Perception and action are tightly coupled. However, there is still little recognition of how individual motor constraints impact perception in everyday life. Here we asked whether and how the motor slowing that accompanies aging influences the sense of visual speed. Ninety-four participants aged between 18 and 90 judged the natural speed of video clips reproducing real human or physical motion. They also performed a finger tapping task and a visual search task, which estimated their motor speed and visuospatial attention speed, (...) respectively. Remarkably, aged people judged videos to be too slow, as compared to younger people: the Point of Subjective Equality, which estimated the speed bias in the SoS task, was +4% in young adults, +12% in old adults and +16% in elders. On average, PSE increased with age at a rate of 0.2% per year, with perceptual precision, adjustment rate, and completion time progressively worsening. Crucially, low motor speed, but not low attentional speed, turned out to be the key predictor of video speed underestimation. These findings suggest the existence of a counterintuitive compensatory coupling between action and perception in judging dynamic scenes, an effect that becomes particularly germane during aging. (shrink)

Research on elders’ acceptance of virtual technologies is much needed. Here we studied the user experience of elders (N = 10, mean age = 88.2 years) during virtual biking, an exergame where participants pedal on a cycle ergometer and wear a Head-Mounted Display that provides them an immersive experience of a bike ride. We tested the effects of augmented gaze on user experience. Augmented gaze is a condition in which horizontal head turns yield amplified visual shifts, which is assumed to (...) facilitate visual exploration. User experience was measured by asking participants to rate satisfaction, motivation, sense of presence and sense of safety. We found a very good acceptance of virtual biking and no signs of negative effects of augmented gaze. These preliminary observations suggest that augmented gaze may be a viable optimization of elders’ experience with certain virtual reality applications. (shrink)

The research sought to systematize two notions around interreligious relations which aim to deconstruct imaginaries of an idealist tendency that often emerge from practices and forms of inter-religious ecumenism: that of power differentials present in society and in interreligious relations and the concept of polidoxy, which would avoid dichotomous and bipolar interpretations and actions. Methodologically, we adopted the process of synthesis of perspectives derived from postcolonial cultural studies – by different authors – and from the feminist theological critique of Kwok (...) Pui-Lan. Among the results of the research are the theoretical bases for the analysis that highlight the power differentials also present in inter-religious relationships. These, as they are critically identified, admitted and evaluated, could attenuate the reproduction of veiled forms of domination, since such forms, contradictorily, are also present in the inter-religious dialogue spectrum. Another result is the clarification of the polidoxy concept, which, through the criticism of the single thought and its unmasking aims to overcome the binomial orthodoxy / heresy. This usually inhibits the realization of an authentic inter-religious and cultural dialogue. The deity, in this approach, is understood in terms of multiplicity, unrestrainability and relationality. (shrink)

Análise dos principais desafios do pluralismo religioso para o contexto teológico latino-americano. Como resultado de nossa pesquisa, formulamos três eixos norteadores da temática: I. A importância pública das religiões para os processos de promoção da paz e da justiça, associada ao valor da mística e da alteridade na formação de espiritualidades ecumênicas e como elas incidirão nos processos religiosos e sociais, favorecendo perspectivas utópicas, democráticas e doadoras de sentido. II. A necessidade de mudança de lugar teológico a partir da realidade (...) das culturas religiosas afro-indígenas. III. A contribuição da teologia feminista da libertação para o debate do pluralismo religioso. Metodologicamente, reunimos a produção teológica latino-americana em torno das questões do pluralismo religioso, identificamos os aspectos principais, especialmente os que interpelam mais diretamente o método teológico e sistematizamos os pontos que consideramos mais desafiadores em torno dos três eixos já referidos. A pesquisa mostra que, diante do pluralismo religioso, faz-se necessária para a teologia das religiões uma atenção especial à articulação entre a capacidade de diálogo dos grupos religiosos e os desafios em torno da defesa dos direitos humanos e das lógicas inclusivas. Palavras-chave: Método teológico. Teologia das religiões. Pluralismo. Teologia da libertação.This paper analyses the main challenges of religious pluralism for the theological Latin American context. The research was formulated around three topics: (i) the public importance of religions for the peace processes and promotion of justice. It takes into account the way in which the ecumenical formation of spiritualities, in the middle of mysticism and alterity, affects religious and social processes, allowing the emergence of new utopian, democratic and meaningful perspectives; (ii) the necessity of rethinking theological locus, shifting to a starting point of afro-indigenous cultures; and (iii) the contribution of feminist liberation theology to the debate of religious pluralism. Our method was to bring together the principal questions around religious pluralism in Latin American theology, identifying its principal aspects, focusing mostly those aspects that directly interpellate the theological methodology. Those aspects were systematized around the three topics mentioned above. The paper shows that, concerning religious pluralism, it is necessary for the theology of religions special attention to the relationship between the capacity for dialogue of religious groups around the defense of human rights and inclusiveness. Keywords: Theological methodology. Theology of religions. Pluralism. Liberation Theology. (shrink)

A pesquisa foi desenvolvida considerando-se o debate sobre a especificidade da Pós-Graduação Profissional no âmbito da área Ciências da Religião e Teologia, da Capes, órgão que no Ministério da Educação brasileiro acompanha e avalia o Sistema Nacional de Pós-Graduação. O objetivo principal das análises feitas foi construir um panorama de questões em torno do trabalho realizado pelos cursos de mestrados profissionais, incluindo os resultados por eles alcançados, somado a um elenco de aspectos que têm sido identificados como desafiadores para o (...) aprofundamento e aprimoramento dessas práticas bem como as perspectivas que se abrem para essa modalidade de Pós-Graduação no Brasil. Metodologicamente, agrupamos a análise dos dados em dois momentos. O primeiro apresenta, em síntese, um histórico da Pós-Graduação Profissional na área Ciências da Religião e Teologia, com destaque para o conjunto de motivações e objetivos que levaram o Ministério da Educação e a CAPES a implementarem a modalidade de Programas Profissionais no país. Em especial, a reflexão se concentra na visão de uma prática profissional centrada em procedimentos e processos aplicados, visando a solução de problemas que emergem da realidade social. O segundo momento destaca aspectos conceituais sobre a importância da pesquisa aplicada, em especial a tarefa de decolonização a ser desenvolvida no meio acadêmico, a contribuição das áreas e subáreas da Árvore do Conhecimento, especialmente a “Ciência da Religião Aplicada” e a “Teologia Prática”, o valor da produção técnica e a especificidade dos Trabalhos de Conclusão de Curso para a Pós-Graduação Profissional, as potencialidades e limites da estrutura modular para o oferecimento dos créditos curriculares e o perfil do egresso nesta modalidade. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende mostrar por que é que a actualidade de Teilhard de Chardin é hoje imune às vicissitudes dos tempos e a sua obra se transformou num verdadeiro clássico do pensamento cristão no século XX. Mostra-se, com efeito, o valor permanente da mensagem teilhardiana, mensagem esta que importa acolher com entusiasmo renovado no momento em que se comemoram os primeiros 50 anos depois da morte do grande cientista e pensador. Neste sentido, o artigo mostra de que modo a (...) questão de Deus constitui o cerne da visão teilhardiana, já que nela reside o eixo orientador de todo o seu pensamento e actividade. O pensamento de Teilhard de Chardin pode, pois, ser considerado como uma grandiosa tentativa de responder à pergunta que nos nossos dias atravessa a alma dos homens e mulheres que se inserem no âmbito da tradição judaico-cristã, a saber: será possível pensar Deus, crer em Deus, aceitar Deus e agir à luz da existência de Deus num mundo que, aparentemente, chegou ao termo da imensa operação cultural, iniciada dois séculos antes, de liquidar de vez a herança teísta de uma história imemorial? Pergunta decisiva, da qual estão suspensas as próprias razões de viver do homem de hoje e o destino do Cristianismo na civilização por ele em grande parte inspirada. Segundo o artigo, a grandeza de Teilhard de Chardin e o segredo do seu imenso impacto num tempo em que a cultura pós-teísta parecia estabelecer definitivamente os seus próprios títulos de legitimidade histórica, residem não só na lucidez com que o pensador fez face à grande interrogação, mas também na originalidade da resposta que para ela encontrou. /// Aim of this article is primarily to show why the actuality of Teilhard de Chardin is nowadays immune to the vicissitudes proper to the change of times and that his work is now a true classic within the realm of contemporary Christian thought. The essay shows the permanent value of the teilhardian message, which we are particularly invited to grasp as we commemorate the 50 th anniversary after the death of the great scientist and thinker. In this sense, the article shows how the question of God constitutes the core of Teilhard de Chardin's vision and how this question is the organizing factor of his thought and activity. Thus, the thought of Teilhard de Chardin can be considered a grandiose attempt at answering the question that in our time touches so many men and women within the Judaeo-Christian tradition, namely: is it possible to think God, to believe in God, to accept God and to act in the light of God's existence in a world in which the cultural operation that began two centuries ago aimed at finishing up with the theistic heritage of our immemorial history seems to have come full circle? This is certainly a decisive issue in the measure that from it depends the question of meaning for the human being of today's world as well as the destiny of Christianity within the Civilization that has so deeply been inspired by it. According to the article, the greatness of Teilhard de Chardin and the secret of his immense impact in a time in which the posttheistic culture seemed to establish definitely its own titles of historical legitimacy, can be found not only in the lucidity with which the thinker faced the great question, but also in the originality of the answer that he was able to give. (shrink)

Este artigo é parte do estudo de doutorado que investigou a concepção de currículo na obra de Dermeval Saviani. O levantamento da produção do autor permitiu-nos identificar que a mesma se concentra, prioritariamente, em quatro grandes áreas: estrutura e política educacional; filosofia da educação; história da educação e teoria pedagógica. Tomamos para análise, neste artigo, as contribuições no campo da filosofia da educação. Concluímos que o autor articula pressupostos ontológicos, gnosiológicos, axiológicos e teleológicos, sustentando uma concepção histórico-crítica de currículo a (...) partir de uma sólida concepção filosófica. (shrink)

This paper examines the debate on AI legal personhood, emphasizing the role of path dependencies in shaping current trajectories and prospects. Three primary path dependencies emerge: prevailing legal theories on personhood (singularist vs. clustered), the actual participation of AI in socio-digital institutions (instrumental vs. non-instrumental), and the impact of technological advancements. We argue that these factors dynamically interact, with technological optimism fostering broader attribution of the legal entitlements to AI entities and periods of scepticism narrowing such entitlements. Additional influences include (...) regulatory cross-linkages (e.g., data privacy, liability, cybersecurity) and historical legal precedents. Current regulatory frameworks, particularly in the EU, generally resist extending legal personhood to AI systems. Case law suggests that without explicit legislation, courts are unlikely to grant AI legal personhood on their own, although some authors suggest that the courts can do so. For this to happen, AI systems would first need to prove de facto legitimacy through sustained participation within socio-digital institutions. The chapter concludes by assessing near- and long-term prospects for legal personification, from generative AI and AI agents in the next 5–20 years to transformative possibilities such as AI integration with human cognition via Brain-Machine Interfaces in a more distant future. (shrink)

If there is an area of discourse in which disagreement is virtually absent, it is mathematics. After all, mathematicians justify their claims with deductive proofs: arguments that entail their conclusions. But is mathematics really exceptional in this respect? Looking at the history and practice of mathematics, we soon realize that it is not. First, deductive arguments must start somewhere. How should we choose the starting points (i.e., the axioms)? Second, mathematicians, like the rest of us, are fallible. Their ability to (...) recognize whether a putative proof is correct is not infallible. In most cases, disagreement over the correctness of a putative proof is, however, evanescent. Once an error is spotted and communicated, the disagreement disappears. But this is not always the case. Sometimes it is recalcitrant; that is, it persists over time. In order to zoom in on this type of disagreement and explain its very possibility, we focus on a single case study: a decades-long (1921-1949) controversy between Federigo Enriques and Francesco Severi, two prominent exponents of the Italian school of algebraic geometry. We suggest that the instability of the mathematical community to which they belonged can be explained by the gap between an abstract criterion of rigor and local criteria of acceptability. It is this instability that made the existence of recalcitrant disagreement over putative proofs possible. We do not condemn speculative mathematics but rather its pretense of being rigorous mathematics. In this respect, we show that the overly self-confident Severi and the more intuitive, visionary Enriques had a completely different attitude. (shrink)

On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which (...) the believer can have no non-overridden evidence. The arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein’s views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta-epistemological implications. (shrink)

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...) by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of.. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es presentar una reconstrucción de la teoría de los grupos dereferencia. La teoría, desarrollada por Robert K. Merton, ha sido largamente utilizada enlos más variados campos de las ciencias sociales, aunque con escasa o nula consideraciónmetateórica hasta ahora. La reconstrucción atenderá a la presentación que de la misma serecoge en sendos artículos de su libro Social Theory and Social Structure, de 1968, a saber:“Contributions to the theory of reference group behavior” y “Continuities in the theory (...) ofreference groups and social structure”. Para presentar esta reconstrucción me apoyaré en elinstrumental de la Metateoría Estructuralista. Después de una consideración informal de lateoría, serán presentados sus modelos potenciales, modelos, modelos potenciales parciales,sus aplicaciones intencionales y algunos comentarios acerca de la noción de “grupo de referencia”en lo que respeta su carácter relacional y disposicional. (shrink)

Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske’s lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...) way of going wrong under Dretske’s lead. As the paper argues, Cartesian skepticism thrives on closure failure in a way that is yet to be acknowledged in the literature. The skeptic can make do with principles which are weaker than the familiar closure principles. But I will further claim that this is only a momentary reprieve for the skeptic. As it turns out, one of the weaker principles on which a skeptical modus tollens must rest can be shown false. (shrink)

The classification of algebraic surfaces by the Italian School of algebraic geometry is universally recognized as a breakthrough in 20th-century mathematics. The methods by which it was achieved do not, however, meet the modern standard of rigor and therefore appear dubious from a contemporary viewpoint. In this article, we offer a glimpse into the mathematical practice of the three leading exponents of the Italian School of algebraic geometry: Castelnuovo, Enriques, and Severi. We then bring into focus their distinctive conception of (...) rigor and intuition. Unlike what is often assumed today, from their perspective, rigor is neither opposed to intuition nor understood as a unitary phenomenon – Enriques distinguishes between small-scale rigor and large-scale rigor and Severi between formal rigor and substantial rigor. Finally, we turn to the notion of mathematical objectivity. We draw from our case study in order to advance a multi-dimensional analysis of objectivity. Specifically, we suggest that various types of rigor may be associated with different conceptions of objectivity: namely, objectivity as faithfulness to facts and objectivity as intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Die Bibliotheca Teubneriana, established in 1849, has evolved into the world's most venerable and extensive series of editions of Greek and Latin literature, ranging from classical to Neo-Latin texts. Some 4-5 new editions are published every year. A team of renowned scholars in the field of Classical Philology acts as advisory board: Gian Biagio Conte (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa) James Diggle (University of Cambridge) Donald J. Mastronarde (University of California, Berkeley) Franco Montanari (Università di Genova) Heinz-Günther Nesselrath (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen) (...) Dirk Obbink (University of Oxford) Oliver Primavesi (Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München) Michael D. Reeve (University of Cambridge) Richard J. Tarrant (Harvard University) Formerly out-of-print editions are offered as print-on-demand reprints. Furthermore, all new books in the Bibliotheca Teubneriana series are published as eBooks. The older volumes of the series are being successively digitized and made available as eBooks. If you are interested in ordering an out-of-print edition, which hasn't been yet made available as print-on-demand reprint, please contact us:[email protected] All editions of Latin texts published in the Bibliotheca Teubneriana are collected in the online database BTL Online. (shrink)

Although we may find the concept of anomie in Greek thought, it is since Durkheim that the concept begins to be used specifically as a sociological concept. However, a theory of anomie only becomes consolidated since “Social Structure and Anomie” by Robert K. Merton (Merton 1938). The theory becomes important and conquers its space in the rest of the century as one of the most productive theories about deviance. In this study, based on a contemporary conception of scientific theory, that (...) of the structuralist metatheory, a reconstruction of Merton’s approach is proposed, allowing to make explicit the deep structure of the theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I will deal with the way linguistics and semiotics focus on person and subjectivity in language. I start from two different meanings of the “person” word and from Benveniste and Latour’s theories of enunciation. Later, I deal with the problem of subjectivity in language and I connect it to two different views: Benveniste’s idea that subjectivity is grounded on the “I” and Guillaume’s idea of a primacy of the “he”. Starting from the Iliad and from the semiotic (...) idea of subject, I take side for Guillaume and Latour’s theory: it is the delocutive structure of the “he” which, in language, expresses subjectivity, namely the capacity of the subject to make himself the object of his reflections and of his words. (shrink)

Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similarly problematic cases—specifically, relevance logicians and (...) like-minded philosophers—or stick with closure and surrender to relevantist claims of failure in truth-preservation aimed at classical rules of inference. Classicist closure advocates find the promise of a way out of the dilemma in the works of Roy Sorensen and John Hawthorne. The paper argues against their pro-closure move and renews Robert Audi’s call for a theory of closure-failure. (shrink)

Among the most egregious and discouraging problems of conservation is the rapidly escalating human‐caused species extinction rate. “De‐extinction” refers to the application of certain cutting‐edge techniques for the supposed recovery of lost species and gives the impression that scientists, enlightened and empowered by the miracles of technology, are coming to the rescue. “De‐extinction” is the latest example of a long play of language that has given conservation efforts a tragically false sense of accomplishment and has worsened the conservation crisis. De‐extinction (...) is the tip of an intellectual iceberg that sits atop of a host of profoundly questionable value systems, expectations, attitudes, and priorities that elude and bewitch critical reflection. It gives the impression that extinction is reversible and, thus, diminishes the gravity of the human annihilation of species. Here, we examine how the language of de‐extinction influences attitudes, shapes thoughts and imagination, and creates ethical blindness. The language developing around “de‐extinction” reveals what is in fact a profound intellectual crisis at the foundation of conservation. The underlying challenge is to find the language that will articulate and inspire the radical and indispensable change needed to come to grips with the value of nature. (shrink)

En este trabajo nos referiremos al debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos a partir del episodio que constituye el debate entre Michael Williams y Alvin Goldman, que se expresa en el intercambio de trabajos presente en el volumen del año 2016 Goldman and his critics. Enmarcaremos esta discusión señalando que, mientras una serie de autores (en particular Laurence BonJour y, siguiendo su influencia, Jennifer Lackey y Fernando Broncano) extrae del debate internismo/externismo la consecuencia “dualista” de que el conocimiento no puede (...) analizarse según un único eje, sino que hallamos al menos dos -el de la razonabilidad subjetiva y el de la conductividad a la verdad-, Goldman se presenta como un externista de “línea dura” para el cual el internismo es simplemente insostenible y la justificación epistémica ha de comprenderse exclusivamente en términos confiabilistas. Sobre este trasfondo, analizaremos la propuesta de Williams, quien por un lado busca probar que las críticas de Goldman al internismo quedan restringidas a una versión “mentalista” o “subjetivista”, y, por el otro, busca ratificar una epistemología internista moderada apoyándose en el señalamiento de que el conocimiento humano es indisociable de consideraciones de responsabilidad (accountability). Buscaremos probar que la réplica de Goldman, que se centra en denunciar una presunta confusión por Williams entre el problema del “estar justificado” y el del “justificar”, no hace justicia a la amplitud del problema de la justificación epistémica, una vez que este es abordado, no a partir de presuntas “intuiciones” sobre el significado de “conocimiento” en el lenguaje ordinario, sino a partir de las prácticas en las que nociones como esta pueden hacerse funcionar. -/- . (shrink)

Nos termos rousseaunianos, a questão fundamental sobre o que de vemos fazer coletivamente (ou seja, o problema da decisão coletiva) se traduz como a questão sobre como podemos conhecer a vontade geral. Só podemos responder adequadamente a essa questão, porém, se prestarmos atenção a uma duplicidade importante no conceito de vontade geral. Rousseau usa a mesma expressão para se referir a duas coisas diferentes: às próprias decisões coletivas, consubstanciadas nas leis (a vg-decisão), e ao padrão do bem comum, em certo (...) sentido anterior e independente das decisões coletivas, servindo como referência para elas (a vg-padrão). A questão genérica sobre como podemos vir a conhecer a vontade geral, portanto, deve ser desdobrada em duas: Como podemos vir a conhecer a vg-decisão? e Como podemos vir a conhecer a vg-padrão? Este artigo pretende identificar os elementos centrais da resposta de Rousseau a essas duas questões, elementos esses que permitem discutir sobre o sentido da concepção rousseauniana de democracia. (shrink)

O principal objetivo desse artigo é interpretativo. Trata-se de historiar as tradicionais teorias descritivistas dos nomes próprios sugeridas por Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein e Searle, demonstrando que, diversamente do que é suposto, elas não constituem teorias diversas a competir entre si, mas apresentações algo diversas de um mesmo modo de ver.

In recent years, several strategies have been proposed to tackle social controversies about topics in which science is settled, among which one of the most influential is that of Elizabeth Anderson, who argues that any lay person with access to the Internet and basic education can reliably assess the acceptability of various claims involving expert knowledge. In particular, the author shows that this procedure can be successfully applied to the case of anthropogenic global warming. In this article we will try (...) to argue why, even if we concede that Anderson's proposal is satisfactory in that particular case, it fails to generalize when applied to other controversies. In this article, we illustrate it with the cases of flat-Eartherism and anti-vaxxerism. (shrink)

In the present essay, I argue that the current EU governance reflects a contradiction between the presumption of a European constitutional framework based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law and the recently adopted economic stability governance defined outside the horizon of the EU treaties. I propose to understand this scenario through the prism of two distinct and context-specific assumptions: a political-sociological hypothesis for which internal contradictions of capitalism are thought to be capable of ‘self-displacing’ to other societal (...) sectors and a political-philosophical thesis for which EU governance is connected to a decrease in democratic legitimacy and right-standards due to hegemonic control by economic powers. Both hypotheses testify to the lowering of the standards of protection of fundamental rights and member states’ regulatory capacities as well as to an overall de-constitutionalization of the EU architecture. (shrink)

It does not seem particularly daring to say that one objective of science education is to enable students to understand different phenomena in the world in their mutual relationship. This is roughly equivalent to promoting knowledge of scientific explanations, which involve resorting to regular relationships between certain phenomena and which, certainly, is different from knowledge of this or that type of event taken in isolation. In this text, we will draw attention to two opposing tendencies that, however, tend towards the (...) common result of hindering the achievement of such an objective. On the one hand, we find characterizations of scientific explanation that assimilate it to argumentation and, therefore, lose sight of what specifically makes explanations explanatory; that is, they ask too little of a scientific explanation. On the other hand, those that consider paradigmatic cases of scientific explanation −such as those achieved by subsuming phenomena such as tides to Newton's laws− do not really constitute explanations but merely descriptions; it is about asking too much of an explanation here. We will therefore point out that a greater attention to the elaborations provided by the philosophy of science about the notion of explanation is crucial to better serve educational purposes. (shrink)

The problem of determinism and freedom in the human being has always been a fruitful philosophical debate. In this discussion Spinoza is a reference in this regard, since since the publication of his works he has generated controversy around the problem. This work seeks to clarify the concept of necessity that Spinoza uses in his philosophy, in order to unravel the meaning of determinism that he builds from it. Within the analysis I show that in Spinoza’s philosophy there is no (...) clear distinction between logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, I argue that the concepts of contingency and possibility are de dicto and not de re issues in the author’s philosophy. That is to say, that they are not properties of the things themselves, but ways of speaking about them. Finally, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis on determinism should be understood mainly as a necessitarianist theory, which can be compatible with a certain sense of freedom in the human being. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to show that the foundations of a dualistic theology of Christian roots are found in the point of connection between platonic metaphysics, gnostic myths and exegesis. It highlights the way in which platonic metaphysics was developed in a completely different way than what is known as “Metaphysics of Exodus”. It considers that myth ─as an expressive vehicle of religious experience and having a polyvalent logic─ was a decisive element for the transmission of gnostic tradition. (...) Thus, the article concentrates on the gnostic understanding of “The Prologue of John”, which focuses on the Christological function of Jesus, bearing in mind the difficulties involved in the indifference with which this tradition dealt with Incarnation. The tools for the exegesis are taken from Hellenic tradition as a form to clarify the gnostic intuition concerning the stages of the propagation of the divine, both before and after the Fall. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen (2000) provided us with a challenging “paradox of conviction” by means of pointing out the fact that, even when we realize that we hold certain beliefs (for example, political or religious ones) only because we have been raised to have them, this discovery does not modify what we believe. This seems to be irrational, but acknowledging that fact would entail that irrationality is much more widespread than we are, in principle, willing to accept. In this article we (...) will focus on the solution proposed by Federico Penelas (2007), according to which the paradox can be dissolved by appealing to Rorty’s “ethnocentrism”. We will try to argue that this solution can work insofar as what supports our choice to retain our “convictions” is not theoretical in character, but practical. The reason why we can continue to support certain positions that lack neutral evidence in their favour is that it would be too costly not to do it—a condition which does not, nonetheless, make it any more probable that the positions in question are theoretically acceptable. (shrink)

It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.

In this work, we will try to state the opposition between two approaches to the problem of the overall reliability of human knowing capacities, and a possible solution to that conflict. On the one hand, as we will point out, there exist a number of approaches that fall under the broad term of “evolutionary reliabilism” and according to which the reasons that we have for believing in the reliability of human cognition are empirical in character. Namely, the adaptive success of (...) our species in a biological environment characterised by the survival of the fittest provides us with a reason to believe that our belief-forming mechanisms are truth-tracking; if they were not, we would have gone extinct. On the other hand, nevertheless, we find analyses—of which we will focus on the case of Ernest Sosa—according to which the tenet that our knowing capacities are reliable cannot be empirically based, and thus contingent; on the contrary, they point out that we need to presuppose—without need of a proof—that such capacities are trustworthy. Given this conflict between an “empirical” defence and a defence “in principle” of our knowing capacities, we will consider two possible objections against Sosa’s proposal and try to answer them. (shrink)

Moore′s paradox came of age when John N. Williams gave us a simple paradoxical argument according to which the Moorean believer must hold false belief while believing contingent propositions. Simplicity was key; it was groundbreaking for the topic. On Williams′s account, given only the notions of inconsistency and self‐refutation, the thesis that belief distributes over conjunction, and a tiny bit of classical logic, we can derive a paradox from the Moorean propositional schemata. But, as argued here, it′s easy to overestimate (...) the significance of his argument to a proper understanding of the problem. His fundamental claim can be established in a way that shows how the paradox arises for any propositional attitude that distributes over conjunction, which gives us the opportunity to reconsider the problem we have been calling “Moore′s paradox”, and to conclude that all of the available analyses of the problem are, at best, incomplete. On this new approach, we lose a little formal simplicity vis‐à‐vis Williams′s approach, but make conceptual economy, as we gain a farther‐reaching problem than the one we have known. (shrink)

A lo largo de una serie de textos, Merleau-Ponty criticó el proyecto husserliano que alternativamente denominó “gramática universal” y “eidética del lenguaje”, y al cual asoció una serie de consecuencias: la tesis de que la gramática universal implica (I) la previa cognoscibilidad de las “formas” universales con respecto a los lenguajes naturales; (II) la univocidad con la que las palabras en los lenguajes naturales se vincularían con sus significados, y la transparencia con que esta relación unívoca se presentaría ante la (...) conciencia, (III) la secundariedad del lenguaje con respecto al pensamiento y (IV) la intertraducibilidad universal. El autor francés rechaza estas consecuencias y por tanto cuestiona la plausibilidad del proyecto universalista en cuestión. sin embargo, no es claro que estas presuntas consecuencias estén realmente implicadas por la propuesta que Merleau-Ponty está discutiendo ni que, de obtenerse, tengan la forma específica necesaria para que la crítica tenga éxito. Trataremos de mostrar que tal crítica en última instancia falla. (shrink)

In this article we follow the reception made by Augustine of Hippo of the Manichean myth; in this we see his visceral reaction against the doctrine of Mani, since –in addition to the apologetic elements properly– there is a clear attempt to take psychological distance from a religious experience that marked it in depth, in every way. In this controversial context we can also discern central aspects of a text that had liturgical value and which, as such, was of capital (...) importance to the Manichaean communities. This Augustinian reading has as horizon the near collapse of the Roman Empire of the West and the ever-increasing confrontation of Constantinople with Persian Empire, the mobility of its borders and the partly political and partly religious persecutions that Manichaeism underwent. (shrink)

In two occasions a Bibliography of Structuralism has been published in Erkenntnis (1989, 1994). Since then a lot of water has flowed under the bridge and the structuralist program has shown a continuous development. The aim of the present bibliography is to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the publication of An Architectonic for Science –structuralism’s main reference work– and of its recent translation into Spanish by updating the previous bibliographies with titles which have appeared since 1994 as well as before (...) that year but which are not included in them. As in the former deliveries, this bibliography only covers books and articles that are concerned directly with the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. We would like to thank the many colleagues who have helped us in collecting all the information. Notwithstanding we apologize in advance for the possible entries that we missed to include in this third Bibliography of Structuralism. (shrink)

Neste artigo, analiso o modo como Carl Schmitt define a natureza política da jurisdição constitucional a partir de seus trabalhos redigidos nos anos derradeiros da República de Weimar: “O Conceito do Político” e “O Guardião da Constituição”. Tento contrastar suas respostas com abordagens algumas contemporâneas. Em especial, sua tese sobre a diferença entre a “alta política” e “política secundária” são imprescindíveis para compreender sua defesa de uma concepção de Estado de Direito respeitosa à “separação de poderes” e sua posição quanto (...) à criação judicial do direito no âmbito da jurisdição ordinária. Corretamente compreendidas, suas teses são de enorme pertinência em contextos marcados simultaneamente por crises políticas-institucionais e intensa judicialização da política. (shrink)

G. E. Moore identified a peculiar form of epistemic irrationality. Wittgenstein called it “Moore’s Paradox”. Neither of them knew exactly what he was talking about. And yet, the vast literature on the problem leaves no room for doubt: the paradox is deep; its resolution, elusive. But, up until now, we haven’t been in a position to appreciate its importance for contemporary epistemology. This paper puts forward an epistemological solution to the paradox. It also seeks to show that the paradox yields (...) counter-examples to deductive closure claims for both epistemic rationality and knowledge that are immune to contextualist pro-closure maneuvers. (shrink)

Neste artigo texto apresento uma interpretação de algumas das principais teses de Carl Schmitt em sua obra Der Hüter der Verfassung, O Guardião da Constituição. Inicialmente, apresento a definição schmittiana de “guardião da Constituição”, por oposição a um “senhor e soberano da Constituição”, comparando-a com as teses de Adrian Vermeule sobre o “constitucionalismo de otimização”. Em seguida utilizo esses conceitos para discutir as teses de Schmitt sobre a função do presidente do Reich como guardião da Constituição; a defesa de uma (...) postura de auto-restrição judicial no exame judicial de constitucionalidade das leis; e sua crítica à “judicialização da política”. Por fim, utilizo essas teses para discutir a função do Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro e questionar seu status de “guardião da Constituição”. (shrink)

Apresentaremos as possíveis aplicações pedagógicas das suas reflexões, como a utilização da imprecisão científica de Heisenberg e da concepção de técnica em Heidegger, a partir da análise histórico-filosófica dos seus escritos, tomando-os como fundamentação a necessária e significativa melhoria da educação técnico-científica.