At present, the science of consciousness is structured around the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. One of the alleged advantages of the NCCs framework is its metaphysical neutrality—the fact that it begs no contested questions with respect to debates about the fundamental nature of consciousness. Here, we argue that even if the NCC framework is metaphysically neutral, it is structurally committed, for it presupposes a certain model—what we call the Lite-Brite model—of consciousness. This, we argue, represents a serious (...) liability for the NCC framework for the plausibility of the Lite-Brite model is very much an open question, and the science of consciousness would be better served by a framework that does not presuppose it. Drawing on interventionist ideas in the philosophy of science, we suggest that the Difference-Maker framework can provide just such an alternative. Instead of searching for the neural correlates of consciousness, we ought to be searching for the difference makers of consciousness. We detail how a shift to searching DMCs will change both the practice of consciousness science and the interpretation of existing results. (shrink)

McGinn's latest brings together moral philosophy and literary analysis in a way that illuminates both. Setting out to enrich the domain of moral reflection by showing the value of literary texts as sources of moral illumination, McGinn starts by setting out an uncompromisingly realist ethical theory, arguing that morality is an area of objective truth and genuine knowledge. He goes on to address such subjects as the nature of goodness, evil character, and the meaning of monstrosity in the context of (...) an aesthetic theory of virtue, which maintains that goodness of character is the same thing as beauty of soul. Looking at such literary works as Billy Budd, Lolita, The Picture of Dorian Gray, and Frankenstein, as well as examples from film and painting, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction is an original and compelling book by a leading philosopher who is also a critic and novelist. (shrink)

How does Descartes characterize the peculiar way in which each of us is aware of our bodies? I argue that Descartes recognizes a sense of bodily ownership, such that the body sensorily appears to be one's own in bodily awareness. This sensory appearance of ownership is ubiquitous, for Descartes, in that bodily awareness always confers a sense of ownership. This appearance is confused, in so far as bodily awareness simultaneously represents the subject as identical to, partially composed by, and united (...) to her body, without distinguishing these relations. Finally, the appearance of ownership is grounded in multiple other ways in which the body sensorily appears: namely, in the fact that the body appears to be inescapable, modified by bodily sensations, and an object of special concern. (shrink)

The demise of behaviorism has made ethologists more willing to ascribe mental states to animals. However, a methodology that can avoid the charge of excessive anthropomorphism is needed. We describe a series of experiments that could help determine whether the behavior of nonhuman animals towards dead conspecifics is concept mediated. These experiments form the basis of a general point. The behavior of some animals is clearly guided by complex mental processes. The techniques developed by comparative psychologists and behavioral ecologists are (...) able to provide us with the tools to critically evaluate hypotheses concerning the continuity between human minds and animal minds. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the work of Emmanuel Levinas, widely recognized as one of the most important yet difficult philosophers of the 20th century. In this much-needed introduction, Davis unpacks the concepts at the centre of Levinas's thought - alterity, the Other, the Face, infinity - concepts which have previously presented readers with major problems of interpretation. Davis traces the development of Levinas's thought over six decades, describing the context in which he worked, (...) and the impact of his writings. He argues that Levinas's work remains tied to the ontological tradition with which he wants to break, and demonstrates how his later writing tries to overcome this dependency by its increasingly disruptive, sometimes opaque, textual practice. He discusses Levinas's theological writings and his relationship to Judaism, as well as the reception of his work by contemporary thinkers, arguing that the influence of his work has led to a growing interest in ethical issues among poststructuralist and postmodernist thinkers in recent years. Comprehensive and clearly written, this book will be essential reading for students and researchers in continental philosophy, French studies, literary theory and theology. (shrink)

Public policies designed to regulate the use of information technology to protect personal data have been based on different theoretical assumptions in different states, depending on whether the problem is defined in technological, civil libertarian, or bureaucratic terms. However, the rapid development, dispersal, and decentralization of information technology have facilitated a range of new surveillance practices that have in turn rendered the approaches of the 1960s and 1970s obsolete. The networking of the postindustrial state will require a reconceptualization of the (...) dynamic relationship between organizational practices and information technology and a more comprehensive appreciation of the privacy problem. With the call for the development of a more coherent information policy in a number of countries, there is evidence that policymakers have been taking this more holistic view. (shrink)

Many people believe that there is a Dutch Book argument establishing that the principle of countable additivity is a condition of coherence. De Finetti himself did not, but for reasons that are at first sight perplexing. I show that he rejected countable additivity, and hence the Dutch Book argument for it, because countable additivity conflicted with intuitive principles about the scope of authentic consistency constraints. These he often claimed were logical in nature, but he never attempted to relate this idea (...) to deductive logic and its own concept of consistency. This I do, showing that at one level the definitions of deductive and probabilistic consistency are identical, differing only in the nature of the constraints imposed. In the probabilistic case I believe that R.T. Cox's ‘scale-free’ axioms for subjective probability are the most suitable candidates. 1 Introduction 2 Coherence and Consistency 3 The Infinite Fair Lottery 4 The Puzzle Resolved—But Replaced by Another 5 Countable Additivity, Conglomerability and Dutch Books 6 The Probability Axioms and Cox's Theorem 7 Truth and Probability 8 Conclusion: ‘Logical Omniscience’ CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In this paper we1 assess the potential for research on nonhuman animals to address questions about the phenomenology of painful experiences. Nociception, the basic capacity for sensing noxious stimuli, is widespread in the animal kingdom. Even rel- atively primitive animals such as leeches and sea slugs possess nociceptors, neurons that are functionally specialized for sensing noxious stimuli (Walters 1996). Vertebrate spinal cords play a sophisticated role in processing and modulating nociceptive signals, providing direct control of some motor responses to noxious (...) stimuli, and a basic capacity for Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning (Grau et al. 1990; Grau 2002). Higher brain systems provide additional layers of association, top-down control, and cognition. In humans, at least, these higher brain systems also give rise to the conscious experiences that are characteristic of pain. What can be said about the experiences of other animals who possess nervous systems that are similar but not identical to humans? (shrink)

Key Concepts for Understanding Curriculum is an invaluable guide for all involved in curriculum matters. Originally published in 1992, and then re-released as two volumes, the third edition returns to a single volume and includes 21 key topics in the field. The topics comprise the latest trends and issues written in Marsh's clear and accessible style, and are an important source of material for an international readership at every level. The book is divided into six sections including: curriculum planning and (...) development; curriculum management; teaching perspectives; collaborative involvement in curriculum; and curriculum ideology. In this third edition many of the latest curriculum trends and issues are included such as standards-based frameworks, using technology in teaching and learning modes, standards based reforms, and politics of decision-making. (shrink)

Are spheres multiply realizable? A venerable tradition implies that they are. Putnam’s discussion of the peg and holes (in [Putnam, 1975]) is often taken to show that all volumetric shape properties are multiply realizable . The argument runs: (a) physics is the science of the “ultimate constituents” (Putnam’s phrase) of matter, and so (b) physics can only track the behavior of each of the simple constituents of a particular system, but (c) tediously tracking individual particles doesn’t make for a very (...) good explanation, so (d) there must be an explanation outside of physics that does talk about shape, and that we should prefer because it abstracts away from the micro-level details of particular spheres. (shrink)

So van Leeuwen prints the lines, following Cobet and Meineke in athetizing 16. Nor is it difficult to find grounds for the exclusion; τòν πο is repeated at 47; the following three words smell of the scholiast; the last three resemble the end of 13. The line taken as a whole seems to play little if any role, and indeed to lack meaning, even if line 47 is some way away and it is a little odd that the three separate (...) elements meld into a perfectly acceptable comic trimeter . Conjectures are not lacking for the replacement of κ τν ρνων by something which gives more sense; Köchly's νθρωποσ ποτ' ὢν may be taken as typical in both meaning and style. (shrink)

Logical consequence is the relation that obtains between premises and conclusion(s) in a valid argument. Orthodoxy has it that valid arguments are necessarily truth-preserving, but this platitude only raises a number of further questions, such as: how does the truth of premises guarantee the truth of a conclusion, and what constraints does validity impose on rational belief? This volume presents thirteen essays by some of the most important scholars in the field of philosophical logic. The essays offer ground-breaking new insights (...) into the nature of logical consequence; the relation between logic and inference; how the semantics and pragmatics of natural language bear on logic; the relativity of logic; and the structural properties of the consequence relation. (shrink)

Fairclough’s (1992) model of critical discourse analysis can be used to show how corporate social responsibility, stakeholder identity and the social relations between organisations and stakeholders are socially constructed in the social and environmental reports prepared by companies. An example from doctoral work-in-progress is provided. Preliminary findings suggest the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies construct corporate social responsibility as functionalist and economically-based. Stakeholders, rather than equal partners, are pacified and persuaded to Shell’s understandings about corporate social responsibility.

In this study of the nature of philosophy, Colin McGinn shows us how philosophy can maintain its connection to the past while looking forward to a bright future.

Although dignity figures prominently in modern ethical discourse, and in the writings of moral and political philosophers writing today, we still lack a clear account of how the concept of dignity might be implicated in various forms of moral reasoning. This essay tries to make progress on two fronts. First, it attempts to clarify the possible roles the concept of dignity might play in moral discourse, with particular reference to Hart's distinction between positive and critical morality. Second, it offers a (...) new typology of dignity concepts and mobilizes it to, on the one hand, criticize some familiar construals of and, on the other, to advertise the possible virtues of an unfamiliar way of thinking about dignity as a moral concept. (shrink)

Three experiments investigated two timed implicit tests of memory—word reading and color naming. Using the study–test procedure, Experiments 1 and 2 showed that studied words caused reliable facilitation in word reading but no interference in color naming relative to unstudied words. Indeed, there was a small amount of facilitation in color naming as well. Experiment 3 further explored the color naming task by alternating shorter study and test intervals and adding control trials consisting of letter strings. Although both studied and (...) unstudied words showed interference relative to the control letter strings, the amounts of interference they showed did not differ. Overall, word reading consistently displayed facilitation whereas color naming never exhibited increased interference due to word priming. Priming appears to be process-specific: It is restricted to facilitating repetition of processing previously applied to a stimulus and does not extend to influencing performance on a different task involving the same studied materials. (shrink)

In this entry, the authors outline the goals of a "dynamic reference work", and explain how the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has been designed to achieve those goals.

The great Roman historian Livy describes a radical attempt at conflict resolution in his version of the story of the Horatii. The warring cities of Rome and Alba agree to settle their differences by pitting two sets of triplets against each other in a battle to the death. Two of the Roman champions, the Horatii, are killed, but the remaining brother wins the day for his city. In a further twist, he then goes on to kill his sister when he (...) finds her grieving for one of the dead Alban brothers, to whom she was betrothed. Although guilty of a dreadful crime, by the will of the people the murderer is spared because of his services to the state. In the version of the story dramatized by the seventeenth-century French playwright Pierre Corneille, it is rather the Roman king who saves the surviving Horatius by deeming that his heroism places him above the law. This article considers whether the interests of the state can offset private crimes, as appears to be the case in the versions of the story told by both Livy and Corneille; and it concludes by referring to Livy's continuation of the story, which shows the resolution of the conflict to be short-lived. (shrink)

Frege famously claimed that logic is the science of truth: “To discover truths is the task of all science; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth”. But just like the other foundational concept of set, truth at that time was intimately associated with paradox; in the case of truth, the Liar paradox. The set-theoretical paradoxes had their teeth drawn by being recognised as reductio proofs of assumptions that had seemed too obvious to warrant stating explicitly, but were (...) now seen to be substantive, and more importantly inconsistent. Tarski includes the Liar paradox in his classic discussion of the concept of truth, and developed it, in the form of his famous theorem on the undefinability of truth, as a reductio of the assumption that a language could be semantically closed, in the sense of being able to contain its own truth-predicate. Frege famously claimed that logic is the science of truth: “To discover truths is the task of all science; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth”. But just like the other foundational concept of set, truth at that time was intimately associated with paradox; in the case of truth, the Liar paradox. The set-theoretical paradoxes had their teeth drawn by being recognised as reductio proofs of assumptions that had seemed too obvious to warrant stating explicitly, but were now seen to be substantive, and more importantly inconsistent. Tarski includes the Liar paradox in his classic discussion of the concept of truth, and developed it, in the form of his famous theorem on the undefinability of truth, as a reductio of the assumption that a language could be semantically closed, in the sense of being able to contain its own truth-predicate. (shrink)

Richard Moon's The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression is an insightful and comprehensive study of the right to freedom of expression in Canadian constitutional law. Moon begins by stressing the importance of the distinction between freedom of expression as a moral or political ideal and as a constitutional right. The former certainly informs the latter. But the general structure of constitutional adjudication will also play an important role in determining how these issues are resolved and this may, in turn, (...) influence our understanding of the right as a moral and political ideal. Moon focuses on the most important Canadian freedom of expression decisions which cover a wide range of topics from the regulation of racist expression and pornography to access to state and private property. (shrink)

Frege famously claimed that logic is the science of truth: “To discover truths is the task of all science; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth”. But just like the other foundational concept of set, truth at that time was intimately associated with paradox; in the case of truth, the Liar paradox. The set-theoretical paradoxes had their teeth drawn by being recognised as reductio proofs of assumptions that had seemed too obvious to warrant stating explicitly, but were (...) now seen to be substantive, and more importantly inconsistent. Tarski includes the Liar paradox in his classic discussion of the concept of truth, and developed it, in the form of his famous theorem on the undefinability of truth, as a reductio of the assumption that a language could be semantically closed, in the sense of being able to contain its own truth-predicate. Frege famously claimed that logic is the science of truth: “To discover truths is the task of all science; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth”. But just like the other foundational concept of set, truth at that time was intimately associated with paradox; in the case of truth, the Liar paradox. The set-theoretical paradoxes had their teeth drawn by being recognised as reductio proofs of assumptions that had seemed too obvious to warrant stating explicitly, but were now seen to be substantive, and more importantly inconsistent. Tarski includes the Liar paradox in his classic discussion of the concept of truth, and developed it, in the form of his famous theorem on the undefinability of truth, as a reductio of the assumption that a language could be semantically closed, in the sense of being able to contain its own truth-predicate. (shrink)

Separated from its anchorage in religion, ethics has followed the social sciences in seeing human beings as fundamentally characterized by self-interest, so that altruism is either naively idealistic or arrogantly self-sufficient. Colin Grant contends that, as a modern secular concept, altruism is a parody on the self-giving love of Christianity, so that its dismissal represents a social levelling that loses the depths that theology makes intelligible and religion makes possible. The Christian affirmation is that God is characterized by self-giving (...) love, then expected of Christians. Lacking this theological background, the focus on self-interest in sociobiology and economics, and on human realism in the political focus of John Rawls or the feminist sociability of Carol Gilligan, finds altruism naive or a dangerous distraction from real possibilities of mutual support. This book argues that to dispense with altruism is to dispense with God and with the divine transformation of human possibilities. (shrink)

By an argument form I shall mean a schema consisting of a string of symbols that are place-­‐holders for either logical terms or non-­‐logical (descriptive/content) terms: substituting terms of the appropriate kind for the symbols yields an argument. A substitution instance of an argument form is an argument that arises as a result of such a substitution. By a valid argument I shall mean an argument such that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. (...) Thus, an invalid argument is an argument such that it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. (shrink)

This lucidly written book looks at the interpretative audacity of five major "overreaders"—Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Emmanuel Levinas, Slavoj Žižek and Stanley Cavell—and asks what is at stake and what is to be gained by their ...