumptions about explanatory practice. First, many of the propositions deployed in the course of explaining have a non-representational function. In particular, a proposition that a scientist uses and also believes to be false, i.e. an “idealization”, typically has some non-representational function in the practice, (...) such as the interpretation of some model or the specification of the target of the explanation. Second, when an agent puts forward an explanation using a model, they usually aim to remain agnostic about various features of the phenomenon being explained. In this sense, explanations are intended to be autonomous from many of the more fundamental features of such systems. I support these two assumptions by showing how they allow one to address a number of recent concerns raised by Bokulich, Potochnik and Rice. In addition, these assumptions lead to a defense of the view that explanations are wholly true that improves on the accounts developed by Craver, Mäki and Strevens. (shrink)

Optimistic predictions that genetic and genomic testing will provide health benefits have been tempered by the concern that individuals who receive their results may experience negative psychosocial outcomes. This potential ethical and clinical concern has prompted extensive conversations between policy‐makers, health researchers, ethicists, and the general public. Fortunately, the psychosocial consequences of such testing are subject to empirical investigation, and over the past quarter century, research that clarifies some of the types, likelihood, and severity of potential harms from learning the (...) results of the testing has accumulated. I aim to provide an overview of the findings of this research by looking at selected systematic reviews. This will convey the gist of the literature’s quality and coverage, reveal gaps in existing knowledge, and highlight promising areas for future scholarship. (shrink)

This essay argues that Montaigne draws on elements of both the Academic and Pyrrhonian skeptical traditions, but that the fundamental desire for self-knowledge that initially led him to appreciate the insights of the ancient skeptics ultimately leads him beyond them. What lies at the heart of Montaigne’s skepticism is neither an epistemological position nor the experience of doubt, but rather the determination to philosophize self-consciously.

Visual experience is shaped by a number of factors that are independent of the external objects that we perceive—factors like lighting, angle of view, and the sensitivities of photoreceptors in the retina. This paper seeks to catalog, analyze, and explain the fluctuations in visual phenomenology that are due to such factors.

It has become common for business practitioners and management scholars to distinguish between compliance and ethics. According to the conventional distinction as expressed in Paine’s formulation of Integrity Strategy, compliance is ordinarily a necessary but insufficient condition for ethics. Now that this distinction has been institutionalized in the most significant judicial, legislative, and regulatory developments in American business conduct management since the Enron failure, it is worth asking whether the current emphasis on ethics represents progress. Does it make logical and (...) practical sense to impose ethics as a compliance requirement, or have we come full circle? I argue that assertions of organizational ethical progress, usually involving an increase in the number and or severity of compliance restrictions, do not get the conventional distinction quite right. Moreover, under the consensus distinction, there can be no such thing as organizational ethical progress. However, our ordinary ways of talking about business conduct management often betray logical confusions about the ethics–compliance relationship. While the metaphors we employ – “higher standards,” “raising the bar,” “gray areas,” and “crossing the line,” etc. – perform a worthwhile function as standards for external evaluation of business conduct, they also have a tendency to limit and impoverish our conception of what it is to be ethical. The idea that ethics matters is fundamental to Integrity Strategy’s implicit claim, consistent with conventional wisdom and moral theory, that the objective of responsible conduct cannot be achieved solely by imposing from outside what is required but must also appeal to what is desired. (shrink)

Comparisons between morality and other 'companion' disciplines - such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics - are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the 'companions in guilt' strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics. This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the (...) field. They examine the methodology of companions in guilt arguments and their use in responding to the moral error theory, as well as specific arguments that take mathematics, epistemic norms, or aesthetics as a 'companion', and the use of the companions in guilt strategy to vindicate claims to moral knowledge. Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics is essential reading for advanced students and researchers working in moral theory and metaethics, as well as those in epistemology and philosophy of mathematics concerned with the intersection of these subjects with ethics. (shrink)

Freedom to innovate in teaching and learning are essential to meaningful higher education. Universities’ rhetorical commitments to freedom and innovation are ubiquitous and quite homogenous. Beneath the rhetoric, however, lie sharp divides between neo-liberal and Humboldtian approaches to innovation, course design, teaching and learning. This article argues that to understand the authentic approach of a university to innovation requires going beyond the rhetoric. We must instead examine context-specific experiences and understandings of the curriculum, especially in terms of teaching, learning, assessment (...) and evaluation. Making this critical examination, we see that Humboldtian frameworks rely on broad understandings of value connected to learners and their communities. Neoliberal frameworks by contrast reduce and essentialise these understandings to customer service provision. Treating students as customers has significant implications for how innovation is defined and enacted through increasing aversion to the risks inherent to attempting innovation. Quality evaluation and assurance processes inevitably align with an institution’s authentic approach, regardless of what rhetorical commitments suggest. The article concludes by suggesting ways forward grounded in teaching, learning and evaluation. These are congruent with a Humboldtian approach and may, through their application bring the rhetoric of teaching and learning innovation into alignment with experienced reality. (shrink)

Unfortunately, the name of the editor was misspelled. The correct name is given below.

This article attempts to draw out and to clarify a tension at the core of Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift. This tension can be put as follows. On the one hand, Schelling insists quite strongly throughout this text upon the inherent goodness of creaturely selfhood—not simply in the negative sense that selfhood is not intrinsically evil, but in the positive sense that each created self is loved by God and destined to play a singular part in God’s self-revelation. On the other hand, Schelling (...) depicts selfhood in terms that seem to link it inextricably—perhaps constitutively—to sin and evil. It is my contention in this article that this tension arises as a result of Schelling’s attempt, in the Freiheitsschrift, to embed an essentially Kantian account of radical evil within the broadly Neoplatonic framework he had sketched five years earlier in his Philosophy and Religion. (shrink)

How secure is the now standard Anglophone division of the Platonic dialogues into ‘early’, ‘middle’, and ‘late’? The present article proposes that such a division of the dialogues should be abandoned : its main foundations are too weak to support it. The turning-point in the Platonic corpus is not the introduction of ‘separated’ Forms (usually taken, after Aristotle, as the mark of a ‘middle’, or ‘mature’, dialogue), but rather the shift from one type of moral psychology, or theory of action, (...) to another ; that is, from an ‘intellectualist’ to a ‘rationalist-irrationalist’ psychology, as argued for in Republic IV. This way of dividing the dialogues – so the article claims – has greater explanatory power than its rival. If it still gives us a distinction between ‘Socratic’ dialogues and others, (a) this distinction cuts across the standard (Anglophone) early/middle division, and (b) it will no longer be describable in terms of ‘deve­lopment’, if ‘development’ implies philosophical progress. (shrink)

It is readily apparent to anyone ministering to Australian adolescents in the early twenty-first century that their efforts take place against the backdrop of a general decline in belief and practice among Catholics, and among young Catholics in particular. Rather than simply join the chorus of lament at the decline of young people's belief and participation in the life of the church, this article seeks to understand better the present 'face' or 'faces' of youth ministry by considering the historical relationship (...) between secularity and the church's pastoral activity with young Australians. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 61 Heft: 2 Seiten: 184-206.

Michel Galley, Pi-Chuan Chang, Daniel Cer, Jenny R. Finkel, and Christopher D. Manning Computer Science and Linguistics Departments Stanford University..

I apply African moral precepts to the topic of ‘superlongevity’. I make the case that African theories give rise to three specific sorts of moral concern about life extension that are distinct from similar objections in Western literature: first, superlongevity presents a challenge to identity; second, significantly longer lives face increased challenges to their meaningfulness; third, life extension may be socially divisive, undermining key tenets of sharing a way of life and communing harmoniously with others. Although these distinctive concerns are (...) significant, I claim that their strength as objections to superlongevity depends heavily on the distribution of life extension technologies. Moreover, since African theories typically hold that moral excellence correlates with increasing age, they provide a prudential and moral incentive to live longer to develop personhood. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe disadvantaged have incentives to commit crime, and to develop criminogenic dispositions, that limit the extent to which their co-citizens can blame them for breaking the law. This is true regardless of whether the causes of criminality are mainly “structural” or “cultural.” We need not assume that society as a whole is unjust in order to accept this conclusion. And doing so would neither stigmatize nor otherwise disrespect the disadvantaged.

method. It is shown that the stochastic method obtains test set gains of +0.98 BLEU on MT03.

Paul de Man - literary critic, literary philosopher, "American deconstructionist" - changed the landscape of criticism through his rigorous theories and writings. Upon its original publication in 1988, Christopher Norris' book was the first full-length introduction to de Man, a reading that offers a much-needed corrective to the pattern of extreme antithetical response which marked the initial reception to de Man's writings. Norris addresses de Man's relationship to philosophical thinking in the post-Kantian tradition, his concern with "aesthetic ideology" as (...) a potent force of mystification within and beyond that tradition, and the vexed issue of de Man's politics. Norris brings out the marked shift of allegiance in de Man's thinking, from the thinly veiled conservative implications of the early essays to the engagement with Marx and Foucault on matters of language and politics in the late, posthumous writing. At each stage, Norris raises these questions through a detailed close reading of individual texts which will be welcomed by those who lack any specialised knowledge of de Man's work. (shrink)

This chapter examines a key focal characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment, namely, its delineation of how a ‘science of man’ can inform and structure an account of ‘society’. The key contribution of the Scots to the rise of the human sciences lies in a conception of society as a set of interlocked institutions and behaviours. The Scots provided an analysis of both social statics and social dynamics, which shifted the focus away from the individualism that characterized early modern jurisprudence. Humans (...) as social beings are best understood in society and not as monadic individuals. The Scottish analysis also sidelined the centrality traditionally allotted to the political. Humans are social as well as political animals. Political institutions are simply one kind of institution among several, to be given no greater priority than the rest. (shrink)

Many commentators have accused Aquinas of committing either a formal or an informal fallacy in his Third Way argument. I believe it is possible to revise the Third Way argument so as to avoid such errors. I here present a revision of the first part of the Third Way that is (a) immune to the objections most commonly raised against it, (b) consonant with the basic tenets of Thomism, and (c) plausible from a contemporary point of view.

In this article, I highlight systemic oppression related to identity construction and ontological performativity. I introduce the concept of inter-relationality as a discursive tool that builds upon intersectionality, feminist theology, and quantum entanglement theory. For a case study, I recount my experience observing sex-trafficked boys in Thailand in order to demonstrate the analytical model I present. My chief analytical guiding principle in the treatment of the case study is the way masculinity operates to re-enforce oppression. I propose queering masculinity using (...) an inter-relational perspective for the purpose of de-constructing oppressive systems and replacing them with liberative ones. (shrink)

In this article, I will elucidate the Indian government’s two primary discourses concerning yoga since 2014 as right-wing Hindu Nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu Nationalist political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, have interacted with both international and domestic audiences. These discourses can be broadly grouped into two categories, or what I refer to as Modi and the BJP’s “double discourse”: Yoga as a global soft power solution to counter the Global North’s climate change privilege on the international (...) stage and Yoga as biopower for the advancement of India’s depressed economy on the domestic front. Relying on yoga’s polyvalent character, Modi and the BJP are able to frame yoga in these two particular ways—which together signal their commitment to neoliberal economic ideology—by drawing from historical and contemporaneous precedents which I also outline in the article. I conclude with a brief visit to the preparations for the BJP’s 2019 International Day of Yoga, where this double discourse becomes most evident in the two divergent themes announced for the event. (shrink)